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Pakistan's intellectual and political conversation changed after Z.A Bhutto - how did a country imbued with the ethic of Jinnah end up an Islamist hole? How did a country in which every manner of idea was open for discussion and debate, a country which saw itself as a forward looking, natural leader end up allowing regressive, medieval attitudes, a public appeal:
Terms of the debate
Salman Tarik Kureshi
This newspaper’s report on the release from preventive detention of Hafiz Saeed, former head of the Lashkar-e Tayba and the current chief of the Jama’at-ud Dawa, carried an extraordinary statement. I quote, “Dogar submitted that the victims of the Marriott Hotel blast in Islamabad were bad Muslims who drank champagne.” The further bombing this week at the PC Peshawar was doubtless intended to further reduce the inventory of ‘bad Muslims’ in Pakistan; but that is beyond my present point.
Now, one does not know the context of the learned advocate’s statement nor its relevance to the detention of the former Lashkar chief. But consider it as it stands and a number of troubling questions arise.
Is it being implied that the horrific mass murder, arson and violence committed by the perpetrators of the Marriott attack (and by extension the PC bombing and numerous other attacks) was somehow justified because some proportion of the victims were ‘bad Muslims’? Is the established test of such ‘badness’ the consumption of champagne? Could someone on the outside take it upon himself to conclude that those inside (including menial staff, women and children) had all been guzzling champagne? If so, it must follow that cold-blooded murder and terrorism are hallmarks of ‘good’ Muslims who presumably do not indulge in such tippling?
It is still more baffling that a lawyer of the eminence of Mr AK Dogar should have made such a comment. In what manner is the Marriott bombing germane to the detention of Hafiz Saeed, who has never been accused of involvement therein? More, how is the issue of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ Muslims relevant to such an extreme criminal act anyhow?
It seems that issues relating to Islam, ‘good’ or ‘bad’ Muslims and the alleged ‘war against Islam’ around the world today represent one pole in every debate or discussion. On every issue, there is an ‘Islamic’ point of view, built upon belief in a vast Hindu-Jewish-Christian-Atheist-Marxist-Capitalist-Liberal conspiracy against Islam and Pakistan’s ‘Islamic’ Bomb (as if a weapon of mass destruction could carry the label of a faith).
The other pole of debate is that of so-called ‘liberals’ and other such ungodly elements. This dichotomy, it is averred, is inevitable in a Muslim country where all arguments must be refracted through an Islamic prism that breaks them into ‘Islamist’ and ‘Western’ spectrums.
Do Muslims in Pakistan see their political and other problems in these, let us call them green-and-white, terms? Does political debate in Pakistan necessarily divide between the two poles of ‘Islamic’ and what by implication must be labelled ‘un-Islamic’?
Well, the first political statement of the new Pakistani nation, as expressed by its founder addressing the first session of the new parliament, revolved around policy statements on law and order, black-marketing, corruption and nepotism without reference to any kind of ‘religious’ perspective. The latter was dismissed by the Quaid, stating that “All these angularities of the...Hindu community and the Muslim community...will vanish...In course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.”
No wonder the mullahs hurled the sobriquet of ‘Kafir-e-Azam’ at him!
The decade between the Quaid’s death and the seizure of power by General Ayub Khan were years of political drift, confused legislation and weak, short-lived governments. Issues like refugee rehabilitation, land reform, economic growth, constitutional rule, human rights and — most fundamental — the rights of the federating units, were continually discussed and debated but remained unresolved.
The point worth noting is that, during that decade, no specifically ‘Islamic’ nostrum was proposed by way of a solution to these and other national problems. It seems that this kind of ‘Islamic’ thinking was simply not a part of the Pakistani frame of reference, except among a tiny minority.
On the other hand, two especially ‘secular’ establishment figures did hypocritically seek to use Islamist rhetoric and groups for their own purposes and played footsy with the mullahs. One was assassinated by a killer believed to belong to a religio-political party. The other lost control of his too clever manipulations and precipitated serious disorder in the city of Lahore. This resulted in the imposition of martial law and the loss of his own chief ministership.
This decade of disorder was brought to a close in October 1958. General Mohammed Ayub Khan now envisioned a decade of development for Pakistan. Whatever one’s view of or judgement on the Ayub years may be, it is undeniable that the great merit of Ayub’s relatively benign authoritarianism was its executive excellence and unrelenting pursuit of results on the ground. Ayub Khan was able to attract a variety of outstandingly able men into his regime. With their assistance, real economic and social development took place. Even a constitution of sorts was promulgated and elections (of a kind) held.
It is not the purpose of this article to argue the merits or demerits of Ayub Khan’s developmental autocracy. Both were numerous, the latter more so. For all its critical failings, there was grandeur and a sense of magnitude about the Ayubian vision. More, and this is the point, the lively intellectual environment of the time, with differing points of view in energetic contention, and the robust political movements that emerged therefrom, were all unmistakably secular.
The regime’s proponents and supporters argued the merits of good governance, economic growth and stable political structures. Its opponents decried the widening wealth gaps, both between classes and regions, the absence of political freedoms, the throttling of provincial autonomy and the promotion of a personality cult; whether Mujib or Bhutto or Bhashani or Wali Khan, they sought a socio-political revolution that would take Pakistan to a new levell.
I ask my readers to note that the entire political debate, one of cyclonic intensity, revolved around perfectly worldly preoccupations. The key political actors all proposed alternate paths to modernisation and propounded contemporary ideologies. No longing for medievalism here!
More important, no one accused the other of being a ‘bad’ Muslim, or even thought to suggest that any person was ‘wajib-ul qatal’. The Islamic preoccupation (that so seems to obsess us today) was simply not one of the terms of the debate — not even on the part of the religio-political parties themselves.
And so it remained through the fourteen years of Ayub and Yahya and the five years of Bhutto that followed. It was after the illegitimate overthrow of the latter that one first heard the Satanic Usurper hissing and snarling on the media about his preference for what he styled as ‘an Islamic system’. It is the frightful institutions he thereafter promoted and the retrograde educational systems he erected that have irrevocably poisoned the intellectual environment of the land and given birth to today’s bigoted, obscurantist political culture and its polluted fallout of violent insurgency, terrorism and cold-blooded mass murder.
The true terms of the debate between stasis and change, authoritarianism and democracy, stagnation and dynamism, have been successfully — and deliberately — obscured by this obsession.
The writer is a marketing consultant based in Karachi. He is also a poet
Terms of the debate
Salman Tarik Kureshi
This newspaper’s report on the release from preventive detention of Hafiz Saeed, former head of the Lashkar-e Tayba and the current chief of the Jama’at-ud Dawa, carried an extraordinary statement. I quote, “Dogar submitted that the victims of the Marriott Hotel blast in Islamabad were bad Muslims who drank champagne.” The further bombing this week at the PC Peshawar was doubtless intended to further reduce the inventory of ‘bad Muslims’ in Pakistan; but that is beyond my present point.
Now, one does not know the context of the learned advocate’s statement nor its relevance to the detention of the former Lashkar chief. But consider it as it stands and a number of troubling questions arise.
Is it being implied that the horrific mass murder, arson and violence committed by the perpetrators of the Marriott attack (and by extension the PC bombing and numerous other attacks) was somehow justified because some proportion of the victims were ‘bad Muslims’? Is the established test of such ‘badness’ the consumption of champagne? Could someone on the outside take it upon himself to conclude that those inside (including menial staff, women and children) had all been guzzling champagne? If so, it must follow that cold-blooded murder and terrorism are hallmarks of ‘good’ Muslims who presumably do not indulge in such tippling?
It is still more baffling that a lawyer of the eminence of Mr AK Dogar should have made such a comment. In what manner is the Marriott bombing germane to the detention of Hafiz Saeed, who has never been accused of involvement therein? More, how is the issue of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ Muslims relevant to such an extreme criminal act anyhow?
It seems that issues relating to Islam, ‘good’ or ‘bad’ Muslims and the alleged ‘war against Islam’ around the world today represent one pole in every debate or discussion. On every issue, there is an ‘Islamic’ point of view, built upon belief in a vast Hindu-Jewish-Christian-Atheist-Marxist-Capitalist-Liberal conspiracy against Islam and Pakistan’s ‘Islamic’ Bomb (as if a weapon of mass destruction could carry the label of a faith).
The other pole of debate is that of so-called ‘liberals’ and other such ungodly elements. This dichotomy, it is averred, is inevitable in a Muslim country where all arguments must be refracted through an Islamic prism that breaks them into ‘Islamist’ and ‘Western’ spectrums.
Do Muslims in Pakistan see their political and other problems in these, let us call them green-and-white, terms? Does political debate in Pakistan necessarily divide between the two poles of ‘Islamic’ and what by implication must be labelled ‘un-Islamic’?
Well, the first political statement of the new Pakistani nation, as expressed by its founder addressing the first session of the new parliament, revolved around policy statements on law and order, black-marketing, corruption and nepotism without reference to any kind of ‘religious’ perspective. The latter was dismissed by the Quaid, stating that “All these angularities of the...Hindu community and the Muslim community...will vanish...In course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.”
No wonder the mullahs hurled the sobriquet of ‘Kafir-e-Azam’ at him!
The decade between the Quaid’s death and the seizure of power by General Ayub Khan were years of political drift, confused legislation and weak, short-lived governments. Issues like refugee rehabilitation, land reform, economic growth, constitutional rule, human rights and — most fundamental — the rights of the federating units, were continually discussed and debated but remained unresolved.
The point worth noting is that, during that decade, no specifically ‘Islamic’ nostrum was proposed by way of a solution to these and other national problems. It seems that this kind of ‘Islamic’ thinking was simply not a part of the Pakistani frame of reference, except among a tiny minority.
On the other hand, two especially ‘secular’ establishment figures did hypocritically seek to use Islamist rhetoric and groups for their own purposes and played footsy with the mullahs. One was assassinated by a killer believed to belong to a religio-political party. The other lost control of his too clever manipulations and precipitated serious disorder in the city of Lahore. This resulted in the imposition of martial law and the loss of his own chief ministership.
This decade of disorder was brought to a close in October 1958. General Mohammed Ayub Khan now envisioned a decade of development for Pakistan. Whatever one’s view of or judgement on the Ayub years may be, it is undeniable that the great merit of Ayub’s relatively benign authoritarianism was its executive excellence and unrelenting pursuit of results on the ground. Ayub Khan was able to attract a variety of outstandingly able men into his regime. With their assistance, real economic and social development took place. Even a constitution of sorts was promulgated and elections (of a kind) held.
It is not the purpose of this article to argue the merits or demerits of Ayub Khan’s developmental autocracy. Both were numerous, the latter more so. For all its critical failings, there was grandeur and a sense of magnitude about the Ayubian vision. More, and this is the point, the lively intellectual environment of the time, with differing points of view in energetic contention, and the robust political movements that emerged therefrom, were all unmistakably secular.
The regime’s proponents and supporters argued the merits of good governance, economic growth and stable political structures. Its opponents decried the widening wealth gaps, both between classes and regions, the absence of political freedoms, the throttling of provincial autonomy and the promotion of a personality cult; whether Mujib or Bhutto or Bhashani or Wali Khan, they sought a socio-political revolution that would take Pakistan to a new levell.
I ask my readers to note that the entire political debate, one of cyclonic intensity, revolved around perfectly worldly preoccupations. The key political actors all proposed alternate paths to modernisation and propounded contemporary ideologies. No longing for medievalism here!
More important, no one accused the other of being a ‘bad’ Muslim, or even thought to suggest that any person was ‘wajib-ul qatal’. The Islamic preoccupation (that so seems to obsess us today) was simply not one of the terms of the debate — not even on the part of the religio-political parties themselves.
And so it remained through the fourteen years of Ayub and Yahya and the five years of Bhutto that followed. It was after the illegitimate overthrow of the latter that one first heard the Satanic Usurper hissing and snarling on the media about his preference for what he styled as ‘an Islamic system’. It is the frightful institutions he thereafter promoted and the retrograde educational systems he erected that have irrevocably poisoned the intellectual environment of the land and given birth to today’s bigoted, obscurantist political culture and its polluted fallout of violent insurgency, terrorism and cold-blooded mass murder.
The true terms of the debate between stasis and change, authoritarianism and democracy, stagnation and dynamism, have been successfully — and deliberately — obscured by this obsession.
The writer is a marketing consultant based in Karachi. He is also a poet
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