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China's 294 megatons of thermonuclear deterrence

I very well know the difference between fission, fusion and boosted devices and also the nuclear reactions in fission and fusion and even the Carbon cycle in the bigger stars.
What he is unable to understand is that after 1998 a lot of progress has taken place but he is really not capable of understanding that basic info, I think he is suffering from severe iodine deficiency, and thinks tests are conducted before the devices are made. Pakistan has not conducted the nuclear tests after 1998 due to political reasons but that does not mean the capability is not there. Before 1998, Pakistan had the fission device and we just tested at the right time. And now Pakistan does not feel so much need to test the thermonukes because of the validation of our fission device in 1998, cold test and computer simulations. Perhaps you know that a fission device is needed to initiate the fusion process of hydrogen into helium and lithium atoms.

Yes bro I briefly know about multi-stage thermonuclear devices. Remember back in 1998, Pakistan made successful fission weapon tests just within 2 weeks after India did the same? Sure progress since then has been made, no doubt, I am confident that Pakistan can at least maintain this "2 week" gap with India, or even do better! Keep up the good work bros!
 
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There are five levels of thermonuclear warhead technology.

1. Single thermonuclear warhead. China's DF-5A is currently the world's largest at five megatons.
2. MIRVs (multiple warheads)
3. MARVs (maneuverable multiple warheads)
4. AMaRVs (advanced maneuverable multiple warheads)
5. DF-ZF (aka Wu-14) hypersonic glide vehicle resembles an AMaRV with a range of thousands of miles
 
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Thermonuclear war is very complicated

Many people mistakenly think that thermonuclear war is a simple exchange. It is not.

If you can attack Chinese hardened silo-based ICBMs with only inertial guidance, it gives you a tremendous capability and advantage. Ideally, Trident D5s with only inertial guidance would want to wipe out Chinese MIRVed ICBMs. The Holy Grail is to used a MIRVed Trident D5 to destroy multiple Chinese silos. This would prevent a Chinese DF-41 10-MIRVed ICBM from landing on the United States.

However, inertial guidance cannot provide sufficiently accurate guidance. A CEP of 1,250 feet is not good enough against a silo built to withstand 2,000 psi. Super-hardened silos built to withstand 4,000 and 8,000 psi require a direct hit from a 500 kiloton W-88 warhead and GPS guidance.

The situation is further complicated by the likely defense of Chinese Nike-Hercules thermonuclear anti-missile missiles. This will create a temperature inversion and scramble a follow-on incoming inertial-guided warhead.

You also have to worry about megaton-class EMPs being detonated to attack the guidance system of ICBMs.

Added to the mix, you have conventional ground-based interceptors targeting ICBMs.

Furthermore, you have Chinese DF-ZF HGVs that fly flat trajectories and are currently impossible to intercept.

Thermonuclear war is not a simple exchange. The threat of EMPs will force a staged response. It is a complicated dance. Since inertial guidance is not sufficient to destroy hardened silos, this means silos can be reloaded for multiple launches.

I predict the citizens of the United States and China will be thoroughly dead after both sides have unloaded their full thermonuclear arsenals.

Thus, it is surprising to see the US media talk so cavalierly about war with China. A war with China could easily escalate and they are going to find out how powerful the Chinese thermonuclear counter-strike can be.
 
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@Martian2 Do you have info about latest stockpile of thermonuclear warheads, for China, Russia and US respectively?
I remember doing a count of Chinese thermonuclear warheads based on the number of brigades (ie. 12 ICBMs per brigade) at Chinese missile bases. It was about 2,000 thermonuclear warheads.

I could do an estimate of China's DF-41 10-MIRV ICBM, but it would only be an educated guess. We would have to agree on the start date of Chinese DF-41 production. Next, we would have to agree on a conservative minimum estimate of one DF-41 ICBM per month.

As a benchmark, China will launch 19 orbital rockets this year. This means that China's relatively underfunded civilian space program produces the equivalent of 19 ICBMs per year. When you adjust for a significantly larger military budget and the national priority of self defense, two to three new DF-41 ICBMs produced each month seems reasonable.

It's been 3 1/2 years since the first known DF-41 ICBM launch. That's 42 months.

42 x 2 = 84 DF-41 ICBMs (probable lower bound)
42 x 3 = 126 DF-41 ICBMs (probable upper bound)

Assuming an average of 100 DF-41 ICBMs (probable middle estimate) with 10 MIRVs per missile, that's an additional 1,000 thermonuclear warheads.

I would say a reasonable and fair estimate of China's current thermonuclear arsenal is about 3,000. The only caveat is the number of DF-5A ICBMs that have been upgraded to DF-5B 8-MIRVed ICBMs. That would add a few more hundred thermonuclear warheads.

In my previous count, I had already attributed 3 MIRVs to each DF-31A ICBM (which is now called DF-31B).

The last adjustment upward is the number of JL-2 8-MIRVed SLBMs. I think the Chinese Type 094 fleet has expanded from three to five. There is a picture of the fifth Chinese Type 094 SSBN in dry dock about 1 1/2 years ago.

Lastly, you have to keep in mind that the Type 096 Tang SSBN could be undergoing sea trials. There is a lag of a few years before China reveals its latest military hardware. The Type 096 SSBN is expected to carry 18-24 SLBMs with longer range (e.g. possibly JL-3 with 10 MIRVs).

Anyway, I don't keep a precise count because everyone knows China can destroy the United States in a thermonuclear counter-strike.
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The number of Russian and American thermonuclear warheads is inflated by tiny tactical thermonuclear warheads. A more apt comparison is strategic thermonuclear warheads that can launch from one continent to strike another.

When you consider only strategic warheads, the number of thermonuclear warheads between Russia, China, and the US is actually fairly close.

Let's face it, B-52s are not survivable. They're useless in a superpower fight. Non-stealthy and subsonic B-52s really can't deliver their thermonuclear payload. A megaton-class EMP would bring down the entire B-52 fleet.
 
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I remember doing a count of Chinese thermonuclear warheads based on the number of brigades (ie. 12 ICBMs per brigade) at Chinese missile bases. It was about 2,000 thermonuclear warheads.

I could do an estimate of China's DF-41 10-MIRV ICBM, but it would only be an educated guess. We would have to agree on the start date of Chinese DF-41 production. Next, we would have to agree on a conservative minimum estimate of one DF-41 ICBM per month.

As a benchmark, China will launch 19 orbital rockets this year. This means that China's relatively underfunded civilian space program produces the equivalent of 19 ICBMs per year. When you adjust for a significantly larger military budget and the national priority of self defense, two to three new DF-41 ICBMs produced each month seems reasonable.

It's been 3 1/2 years since the first known DF-41 ICBM launch. That's 42 months.

42 x 2 = 84 DF-41 ICBMs (probable lower bound)
42 x 3 = 126 DF-41 ICBMs (probable upper bound)

Assuming an average of 100 DF-41 ICBMs (probable middle estimate) with 10 MIRVs per missile, that's an additional 1,000 thermonuclear warheads.

I would say a reasonable and fair estimate of China's current thermonuclear arsenal is about 3,000. The only caveat is the number of DF-5A ICBMs that have been upgraded to DF-5B 8-MIRVed ICBMs. That would add a few more hundred thermonuclear warheads.

In my previous count, I had already attributed 3 MIRVs to each DF-31A ICBM (which is now called DF-31B).

The last adjustment upward is the number of JL-2 8-MIRVed SLBMs. I think the Chinese Type 094 fleet has expanded from three to five. There is a picture of the fifth Chinese Type 094 SSBN in dry dock about 1 1/2 years ago.

Lastly, you have to keep in mind that the Type 096 Tang SSBN could be undergoing sea trials. There is a lag of a few years before China reveals its latest military hardware. The Type 096 SSBN is expected to carry 18-24 SLBMs with longer range (e.g. possibly JL-3 with 10 MIRVs).

Anyway, I don't keep a precise count because everyone knows China can destroy the United States in a thermonuclear counter-strike.
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The number of Russian and American thermonuclear warheads is inflated by tiny tactical thermonuclear warheads. A more apt comparison is strategic thermonuclear warheads that can launch from one continent to strike another.

When you consider only strategic warheads, the number of thermonuclear warheads between Russia, China, and the US is actually fairly close.

Let's face it, B-52s are not survivable. They're useless in a superpower fight. Non-stealthy and subsonic B-52s really can't deliver their thermonuclear payload. A megaton-class EMP would bring down the entire B-52 fleet.

Thanks bro! I was wondering how many thermonuclear warheads (i.e. "H-bomb") are still active at the moment in US inventory. Can you get info? For Russia or China as well. Not total nuclear stockpile, only thermonuclear warheads.

The following pics were about the last Mk/B53 (yield 9 megaton) being disassembled on 25 October 2011:

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13913275.jpg
 
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Good progress!

By the way, how many thermonuclear warheads (i.e. "H-bomb") are still active at the moment in US/Russia/China inventory?
Russia and the US have thousands, but the number is inflated by small tactical warheads with a low yield. The American W76 is only 100 kilotons. One Chinese DF-5A is five megatons. That means one Chinese DF-5A warhead is equal to 50 Trident I (aka C4) W76 warheads.

Also, the 1.2 megaton American B83 thermonuclear bomb carried by B-52s really shouldn't be counted at all. How are you going to realistically send a subsonic non-stealthy B-52 into China? It'll never reach its target.

We should only really count the Minuteman IIIs (about 400) and the SLBMs.

The B-52s are not survivable. The non-stealthy B-1s are also non-survivable. I have my doubts about a slow-flying subsonic stealthy B-2 that can be brought down by a megaton-class EMP. In any case, the thermonuclear war will be over in 30 minutes. The B-2 won't make any difference.

With respect to the Chinese thermonuclear arsenal, The New York Times usually prints a disclaimer. I remember reading that the Chinese thermonuclear arsenal is unknown (with the explanation after an asterisk).

NTI (ie. Nuclear Threat Initiative) also printed a disclaimer. They said China's arsenal is the "most opaque" of the five acknowledged nuclear powers.
 
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Good progress!

By the way, how many thermonuclear warheads (i.e. "H-bomb") are still active at the moment in US/Russia/China inventory?
There are six things to keep in mind.

1. Russian and American thermonuclear weapons are inflated by tactical nukes (see Federation of American Scientists' citation below).

2. To compare apples to apples, we have to adjust for the difference in yield between tactical and strategic thermonuclear warheads. This normalization can be easily accomplished by comparing overall yield for the different countries. Nuclear Threat Initiative (ie. NTI) provides a rough comparison. I say rough, because NTI's estimate of China's 294 megatons of thermonuclear weapons is about 10-15 years old.

3. Tactical nukes should probably be excluded from consideration altogether. In an all-out nuke war, tactical nukes have insufficient range.

4. Among strategic nuclear weapons, the ones carried by aircraft probably should be excluded from the count too. B-52s, B-1s, and B-2s (susceptible to EMP) are not survivable. Also, refueling tankers are vulnerable to EMPs too.

5. The Federation of American Scientists (ie. FAS) tell you that China's tactical nuke information is "vague and contradictory." It would make more sense if everyone simply agreed that there is little reliable information regarding China's thermonuclear arsenal. No one really knows and the printed estimates are laughable. They are too low and haven't changed since about 1980.

6. The US has always planned to simultaneously nuke Russia and China [see Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP)]. Otherwise, the untouched Russia or China would become the world's dominant superpower. Hence, the US arsenal has to be divided by two. NTI says China has at least 294 megatons. NTI also says the US has 570 megatons. 570/2 = 285 megatons. Looking at the overall megatonnage, China should be able to inflict more damage on the United States.

In any case, after the Russians unload on the US, the US definitely will suffer more damage than China or Russia.
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Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons - Federation Of American Scientists

On9PKfN.jpg
 
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US only has 725 strategic nuclear warheads aimed at China under New START treaty

You've read the misleading mainstream media propaganda. The US has tens of thousands of nuclear warheads. Most of these warheads are tactical and cannot reach China.

Let's talk about strategic nuclear warheads that are capable of hitting China.

The U.S.-Russian New START treaty entered into force on February 5, 2011 (see citation from U.S. Department of State below)..

By the New START treaty deadline of February 5 2018, the U.S. and Russia are each limited to a maximum of 1,550 strategic nuclear warheads (see paragraph two under "Aggregate limits:" in the citation below).

Under the long-standing U.S. SIOP plan (which calls for a simultaneous nuclear strike on Russia and China) and its classified successor, we have to divide the US strategic nuclear arsenal into two halves. Both Russia and China are continental sized. This means the U.S. only has 725 strategic nuclear warheads available under the New START treaty to aim at China.
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New START

VJb4tiz.jpg
 
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US only has 725 strategic nuclear warheads aimed at China under New START treaty

You've read the misleading mainstream media propaganda. The US has tens of thousands of nuclear warheads. Most of these warheads are tactical and cannot reach China.

Let's talk about strategic nuclear warheads that are capable of hitting China.

The U.S.-Russian New START treaty entered into force on February 5, 2011 (see citation from U.S. Department of State below)..

By the New START treaty deadline of February 5 2018, the U.S. and Russia are each limited to a maximum of 1,550 strategic nuclear warheads (see paragraph two under "Aggregate limits:" in the citation below).

Under the long-standing U.S. SIOP plan (which calls for a simultaneous nuclear strike on Russia and China) and its classified successor, we have to divide the US strategic nuclear arsenal into two halves. Both Russia and China are continental sized. This means the U.S. only has 725 strategic nuclear warheads available under the New START treaty to aim at China.
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New START

VJb4tiz.jpg

How does this get enforce? A treaty is all find and dandy but what's stopping each country from producing more nukes than the agreed amount. I find these type of treaties laughable just like I find "rules for war engagement" under Geneva laughable.
 
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How does this get enforce? A treaty is all find and dandy but what's stopping each country from producing more nukes than the agreed amount. I find these type of treaties laughable just like I find "rules for war engagement" under Geneva laughable.
You have to read the U.S. Department of State citation (see below). It explains the verification mechanism of on-site inspections.

I saw a documentary where an American is posted at every Russian ICBM rocket factory. The US counts every Russian ICBM that comes off the production line.

Ronald Reagan always said: "Trust, but verify."
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New START

"Verification and Transparency: The Treaty has a verification regime that combines appropriate elements of the 1991 START Treaty with new elements tailored to the limitations and structure of this Treaty. Verification measures under the Treaty include on-site inspections and exhibitions, data exchanges and notifications related to strategic offensive arms and facilities covered by the Treaty, and provisions to facilitate the use of national technical means for treaty monitoring. To increase confidence and transparency, the Treaty also provides for an annual exchange of telemetry on an agreed number of ICBM and SLBM launches.
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What is the difference between a “Type One” and a “Type Two” inspection?
The New START Treaty provides for 18 on-site inspections per year. There are two basic types of inspections. Type One inspections focus on sites with deployed and non-deployed strategic systems; Type Two inspections focus on sites with only non-deployed strategic systems. Permitted inspection activities include confirming the number of reentry vehicles on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs, confirming numbers related to non-deployed launcher limits, counting nuclear weapons onboard or attached to deployed heavy bombers, confirming weapon system conversions or eliminations, and confirming facility eliminations. Each side is allowed to conduct ten Type One inspections and eight Type Two inspections annually."
 
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You have to read the U.S. Department of State citation (see below). It explains the verification mechanism of on-site inspections.

I saw a documentary where an American is posted at every Russian ICBM rocket factory. The US counts every Russian ICBM that comes off the production line.

Ronald Reagan always said: "Trust, but verify."
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New START

"Verification and Transparency: The Treaty has a verification regime that combines appropriate elements of the 1991 START Treaty with new elements tailored to the limitations and structure of this Treaty. Verification measures under the Treaty include on-site inspections and exhibitions, data exchanges and notifications related to strategic offensive arms and facilities covered by the Treaty, and provisions to facilitate the use of national technical means for treaty monitoring. To increase confidence and transparency, the Treaty also provides for an annual exchange of telemetry on an agreed number of ICBM and SLBM launches.
...
What is the difference between a “Type One” and a “Type Two” inspection?
The New START Treaty provides for 18 on-site inspections per year. There are two basic types of inspections. Type One inspections focus on sites with deployed and non-deployed strategic systems; Type Two inspections focus on sites with only non-deployed strategic systems. Permitted inspection activities include confirming the number of reentry vehicles on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs, confirming numbers related to non-deployed launcher limits, counting nuclear weapons onboard or attached to deployed heavy bombers, confirming weapon system conversions or eliminations, and confirming facility eliminations. Each side is allowed to conduct ten Type One inspections and eight Type Two inspections annually."

Good time for China to produce as much thermonuclear warheads as possible that can destroy both Russia and US.
 
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