The battle of Hussainiwala and Qaiser I Hind - The 1971 War

[Jackdaws]

East and WP are about are not as diverse as what Punjab would be from Tamil Nadu in India.

You did not build institutions which are meant to be neutral which would have kept your country together. Modi bhakts and the daft RSS duffers don't realize it - but India's institutions were built because of the vision of Nehru. No lopsided development. Neutral election commission. He even gave a fillip to the Opposition parties so that there would be a democratic tradition in India. And now somehow we in India have managed to get the opposite of Nehru in office.

 

[Tps43]

The battle of Hussainiwala and Qaiser I Hind

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I was searching oxford university press website and I came across a book named “The battle of Hussainiwala and Qaiser I Hind” by Lt col Habib Ahmad. The book is a detailed account of actions by the 106 brigade of Pakistan army in the battle of Hussainiwala in west Pakistan in 1971 when East Pakistan was slipping away from West Pakistan. Since the topic of 1971 is very close to my heart, I immediately ordered the book and when the book arrived I sat down to read the book.


The book was written decades after the battle of Hussainiwala and has firsthand account of actions taken by soldiers of 41st Baloch (under 106 Brigade) against the Indian oldest 15th Punjab (formerly 1st Patiala) regiment to capture Hussainiwala salient and qaiser I Hind tower, when the hostilities started at the western theater in 1971. Although the book was written to commemorate the bravery of soldiers of newly raised 41st Baloch (under 106 brigade) under author’s command however there is a brief commentary on Pakistan ruling elite, military high command and Bangalis.


The start of the book captures the political alienation in East Pakistan and overwhelming realization among the concerned Pakistanis that east Pakistan was slipping away. He penned down some of the pleasant memories from his stay in East Pakistan before 1971 war. He praised Bangalis for being simple, educated and loving people and blamed Pakistani ruling elite for the unrest in east Pakistan He also shows disdain towards the casual behavior of Yahya Khan towards the whole situation. In next chapter, he sheds light on raising of 41st Baloch and training. Next chapters are detailed account of operational planning, military drills and reconnaissance of the operation areas employing many tactics. The final chapters are dedicated to the minute details of actions of tenacious soldiers of 106 brigade under his command, capture of hussainiwala and surrender in east Pakistan.


The author believed that even after the civil unrest in east Pakistan there was a way for Pakistan to solve the problem politically instead of a military operation. He mentions officers of Pakistani military who resigned when asked to start a military crackdown in east Pakistan. Despite all that he believed that there was a way to avoid embarrassing surrender in 1971. When the situation reached to dangerous point of no return his consistent frustration with the high command on not to initiate attack on India is visible in his book.


If I may summarize the reasons according to the author why we lost east Pakistan, those would be,

1. Failure to transfer due political power to the people of east Pakistan after a fair and free election where Mujib won a landslide victory and a history of neglecting bangalis for their rights since 1947

2. A brutal military crackdown in east Pakistan to quell civil unrest and targeting students and intellectuals creating a sphere of fear and genocide

3. Inability of Yahya Khan, Abdul Majid Khan and his cohorts to launch pre-emptive strikes from western theater despite knowing India’s hand in sending guerrilla fighters to east Pakistan

4. Half-heartedly attacking India from west Pakistan at 3rd December while India had already invaded at 26th November

5. Despite the claim of “Defense of the east lies in defense of the west” military high command did not utilize the resources available to it in west Pakistan to mount an offensive. For example, 5 divisions or more under the command of Tikka Khan were kept out of action during the whole war

6. Inability of AK Niazi to hold the Dacca when he had ample men and weapon at his disposal

7. The frequent change of military plans during the war which led to the confusion and frustration among the commanders

8. Presence of people in armed forces who poisoned the ears of top brass against the most diligent commanders and presented wrong pictures of the pertaining situations

Some personal observation,

· While the offensive on Hussainiwala was planned months before the actual attack however author did not mention role of air force during the whole operation

· Indian airforce extensively strafed and bombed Pakistani forces while Pakistan airforce was absent from the action and ground forces were left to fend off using their automatics

· Author praised the bravery of Indian soldiers, especially machine gunners positioned at tower of Qaiser I hind citadel which never stopped fighting until one tank silenced them forever. The Sikh soldier who hid while Pakistani army was all around yet moved forward and disabled advancing Pakistani tank

· While the author did a tremendous job of achieving his goal however it seemed that he had no plan in place for the fall back if things didn’t go according to the plan


While I personally believe that Pakistan army had a thin chance to save east Pakistan from becoming a new country owning to the fact that we were outnumbered and had not aerial and land route available for logistics and supply lines, what do you think were the potential steps that could have saved us from the surrender?

Some many nice points

 

[Indus Pakistan]

East and WP are about are not as diverse as what Punjab would be from Tamil Nadu in India.

It's not only about diversity alone. I want you think about the birth of USA in 1778. Brother fought brother, New York fought York, New London fought London, Englishman fought Englishman. There was zero diversity because they literally were the same. Why? There was 5,000 miles of Atlantic Ocean.

Your comparison with Punjab and Tamil Nadu does not hold water for the simple reason that all the space inbetween is India. Meaning this is one contigous India. The prpblem with EP was beyond the diversity between the two poles there was huge geographic distance. WP and EP were not contigous. 1,200 miles with India inbetween. By sea it was 2,500 miles. That is same distance between UK and Istanbul, Turkey.

 

[Joe Shearer]

In my view when the British drew the borders they knew that both west and East Pakistan would one day part ways.It would have been difficult adhere to the wishes of both the wings. I agree with @Indus Pakistan that if it was not east then it would have been west Pakistan that would have cried discrimination.

It was nothing to do with the British. This was the doing of Jinnah and the leaders of the Congress, especially Nehru and Patel, propelled by that mischief monger, Shyama Prasad Mukherjee. Suhrawardy, Netaji's brother, Sarat Chandra Bose, and Kiron Shankar Roy, were all three of them agreed on avoiding a partition of Bengal, and on striking out on their own, Jinnah had thrown up his hands in frustration, but Nehru and Patel called Bose to Delhi, read him the riot act, and that was that.

 

[Jackdaws]

It's not only about diversity alone. I want you think about the birth of USA in 1778. Brother fought brother, New York fought York, New London fought London, Englishman fought Englishman. There was zero diversity because they literally were the same. Why? There was 5,000 miles of Atlantic Ocean.

Your comparison with Punjab and Tamil Nadu does not hold water for the simple reason that all the space inbetween is India. Meaning this is one contigous India. The prpblem with EP was beyond the diversity between the two poles there was huge geographic distance. WP and EP were not contigous. 1,200 miles with India inbetween. By sea it was 2,500 miles. That is same distance between UK and Istanbul, Turkey.

That is true. Geographical contiguity too matters.

 

[PAR 5]

Any body part that is not connected to the main body is bound to wither away sooner or later. East Pakistan never could have been and I'm glad it became Bangladesh albeit in a violent way

 

[Pakistani E]

While I personally believe that Pakistan army had a thin chance to save east Pakistan from becoming a new country owning to the fact that we were outnumbered and had not aerial and land route available for logistics and supply lines, what do you think were the potential steps that could have saved us from the surrender?

In my opinion, the Pakistan Army lost the war with India before it even began. As far as I am concerned, what kept the Eastern wing with West Pakistan was the unity of purpose and belief in the state. When that state, rightly or wrongly, failed to uphold it's end of the bargain, there was no way on earth that the military could have held on to East Pakistan with the following factors in play:

- Logistics nightmare (i.e distance from base restricts route of reinforcements, supplies etc)
- No political or minimal support from elements within East Pakistan. You cannot defeat an insurgency simply through military means if it has widespread support. What would we have replaced the system with if we had won? Ban all existing parties there except the ones which are Pro West Pakistan. In that case, we're back to square one.
- No popular support (Yes, I understand that a significant minority of people in East Bengal still supported the army, but we lost the support of the majority.) In that case, it became a sort of an occupation in hostile territory amongst a sea of hostile populace, being helped by a nation surrounding you from all sides.
- We did not have enough troops to establish control over all major populations centres and countryside to prevent insurgents from interacting with the local people. Cutting off interactions between insurgents and the people is critical to winning a guerilla war.
- Deny insurgents bases and destroy their supply lines. Once again, we simply did not have enough of a security apparatus to secure this both inside and outside (Read India) areas that were being used by insurgents for supply, recuperating, funding and recruitment etc.

In a nutshell, the moment India got involved, the war was lost. At least in my opinion. Now, could the whole war had been avoided if West Pakistanis had agreed with the demands from Mujeeb? You know, although I am one of those who says we started off as unjust in the war, I also believe that Mujeeb was too rigid in his demands and expectations. And for fear of making this post too long, and having the benefit of hindsight, I will conclude by saying that I feel that if Mujeeb's demands been met, the resentment against East Pakistanis would have in turn grown in West Pakistan.

The nature of his leadership after independence, and that of his daughter, tell me that he believed in a very undemocratic and authoritarian style of rule himself. Again, this is mere conjecture, but what happened in 1971 was inevitable, I just wish it didn't have to be in such a bloody way.

 

[Indus Pakistan]

Any body part that is not connected to the main body is bound to wither away sooner or later.

Think of the Anglo Saxon father and his children. Australia, New Zealand, USA, Canada. The children 'withered away' from the father ~ Britain. Why? The geographic distance.

These are same people, same genes, same language, same religion, same culture. Literally brothers from the same parent but time and space divided them.

 

[Signalian]

4. Half-heartedly attacking India from west Pakistan at 3rd December while India had already invaded at 26th November

The date of attack is not the only point that gives most pain. Where was 1st Armored Div, where was 6th Armored Div ? Pakistan Army waited for Indian Army to launch its armor and Indians waited for Pakistan to launch theirs. Both Armies kept their armored formations as strategic reserves.

 

[Cuirassier]

The date of attack is not the only point that gives most pain. Where was 1st Armored Div, where was 6th Armored Div ? Pakistan Army waited for Indian Army to launch its armor and Indians waited for Pakistan to launch theirs. Both Armies kept their armored formations as strategic reserves.

On 12th December our Mirages took some photos from recce ops in the planned axis of our II Corps offensive (ahead of Fazilka towards Bathinda), which revealed the Indians already had amassed significant armour.

Our paralyzed high command had given away too much time in 'suspension of action', and with no element of surprise left, any retaliatory large scale offensive had low chances of success.

There's a simplicity to war.
Dare, and the world yields.

 

[GriffinsRule]

Things have changed a lot.
He who controls the air controls the land.
Pakistan showed its metal as a united nation on the 26tb feb onwards. India knew and never came back

They will come back better prepared. We need to be ready