PARIKRAMA
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an interesting read
SAM tactical limitations
One limitation is a radar horizon. Since surface of the Earth is curved, aircraft beyond some distance will be hidden by the planet itself. If we take aircraft altitude to be 10 meters, 93KK Osa with 4,2 meter mast will detect it at distance of 21 kilometer, Buk with 21 meter mast will detect it at distance of 32 kilometers and S-400 with 40 meter mast will detect it at 40 kilometers. If aircraft is at altitude of 30 meters, then Osa will detect it at distance of 31 kilometer, Buk will detect it at distance of 41 kilometer and S-400 will detect it at distance of 49 kilometers. Nominal missile ranges are and up to 15 kilometers for Osa, up to 50 kilometers for Buk and up to 400 kilometers for S-400, meaning that neither Buk or S-400 will make use of their longest-ranged missiles.
Another issue are terrain obstacles. Radio waves are disrupted or stopped by solid objects, which means that radars are typically positioned at high vantage points, making them easier to find. This also means that aircraft can use terrain to hide from detection even at relatively short ranges. While this leaves it in danger of MANPADS and optically-aimed AAA, it is a viable tactic for heavily armored CAS aircraft. Not so for thin-skinned fast jets and “attack” helicopters – former take damage too easily, while latter can pull no more than 3 g and cannot be anywhere as protected – in terms of armor, system redundancy or countermeasures – as CAS aircraft can. CAS aircraft such as the A-10 are actually ideal for SAM supression due to their resillience to AAA and long loiter time
Even when aircraft is detected, there is an issue of range. A premier Russian SAM S-400 has an engagement range from 3 to 400 kilometers against an aerodynamic target. With air-to-air missiles, effective range is cut to 1/4 if target is attacked from the rear, to 1/2 if target is maneuvering, and every 100 knots of speed advantage cut effective range by 5-25%. Thus (and this is optimistic in this case due to target aircraft having few thousand meters of altitude advantage over SAMs), an S-300 will have an effective range of against a Mach 0,9 (516 kts at 40k ft) Rafale of 128 km if Rafale does not turn away, and 20 km if it does. S-400 will have an effective range of 255 km if Rafale does not turn away and 38 km if it does. If Rafale speeds up to Mach 1,4 (802 kts at 40k ft), then S-400 will have an effective range against a retreating Rafale of only 33 km. This will allow a pair of Rafales to easily play “peek-a-boo” with S-400, with one Rafale acting as a bait and providing targeting info to another Rafale.
Alternatively, Rafales can simply go in, fire ARMs once SAMs lit up, and leave. Issue is that a radar-guided SAM battery will have to give away its position to launch a missile. This means that aircraft attacked can lob an anti-radiation missile before having to begin evasive maneuvers, since SAMs cannot launch as soon as radar is turned on – targeting process will take at least several seconds.
(This tactic is viable for any aircraft, though as it can be seen, good endurance, low-altitude flight characteristics and supercruise are major advantages if present; only fighter aircraft that combine all three are Rafale and upcoming Gripen NG).
In effect, a “circle of death” so engrained in a public psyche when discussing SAM’s is a myth. However, it is used to promote expensive and typically unnecessary systems, such as stealth aircraft, drones and UCAVs.
Mobile radars are not invulnerable either. Most mobile radars can only scan when deployed (static), and need several minutes to either deploy or pack up. While it is technically possible to design a radar that can scan “on the move”, vibrations and unsteady platform will cause problems. This means that, once they give up their position, they are just as vulnerable as any other SAM.
IR MANPADS are a greater threat: since they do not reveal themselves with active emissions, have excellent maneuverability and IR seeker, and being used to typically attack low-altitude aircraft, they leave little time for reaction – this results in a very high (for a SAM) probability of hit. Optically-aimed AAA have the same advantages.
Conclusion
Primary element in surviving a SAM threat is situational awareness. Most aircraft that have been shot down by SAMs have been unaware; if pilots attempted to evade SAMs they were typically successful, especially if SAMs in question were radar-guided. Since most modern fighter aircraft are equipped with missile approach warners – many of them of IR or UV variety – SAM success rate can be expected to be far less than it was in any war previous to Gulf War I.
Most important impact that radar SAMs have is the effort required (or believed to be required) to defeat them.
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The spyder, akash and pantsirs provide a very detailed multilayer protection.. Particularly the pantsirs.. Whose work is a dual mode of defending via guns n missiles.. TBH pantsirs systems actual work is to ensure such terrain hugging CM or ARM are taken out close ranged the most..
As per the read, the capability of an aircraft to fly even at 30m wit a EW suite to jam and infiltrate deep and then locking onto S400 and foxone into it will need a very advanced jet. PAF is a good combination but JF17 or F16 52 are not in the league of Rafale or Gripen NG. Thus the Mar 1 missiles about 100 odd won't be used in a scenario enlisted above which seems to be presenting the best case here.
The situation would change if a far more advanced bird comes into PAF and definitely this job is not for a flanker.. You don't want enemy radar screens lighting up bcz of huge rcs negating terrain hugging type flying..
And pls don't quote a spectra equivalent in PAF or in RuAF or Chinese AF.. That is an advanced piece of tech no doubt.
