Chinese threat looms large
Recently one of the television channels reported that Defence Minister AK Antony had asked the armed forces to be prepared for a two-front war. Lately he has cautioned on China’s Defence Budget, PLA modernisation and burgeoning infrastructure in Tibet, but at the same time he has noted that all this is not a worry. This kind of ambiguous talk on China has become the style and substance of this Government when Chinese assertiveness in respect of India is getting conspicuously sharp.
Of the many stories about Chinese arrogance, two are pointed. The ruling CPC’s official magazine has warned countries on China’s periphery, including India, that it is prepared to go to war to safeguard national interest. The more entertaining story is of a Chinese seminarist who, while in Washington, DC, said that “India was an indisciplined country where plague and leprosy still exist. How a big and dirty country like that could rise so quickly has amazed us.” Taken together, they reflect the astonishing decline in India-China relations when our diplomats who were posted in that country continue to paint a rosy picture.
The operational directive to the services has not come a day too soon and was well timed to coincide with Monday’s Defence Budget which has made no additional provisions for operational enhancement on the China front.
In December 2009, the previous Army Chief, Gen Deepak Kapoor, at a seminar had said that the Army has to be ready to fight on two fronts — Pakistan and China. This created ripples in Pakistan followed by China, both all-weather allies whose strategic collusion is historic. Officers joining the Army were told that while Pakistan is the immediate threat, China is the long term challenge. This threat perception has survived for six decades. One scenario envisioning a joint or simultaneous offensive called ‘Operation Brass Board’ was to have been war-gamed in the late-1980s but its author, Gen K Sundarji, left office before it could be tried out.
During the 1965 India-Pakistan war, the Chinese were expected to keep Indian forces engaged to prevent switching of assets from east to west. A secret cable A-37, sent on October 13, 1966 by US Consul-General William K Hitchcock to the US State Department reported that he had had a conversation with Lt Gen Sam Manekshaw, GoC-in-C Eastern Command, on a flight from New Delhi to Calcutta. He noted that Gen Manekshaw was convinced that the Chinese would not move but the Army Chief, Gen JN Chaudhuri, was not sure. Gen Manekshaw wanted the war to go on for two to three months more (so that forces could be switched). But regrettably India allowed China, through a few “menacing sounds”, to pin down more than 3,00,000 troops.
In the 1971 war, Gen Manekshaw was the Army Chief. India had signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the USSR and operations were launched only when the northern passes were closed. Yet there were apprehensions the Chinese would intervene once hostilities broke out to prevent troop withdrawal from the border. The same Gen Manekshaw who was keen to move troops in 1965 was excessively cautious in 1971 but allowed three Brigades to be withdrawn from the Chinese front. In both wars with Pakistan, China was a constraining factor.
If India-China relations are at the lowest today, China-Pakistan relations have climbed to new heights and there will be more than menacing sounds in the event of conflict. The speed of Chinese defence modernisation is in sharp contrast to India’s lethargic response. The PLA’s first aircraft carrier, Shi Lang, will take to sea four years ahead of schedule at the end of the year and five more will follow in a decade. China’s submarine fleet will reach 100 vessels in the next three to five years and its stealth fighter has been tested. A new anti-ship missile is also reported operational. Technology and fire power at the disposal of the PLA have grown fast and thanks to the Chinese economic miracle, the Defence Budget has been boosted five-fold in the last decade, touching nearly $90 billion though the actual figure could be as high as $150 billion. China has sent a general warning to keep off South China Sea, Taiwan and Tibet.
China has settled land borders with all 14 countries except India. The road and rail infrastructure in Tibet has developed phenomenally with the railway to be extended to Shigatse from Lhasa by 2014 and thence venturing into the Chumbi valley. One third of China’s nuclear and missile arsenal is deployed in Tibet and India is the only country not covered by Beijing’s nuclear ‘No First Use’ policy. China has refused to engage India in nuclear conversations as it does not recognise India’s nuclear weapon power status.
The PLA’s capacity for a military build-up against India has increased five-fold in the last 20 years. Chinese think-tanks have warned India “not to forget 1962” and talked about the difficulty in the bilateral relationship which our diplomats describe as “complex”.
India is no walkover, the PLA knows. That still does not bridge the military capability and infrastructure gap with China. India has been so pre-occupied with Pakistan that Mr Antony put a figure on the decline in modernisation to lagging behind by 15 years. In the late-1980s the Defence Perspective Plan 2000 had recommended narrowing the capacity gap with China, especially on infrastructure. What we do now will be too little, too late.
The Indian Army’s study on ‘Transformation’, which should have been a tri-service defence capability review, has done some useful work. Among other things, it has recommended the formation of a strike command, including an offensive corps for Tibet. Such a capability ought to have been created a decade ago, instead of mollycoddling the Chinese.
The Army Chief, Gen VK Singh, said recently that we are prepared for all contingencies. The ‘Transformation’ idea, which is being examined by an Experts' Group, aims to shift from adversary-specific to capability-based forces, dovetailed into the concept of theatrisation with adequate strike forces. But pause to ponder. India has specific adversaries.
Unless done, Mr Antony must issue an operational directive to the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and individual Service Chiefs to prepare and equip for a two-and-a-half front war which will include a full-blown insurgency. It’s time to prepare and stop hedging the China threat.
The Pioneer :: Home : >> Chinese threat looms large
Recently one of the television channels reported that Defence Minister AK Antony had asked the armed forces to be prepared for a two-front war. Lately he has cautioned on China’s Defence Budget, PLA modernisation and burgeoning infrastructure in Tibet, but at the same time he has noted that all this is not a worry. This kind of ambiguous talk on China has become the style and substance of this Government when Chinese assertiveness in respect of India is getting conspicuously sharp.
Of the many stories about Chinese arrogance, two are pointed. The ruling CPC’s official magazine has warned countries on China’s periphery, including India, that it is prepared to go to war to safeguard national interest. The more entertaining story is of a Chinese seminarist who, while in Washington, DC, said that “India was an indisciplined country where plague and leprosy still exist. How a big and dirty country like that could rise so quickly has amazed us.” Taken together, they reflect the astonishing decline in India-China relations when our diplomats who were posted in that country continue to paint a rosy picture.
The operational directive to the services has not come a day too soon and was well timed to coincide with Monday’s Defence Budget which has made no additional provisions for operational enhancement on the China front.
In December 2009, the previous Army Chief, Gen Deepak Kapoor, at a seminar had said that the Army has to be ready to fight on two fronts — Pakistan and China. This created ripples in Pakistan followed by China, both all-weather allies whose strategic collusion is historic. Officers joining the Army were told that while Pakistan is the immediate threat, China is the long term challenge. This threat perception has survived for six decades. One scenario envisioning a joint or simultaneous offensive called ‘Operation Brass Board’ was to have been war-gamed in the late-1980s but its author, Gen K Sundarji, left office before it could be tried out.
During the 1965 India-Pakistan war, the Chinese were expected to keep Indian forces engaged to prevent switching of assets from east to west. A secret cable A-37, sent on October 13, 1966 by US Consul-General William K Hitchcock to the US State Department reported that he had had a conversation with Lt Gen Sam Manekshaw, GoC-in-C Eastern Command, on a flight from New Delhi to Calcutta. He noted that Gen Manekshaw was convinced that the Chinese would not move but the Army Chief, Gen JN Chaudhuri, was not sure. Gen Manekshaw wanted the war to go on for two to three months more (so that forces could be switched). But regrettably India allowed China, through a few “menacing sounds”, to pin down more than 3,00,000 troops.
In the 1971 war, Gen Manekshaw was the Army Chief. India had signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the USSR and operations were launched only when the northern passes were closed. Yet there were apprehensions the Chinese would intervene once hostilities broke out to prevent troop withdrawal from the border. The same Gen Manekshaw who was keen to move troops in 1965 was excessively cautious in 1971 but allowed three Brigades to be withdrawn from the Chinese front. In both wars with Pakistan, China was a constraining factor.
If India-China relations are at the lowest today, China-Pakistan relations have climbed to new heights and there will be more than menacing sounds in the event of conflict. The speed of Chinese defence modernisation is in sharp contrast to India’s lethargic response. The PLA’s first aircraft carrier, Shi Lang, will take to sea four years ahead of schedule at the end of the year and five more will follow in a decade. China’s submarine fleet will reach 100 vessels in the next three to five years and its stealth fighter has been tested. A new anti-ship missile is also reported operational. Technology and fire power at the disposal of the PLA have grown fast and thanks to the Chinese economic miracle, the Defence Budget has been boosted five-fold in the last decade, touching nearly $90 billion though the actual figure could be as high as $150 billion. China has sent a general warning to keep off South China Sea, Taiwan and Tibet.
China has settled land borders with all 14 countries except India. The road and rail infrastructure in Tibet has developed phenomenally with the railway to be extended to Shigatse from Lhasa by 2014 and thence venturing into the Chumbi valley. One third of China’s nuclear and missile arsenal is deployed in Tibet and India is the only country not covered by Beijing’s nuclear ‘No First Use’ policy. China has refused to engage India in nuclear conversations as it does not recognise India’s nuclear weapon power status.
The PLA’s capacity for a military build-up against India has increased five-fold in the last 20 years. Chinese think-tanks have warned India “not to forget 1962” and talked about the difficulty in the bilateral relationship which our diplomats describe as “complex”.
India is no walkover, the PLA knows. That still does not bridge the military capability and infrastructure gap with China. India has been so pre-occupied with Pakistan that Mr Antony put a figure on the decline in modernisation to lagging behind by 15 years. In the late-1980s the Defence Perspective Plan 2000 had recommended narrowing the capacity gap with China, especially on infrastructure. What we do now will be too little, too late.
The Indian Army’s study on ‘Transformation’, which should have been a tri-service defence capability review, has done some useful work. Among other things, it has recommended the formation of a strike command, including an offensive corps for Tibet. Such a capability ought to have been created a decade ago, instead of mollycoddling the Chinese.
The Army Chief, Gen VK Singh, said recently that we are prepared for all contingencies. The ‘Transformation’ idea, which is being examined by an Experts' Group, aims to shift from adversary-specific to capability-based forces, dovetailed into the concept of theatrisation with adequate strike forces. But pause to ponder. India has specific adversaries.
Unless done, Mr Antony must issue an operational directive to the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and individual Service Chiefs to prepare and equip for a two-and-a-half front war which will include a full-blown insurgency. It’s time to prepare and stop hedging the China threat.
The Pioneer :: Home : >> Chinese threat looms large
