Amphibious warfare through marines or brigades raised for amphibious warfare should have been the focus instead of defence of east lies in the west philosophy. The use of air cavalry by acquisition of UH-1s since the road network wasn’t vast. 1 infantry division and 1 PAF Squadron weren’t enough. Should have been 3 for both forces, with an expanding role for Navy through gun boats. M-113s with RR, mortar, and other roles would have served better instead of deploying M-24 Chaffee. The mobility factor of M-113 always has an edge and could have put a good defence against PT-76 and the few T-55 when equipped with RR. Heavy mortar 120mm or 81 mm could have proved decisive where howitzers could not reach in time. Thus instead of building static defences which were by passed by Indian Army, a more mobile force could have played a crucial role. Jeeps were lighter but needed boats to be ferried across riverine, swamps, nullahs, lakes and streams. Heavy logistics had to be hauled on roads.
Logistical and mobility factors through UH-1s and M-113. Study of Vietnam war was imperative.
