Again, you are trolling.
The DF-31A is a solid fuel ICBM, where most of Russia's ICBMs are liquid fuel.
Russia got the Topol M, but it is single warhead, while the DF-31A is multi warheads.
Russia got the RS-24 Yars, but it was deployed much later than the DF-31A, so the DF-31A couldn't be derived from it.
Only the TEL derived from the Soviet technology, but the missile is cleary not.
" Without Soviet assistance, it would not have been possible for China to make rapid progress in its nuclear and missile endeavours. Some senior Chinese still alive in 1985 blamed Mao for the collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance. One military leader even admitted, "We should apologise to Moscow."
Marshal Nie Rongzhen acknowledged China's immense debt to the Soviet Union. According to him, the Russians provided China with prototypes of several kinds of guided missiles, aircraft, and other military equipment and relevant technical data."
Source : Lewis and Litai, op. cit., pp. 63-4.
Again, you are trolling.
The DF-31A is a solid fuel ICBM, where most of Russia's ICBMs are liquid fuel.
Russia got the Topol M, but it is single warhead, while the DF-31A is multi warheads.
Russia got the RS-24 Yars, but it was deployed much later than the DF-31A, so the DF-31A couldn't be derived from it.
Only the TEL derived from the Soviet technology, but the missile is cleary not.
" China also sought Soviet assistance in the development of missile technology. Under the New Defence Technical Accord of October 15, 1957, Khruschev sent an Army missile battalion with two R-2 missiles (code-named SS-2 in the West), with a range of 590 kilometres, and their associated launching equipment. The nuclear warhead China was then developing was heavier than R-2's throw-weight limit of 950 kilograms. Blueprints and technical documents in 10,151 volumes and missiles were also sent to China for manufacturing, testing, and launching purposes. Soviet missile engineers arrived in Beijing to help China set up its missile industry. China purchased 12 more R-2s. This marked the beginning of China's ballistic missile programme. The missile was now called 1059.
The Soviet Union refused to supply R-12 (its code name in the West was SS-4) because, as a rule, it did not transfer state-of-the-art weapons to allies before its own deployment of at least two more advanced systems. This did not deter the Chinese from obtaining the technology even if it had to be done in an underhand manner. Chinese students studying at the Aviation Institute, Moscow, had acquired a rudimentary knowledge of the missile. This provided the basis for the dongfeng (East Wind) DF-1 missile.
Those students learned more about R-5 because it was included in their courses and was displayed during the October 1957 parade in the Red Square. They copied restricted data and notes and questioned Soviet experts in order to extract vital information about the missile. It was not on the authorised list of sales to China because the Soviet Rocket Forces had deployed its follow-on model, the R-7 that had launched the Soviet Sputnik on October 4, 1957.
Source :
John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, "China's Ballistic Missiles: Technologies, Strategies, Goals",
International Security, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 13-4.
For those who doubt veracity and authenticity of Source
Hua Di is one of the top-ranking Chinese missile scientists. With the blessings of the Chinese government, Hua began in the 1980s a long association with the Centre for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. He left for a short visit to China on December 31,1997 and was arrested shortly after arrival in Beijing. Accused of revealing Chinese secrets, Hua was recently sentenced to 15 years in prison. ( Mike Moore, "The Kafkaesque case of Hua Di", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 1999, pp. 12-14 and Mike Moore "Hua Di convicted", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2000, p.17.)
