What's new

China to build 93,000-ton atomic-powered aircraft carrier

EagleEyes

ADMINISTRATOR
Joined
Oct 3, 2005
Messages
16,774
Reaction score
25
Country
Pakistan
Location
United States
China to build 93,000-ton atomic-powered aircraft carrier: source

Vessel to be on par with latest U.S. carrier, according to data

China has been pushing ahead with construction of a mega-sized nuclear-powered aircraft carrier to be completed in 2020, according to a Chinese Communist Party's dossier.

A source close to Chinese military affairs said on March 27 that China has been promoting the construction of a 93,000-ton atomic-powered carrier under a plan titled the "085 Project." The nation also has a plan to build a 48,000-ton non-nuclear-powered carrier under the so-called "089 Project," added the source.

The source made such remarks based on government a dossier that reveals that China’s Central Military Commision recently approved the two projects. The dossier also contained specifications of the aircraft carriers.

China had so far been known to be pushing ahead with construction of a non-nuclear-powered carrier, but not an atomic-powered one.

Once the proposed Chinese carriers are deployed, the radius of the Chinese Navy’s range is expected to reach Guam, where a U.S. base is located. Thus, military experts are worried about China’s moves prompting an arms race in Northeast Asia.

The dossier said the construction of the nuclear-powered carrier will be completed in 2020. China State Shipbuiling Corp’s Jiangnan shipyard located on Changxing Island near Shanghai, will be responsible for its design and construction. The size is similar to former Soviet’s unfinished atomic-powered carrier Ulyanovsk, the dossier states. China reportedly secretly purchased the design of Ulyanovsk from Russia. When the nuclear-powered carrier is finished, China will own an aircraft carrier which is on par with the U.S.’s newest of such vessels, the 97,000-ton atomic-powered USS Ronald Reagan, which recently docked at Busan Port to participate in a joint exercise between the South Korean and U.S. militaries.

According to the dossier, China plans to construct a non-atomic-powered carrier as a transition stage to building the larger nuclear-powered one. The non-atomic-powered carrier, due to be completed in 2010, will be a mid-sized carrier with a standard displacement of 48,000 tons and a full-load displacement of 64,000 tons and will be able to carry 30-40 Chinese-built J-10 fighters, which China fielded in December last year. The Chinese authorities are reportedly overhauling J-10 fighters to be loaded onto the new aircraft carriers. Until the work is complete, the new carriers are going to handle 10-20 Russian-made Su-33 fighters.

The non-nuclear-powered carrier is reported to be a revised version of Ukraine’s Varyag, which China purchased in 1998. A shipyard in Dalian is in charge of its design and construction. After the new carrier is completed, Varyag will be used for military training only.

Remarks made by Zhang Yunchuan, Minister of the Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense, to reporters after the National People’s Congress (NPC) on March 16 - "The construction of an aircraft carrier with China-developed technology will be completed by 2010" - support the dossier’s information as reported by the source.

A general-ranked official at South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense said, "China’s plan to push ahead with construction of atomic-powered aircraft carrier has not been widely known. However, it is sufficiently to predict that the nation will ultimately pursue the ownership of such a vessel."

http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/199284.html
 
In China,a vehement argumentation has lasted for over ten years on the project of aircraft carrier,but all agreed to tarin crew to possible carriers from the begining.

Hujingtao,the chairman of Chinese Central military commission made a reelection of its committee members as many as 21 last year,more naval officers were brought in according to the renewed policy of emphasis on naval development.and consequently opinion of necessary aricraft carriers has come into majority.

now it's no longer a subject whether build it or not,the Chinese govt. never announced their decision though.
 
There is nothing wrong with China building up aircraft carriers. It is a must for China, since Indian Navy will probably have around 4 aircraft carriers in the future, and that may be a threat to Chinas pearl of string strategy.
 
China is not building carriers now. The above report is wrong.

Could be bias coz you can't hide a reverse engeneerd Varyag kind of project without US spy sats spotting it at some point.

But I'm a supporter of strong China and like webby said having AC Carriers is a must for China or any other super power.
Hope they build a good fleet of atleast 10 vessels.:ChinaFlag:
 
There are many more reasons. This report is wrong. At present China does not plan to build AC. It may in the future, however not at this stage.
 
There are many more reasons. This report is wrong. At present China does not plan to build AC. It may in the future, however not at this stage.

just like J-10; they will tell you about the aircraft carrier when its floating in an Indian ocean.
 
Forget abt the nuke carrier ...

I wonder who is going to supply gas turbines for China's midget carrier ....??

Its a tech few nations possess and China is still under arms embargo frm EU and US..

..even russia may not help here because PLAN's AC will be a potent threat to all nations in fareast including russia .
 
In China,a vehement argumentation has lasted for over ten years on the project of aircraft carrier,but all agreed to tarin crew to possible carriers from the begining.

now it's no longer a subject whether build it or not,the Chinese govt. never announced their decision though.

Exactly!!

There was such an argument in the first place because china has to build the AC from the scratch as it cant get help from other nations ...
they also have to put a tremendous amount of effort and money in it..

thats why people in china were debating whether such an effort is worth it...

am i right..??
 
Here is an interesting article about China's ambitions for getting a carrier know that they purchased 3 Ex-USSR carriers (the local companies), and that PLAN, technical and architect people also inspected these. It's dated 2004 but gives a good idea, I suggest before commenting you read the whole article, also designing it wouldn't be a problem, since they also acquired a Australian carrier with it's deck intact and not so old carriers from Russia.

Also, know that China isn't purchasing in the future Naval Air Craft for nothing you know!

..even russia may not help here because PLAN's AC will be a potent threat to all nations in fareast including russia .

China is also doing R&D on engines just like they did with their subs, also know Ukraine might also help out, and know that Russia might as well they need the money, we seen what happened with JF-17 right? Trust me a carrier engine willn't be a problem.

China's aircraft carrier ambitions: seeking truth from rumors

Naval War College Review
2004
by Ian Storey,

Some reports suggest that China plans to refit one or more aircraft carriers from the former Soviet Union or other countries. Others claim that China has investigated the possibility of buying a light aircraft carrier from a European shipbuilder. Other reports suggest China has already made the decision to build two or three indigenous carriers and has even allocated funding for the program. However, none of these reports has ever been confirmed, and no firm evidence exists that China really does intend to refurbish, build, or buy an aircraft carrier. Thus the prospect of a Chinese carrier remains subject to a great deal of rumor and speculation.

However, the issue is an important one, for a number of reasons. Were China to begin operating aircraft carrier battle groups, the strategic equations in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea would be altered. Moreover, the appearance of Chinese aircraft carriers would inevitably set alarm bells ringing throughout East Asia, especially in Japan and Southeast Asian capitals. It would also have implications for U.S. naval policy in the Asia-Pacific region.

This article examines the issue of Chinese aircraft carrier capability from several angles. First, it reviews the "development" of China's aircraft carrier program to date and the various media reports that have appeared over the years.

Second, it traces the progress of China's blue-water ambitions and the debate within the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) as to the necessity of acquiring such vessels. Third, it assesses China's ability to initiate a carrier-building program, and the financial, technological, and geopolitical problems involved in such a venture.

CHINA'S AIRCRAFT CARRIER PROGRAM TO DATE

The father of China's aircraft carrier research and development (R&D) program was Admiral Liu Huaqing. From 1954 to 1958 Liu studied under the great Soviet naval strategist Admiral Sergei Gorshkov at the Voroshilov Naval Academy in Leningrad. Gorshkov was the driving force behind the Soviet navy's oceangoing offensive strategy, an ambition that came to fruition during the 1980s. Gorshkov's maritime strategy greatly influenced Liu's ideas on how the People's Liberation Army Navy should evolve. Like its Soviet counterpart, the PLAN had traditionally been subordinate to the army, with a primary role of coastal defense. Liu argued that China's maritime doctrine should evolve through two stages. The first should be a "green-water active defense" that would enable the PLAN to protect China's territorial waters and enforce its sovereignty claims in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea. The second phase would be to develop a blue-water navy capable of projecting power into the western Pacific. Liu was able to put these ideas into practice during his tenure as commander in chief of the PLAN (1982-88) and then as vice chairman of the powerful Central Military Commission (1989-97)

Liu believed that in order to fulfill a blue-water capability, the PLAN had to obtain aircraft carriers. In 1997, just before his retirement, Liu penned an article in Zhongguo Haiyang Bao (China's Maritime Paper) in which he argued it was "extremely necessary" for China to possess aircraft carriers. According to Liu, aircraft carriers were needed to protect China's sovereignty and maritime resources, especially with regard to Taiwan and the South China Sea; guard China's sea lanes of communications as the country industrialized and increasingly became a major trading power; enable China to keep up with regional powers such as India and Japan; and give the PLAN a decisive edge in future naval warfare. (1)

On becoming commander in chief of the Chinese navy in 1982, Liu initiated at the navy's Shanghai Research Institute a feasibility study on the design and construction of an aircraft carrier. Models were constructed and tested in the institute's six-hundred-meter (656-yard) pool and at Tai Lake in Jiangsu Province. (2) In 1985 Liu ordered the establishment at the Guangzhou Naval Academy of a training course for aircraft carrier commanders. (3) (Following the American tradition, aircraft carrier commanding officers would be selected from among pilots rather than captains of surface warships.) The importance of the course was underlined by the academy's president, Admiral Yao:

Since the Second World War, aircraft carriers as the symbols of a
country's important deterrent power have been accorded more
attention. For some historical reasons, China has not yet built
aircraft carriers. But the Academy must look forward and train
experts needed for the carriers. As the building process is long we
simply cannot afford to dig wells after becoming thirsty. (4)

In 1992, students in the course began active training on board China's most advanced guided-missile destroyers.

Carrier design and pilot training received a major boost in 1985 when a Chinese ship breaker purchased the fifteen-thousand-ton Majestic-class aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne from Australia. At that time the Australian government did not oppose the sale, because China was seen as an important strategic counterweight to perceived Soviet expansionism in Asia. The purchase helped the PLAN's R&D program in two ways. First, as the carrier was being dismantled for scrap, Chinese naval architects and engineers were able to see at first hand how it had been designed and built; using this information naval architects were able to prepare drawings for a light carrier. Second, the flight deck of the Melbourne was kept intact and used for pilot training in carrier takeoffs and landings (though a static flight deck would, of course, have been of limited utility, since it could not replicate the pitch and roll of an aircraft carrier at sea). China's carrier R&D program remained top secret. In 1987 Colonel General Xu Xing denied that China wanted to acquire an aircraft carrier capability, citing the country's "defensive" military doctrine. (6)

During much of the 1980s the People's Liberation Army (PLA) focused on the land threat posed by the USSR in the Soviet Far East and did not see an aircraft carrier as a strategic priority. However, the collapse of the USSR in 1991 allowed China to turn its attention to strategic priorities in the south and southeast--namely, the South China Sea dispute and Taiwan. Both of these areas of potential conflict required increased naval power. As a result, China's aircraft carrier R&D program was accelerated.

In the first half of the 1990s reports appeared and persisted that China was interested in purchasing an aircraft carrier from another country as a stopgap measure while it built its own. In 1992 the Chinese government reportedly approached the Ukrainian government with a view to buying the unfinished Soviet Kuznetsov-class carrier Varyag. However, nothing came of these talks; the Ukrainian government in fact denied that any discussions had taken place. (7) In December 1992 Russian president Boris Yeltsin visited Beijing, where Chinese officials reportedly expressed to him an interest in buying one of the Russian navy's forty-thousand-ton Kiev-class carriers. (8) Although nothing came of these talks either, Chinese companies were later able, as will be discussed later, to purchase two Kiev-class carriers (the Kiev and Minsk) and the still-incomplete Varyag.

In 1995-96 two European countries approached China with aircraft carrier technology. In February 1995 it was reported that the Spanish shipbuilder Empresa Nacional Bazan had offered to build China a low-cost, lightweight conventional-takeoff-and-landing (CTOL) carrier. Bazan placed before China two designs: the twenty-three-thousand-ton SAC-200 (overall length 728 feet, or 221.8 meters); and the twenty-five-thousand-ton SAC-220 (overall length 787 feet, or 240 meters). (9) The cost of the vessels would be $350-400 million. The SAC-220 would accommodate up to twenty-one CTOL fighters, such as the MiG-29K. According to Bazan, the first carrier could be delivered within five years, with the second three and a half years later. At the time, Bazan was constructing the 11,500-ton carrier Chakri Naruebet for the Royal Thai Navy and was eager to secure further orders in Asia. China expressed an interest in the proposal, and initial talks between the Chinese and Bazan were held in January 1996. However, according to a representative of Bazan who spoke with the authors, the Chinese side seemed more interested in obtaining the blueprints of the carrier than in ordering the actual vessel. (10)

At the end of 1995 it was reported that France had offered to give China, gratis, the 32,700-ton carrier Clemenceau. (11) In return it was expected that French companies would be awarded lucrative contacts to upgrade the vessel's radar and communication systems. Again, nothing came of the proposal. However, even if the Spanish or French proposals had progressed farther, delivering an aircraft carrier to China would have been politically difficult, especially with the European Union's 1989 post-Tiananmen Square arms embargo on Beijing still in place.

Beginning in 1997, a series of newspaper articles suggested that China had decided to build its own fleet of aircraft carriers rather than either upgrading secondhand vessels from abroad or buying new ones. In November 1997 the Far Eastern Economic Review reported that the Chinese government had shelved plans to build fixed-wing carriers in favor of smaller helicopter carriers. (12) In 1999 Singapore's Straits Times reported that the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and the State Council had earmarked 250 million yuan for the design and construction of two aircraft carriers, to be completed by 2009. (13) In 2000 the respected Hong Kong Chinese-language newspaper Ming Pao reported that construction of China's first carrier would begin later that year and would be completed by 2003. (14) According to Ming Pao the Chinese carrier would displace forty-eight thousand tons and carry twenty-four fighters, probably Su-27Ks (Su-33s) from Russia. The cost of each vessel would be 4.8 billion yuan ($580 million).

However, to date there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that any aircraft carriers are under construction in the PRC.

EX-SOVIET AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AND CHINA'S R&D PROGRAM

As mentioned earlier, during the early 1990s China repeatedly sought to buy aircraft carriers from the former Soviet Union. By 2000 it had managed to acquire three: Minsk, Kiev, and Varyag. How these vessels were acquired and the purposes to which they have been put make interesting reading.

In 1975 the USSR commissioned the Kiev, the first of a new class of forty-thousand-ton carriers designed to provide organic fighter cover for the Soviet navy. Between 1978 and 1984 three more Kiev-class carriers were commissioned: Minsk (1978) Novorossiysk (1982), and Admiral Gorshkov (1984) Kiev-class carriers (referred to by the Russians as "heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers") were conventionally powered and capable of carrying twelve Yak-38 Forger vertical/ short-takeoff-and-landing (VSTOL) fighters and twenty helicopters. Following the collapse of the USSR in 1991 and the subsequent emasculation of the Russian navy, all four carriers were decommissioned.

In 1995 the Minsk and Novorossiysk were sold to South Korea for scrapping. However, in June 1998 the Minsk was purchased for five million dollars by a Chinese firm, the Minsk Aircraft Carrier Industry Company. (15) Before the sale went through, however, the South Korean firm stripped the warship of its armaments, engines, and communication systems and exacted a guarantee that the new vessel would not be used for military purposes. (16) The Minsk was towed to Guangdong Province, where a four-million-dollar conversion transformed the carrier into a floating museum. The vessel was moved to Shenzhen in September 2000 to form the centerpiece of the "Minsk World" theme park. For an entrance fee of eight dollars, visitors can now board the former flagship of the Soviet Pacific Fleet and see MiG fighters on the flight deck, models of antiship missiles and other weapons systems, and exhibitions on the history of the Russian navy and the Soviet space program. Visitors can also watch displays of Russian dancing in the hangar, eat at a Russian-themed restaurant, and ride on a tank on parkland in front of the vessel. According to the pro-Beijing Hong Kong newspaper Wen Wei Po, Minsk World is aimed at "popularising science as well as national defense education." (17) Minsk World has proved a hit with both locals and tourists alike.

In May 2000 the Kiev was purchased by the Tianma Shipbreaking Company in Tianjin for $8.4 million. (18) The contract with the Russian Defense Ministry stipulated that the vessel had to be scrapped. However, local authorities in Tianjin had other ideas for the Kiev. In July 2000 the Tianjin Municipal Standing Committee established a project investment corporation with the aim of turning the aircraft carrier into a tourist attraction. In November 2000 the original contract with Moscow was renegotiated to allow the Kiev to be used for tourism purposes. According to the developer, the Kiev will form part of the Beiyang Recreation Harbor project, which will include "military recreation activities, museums, exhibitions, fun parks, recreational grounds, [and] education sites." (19) Planned amenities on the Kiev include a conference center, TV studio, nightclubs, restaurants, and swimming pool.

The most intriguing purchase to date has been that of the Varyag. The second of the 67,500-ton Kuznetsov class, the Varyag was laid down in 1985 at the Nikolayev shipyards in the Ukraine, then part of the USSR. Kuznetsov-class carriers are conventionally powered but unlike the Kiev class are capable of accommodating fixed-wing aircraft, such as Su-27Ks and MiG29Ks. This class of carrier does not utilize a steam catapult for launching fighters but is equipped instead with a ski jump at the bow to allow short takeoffs. Work on the Varyag was abandoned at the beginning of 1992 following the breakup of the Soviet Union. The USSR's successor state, Russia, could not afford to pay Ukraine to complete construction. The vessel was 70 percent complete but was without engines, rudders, or armament. As mentioned earlier, the Chinese government expressed an interest in buying the Varyag in 1992, but the sale did not go through at that time.

In March 1998 the Varyag was bought by the Chong Lot Tourist and Amusement Agency for twenty million dollars. (20) Chong Lot was based in the then Portuguese colony of Macau, although the company had no offices there; (21) Chong Lot was in fact a subsidiary of a Hong Kong company, Chin Luck Holdings. In November 1998 Chong Lot unveiled plans to turn the Varyag into a floating casino and entertainment complex anchored in Macau harbor. (22) Two aspects of this plan were unusual. First, the Macanese authorities did not (and have yet to) receive an application to operate a casino on an aircraft carrier in the enclave. Second, the waters around Macau are too shallow to accommodate such a large vessel. (23)

When news of the sale was announced, the Russian media claimed that Chong Lot and Chin Luck were acting on behalf of the Chinese government. The Chinese embassy in Moscow was quick to dismiss these reports. (24) However, investigations by the Hong Kong media revealed that the two companies involved in the purchase of the Varyag had close connections with the PRC. Two of Chong Lot's directors were former PLAN officers. (25) In August 1999, Hong Kong-based Goldspot Investments became a majority shareholder in Chong Lot. One of the directors of Goldspot has an address inside a military compound in Beijing. The majority shareholder of Goldspot is China Securities International Ltd., which in turn is a subsidiary of China Securities, a large, state-owned brokerage house. (26) The plan to tow the Varyag to Macau was held up for fifteen months because the Turkish authorities refused to allow the vessel to pass through the Bosporus Strait, alleging a danger to shipping. (27) In September 2001 Turkey finally gave permission for the passage. After an eventful journey through the Mediterranean and around the Cape of Good Hope, the Varyag arrived in March 2002 at the northeastern Chinese port of Dalian. (28) The owners continue to assert that the vessel will be turned into a casino.

The purchase of these carriers raises two important questions. First, is it mere coincidence that three of the former Soviet navy's aircraft carriers have ended up in the PRC? Second, if it is not coincidence, how valuable are these vessels to China's research and development program?

It stretches belief that the acquisition of three ex-Soviet carriers by Chinese companies is mere happenstance. Chinese authorities actively tried to purchase directly one or more Kiev-class carriers and the Varyag in 1992-93 but failed. Beijing has now been able to accomplish this goal through China-based companies. In the case of the Varyag, as noted, the companies involved had links to the central authorities and the Chinese military. For some reason Beijing was particularly keen to acquire the Varyag. Its price, twenty million dollars, was about three times its scrap value. Moreover, it was the direct intervention of Chinese deputy foreign minister, Yang Wenchang, who visited Ankara in September 2001, that finally won clearance to tow the ship through the Bosporus. Yang reportedly offered a $360 million economic aid and tourism package to induce the Turkish government to let the Varyag go. (29)

If the Chinese government was behind the purchases, to what purpose could it put these vessels? Many analysts have contended that Chinese naval architects and engineers could learn a great deal about the design and construction of aircraft carriers by inspecting the vessels. Presumably PLAN experts have already inspected the three carriers. In May 2002 the Hong Kong media reported that security around the Kiev in Tianjin was very tight, leading to speculation that naval architects and engineers were examining the vessel. (30) However, the value of these inspections has probably been overstated. The technology employed was a generation behind that of Western navies; China would simply be learning obsolete technology. Should the Chinese employ this technology in an indigenous carrier, it would be obsolete when begun, let alone after the time it would take to construct and commission it.

CHINA'S MARITIME DOCTRINE AND THE ROLE OF AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

Since the early 1980s, and especially during the 1990s, there was much talk of China's blue-water ambitions. Military analysts generally believed that by the year 2000 or shortly thereafter, the PLAN would have achieved green-water (i.e., coastal zone) status and would be capable of limited power projection into the western Pacific. By 2010 the transition to a blue-water navy would be complete. As of 2003, however, although the Chinese navy has increased its basic war readiness over the past decade, its overall progress is stagnant. It cannot even exercise sea control in its own coastal waters.

China's blue-water ambitions have remained unfulfilled for three reasons. First, despite impressive economic growth and industrialization since 1978, the PRC still lacks the financial resources and technological know-how to effect rapid and effective naval modernization. Second, as will be examined later, the Taiwan issue has forced the Chinese leadership to focus on home waters. Third, Soviet influence in terms of operational doctrine, campaign theory, and combat tactics persists, hindering the PLAN's transition to blue-water capability. (31)

In combat terms, the PLAN is restricted to offshore-water defense, mostly at the campaign level. In other words, although the Chinese naval strategy envisages, on paper, a global reach in the future, for the present it emphasizes the strategic or tactical deployment of naval power. This emphasis limits strategic objectives, weapons acquisition, and battle planning. More importantly, the PLAN's maritime strategy is reflected in the combat models that actually guide the navy's modernization.

According to China's maritime doctrine, there are two combat models: the first is the independent employment of naval power, and the second is that of joint operations with other services, particularly the army. (32) According to the first model, the navy's role is to project power into areas far from home waters, most likely in the form of strategic independent campaigns against the enemy's fleets or land targets. Under the second model, the PLAN's primary mission is defensive--to engage enemy ships in coastal waters--but the navy also has an offensive role, to assist the army and air force in amphibious operations. At present, the PLAN is limited in scope to missions of the second model, and has accordingly developed a light fleet. Ultimately, though, the goal is to fulfill the first model.

The projection of naval power far from coastal waters (i.e., the first model) is in fact a mission the PLAN already faces, though without the resources to accomplish it. (33) The most likely scenario would be armed conflict in the South China Sea, where the Chinese navy's mission would be to occupy disputed islands, ejecting the forces of other disputants. Conflict in the Taiwan Strait is a unique case that cuts across the two models. Any action in the strait would be geographically close to home. However, the conflict zone could expand into deep oceans if the United States were to become involved militarily (as the majority of Chinese security analysts fully expect that it would). (34) In this case, the PLAN would have to engage enemy fleets relatively independently and in distant waters while it was assisting the army in amphibious landings on the island.

Sea control and sea denial are two important concepts that sustain the PLAN's combat models. Admiral Liu set attaining sea control as the service's most important priority soon after he became commander in chief. The PLAN proposes to exercise sea control within an inner line of defense that comprises China's three offshore narrows: the Bohai Sea Strait, the Taiwan Strait, and the Qiongzhou Strait. Of these the Bohai is the most important, as it protects Beijing and northern China. The Taiwan Strait is also vital, because it allows the PLAN access to the western Pacific. Aside from these three straits, the South China Sea is an area of major concern for the navy.

In exercising sea control, the PLAN would launch defensive campaigns against enemy fleets in waters adjacent to major coastal cities, such as Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Fuzhou. The Chinese navy would also try to obtain, by means of an offensive campaign--such as an amphibious landing on islands occupied by Taiwan, such as Jinmen--control of the sea around the invasion area and to protect the People's Liberation Army from the air and sea. As far as the PLAN is concerned, sea control is to be achieved not across a large horizontal geographic area but in a few vertically distributed lanes. It need not be comprehensive; partial control for a limited time would be sufficient.

In contrast, the outer layer of China's maritime defense is covered by the sea-denial concept. According to senior Chinese naval analysts, the traditional U.S. ocean frontiers of containment against China involve two "island chains." The first stretches from Japan to the Liuqi Islands, then to Taiwan and the Philippines. The second island chain stretches from Japan's Ogasawara-gunto Islands to the Marianas. The PLAN's second layer of defense and its sea-denial capabilities are designed primarily to break a blockade of the first island chain. (35)

How is the PLAN's aircraft carrier program linked to these two combat models? Actually the linkage is not very clear, and this is one of the reasons why the project has been shelved. That said, the program has only been delayed, not canceled altogether. Research and development continues, demonstrating that aircraft carriers are not considered irrelevant to China's national defense and the Chinese navy's long-term modernization goals.

The continued relevance of an aircraft carrier capability for China lies in the fact that sea control can be achieved only through air superiority. This reality was the origin of China's aircraft carrier ambitions. In the 1980s the PLAN perceived a need to acquire aircraft carriers for possible action in the South China Sea. If China was to dominate the area, it needed air superiority. Given the distances involved from the Chinese mainland (950 miles, or 1,500 kilometers) and the very short reach of People's Liberation Army Air Force fighters, the navy considered that air control could be won only by carrier-based aircraft. Admiral Liu was not convinced that aerial in-flight refueling was the answer to the range limitations of land-based air. In March 1990 Liu visited the air force base where in-flight refueling technology was being developed; he remained unconvinced that the tanker aircraft could be protected except by fighters from aircraft carriers. (36)

As mentioned earlier, with the disappearance of the Soviet threat in 1991, the Chinese military focused its attention on the South China Sea dispute and the Taiwan problem. During the first half of the decade, priority was given to the South China Sea dispute, which centered around the Spratly Islands, a group of about two hundred small reefs and atolls. Sovereignty of the Spratlys is contested by six parties; China, Taiwan, and Vietnam claim ownership of all the islands in the archipelago, and the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei claim certain parts of the group. The area includes valuable fishing grounds and is believed to be rich in oil and gas deposits; additionally, the islands occupy an important strategic position straddling vital sea lanes that link the Indian and Pacific Oceans and carry much of the world's trade. China bases its claims on grounds of discovery and occupation stretching back thousands of years. In the early 1990s China began pursuing a more assertive policy in the area. In 1992 the Chinese National People's Congress passed the Territorial Law of the Sea, by which it claimed sovereignty over almost the entire South China Sea; in May 1992 Beijing awarded the U.S. oil company Crestone a contract to search for oil in waters disputed by Vietnam; and in July 1992 PLA forces occupied Vietnamese-claimed Da Lac Reef. Most alarming of all, Chinese-built structures were discovered in February 1995 on Mischief Reef, claimed by the Philippines. (37) These structures were upgraded into a permanent military fortress in November 1998. (38) China's policy in the South China Sea has been one of "creeping assertiveness"--establishing an ever greater physical presence, but gradually and without military confrontation.

Later in the 1990s China's focus shifted to the Taiwan Strait, because of a deterioration in cross-strait relations. During the decade Taiwan had democratized, a strong Taiwanese identity had emerged, and the leadership in Taipei had begun to pursue more self-confident and independent-minded policies. (39) Manifestations of this newfound self-confidence included President Lee Teng-hui's trip to the United States in June 1995, the December 1995 legislative elections, and the March 1996 presidential poll, the first ever held on the island. China was increasingly exasperated by these developments and lashed out at what it saw as moves toward Taiwanese independence. Cross-strait relations reached crisis point between July 1995 and March 1996, when Beijing conducted a series of military maneuvers and live missile tests near Taiwan in an effort to intimidate its voters and to send Taipei an unmistakable and definite signal that it was serious about reunification at any cost. When President Lee announced his "two states theory" in July 1999, Beijing mobilized the armed forces and conducted amphibious landing exercises, again as a warning to Taiwan. The Taiwanese electorate was not intimidated and in March 2000 elected as president the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party candidate, Chen Shui-bian, thus propelling cross-strait relations into a new and uncertain realm. The Chinese government has since repeatedly warned Taiwan that it does not rule out the use of force to achieve reunification.

As China's primary security concern has shifted to the Taiwan theater, the acquisition of aircraft carriers seems to have lost whatever urgency it had. Should conflict erupt in the Taiwan Strait, operations are likely to be conducted within three hundred kilometers (190 miles) of the mainland. The PLA is confident that as modernization of the air force continues, land-based aviation can control the air over at least selected maritime areas at that range. In addition, China is increasingly relying on its growing arsenal of medium and intermediate-range Dongfeng ballistic missiles stationed in Fujian and Zhejian Provinces to achieve victory in any attack on Taiwan.

If shifting priorities reduced the strategic impetus for aircraft carrier acquisition, the retirement in 1997 of Admiral Liu Huaqing removed the idea's main champion. At the same time, proponents of a "revolution in military affairs" (RMA) were gaining influence within the Chinese armed forces. They argue that aircraft carrier battle groups are becoming obsolete. (40) Because of their high radar and electromagnetic visibility, proponents hold, carriers have become easy targets for precision-guided missiles. Further, in their view, aircraft carriers are vulnerable to submarines and mines. Third, the frequent need to resupply carriers at sea makes them vulnerable to the destruction of logistical vessels. For all these reasons, the RMA school believes that in modern warfare aircraft carriers have become "floating coffins." (41)

In any case, the RMA advocates believe, it is not in China's interests to develop a costly symmetrical fleet. Instead, China should exploit technological advances and adopt asymmetrical strategies to defeat the larger and more powerful U.S. Navy in a cross-strait conflict. Specifically, they argue, its carrier battle groups can be defeated by disabling command and information systems and severing access to supply, and by attack with such sophisticated weapons as shore-based precision-guided missiles, stealthy surface vessels, and advanced submarines. (42) In fact, the PLAN's acquisition of Kilo-class submarines and Sovremenny-class destroyers from Russia is part of just such asymmetrical warfare strategy. (43)

TECHNICAL, FINANCIAL, AND GEOPOLITICAL HURDLES

The lack of urgent strategic need is not the only factor that has put the acquisition of a Chinese aircraft carrier on hold. Even if the central government decided that the project was a strategic necessity, Chinese engineers would face formidable problems in transforming their ambitions into reality. In addition, the astronomical cost militates against the project for the time being. Moreover, the Chinese leadership would also have to weigh the geopolitical consequences very carefully.

Building an indigenous carrier or upgrading a secondhand vessel would present a raft of technical and engineering problems. Although China has a competent shipbuilding industry with much experience in constructing large, oceangoing vessels, aircraft carriers require special technologies to which it has had little exposure. These include steam catapults, arresting wires, and large elevators. In addition, a carrier would also require highly advanced electronic warfare and radar systems--an area in which China has a patchy record and has relied, in the main, on foreign technology. As suggested earlier, the extent to which Chinese engineers can make up for these deficiencies by examining ex-Soviet carriers is doubtful.

Transforming the Minsk, Kiev, or Varyag into operational vessels would be highly problematical. The Minsk and Kiev have both been stripped of their propulsion machinery, armament, and communications. Replacing these key elements would be difficult and costly. In addition, the vessels had been laid up for over five years, resulting in significant deterioration by the time they arrived in China (the incomplete Varyagis in even worse condition than the Minsk or Kiev).

Moreover, China possesses no VSTOL aircraft that could operate from the carriers as they are now configured. The Russian navy was always disappointed with the performance of its Yak-38s, and in any case these aircraft are no longer in production. It is highly unlikely that Britain, the United States, or Spain would sell secondhand Harrier "jump jets" to Beijing. The Western arms embargo placed on China following the 4 June 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre is still in force; in any case, these countries would not want to help equip the PLAN for possible action in the Taiwan Strait or South China Sea. India, which also possesses Harriers, views China as a long-term rival.

China could use these vessels as helicopter carriers. Another option, however, would be to modify the Minsk or Kiev to accommodate conventional or short-takeoff fixed-wing aircraft. This is what India plans to do with the last of the Kiev-class carriers, Admiral Gorshkov. In December 1998 India and Russia agreed in principle on the transfer of the Admiral Gorshkov; (44) the ship is to be provided free, if India has the extensive refit and refurbishment work done in a Russian shipyard. The weapons forward will be removed to make way for a "ski jump." The flight-deck elevators will be enlarged and arresting gear fitted. This conversion will configure the carrier for short takeoff but arrested recovery (STOBAR).

The Indian project, however, will cost an estimated two billion dollars--$750-800 million for the refit and a further $1.2 billion for an air wing of fifty MiG-29Ks and a number of Ka-28 and Ka-31 early-warning helicopters. (45) For China, this figure is prohibitive. Construction of a carrier or conversion of a secondhand vessel in a domestic yard would also be extremely costly, especially since much of the technology would have to be purchased abroad, quite aside from the new fighters, helicopters, early-warning aircraft, escort surface vessels, and screening submarines required. Moreover, one carrier would not be sufficient; full operational capability would require, nominally, three whole carrier groups--one deployed, one in refit, and one working up. Strategically located naval bases capable of berthing the carriers would also have to be constructed, adding to the already burdensome bill.

Presumably the technical and engineering difficulties could be resolved over time, with the assistance of foreign companies. There is no reason to believe that Moscow would not assist China in the construction of an aircraft carrier, as it has done with India. Also, the money could be found if the Chinese government deemed it a strategic necessity; the Chinese economy continues to register impressive growth. After all, the Chinese were able to overcome both technical and financial problems in the mid-1960s, the height of the chaotic Cultural Revolution, to develop nuclear weapons; the country's scientific, industrial, and economic bases have been strengthened considerably since then.

The geopolitical consequences, however, are a different matter. The Chinese government could argue that aircraft carriers are defensive, but other countries in East Asia would view the matter very differently. A Chinese aircraft carrier battle group would be seen as a formidable power-projection tool. It would reinforce fears that Beijing intended to resolve its territorial disputes (especially in the South China Sea) by force and to become the dominant regional power. The members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), particularly those with competing territorial claims to the Spratly Islands, would undoubtedly strengthen their military links with the United States, ensuring a continued U.S. naval presence in the region. Japan would almost certainly initiate its own aircraft carrier program.

China has been interested in the concept of aircraft carriers since the early 1980s, when Admiral Liu Huaqing advocated the acquisition of such vessels as part of his blue-water navy aspirations. With the retirement of Liu in 1997, however, the aircraft carrier lost its champion in the Chinese navy. At the same time, the need to control the South China Sea as a strategic priority was downgraded as reunification with Taiwan hurtled to the top of Beijing's agenda. In that context, given the relative closeness of Taiwan and improvements in the capabilities of the Chinese air force and missile arsenal, aircraft carriers are not now considered vital. Moreover, the costs associated with building and operating aircraft carriers, the technical difficulties involved, and the likely adverse reaction of neighboring countries all argue against a Chinese carrier battle group for the moment.

However, the PLAN has not abandoned the idea altogether--merely shelved it. The Chinese navy is determined to fulfill its blue-water ambitions, even if it takes a generation or more. Moreover, public support for the acquisition of an aircraft carrier seems high. Following the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by NATO warplanes on 8 May 1999, a campaign was initiated on Chinese Internet sites to raise funds to build a carrier. Provincial newspapers across the country took up the cause; within a month eleven million yuan had been. (46) Aircraft carriers perceived as potent symbols of the national power around the world, and China is no different. The memory of the "Century of Humiliation" (1842-1949), when European countries, Russia, and Japan forced a weakened China to grant territorial concessions and then divided the country into competing spheres of influence, still has a deep resonance among the Chinese people. The Chinese see a powerful navy, capable of projecting power into the world's oceans, as an important tool to prevent China from being "bullied" again by outside powers.
 
The key-tech ahead of Chinese carrier is not engine,but ejection device.Chinese navy doesn't feel like a Russian way.
 
The key-tech ahead of Chinese carrier is not engine,but ejection device.Chinese navy doesn't feel like a Russian way.


the displacement of type 52(B,C) is 6,500 tons and they are the best China can manufacture indigenously...

Even for these the engines are provided by Ukraine and another a copy of German engine (i.e 2 Ukraine DN80 gas-turbines and 2 copied MTU Friedrichshafen 12V 1163TB83 diesels)...


So for a 48,000 ton class carrier where will China source the engines from..??

It has no choice but to design and manufacture its own engines...and its not going to happen in the near future
 
If you're talking about gas turbines (for light or mid-size carriers),a copy work started in 2003,supported by China's 863 plan, is indeed in process. and before this, R0110, an 110 megawatt engine developed by Shenyang Liming Combustion Engineering Inc. has come into market last year. But this does not surely attest to China's AC progress.
 
China is not building carriers now. The above report is wrong.



Strategic Analysis

Strategic Analysis:
A Monthly Journal of the IDSA
October 2000 (Vol. XXIV No. 7)

Dragon's Dragonfly: The Chinese Aircraft Carrier
By Vijay Sakhuja *



There is little doubt that People's Republic of China is engaged in an aggressive naval acquisition programme aimed at modernisation of the PLA Navy. A variety of advanced ships, submarines, aircraft, missiles and electronic warfare equipment have been added to the naval inventory. These acquisitions have been a matter of concern among several Asia Pacific countries who fear that China is building an aggressive naval posture to influence events in the region. Some have even suggested that the modernisation process has heightened regional anxiety and raised tensions. The ongoing naval acquisition clearly indicates that China is pursuing an assertive maritime policy. Towards that end the debate over acquisition of an aircraft carrier has become central in the minds of Chinese naval strategists and practitioners.

It is no more a secret that Beijing is keen on acquiring an aircraft carrier. This keenness is familiar to even the most casual China watcher. Interestingly, the 'dragonfly' 1 has touched the hearts of both the leadership and the general public who have even suggested that if China wants to be a great power, it must possess an aircraft carrier. A review of events over the past two decades indicate that Chinese naval planners have been window shopping for an aircraft carrier in the 'shopping malls' in Latin America, Australia, Europe and Russia. Besides the indigenous capability to build the vessel is also being explored which has added to the 'build' or buy' debate. Whether China' builds' or 'buys' an aircraft carrier, the question still remains how the induction will influence the balance of naval power and the security environment in the Asia Pacific region.

This paper examines the Chinese aircraft carrier acquisition plans. In doing so, it discusses in detail the various vessels that China has purchased as scrap and those that it has been interested in. The paper also highlights the type of aircraft carrier that fits into the Chinese naval doctrine and efforts made by the PLA Navy in training its officers for carrier operations. The acquisition of the carrier is bound to change the strategic balance in the Asia Pacific region. Towards that end, the paper highlights the implications of such acquisition on the regional security environment as also its implications for Indian security.

Aircraft Carrier in Strategic Thought

The Chinese naval strategists and practitioners have long argued that an aircraft carrier is an important element of any blue water naval force structure. Without the carrier, any ocean going taskforce is limited in its area of operation, due to non-availability of air cover. They argue that a carrier with 40 aircraft on board can provide the combat effectiveness of about 200 to 800 shore based fighters for air defence. Besides, the carrier is able to provide cover at least fifty times larger than that provided by any other surface combatant. 2 In the context of China, with territories extending as far as one thousand nautical miles in South China Sea, the relevance of an aircraft carrier becomes all the more important.

Admiral Liu Huaquing, the Chinese 'Mahan' or 'Gorshkov' and erstwhile Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission has long cherished the dream of the PLA Navy acquiring an aircraft carrier. He was quoted as saying " I'll die with an everlasting regret if China does not build an aircraft carrier". 3 A man of vision and the architect of the modern day Chinese navy, Admiral Liu Huaquing even started the 'pilot warship captains' course in Gungzhou Naval Academy for command of surface ships. 4 Rear Admiral, Yao, President, Guangzhou Naval Academy, had noted that:

"Since the Second World War, aircraft carriers as the symbol of a country's important deterrent power have been accorded more attention. For some historical reasons, China has not yet built aircraft carriers". As the building process is long, we simply cannot afford to dig wells after being thirsty." 5

Since the 1980s, China watchers have been speculating that China was building an aircraft carrier. In 1987, Colonel General Xu Xing, Deputy Chief of General Staff denied such speculation and argued that Chinese military strategy was one of defence and such power projection platforms do not find any place in the naval force structure. 6 Interestingly, there is an anecdotal evidence that Deng Xiaoping was also not keen that China should possess an aircraft carrier. 7 But it appears that in 1992, he had reluctantly approved the plan to design and build a carrier in China. 8 President Yang Shangkun also appears to have asked the General Staff Department of the CMC to procure an aircraft carrier and 'make it functional by 1997'. 9 By 1993, the Chinese naval leadership made public their plans on research and development on the carrier and that the construction had not started at that time. 10 In 1995, Yomiuri Shimbhun, a Japanese daily reported that the Chinese leadership had decided to build the aircraft carrier. Two carriers were planned to be built over the next ten years begining 1996. 11

Be that as it may, Chinese naval officers have been most vocal about the utility of an aircraft carrier both as a political instrument and power projection platform. In an article titled' The Dream of Chinese Aircarft Carrier', Captain Cao Xuegui, PLA Navy (Commanding Officer of Luda class destroyer Pennant No.108) noted that a mobile 'battlefield on the sea' is an important component of the Chinese naval task force for the defence of Chinese territory in South China Sea. He observed that with limited air cover, the task force would be dangerously exposed to the enemy fighter aircraft. Therefore building an aircraft carrier is a necessity. 12 Similar arguments have been put forward by the Commanding Officer of a PLA Navy frigate Pennant No.537.

"..It is a top priority to build or import aircraft carriers and this necessity is not man made, but arises from the realistic situation of War. It still required quite a long period of time before this goal can be reached" 13

More recently, the Chinese public has been in favour of building an aircraft carrier. The bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia on May 8, 1999 appears to have generated enough passion in support of acquisition of an aircraft carrier or its construction. The South China Morning Post reported that a retired PLA soldier, surnamed 'Li" writing under the name of "Bingmeizi" - 'sister soldier' posted a rousing message on a Shengdu, Henan, web site calling all Chinese around the world to contribute to the construction of the world's largest and most advanced aircraft carrier to enhance China's defence capability. 14 What followed was a flurry of support messages in the internet chat rooms in China. Responding to these sentiments, a local daily published special editions to raise funds for the carrier. Added to that the local television began broadcasting stories at regular intervals. Reportedly, the atmosphere was so charged that contributions began pouring in ranging from 99 Yuan by a young girl named Li Fan to 10 million Yuan from a company in Anyang in Henan, China. In about a months time, the total contribution added up to 11 million Yuan. 15

In this context, the China Science and Technology Association noted, "The fact that China is the only permanent UN Security Council member with no aircraft carrier battle group is a handicap which fails to match China's status". It also published a book 'The 21st Century : China's Super Aircraft Carrier', and argued for modernisation of the military through indigenous efforts and not through imports. 16

The calls for building an aircraft carrier have been around for almost two decades now. It appears that the bombing incident has to some extent acted as a catalyst for fulfilling the Chinese desire to dominate regional affairs. They believe that an aircraft carrier is a symbol of China's rightful place in the world order and these war islands not only fulfill the military role but send a message similar to the one that Chinese emperors sent to tributary states. "China is a great power. Tremble and obey!!" 17

An article in a PLA daily, stressed the need for an aircraft carrier and noted, 'History has proved time and again (that) without air domination over the seas there will be no control over the seas' An aircraft carrier is a mobile station indispensable for naval airforce '. It also noted that 'whether or not to have an aircraft carrier is not merely an issue of equipment but, in the final analysis, one of whether to have air control over the seas and whether to become a sea power'. 18

Admiral Shi Yunsheng, the current PLA Navy Commander-in-Chief, on March 19, 1992, stated that, " in order (to) effectively control and protect the air over the South China Sea, we must give priority to air capable of long distance battle and to carrier based aircraft". 19 Admiral Shi was then the Naval Air Force Commander of the South Sea Fleet and was making these observations in the wake of the Sino-Vietnam clash in the Spratly Islands in South China Sea. The Chinese naval practitioners are convinced that an aircraft carrier is essential for the Chinese navy to go to the oceans and an aircraft carrier should be the priority and that this is in the national interest.

Some Chinese naval experts point out that Brazil, Argentina and India are three of the largest debtor nations in the world but still possess or hope to acquire aircraft carriers. 20 Interestingly, India has often figured in the Chinese debate over acquisition of an aircraft carrier. They argue that India has a smaller navy but has two aircraft carriers. The argument over the high costs of building are dismissed by noting that India is not that rich but it is really an issue of 'sea mentality'. 21

Shopping for a Carrier

The Chinese appear to be patient but vigorous window shoppers. At least this is true as far as aircraft carriers are concerned. In the last two decades, they have stepped into the carrier shopping malls in Latin America, Europe, Russia, Australia and even India. 22 They received positive response from several of them who were willing to either sell or build for China. Surprisingly, they did not make inquiries with the US and UK. They must have been confident that the US would never allow such a sale since it would result in a change in the US monopoly in politico-military power. This is further corroborated by the fact that the US has decided to scrap the 52,000 ton aircraft carrier USS Coral Sea on its own soil by an American firm. 23 As far as UK is concerned, the Australians offered them the alternate route in the form of the HMAS Melbourne.

Argentina-Vienticinco de Mayo

Perhaps the first concrete example of Chinese acquisition of an aircraft carrier , albeit in its scrap form, was from Argentina. This Colossus class carrier had flown the ensign of two countries before being commissioned in the Argentine navy. It was built in 1945 for the Royal navy . Later it was sold to the Royal Netherlands navy in 1948 before its final sale to Argentina. During its service in the Argentine navy, it was modernised to allow for operations of Super Etendard aircraft. Since 1985 it had not been operational and was scrapped in 1997. The Chinese had bid for the sale of the vessel as scrap but the deal did not fructify. 24

Australia-Melbourne

China purchased decommissioned HMAS Melbourne from Australia in 1985, as scrap for $1.4 billion. 25 The vessel was originally built for the Royal Navy to be named as HMS Majestic. Its keel was laid on April 15, 1943 at Vickers Barrow, UK. By the time World War II ended, the vessel had still been under construction. Keeping in mind the future requirements of the Royal Navy, the Admiralty appears to have decided to stop building it any further. But, by 1949 the work on the vessel had been resumed and its design modified to include angled deck, steam catapult and a mirror deck landing system. 26

The vessel was finally commissioned in the Royal Australian navy as HMAS Melbourne on October 28, 1955 at Barrow-in-Furnam, UK. It was the longest serving flagship of the Australian Navy. 27 During its thirty year service it picked up for itself the title of 'cursed ship' as it was involved in two major collisions with HMAS Voyager and USS Frank E Evan. 28 On June 30, 1982, it was placed under reserve. At that time, the Australian navy had plans to purchase the HMS Invincible from Britain but the Falkland war in 1982 appears to have forced Britain to cancel its sale. The Australian plans to decommission Melbourne were delayed and it remained inactive till 1985. It was finally towed from Sydney to be broken up in south China.

The Chinese showed special interest in equipment such as catapults, arrestor wires and aircraft lifts / elevators. The flight deck was dismantled and put ashore and PLA navy pilots undertook deck landing practices on the removed deck. Melbourne was in existence till as late as 1994. 29

France-Clemenceau

Chinese interests, however, were not only confined to learning from the Australian example. They also started seriously studying aircraft carrier models of other countries. For instance a high level Chinese military delegation headed by Admiral Liu Huaquing, Vice Chairman, Central Military Commission visited France in late September 1996. 30 Among the several issues of discussions between the two sides, the Chinese delegation showed keen interest in the French aircraft carriers. At that time the French navy was operating two carriers-Clemenceau and Foch. These Clemenceu class aircraft carriers were the first of the French carriers to be built in France after World War II. The construction for the vessels began in the 1950s and they were commissioned in the 1960s (Clemenceau in 1961 and Foch in 1963) as project PA-54 and PA-55. 31 These vessels were scheduled to be decommissioned in 1997 and 2000 respectively.

Clemenceau was deployed for several combat tours of duty : Djibouti (1974), Lebanon (1983), Iran-Iraq War, Gulf War (1991), and Yugoslavia (1993, 1994, 1995 and 1996). During the Iran -Iraq war, the ship cruised 80,000 nautical miles and its aircraft flew 11,000 hours and made 5000 deck landings. 32 The French Navy was not keen to sell the Clemenceau to China. The officials were quoted as saying that the sale would send wrong signals of France supporting a totalitarian regime with a poor human rights record. They were convinced that the carrier would ultimately be used in operations against Taiwan for unification with mainland China. 33 They also feared that the proposed sale would draw criticism from Taiwan, which had earlier purchased La Fayette class frigates. Responding to the likely sale of the French carrier to China, Taiwanese authorities expressed concern arguing that the proposed sale would result in deterioration of the regional security environment and lead to an undesired arms race. 34

Notwithstanding that and the 1989 post-Tianenmen Square arms embargo, Paris was keen to go ahead with the sale of the Clemenceau. French Foreign Minister Herve de Charette told Admiral Liu Huaquing that 'European arms embargo against China is out dated and should be lifted'. 35 The French on their part were exploring loopholes to circumvent the embargo and facilitate sale as 'gift' and sell only non lethal electronic systems. The sale did not materialise and the vessel was decommissioned to be scrapped in France in 1997. 36 However, it was reported that along with the technology transfer related to French Dauphin and Super Frelon helicopters to China, the French also agreed to train Chinese in operating aircraft carriers.

Interestingly, Brazil had shown interest in Clemenceau. More recently, Foch, the other Clemeneau class vessel, due to be decommissioned in 2000 made a port call at Rio de Janerio after exercises with the Indian navy in February 2000. 37 Reportedly, the vessel is likely to be sold to Brazil.

Russia-Varyaag (ex Riga)

Talk that China has acquired the Varyaag has persisted for a very long time. It is true that Chinese officials inspected the vessel in 1992 but failed to agree with the Ukrainian authorities on the price. At that time the vessel was seventy per cent complete. This 67,000 ton, 307 meters long vessel was originally designed for the Soviet Navy and had been under construction since 1985. In fact the original name of the vessel was Riga but following the anti-Soviet demonstrations in the city of Riga, the name of the vessel was changed to Varyaag. 30

By 1996, the condition of the vessel had deteriorated considerably. It was in the dock in the Black Sea shipyard of Nikolayev. 39 It lacked maintenance and was totally exposed to weather and remained unattended. Notwithstanding that, the Chinese had preferred to purchase the vessel as scrap and study its architecture. It was also believed that Chinese naval designers would be able to obtain significant information by taking the vessel apart. Importantly, they wanted to study lifts, wiring and piping. Reportedly, these are the weak areas in Chinese shipbuilding. Interestingly, the vessel was purchased by a Chinese shell company. Chong Lot Tourist and Amusement Agency, a typical Chinese trading house, located in Macao put in its bid in August 1997 to purchase the vessel as scrap.

Among the six bids, the Chinese company submitted the best offer of $600 per ton of steel . This price was at least three times the normal scrap price for similar tonnage ships. The vessel weighed about 33,600 tons in its unfinished condition and totaled to about $20 million. 40 Chong Lot pledged to turn the vessel into a hotel or an amusement center and was able to satisfy the Ukrainian National Agency for Reconstruction and European Integration. The agency stated that the commission had a certificate from the company (Chong Lot) which showed that the tourist firm plans did not run counter to the conditions. The Portuguese authorities in Macao responded that they had not received any request/permission for opening a hotel on a ship to be based in Macao and dismissed it as a joke. 41 Now that Macao has been handed over to China and unified with the mainland, Chong Lot is free to do what it pleases with the vessel. The ploy to buy Varyaag as an amusement center appears to have worked in purchasing the vessel but it is still debatable what the Chinese would do with the vessel. The vessel is still sitting in Nikolayev and rusting. It is doubtful if it is sea worthy to take a long voyage from Black Sea to South China. A satellite imagery taken by the US in 1995 showed that the ship's ammunition elevator was open. 42 It is beyond doubt that the material state of the hull is poor. Even if the vessel is towed to China, it would be scrapped but the naval architects could study it in detail.

Russia-Minsk

While the Chinese were busy negotiating for the Varyaag, a Korean business man purchased Minsk at a bargain price in 1995. 43 The key equipment had been removed. Minsk was the flagship of the Soviet Pacific Fleet. This 47,000 ton, 273 meter long vessel was the fifth largest carrier in the world and entered service in 1978. In 1988-89 it had developed major machinery problems and was laid up alongside. Financial constraints did not permit the Soviets to undertake repairs and lack of maintenance forced them to consider its sale. 44

Three years after its sale to Korea, the vessel was sold as scrap to SZ Minsk Aircraft Carrier Industrial Co. of China for $5 million. 45 After 18 months of refit in Guangzhou, the vessel was converted into a military theme park titled 'Minsk World' and given the theme 'war and peace'. All external weapon systems like surface to air missile launchers, anti-submarine missile containers and guns have been retained. According to Wu Bin, the General Manager of S.Z. International Tourism Corporation, Minsk would attract military fans and school students and the carrier itself can arouse curiosity among the people. 46 The Chinese believe that this would provide an opportunity for education in science and national defence. The important aspect of the refurbishment of Minsk is that the Chinese shipbuilding experts and architects have learnt more about building such large complex platforms and have improved upon their knowledge obtained from Melbourne scrapping. Interestingly, the Chinese have retained the vessel's original name, i.e. Minsk and the weapon systems . This certainly symbolises the growing Sino- Russian relations.

Russia-Kuznetsov

As with other Russian/Ukrainian carriers, the Chinese have taken keen interest in the Admiral Kuznetsov aircraft carrier. This is the largest warship ever built by Russia or the erstwhile Soviet Union. Kuznetsov is in the real sense a 'defensive aircraft carrier'. 47 The plan to build this vessel began with 80,000 tons standard displacement but ended up with 55,000 tons. The nuclear propulsion was shelved for boiler turbine engines. Similarly, the originally planned four catapults were abandoned and a twelve degree ski jump was fitted. 48 The absence of catapults precluded her aircraft carrying a large pay-load. The vessel is not a true carrier by western definition and can be termed as 'heavy air capable' cruiser. 49 Chinese appear to have liked the concept and reports indicate that a similar vessel under code name Plan 9985 is expected to be built at the Shanghai-Jiangnan Shipyard. 50 Further, the likely tonnage of the vessel is expected to be 48,000 tons.

Spain-Empresa Nacional (Bazan)

In their pursuit to acquire an aircraft carrier, the Chinese even explored the possibility of purchasing a new vessel instead of buying either a scrapped or second hand vessel. Empresa Nacional of Spain offered China two designs of low cost, light, conventional take off and landing carriers with capacity to house 21 aircraft and four helicopters. It offered to build a carrier of 16,000 tons similar to the Thailand carrier Chakri Nerubet.

The design appears to have found favour with the Thai Navy who placed an order for one such vessel on Empresa Nacional. Reportedly this contract of $358 million was accepted against contenders in Great Britain, France, Italy and the USA. 51 The highlights of the contract were the price, technology and production time of only five years. It has a ski jump of 12 degrees and is capable of hosting six Sea Harriers and 12 helicopters. The most important feature of the vessel is that it offers the best ratio between dead weight tonnage and aircraft weight. 52 In 1995, China contacted Bazan shipyard for supply of design drawings of the aircraft carrier. The Chairman of Bazan shipyard Edwardo Abellan visited China and offered to build the vessel. 53 The two sides held talks but it resulted in nothing definite. Reportedly, China inspected the Thai Chakri Nerubet, possibly attempting to capitalise on Thailand's economic crisis. The vessel had not been put to sea for sometime due to economic constraints and is currently open to visitors as a tourist attraction. 54

Naval Doctrine and Aircraft Carrier

Before proceeding to examine the relevance of aircraft carriers in the Chinese naval doctrine, it would be important to locate this power projection platform in the operational doctrine of the United States, Japan, Europe (UK and France) and Soviet Union/Russia where such vessels have been built/deployed. The United States and Japan were the first and the only countries to have deployed carrier based air power. Both were faced with a vast oceanic area of operation. The Pacific Ocean lacked islands/bases capable of supporting large land and air forces. This geographical constraint forced both the US and Japanese navies to acquire aircraft carriers that were self contained, flexible for operations on land and capable of surprise attacks on the enemy fleets/bases. They could also undertake long range reconnaissance and possessed enough capability for defence in the form of escorts. With the emergence of aircraft carriers on the scene, the relevance of battleship as the most powerful platform became suspect. This resulted in development of large aircraft carriers capable of hosting 50 to 100 aircraft.

On the other hand, the European experience was much different. During the pre-war period, the threat of land based air power dominated the minds of naval planners. With a large number of land based bombers in the inventory, the aircraft carriers were perceived to be vulnerable and restricted in offensive role. Land based air power was considered enough to achieve sea control. The British used their carriers in supportive role to locate German commerce raiders and attack them with torpedoes. Since these vessels were in supportive role, they were not fitted with offensive weaponry.

The Soviet tactical exploitation doctrine of their aircraft carriers was developed over more than half a century. Based on the 'active offshore defence' theory, the Soviets formulated 'blishaya pulogulama' or the 'great plan' and advocated building a large naval force comprising aircraft carriers, modern warships, naval airforce and a marine corps. 55 After World War II, under Stalin, the plans to build a large ocean going navy were given the go ahead. The plan continued well but under Khruschev a high priority was accorded to the strategic rocket force or the 'second artillery' and nuclear submarine. 56 The rationale for this prioritisation was that aircraft carriers were susceptible to attack from sophisticated long range missiles. Besides, should there be shortage of funds when developing 'balanced fleet', only the nuclear submarines had the capability to provide the desired deterrence. 57

In contrast to the limited naval capabilities of the Soviet Union during the 1950s and 1960s, as exemplified in its weakness to play an active oceanic role and assert itself in the bipolar naval conflicts of the period, Soviet naval strategy from the 1970s pushed forward the aircraft carriers as one of its instruments in global power projection. The Soviets built/ planned at least five different classes of aircraft carriers. These are (a) Moskva class, 1967 (b) Orel class,1973 (c) Kiev class, 1975 (d) Kuznetsov class (e) Ul'yanovsk class 199?/2000. 58 Only three i.e. Moskva , Kiev and Kuznetsov class were finally constructed. Under Admiral SG Gorshkov, the Soviet navy had three distinct mission roles (a) ship to ship attacks (b) defending Soviet strategic nuclear forces (c) defend Soviet SLOCs and destroy enemy SLOCs. 59 These tasks envisaged a high degree of anti-submarine warfare, targeting at sea and destruction of targets on land. The Moscow class aircraft carrier had the tactical task of defending nuclear submarines and SLOCs and undertaking interdiction of enemy SLOCs. Accordingly Moscow was fitted with ASW helicopters and variable depth sonars to hunt submarines. The Kiev class had the tactical task of anti submarine operations, attacking strategic targets like aircraft carrier at sea and destroying strategic infrastructure on land and naval facilities. These ambitious tasks also called for a commensurate weapon load on board these carriers. The Minsk was fitted with SS-N-12 (range 555 kilometers) SUW-N-1 anti submarine missiles and air defence missiles. 60 The Varyaag class aircraft carrier had an even more ambitious tactical task as compared to the earlier carrier. It was to use its long range anti-ship, anti-air missiles for the classical role of destroying enemy, as also cooperate with missile cruisers, SSGNs and SSBN's to completely destroy the enemy's aircraft carriers and SSGNs. 61 On the basis of the above discussion, it is clear that each class of Russian aircraft carrier had a specific task to play and the development of aircrafts carrier was based on 'incremental tactical/strategic role'.

Though there are several political and ideological differences between the two regimes, the Chinese navy too appears to have followed the Soviet ' balishaya pulogulana' based on the development of modern warship, a naval airforce and a marine corps. Like the Soviets, the Chinese also laid emphasis on development of strategic forces and submarines. But unlike the Soviets, China has taken a long time to build aircraft carriers. This is not to suggest that aircraft carriers did not have any relevance in the Chinese naval strategy.

Since its establishment on July 23, 1949, the Chinese navy (Jiefangjun haijun) pursued a coastal defence strategy under the 'Peoples War' doctrine. Neither its objectives nor its capabilities allowed it to go beyond coastal waters. It was not required to wage a decisive war. However, by the mid 1970s, China's strategic thinking had changed significantly and in Deng Xiaoping's doctrine of 'peoples war under modern condition' and 'military strategy of active defence under high-tech historical conditions' the navy had a major role to play. In 1982, Admiral Liu Huaquing, a former student of Voroshilov Naval Institute in Soviet Union assumed the command of the PLA Navy. Admiral Lui argued that sea power is a crucial element of China's efforts in attaining great power status and maritime issues were extremely important. China needed to build a modern navy to safeguard its maritime interests. Liu articulated the 'offshore active defence' concept and noted that offshore was an idea relative to the high seas and the navy should effectively exercise control of the seas within the first island chain (Alleutions, Kuriles, Japanese archipelago, Ryukyus, Taiwan, Philippines and the Great Sunda islands). 62 This called for acquisition of high technology and modern naval equipment.

Admiral Zhang Lian Zhong, succeeded Admiral Liu (the latter was elevated to Vice Chairman CMC). Admiral Zhang noted that to defend China truly and effectively from raids and attacks from the sea (China) must strengthen the defence in depth at sea and possess naval forces that have the capability to intercept and wipe out the enemy. 63 This called for power projection platforms because only such vessels had the endurance, weapons and capacity to operate far from the home ports in to blue waters. The Chinese believe that in order to wrest control of distant territories and safeguarding maritime zones, China should build platforms to effectively safeguard their maritime interests.

Given these tasks, and the new operational thinking, the PLA Navy has its role cut out to safeguard national offshore territories, exclusive economic zones, unification of Taiwan, strengthening of China's coastal defence and deterrence. Accordingly, the acquisition of an aircraft carrier is the crux and a symbol of the PLA Navy's blue water strategy. 64 They argue that aircraft carriers are the only means of providing air cover to an ocean going task force . According to the long cast of naval force structure and tactical roles, the PLA Navy task forces will be headed by aircraft carriers and form 'a three dimensional system of attack and defence with air, surface and submarine attachment'. 65

A Doctrinal Appreciation

The Chinese naval experts are of the opinion that the size, shape, propulsion, aircraft and the weapon outfit of the aircraft carrier will be determined by the country's naval strategy which should be in compliance with the overall military and economic strategy reflecting 'Chinese characteristics'. 66 Admiral Liu Huaqing has articulated the extent of the 'first island chain' and the 'second island chain'. Besides most naval experts have argued that the PLA Navy needs an aircraft carrier to provide air cover to the fleet operating in South China Sea. This has been emphasised by Admiral Shi Yunsheng, the present Commander-in-Chief of the PLA Navy. Some naval experts have noted that the carrier will facilitate operations against Taiwan. Besides the American deployment of aircraft carriers in all major crises in the Taiwan Straits in 1958 and 1996 is one of the most important factors in Chinese thinking.

If this be the thinking, then neither the Varyaag nor Minsk or for that matter any other Russian carriers have any relevance in the Chinese naval doctrine. These vessels were conceived by the Soviet/Russian navy in a different strategic/tactical context. Their ability to host long range missiles such as SS-N-12 , operations in conjunction with SSBNs and SSGNs and their ability to attack targets on land , clearly highlight their role far beyond simple air cover to a fleet operating far from home. The current Chinese naval doctrine has no such role as performed by the Soviet/Russian carriers.

It can be argued that China will build two types of aircraft carriers: (a) light CTOL carrier of 20,000 to 25,000 tons for operations within the first island chain and (b) heavy duty carrier of 40,000 to 50,000 tons equipped with long range missiles with capability to operate with SSBNs. This would call for redefining the naval doctrine and area of operation, currently restricted to the first island chain. You Xu and You Ji have noted that in the second phase of the development (2001 to 2020), the PLA Navy 'would gradually break away from the west Pacific and enter the oceans around the world' . Beyond 2020, China would have the capability of a major sea power. 67

'Build or Buy' Debate

Captain Cao Xuegui, Commanding Officer of Pennant No.108 'Luda' class destroyer advocates building a 15,000 ton light duty, nuclear power driven carrier with combat aircraft, ship to ship missiles, ship to air missile, automatic 100 mm gun , 30 mm close in weapon system, advance electronic warfare equipment and modern C3I suite. 68 You Xu and You Ji believe that if China builds an aircraft carrier it will be similar to the British Invincible type of 20,000 to 40,000 tons. They further argue that it would be easy for China to define the vessel as defensive and intended solely for safeguarding maritime territory. 69

Reports about China building an aircraft carrier indigenously have appeared in the media for quite some time. Some of these appear to be part of western propaganda while there are some reports that quote documentary evidence. For instance it was reported that a huge hole was observed at Dalian. It ultimately turned out to be the Dalian new shipbuilding dock and subsequent inquiries revealed that the Dalian new dock had orders to build 120,000 ton vessels for Norway. 70 It was also reported that the carrier-building programme was listed as a key project in the 8th Five Year Plan. 71 Recent reports suggest that Beijing has plans to build a conventional carrier (Plan 9985) with a displacement of 48,000 tons. The vessel will be powered by TB 12 steam turbines with a maximum speed of 30 knots. The vessel is to be launched in 2003. Interestingly, the report notes that China will build one aircraft carrier every three years. 72

There is little doubt that the PLA Navy will acquire an aircraft carrier. The debate however is 'build' or 'buy'. Aircraft carriers, by their very nature are technology intensive platforms. They host complex systems such as catapults, landing gear, lifts/elevators to move aircraft from hangar to deck and back and a reinforced landing deck/ski jump. Such technologies are not easily available in the international market. As regards shipbuilding, China ranks third in the world and has the capability to build larger vessels over 100,000 tons. It also has a long experience of building warships and submarines but non availability of specialist equipment will delay construction or may even force China to purchase the complete vessel from a foreign source.

Budgetary Constraints

Another impediment in the acquisition of the carrier is the huge cost attached to it. Going by current prices, the cost of building a carrier is about $4.0 to 4.5 billion Yuan. According to some Chinese, budgetary consideration may not be so important since it is the political determination that will dictate allocation of financial resources for the vessel. Some unconfirmed reports even suggest that up to three billion Yuan i.e. 2 to 3 percent of the PLA's budget with a daily operating cost of 300,000 Yuan has been earmarked.

Professor Zhang Zhaozhong, a military expert at the National University of Defence Technology noted that to build an aircraft carrier involved an expenditure equivalent to six to seven years budget of the PLA. He stated, "Even if our army did not eat, buy new clothing or equipment for six to seven years we would still not be able to afford one Nimitz". 73 A Chinese naval military equipment expert responded by noting," We should not calculate the cost of aircraft carriers this way because all building expenses in China would be cheaper. By some estimates it would be closer to 1:1 i.e. what the US can do with one dollar, China can do with one renminbi". 74

While there are others who argue that when it was poor, China could afford to spend 1.3 billion Yuan on space programme, it can certainly afford to build a carrier. Since the building process is long, the breakdown cost per year will not be 'unbearably high'. 75 As noted earlier, the vessel under Plan 9985 is expected to cost 4.8 billion renminbi (US$580.41 million) . The first phase building fund of 1.0 billion renminbi (US$120.92 million) has already been approved. 76

Training

As noted earlier, in 1995, Admiral Liu Huaquing ordered the establishment of a special course for naval pilots to train them to command warships. The course is linked to the command of an aircraft carrier. The Chinese appear to draw inspiration from the US Navy practice appointing naval pilots to their aircraft carriers. 77 Rear Admiral Yao was quoted as saying that the Guangzhao naval academy would train experts needed for carriers.

In the past, Chinese Naval airforce (NAF) pilots have undertaken short range take off and landing on roads. Reportedly, the deck of Melbourne was also used by Chinese Naval Air Force pilots to practice deck landing. In 1987, the PLA Navy has even experimented with F-8 II in catapult launch mode. 78 Similarly, Ka 27 helicopters have completed deck landing on Luhu class destroyers.

Earlier China acquired Su 27 aircraft from Russia with license to produce up to 500 aircraft at its factory in Xian. The Russian navy already operates Su 27 K, the naval version of Su 27, on its carriers. There is every likelihood that Chinese naval pilots have already completed training on board the Russian carrier. Besides, the PLA navy has also built a simulated flying deck at an airport in northern China. The Melbourne deck was used as reference and an indigenously built 'optical landing system' has been fitted. 79

Regional Security Environment

The Chinese are determined to possess an aircraft carrier. All trends, indicators and articulations point to the fact that the Dragon's ' Dragonfly' will be a reality in the near future. It is bound to generate anxiety and tension among the regional countries. Similarly, the regional security architecture will undergo a major transformation and alter the strategic balance. The Chinese leaders make no secret of their desire to become a major power and unlike Japan, are developing both economic and military capability to influence events in the region.

There is a logical temptation among the Republics of Korea, Japan and Taiwan to acquire aircraft carriers and offset the imbalance that would be created by the 'Dragonfly'. A Japanese defence official has argued that Tokyo needed 'small defensive' aircraft carriers of 25,000 tons to defend the sea lanes that serve as its umbilical cord. 80 In an interview, Rear Admiral Chiaki Hayashizaki, Director of Operations and Planning of the Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force stated that Japan's defence policy did not exclude the possibility of building small aircraft carriers. 81

The acquisition of an aircraft carrier by China will certainly fuel an arms race. Reportedly, the Republic of Korea navy already has plans to acquire at least two aircraft carriers. With a highly sophisticated shipbuilding industry, Korea has the technological capability to build complex platforms such as aircraft carriers. Besides the western 'carrier malls' will be more than willing to meet the demands of any other navy in the Asia Pacific region. This would act as a catalyst in the carrier acquisition race. Thailand navy acquired the Chakri Nerubet and sent out a signal that it was joining the elite club of carrier nations and assuming the role of military leadership in the region. Besides, strategic planners in Bangkok have reportedly cited the rise of Indian naval power as a reason for Thailand's naval modernisation and expansion. A possibility of increased interest by Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines cannot be ruled out.

Implications for India

China's recent rise as an important trading state, its high economic growth, rising defence budget, military modernisation and also its relative importance in the international forum, raise questions about its regional objectives. The assessments cover a wide spectrum of future Chinese ambitions. But the recent Chinese response to various issues relating to sovereignty, security and national integrity are only reflective of Chinese intentions. It is an ambitious power out to acquire capabilities to dominate regional affairs and stake its claim as the rightful regional force.

China has long understood the strategic importance of the Malacca Strait. Malacca has figured in the strategic thinking of their ancient mariners. The Strait continues to dominate the commercial and economic lifelines of the Asia-Pacific region, and this reality is of increasing importance to China. China's naval and military surge into the Indian Ocean is a major strategic priority of planners in Beijing. The surge is aimed at consolidating the Chinese military posture in support of its maritime interests. In 1993, Gen Zhao Nanqi, Director of the General Logistic Department of the PLA, issued a top secret memorandum which explained in detail the PLA's strategic plans to consolidate control over the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean under the new doctrine of 'high sea defence'. Zhao stated, " We can no longer accept the Indian Ocean as only an ocean of the Indians". Beijing has no doubts that its neighbours would oppose China's strategic surge. "We are taking armed conflicts in the region into account", Zhao stated in his top-secret memorandum. 82

As noted earlier, in the naval realm, the PLA Navy has defined its role within the framework of its 'offshore active defense' strategy. No conclusive definition was given regarding the extent of 'offshore'. Admiral Liu Huaqing, then Commander, PLA Navy, gave his interpretation of the concept of 'offshore' and noted that 'offshore' should not be interpreted as coastal; instead 'offshore' is a concept relative to the 'high seas'. While referring to the Great Sunda Islands, the Chinese 'Mahan', Admiral Huaquing, had included the strategic choke point of the Malacca Strait in his strategic calculations.

China has long been seeking an outlet into the Indian Ocean in furtherance of its bid for the rich mineral resources of Asia, oil from the Persian Gulf and the markets of the region. Besides China is well aware of the strategic choke points of Southeast Asia. Towards that end, China has begun making inroads into the Indian Ocean and has begun to encircle the Malacca Strait as also India, which it perceives as a possible containment force. Geographically, the South China Sea in the east and India and Indonesia in the west dominate the approaches to the Malacca Strait . China has begun to neutralise the domination of both India and Indonesia by making diplomatic, military and economic inroads into Myanmar. Myanmar offers a strategic staging post to control the western approaches to the Malacca Strait. In the east, the Spratly Islands offer a strategic location with respect to the sea-lane between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean via the Malacca Strait. It would not be long before Chinese naval task forces, headed by aircraft carriers start making frequent voyages in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea.

Endnotes

Note *: Research Fellow, IDSA Back.

Note 1: See Thomas J Hirschfeld, "Chinese Aircraft Carrier Programme: A Virtual Dragonfly", p.3., at <http://www.kida.re kr/journal/hirsh.html>. Back.

Note 2: You Xu and You Ji, "In Search of Blue Water Power : The PLA Navy's Maritime Strategy in the 1990's and Beyond", Working Paper No 222, The Strategic and Defence Studies Center, Australia: Canberra, Australian National University, 1990, p.12. Back.

Note 3: Far Eastern Economic Review, April 9,1998,p. 20 . Back.

Note 4: You Xu and You Ji., n.2, p.12. Back.

Note 5: Ibid. Back.

Note 6: Ibid., p,11. Back.

Note 7: SeeThomas J Hirschfeld, n.1., p.3. Back.

Note 8: Ibid., p.6. Back.

Note 9: Jun Zhan, "China Goes to the Blue Waters : The Navy, Seapower Mentality and South China Sea", The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 17, no. 3, September 1994, p.201. Back.

Note 10: Ibid. Back.

Note 11: Swaran Singh, "China's Aircraft Carrier Programme", The Pioneer, September 4, 1995. Back.

Note 12: See Andrei Pinkov, "The Chinese Navy and Russian Aircraft Carriers", at <http://www.kanwa.com/english/981107c.html>. Back.

Note 13: Ibid. Back.

Note 14: See <http://www.cnd.org/CND-Global.99.2nd/CND-Glogal.99-06-15.html>. Back.

Note 15: Ibid. Back.

Note 16: Ibid. Back.

Note 17: See <http://www.tibet.ca/wtn archive/1993/3/8-1.html>. Back.

Note 18: Yang Zhiben, "China Needs Sea Power", Junshi Shilin 29 (April 1990), p.63, cited in Jun Zhan, n. 15, p. 200. Back.

Note 19: Xia Jun, "An Interview With the Naval Air Force Commander of the South Sea Fleet", Jianchun Zhishi (Jun1988), p.13. , cited in Jun Zhan, n.15, p. 200. Back.

Note 20: Lester J Gesteland, "China Naval Experts Ponder Need For Aircraft Carrier", at <http://www.chinaonline.com/industry/aviation/Archive/Secure/1999/december/c9120104.asp>. Back.

Note 21: Jun Zhan, n.15, p. 200. Back.

Note 22: Paul Beaver, "China Looks to Europe for Aircraft Carrier", Jane's Pointer, December 1996, cited in no.1., p.5. Back.

Note 23: Far Eastern Economic Review, April 9, 1998. Back.

Note 24: Jun Zhan, n.15, p.199. Back.

Note 25: See <http;//www.tibet.ca/wtnarchive/1993/3/8-1.html>. Back.

Note 26: Jane's Fighting Ships 1983-84,p.21. Back.

Note 27: See <http://www.iol.net.au/~conway/ships/melbourne2.html>. Back.

Note 28: Ibid. Back.

Note 29: See < http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/row/plan/cv.html>. Back.

Note 30: Nayan Chanda, "No Cash Carrier", Far Eastern Economic Review, October 10, 1996, p.20. Back.

Note 31: See <http://www.cast.ru/english/publish/1997/april-may/mikhailov.html> and <http;//www.frenchnavy.free.fr/clem.html>.

Note 32: Ibid.

Note 33: Nayan Chanda, n.3., p.20.

Note 34: See <http://www.taiwandc.org/twcom/73-no5.html>.

Note 35: Ibid.

Note 36: See <http;//www.frenchnavy.free.fr/clem.html>.

Note 37: See <http://www.sholey.can/stories/march2000/01032000.html..

Note 38: See <http://www.periscopeone.com/demo/weapons/ships/carriers/w0003911.html>.

Note 39: Bruce Gilley, "Scrap Value : Buyers of an Unfinished Ukrainian Carrier have China Ties", Far Eastern Economic Review, April 9, 1998, p. 20 . Back.

Note 40: Ibid. Back.

Note 41: Ibid. Back.

Note 42: Ibid. Back.

Note 43: Beijing Review, May 22, 2000, p.18. Back.

Note 44: See <http://www.shenzhenwindow.net/guides/military-park%20html>. Back.

Note 45: Ibid. Back.

Note 46: Ibid. Back.

Note 47: See <http://www.periscopeone.com/demo/weapons/ships/carriers/w0003911.html>. Back.

Note 48: Ibid. Back.

Note 49: "Mystry Surrounds Chinese Carrier Deal", Jane's Navy International, June 2000, p.9. Back.

Note 50: See <http://www.chinaonline.com/industry/aviation/newsarchives/secure/2000/january/c00011102as p.>. Back.

Note 51: Ibid. Back.

Note 52: Ibid. Back.

Note 53: See <http://www.cast.ru/english/publish/1997/april-may/mikhailov.html> Back.

Note 54: See William M Carpenter, "China Defence Buildup on Track", at < http://www.gdr.org.>. Back.

Note 55: Andrei Pinkov, n.12, p.1. Back.

Note 56: Ibid. Back.

Note 57: Ibid. Back.

Note 58: See <http://www.webcom/~anraa.html#orel>. Back.

Note 59: Andrei Pinkov, n.12, pp.2-3. Back.

Note 60: Ibid. Back.

Note 61: Ibid. Back.

Note 62: Ai Hongren, Joint Publication Research Service, China ( JPRS-CAR-90-052), July 16, 1990, p.14. Back.

Note 63: Cited in James Gregor, "Qualified Engagement: US China Policy and Security Concerns", on line version of Naval War College Review, Spring 1999, p.14. Back.

Note 64: You Xu and You Ji, n.2, p.14. Back.

Note 65: Ibid.,pp.6-7. Back.

Note 66: Lester J. Gesteland, n.20, p.1. Back.

Note 67: You Xu and You Ji, n.2, p.6. Back.

Note 68: Andrei Pinkov, n.12, p1. Back.

Note 69: You Xu and You Ji, n.2, p.13. Back.

Note 70: Thomas J. Hirschfeld, n.1, p.4. Back.

Note 71: You Xu and You Ji, n.2, p.13. Back.

Note 72: "China Reportedly to Build First Aircraft Carrier", FBIS-CHI-2000-0112, January 13,2000. Back.

Note 73: Lester J. Gesteland, n.20, p.1. Back.

Note 74: Ibid. Back.

Note 75: You Xu and You Ji, n.2, p.13. Back.

Note 76: "China Reportedly to Build First Aircraft Carrier", FBIS-CHI-2000-0112, January 13, 2000. Back.

Note 77: You Xu and You Ji, n.2, p.12. Back.

Note 78: Swaran Singh, "China's Aircraft Carrier Programme", The Pioneer, September 4, 1995. Back.

Note 79: "China Reportedly to Build First Aircraft Carrier", FBIS-CHI-2000-0112, January 13, 2000. Back.

Note 80: See <http://www.tibet.ca/wtn archive/1993/3/8-1.html>. Back.

Note 81: David Arse," A Militarized Japan", The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 4, 18, no 3, September 1995, p.85. Back.

Note 82: Yossef Bodansky, "The PRC Surge for the Strait of Malacca and Spratly Confronts India and the US, Defence & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, September 1995, p.6. Back.

CIAO Home
 
My FAV pic, 039


I'm sorry! I don't know how tu upload the pic........
 
Back
Top Bottom