Only chinese can understand.......
Correct, China is a civilization more than a nation. Like past Dynasties and emperors, power may change hands but the people remain the same!
New Recruit
"some film about them" you say.
Remember at first the cultural difference may seem big, but if you always keep this in mind:
1) be polite and thoughtful to their needs
2) control your temper and don't get into sino-nippon politics
3) show the you care, take them out, take good care of them
AND
4) talk to them a lot
If you do this, you will have little problems, even if you are ugly or a little poor!
Haahahaha, I am watching chinese BBS. And they say:
theater missile defense=TMD
midcourse missile=National Missile Defense=NMD
So, TMD and NMD made in china should be
CTMD
CNMD
Thanks for you suggestions. BUT for you ideal of Pakistan and India, I don't think so. China and Japan in culture is same ,do you think we will become one country? NO.
so for Pakistan and India, I don't think so too.......Even they are be controlled by Engliand at the same time......
TMD, NMD, CNMD, CTMD.....
yes, it is always used in argument unfriendly........
When I see them first time, I won't think anything about missile...
You misunderstood my posting. I meant, China is united as a whole. But Pakistan before was several unique regions (Baloch, Sindh, NWFP, etc) and India was and still is really a bunch of loosely knit serfdoms.
And Japan will remain a separate nation for the nest few decades but will join the East Asian Community. Then whether it will become part of China, who knows?
Japan will have to be a part of the Chinese civilization, if not as a part of the Chinese nation state.
New Recruit
What I mean was that before British Raj these places existed but not as a unified place. So I mean a united Pak that is separate from a united India.
And Japan will remain a separate nation for the nest few decades but will join the East Asian Community. Then whether it will become part of China, who knows?
Japan will have to be a part of the Chinese civilization, if not as a part of the Chinese nation state.
wow incredible...... dirty minds thinking Japan also as their territory..... thank god Japanese members are not their on this forum.....or else they will give proper answer to this sort of mentality...
but u dont see the muslims being killed in lakhs in Uighar because when it comes to China it is allowed.....u cant object to it....!!!!!
that is all... the post is not worth more than this to reply....
p.s: talkin about freedom...i think Tibetans and Uighurs also got same rights......ooouch...
and also the manslaughter and ethnic ceansing u talkng about... it is relevent inTibet and Xinxang only.. THE WORLD KNOWS IT....
Tibetans and Uighurs have more freedom than your sorry a$$.
that is all... the post is not worth more than this to reply....
p.s: talkin about freedom...i think Tibetans and Uighurs also got same rights......ooouch...
and also the manslaughter and ethnic ceansing u talkng about... it is relevent inTibet and Xinxang only.. THE WORLD KNOWS IT....
OK...You asked for it...
But am not going into details about these sub-phases.
On the surface, it seems reasonable enough. But not everyone has orbital observation platforms specifically designed to detect rocket IR emissions. China does not have global orbital surveillance capability. To have effective boost phase interception means there must be constant surveillance over the suspected area and that area is usually someone else's sovereign territory. So from a general idea perspective, Kopp is correct. But from an operational perspective, we can dismiss boost phase detection, tracking and interception as out of reach for everyone. For US, we can only detect and track, not intercept.
Perhaps Kopp is a bit out of date in his technical journals...
What Kopp does not say is that mid-course detection and tracking is usually done from the ground. As the bus assembly is briefly in orbit it spins and as it spins, its surface imperfections create radar scintillations, aka 'micro-doppler' effects, making radar detection and tracking very possible for a technologically competent country like the US. A helo's rotors create radar scintillations.
Note the highlighted. Early warheads were quite blunt in the nose section, slowing the warhead's descent. Improved sensor and guidance systems give us sharply pointed warheads to reduce time to target. But this also mean the defender has a base RCS parameter in which he can fine tune his radar to detect a cluster or micro-Doppler effects created by the bus assembly. The spin rate will be constant, therefore any surface irregularities will create radar scintillations that are PREDICTABLE, much like the rhythmic arm movements created by a walking man. Kopp is correct in that this level of sensor sophistication is considerable, but not impossible for any country that is capable of launching an orbital vehicle.
Lay aside decoys and ECM. Assume effective detection and tracking of the descending warhead. What make terminal interception difficult is the compressed response time which give no second chance to the interceptor should it miss. This is why the early nuclear ICBM defense interceptors were themselves nuclear weapons -- assurances of destruction. In a mid-course interception, the bus assembly is IR contrasted against space. Depending on the time of interceptor launch, if the interceptor has its own sensor suite of active radar and IR, correlated against ground based radars, the interceptor would have more time to orient itself against the target for a kinetic kill than when the interception is supposed to be in atmosphere.
Possibly violating territorial airspace. The 'close proximity' include orbiting observation platforms. Or constant airborne surveillance just outside of the potential adversary's territorial airspace. This quite leave boost phase intercepts out of the reach of most countries.
The ascent phase is before apogee. Detection and tracking of the bus assembly can be from ground based radars.
Twenty minutes is more than enough time for a ground based radar to guide the interceptor to the bus assembly. If the interceptor has its own sensor suite, this is more than enough time to orient itself against the target for a kinetic kill. The problem for the interceptor is flight controls and overall avionics sophistication as currently no orbital interceptor is capable of reacquiring the target after a miss. So that twenty minutes, or less, is vital. So while China's mid-course interception is commendable, it hardly qualified as 'most difficult'.
The word 'Theater' is now replaced with 'Terminal', as in 'Terminal High Altitude Area Defense'. The key words here are 'high altitude', as in so high that it is very near being suborbital. The goal here is to extend the interception to when the warhead begins its descent. Terminal interception time is usually less than 30 seconds, versus 20 minutes for mid-course. It is at this point that if so equipped, the warhead will deploy countermeasures. Defense fire control will be heavily stressed by what is called 'closely spaced objects' (CSO). Decoys are usually less massive than the real warheads and will exhibit different radar return behaviors. But by the time the defender's radar determine that it is facing countermeasures, the defenders will have almost no time at all to effect an intercept.
For a sophisticated attacker, the intention should be to create distinct decoys AND unresolved targets, thereby creating uncertainty in the defender's automated defense system. Uncertainty equals to hesitancy and in a terminal defense phase, it is a guaranteed success for the attacker. Therefore, the goal for the defender should be to have as sophisticated a sensor suite as possible and to attempt an interception at as high an altitude as possible REGARDLESS of the level of technical sophistication of the attacker. Put it this way...You should not care how smart or stupid is your attacker, only that no matter what he brings to bear, yours is much more smarter than what he can bring to the fight.
...Are utterly absurd.
