Sino-PakFriendship
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With this tool, Western whites (USA, Australia, NATO) and their minions (India, Jap, K-dog) has ZERO chance to spit Tibet from China!
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There are four MAIN phases in a ballistic trajectory: boost, ascent, mid and terminal. In between there are sub-phases, such as the 'gravity turn' phase...
Gravity turn - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
But am not going into details about these sub-phases.
Each main phase require different methods and if necessary different technologies to effect detection. Detection and tracking is not the same as interception to destroy, so this argument -- Mid course phase intercepts are arguably the most challenging from a detection and tracking perspective -- should not be taken as gospel that mid-course interception is more difficult than the other main phases. What is 'difficult' for some does not equate to the same degree of hardship for others, especially when there is a clear technological gap between contestants, US and China with the US the clear leader.
So let us examine what Kopp is saying...
Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence Systems
On the surface, it seems reasonable enough. But not everyone has orbital observation platforms specifically designed to detect rocket IR emissions. China does not have global orbital surveillance capability. To have effective boost phase interception means there must be constant surveillance over the suspected area and that area is usually someone else's sovereign territory. So from a general idea perspective, Kopp is correct. But from an operational perspective, we can dismiss boost phase detection, tracking and interception as out of reach for everyone. For US, we can only detect and track, not intercept.
Perhaps Kopp is a bit out of date in his technical journals...
Scintillation (radar) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
What Kopp does not say is that mid-course detection and tracking is usually done from the ground. As the bus assembly is briefly in orbit it spins and as it spins, its surface imperfections create radar scintillations, aka 'micro-doppler' effects, making radar detection and tracking very possible for a technologically competent country like the US. A helo's rotors create radar scintillations.
Classify human motions using micro-Doppler radar
Note the highlighted. Early warheads were quite blunt in the nose section, slowing the warhead's descent. Improved sensor and guidance systems give us sharply pointed warheads to reduce time to target. But this also mean the defender has a base RCS parameter in which he can fine tune his radar to detect a cluster or micro-Doppler effects created by the bus assembly. The spin rate will be constant, therefore any surface irregularities will create radar scintillations that are PREDICTABLE, much like the rhythmic arm movements created by a walking man. Kopp is correct in that this level of sensor sophistication is considerable, but not impossible for any country that is capable of launching an orbital vehicle.
Here is what Kopp said that is truly significant -- Kinematically, mid course phase intercepts are demanding in terms of altitude.... Not every country in the world is capable of launching even a suborbital vehicle. So what make a mid-course interception more difficult than a boost phase interception is altitude. Interception, not detection and tracking. What Kopp also does not say is that the mid-course phase decrease the response time by half. Of course it does as by now the missile is half way to its target. What Kopp also does not say is that decreased response time decreases the margin of errors, which lead us to terminal phase detection, tracking and interception...
Lay aside decoys and ECM. Assume effective detection and tracking of the descending warhead. What make terminal interception difficult is the compressed response time which give no second chance to the interceptor should it miss. This is why the early nuclear ICBM defense interceptors were themselves nuclear weapons -- assurances of destruction. In a mid-course interception, the bus assembly is IR contrasted against space. Depending on the time of interceptor launch, if the interceptor has its own sensor suite of active radar and IR, correlated against ground based radars, the interceptor would have more time to orient itself against the target for a kinetic kill than when the interception is supposed to be in atmosphere.
Anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense cannot be taken apart and its components carelessly interpreted to fit fanboy rhetorics. Here is what the US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) actually says about the entire concept...
Ballistic Missile Defense System Elements
Possibly violating territorial airspace. The 'close proximity' include orbiting observation platforms. Or constant airborne surveillance just outside of the potential adversary's territorial airspace. This quite leave boost phase intercepts out of the reach of most countries.
The ascent phase is before apogee. Detection and tracking of the bus assembly can be from ground based radars.
Twenty minutes is more than enough time for a ground based radar to guide the interceptor to the bus assembly. If the interceptor has its own sensor suite, this is more than enough time to orient itself against the target for a kinetic kill. The problem for the interceptor is flight controls and overall avionics sophistication as currently no orbital interceptor is capable of reacquiring the target after a miss. So that twenty minutes, or less, is vital. So while China's mid-course interception is commendable, it hardly qualified as 'most difficult'.
The word 'Theater' is now replaced with 'Terminal', as in 'Terminal High Altitude Area Defense'. The key words here are 'high altitude', as in so high that it is very near being suborbital. The goal here is to extend the interception to when the warhead begins its descent. Terminal interception time is usually less than 30 seconds, versus 20 minutes for mid-course. It is at this point that if so equipped, the warhead will deploy countermeasures. Defense fire control will be heavily stressed by what is called 'closely spaced objects' (CSO). Decoys are usually less massive than the real warheads and will exhibit different radar return behaviors. But by the time the defender's radar determine that it is facing countermeasures, the defenders will have almost no time at all to effect an intercept.
Decoys, or CSO, may create what is called 'unresolved targets', meaning what is detected must be either classified as the true warhead or a decoy. Unresolved targets contaminate what is called 'purity of track'. The defender's radar system, in 30 seconds or less, must attempt to rid itself of 'unresolved targets' BEFORE launching the interceptor...
Track initiation of occasionally unresolved radar targets
For a sophisticated attacker, the intention should be to create distinct decoys AND unresolved targets, thereby creating uncertainty in the defender's automated defense system. Uncertainty equals to hesitancy and in a terminal defense phase, it is a guaranteed success for the attacker. Therefore, the goal for the defender should be to have as sophisticated a sensor suite as possible and to attempt an interception at as high an altitude as possible REGARDLESS of the level of technical sophistication of the attacker. Put it this way...You should not care how smart or stupid is your attacker, only that no matter what he brings to bear, yours is much more smarter than what he can bring to the fight.
This is why claims like these...
...Are utterly absurd.
Different ballistic phases may remove different difficulties but at the same time introduces new difficulties. Boost phase intercept is somewhat easy but require the defender to be near the attacker. Ascent and mid-phase intercepts may allow the defender to be secured at home soil but at the expense of reduced reponse time in the event of an attack. Terminal defense, not merely detection and tracking, is the most difficult of all.
With this tool, Western whites (USA, Australia, NATO) and their minions (India, Jap, K-dog) has ZERO chance to spit Tibet from China!
Which tool, the anti missile defence? It has zero affect on the US for sure as its not capable of making a dent on US missile offense against China. This should be for countries for smaller ICBM arsenals. In this case, this system would not affect Indian missiles as well.
Then why does your US always try to deploy such systems around Russia?
Similarly, the Chinese anti-ballistic missile test send a political message. Not that China has a way of defending agaist US missile defence as US missile can easily overwhelm Chinese missile defence.
Which tool, the anti missile defence? It has zero affect on the US for sure as its not capable of making a dent on US missile offense against China. This should be for countries for smaller ICBM arsenals. In this case, this system would not affect Indian missiles as well.
Then why does your US always try to deploy such systems around Russia?
NTI: Global Security Newswire - China Said to Close Gap With U.S. Missile Defense in Monday Test
"In comparison with the U.S., we still have a lot of work to do," Xu said. "In particular, we need more better and more powerful early warning satellites. The missile defense system's base should not be on the ground, but in space" (Stephen Chen, South China Morning Post I, Jan. 13).
Oh my God...!!!! It means ABMs would be installed in the giant spaceship.... woooooooo
Go China Go....
New Recruit
Hey, brother, sorry for my late reply.
Most japanese cannt read and write english well. And most young japanese are not interested in militory or politics... Some of them just use internet to seek AV or chat with girls....... They dont care about their gvot or global context, they just care about how to earn more money.
NTI: Global Security Newswire - China Said to Close Gap With U.S. Missile Defense in Monday Test
"China Said to Close Gap With U.S. Missile Defense in Monday Test
Thursday, Jan. 14, 2010
China's missile defense test on Monday made it the second country to destroy an incoming missile target beyond the Earth's atmosphere, the South China Morning Post reported (see GSN, Jan. 12).
The United States was the first state to demonstrate such a capability, according to the report.
Beijing's accomplishment is proof of its advanced missile defense capabilities and also shows that it now has sophisticated radar technology, the newspaper stated.
Three years ago, China took the international community by surprise when it targeted and shot down one of its old weather satellites with a missile (see GSN, Jan. 19, 2007). This led to worries that the country might seek to remove the satellites of other nations.
The 2007 event was a much simpler feat than Monday's test as the satellite's flight course was known beforehand and because it had no protective capabilities, said retired People's Liberation Army Gen. Xu Guangyu.
This week's missile interception was more complicated as the incoming target's high velocity allowed only minutes for identified and targeted and for an interceptor to be fired.
"Satellite interception is like shooting a beer bottle. Missile interception is like shooting ducks," Xu said. "Monday's announcement marked a milestone in China's active defense strategy. Midcourse missile interception requires superior technology and equipment."
Though some wondered whether the missile interception was just simulated by computers, the U.S. Defense Department said it had ascertained unusual action above the Earth's atmosphere.
China has been following and analyzing U.S. technology for more than 10 years and its navy, army and air force each possess a ballistic missile defense program, according to military research documents.
Monday's successful interception does not mean that development of China's missile defenses is finished, Xu said.
"In comparison with the U.S., we still have a lot of work to do," Xu said. "In particular, we need more better and more powerful early warning satellites. The missile defense system's base should not be on the ground, but in space" (Stephen Chen, South China Morning Post I, Jan. 13).
Kanwa Defense Review editor Andrei Chang said the test could lead nations including India, Japan and Russia to pursue defenses against ballistic missiles, the Post reported. It could also be cause for worry among some nations in the region that possess ICBMs, according to the article (Kristine Kwok, South China Morning Post II, Jan. 13)."