Can China repeat its 1962 military humiliation of India?

[ChinaToday]

I think japan can repeat what it did to china ..but i have doubts over your ability to do the same against india

Here come cheer leader number 1

 

[ChinaToday]

I just wonder what type of humans these Chinese are. If there was any humiliation, it was for the Chinese not Indians because it is them who lost their lands (India only lost a few more soldiers than them) to India. I think their CCP has brainwashed them to the extent that they think they won the war.

Sorry mate we chinese dont call it a humiliation we called it The crushing moment: China India 1962 war - Part 1

 

[INDIC]

Here come cheer leader number 1

I think Chinese cheerleaders haven't commented yet. Let us wait.

 

[Major Shaitan Singh]

China will never be able to repeat 1962....Again end of question (cannot predict on Congress Govt).

In 1962 India did not had experience in rugged and mountain warfare

To repeat 1962 China has to kill more 50k Soldier which will breach Nuclear Threshold.

Now we have 4 mountain division (Approx 200k Soldiers), Light Tanks (Approx 500), Attack Coppers (50), multi-rockects (Pinaka and Smerch) and battle field missile(Nirbhay) (10k), Para-troops (20k)... now we have better transportation link etc.

Mighty Airforce

SU 30MKI
MIG 29K
MIG 21
Mirage
Jaguar
Transport Aircraft


Missile Battery

Agni
Prithvi
Shaurya
Brahmos
Nirbhay

Naval Blockade of Indian Ocean

 

[Enemy]

+ numbers too matters 80k chinese fighting with 10k indian and our kill ratio was better and we still have arunachal

Don't worry, Indian army has taken all necessary measures. We have followed the strategy of Lebensraum in Arunachal Pradesh as a huge number of High Caste Aryan Indians of Haryana, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar have been deported to Arunachal Pradesh and other northeast states. They were encouraged to settle in those lands because the govt provided subsidies and other financial assistance. These people will be available in case there is need for more army recruits. The low caste mongoloid tribals are, on the other hand, encouraged to move to other parts of India so that their number in those areas gets reduced. This is a demographic strategy to make sure that China is not able to exploit any ethnic brotherhood in case of conflict.

 

[Enemy]

Sorry mate we chinese dont call it a humiliation we called it The crushing moment: China India 1962 war - Part 1

You don't have the IQ to understand why I said its a mere propaganda to claim India lost in 1962 war despite the fact that India was able to actually snatch lands from China and not the other way around. You would have understood this fact had you not been a Chinese.

 

[PlanetWarrior]

Leaving aside all the patriotism and blah blah, India was ill prepared for 1962. The problem was that we had a PM who was too busy cheering "Hindi - Chini bhai bhai" instead of watching our backside. Let that be a lesson to India to never snooze on the asuumption that we have friendly relations with our neighbours. Keep the swords sharpened at all times

 

[IND151]

well the possibility of another Sino India war is low-as of now

this situation may change, depending on thinking of new Chinese leadership- which has taken charge recently and changing realities of Asia

 

[Alphacharlie]

Can the history of India’s humiliation at the hands of China in 1962 repeat itself? As we approach the 50th anniversary of the humiliation next month, we have to analyse this question in depth in our governmental national security community as well as outside. It is important for the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) to organise a series of brainstorming on this subject with the participation of experts on China from the government and outside.

The starting point of such a brainstorming has to be a presumption that the present efforts to solve our border dispute with China through talks may not succeed and that we may be confronted with a fresh military confrontation in the future. Should such a confrontation arise, are we better prepared to face it today than we were in 1962? If not, what are the deficiencies, and how do we remove them?

It is important for us to objectively identify the factors that led to the 1962 humiliation and examine to what extent they have been addressed. It is also important to foresee what kind of new factors that were not seen in 1962 could arise and what implications they could have for our capabilities.

It is my view that our ability to prevent another humiliation in the future would depend upon our trans-Himalayan military strategy and capability as it did in 1962. The roles of the Army and the Air Force in such a strategy will be pre-eminent. The role of the Navy will be marginal. It will be our trans-Himalayan strategic mindset and tactical thinking that will determine the future course of any new military confrontation with China as it did in 1962.

I would identify the following as the basic causes of our humiliation of 1962:

(a) Though our civilian and military intelligence agencies had a satisfactory capability to collect infrastructure intelligence from Tibet, their capability to collect war indicators from Tibet was very poor. They detected in time the clandestine Chinese construction of roads such as the Aksai Chin road in the Western sector, but they missed the Chinese preparations for a military foray into our territory. The Chinese attack on our positions must have been preceded by weeks, if not months, of preparations on the ground in Tibet. The war indicators caused by such preparations were missed by our intelligence agencies.

(b) Our capability to analyse and assess China-related intelligence was inadequate. Even the limited intelligence flowing from Tibet from human and technical sources was not subjected to vigorous analysis and assessment. Our knowledge and assessment of the Chinese military thinking and mindset were poor. We hardly knew anything about the India expertise in the PLA and the Chinese intelligence. As a result, we seriously underestimated the Chinese political and military will to assert their ground interests across the Himalayas and over-assessed and over-projected our capability to anticipate and neutralise any Chinese assertion of their will.

(c) Inadequate professionalism in our armed forces and their inability to foresee different scenarios that could arise and identify the available options. This lack of professionalism was seen right across the board—from the failure to procure the military stores that would be required for a trans-Himalayan war to re-adapting the training of our officers. The Army went into war with very little training and experience in mountain warfare and with very few equipment for such a warfare.

(d) The inexperience of our political leadership in military-related decision-making and in enforcing the implementation of the decisions taken.

My assessment of the present position regarding these factors is as follows:

(a) Our intelligence collection capability in Tibet has improved. Our intelligence agencies are unlikely to miss war indicators in Tibet as badly as they did in 1962.

(b) Our analysis and assessment capability has improved over what it was in 1962, but continues to be inadequate. The Chinese language capability of our national security community is worse than what it was in 1962 and in the years immediately thereafter. Our ability to understand and analyse the Chinese military mindset and thinking continues to be poor. Whatever capability we have built up in this regard has been largely influenced by Western thinking and analysis without an independent application of our mind. Our analysis and assessment infrastructure in respect of China-related intelligence lags behind our analysis and assessment infrastructure in respect of Pakistan-related intelligence. We can anticipate, analyse and counter Pakistan better than we can China. There are wild swings in our assessments on China—from alarmism on the one side to total complacency on the other.

(c) The professionalism of our armed forces has improved. They are better equipped, better trained and better led for a trans-Himalayan warfare today. But there is a lack of convergence of thinking between the Army and the Air Force on the one side and the Navy on the other as to what China implies for our national security and armed forces. There is inadequate integrated joint staff thinking in the armed forces as a whole on China. There is a newly-acquired fascination for naval power and an inadequate appreciation of the continuing importance of military (Army related) and air power.

(d) The understanding of our political class in matters relating to strategic decision-making on China is inadequate though it is better than what it was in 1962 and the years before. There is a clear understanding in our political class of China as a political and economic competitor, but inadequate comprehension of China as a military factor.

Two new factors that have made their appearance since 1962 have not received adequate attention in our national security community:

(a) The Chinese search for alternative means of taking India by surprise. In 1962, they took us by surprise because our intelligence agencies had little capability for collecting war indictors from the ground in Tibet. The Chinese no longer enjoy this advantage. The increasing Chinese emphasis on the role of the helicopter-borne operations of their Army has to be seen in the context of their search for new means of taking India by surprise—particularly in Arunachal Pradesh. The equipping and training of the copter wing of their Army is receiving increasing attention with some major exercises already noticed.

(b) The Chinese testing and fine-tuning of integrated techniques of an Army-Air Force role in defending Tibet from external threats and in asserting their will trans-Himalayas. There has been an increase in the number of Air Force exercises in Tibet. There is inadequate knowledge of Chinese Air Force exercises in Yunnan, but my surmise is that in any future military confrontation with India, the Chinese will use their Air Force defensively from Tibet and offensively from Yunnan.

In 1962, the entire North Myanmar was a political, administrative and military vacuum. The Myanmar government presence has since improved in the Rakhine (old Arakan) and Chin areas bordering Bangladesh, but remains the same in the Kachin State bordering Yunnan. The Kachin State and Yunnan are very important in any trans-Himalayan military strategy. We continue to neglect these two important regions from the point of view of our intelligence coverage as we were doing before 1962. Kachin State is important for defending our North-East in any new confrontation with China. Rakhine State is important for our Indian Ocean objectives and our energy security.

I do not consider it necessary to touch upon the nuclear aspect in this analysis. It has to be discussed in camera.

Can China repeat its 1962 military humiliation of India? | Firstpost

Thank you China for inflicting 1962 Defeat on us Because of which we started raising our Military China was a Dear Friend which attacked us.

Each and Every war after 1962 was astounding sucess 1965 (Not Major Victory), 1971,1984,1999

In 1962 Indian Army Strength stood at Mere 80,000 troops which fought against an Army which was 1.2 Million.

During 1965 War Indian Regiments -Rajput/ Gorkha stood till last man

2nd Rajput under the command of Lt. Col. M.S. Rikh were at Walong in early 1962 and were moved to the banks of the Namka Chu river by October 10 as a part of 7 Infantry Brigade. The brigade was stretched on a twelve mile front along the Namka Chu, with the marching time from one end to the other being five days. A massive assault came on the Rajput front and in the fierce fighting that ensured, in spite of heavy odds against them the Rajputs did not give in and fought until last man standing

Major Dharam Thapa- Repulsed 3 Attacks by China and stood till last bullet then went on Bayonet charging.

Jaswant Singh Rawat hammered Chinese attacks. There are many more stories of Valour - where we fought till last bullet.

PLA never won any war when they fought against real armies in Past.

Most Important Wars were pure DEFEAT

1950-1954 Korea War where PLA was defeated along with NKA and pushed too 36th Parallel with 150,000 casualties
1969 to 1978 - Sino Soviet Border Conflict - Over 9000 killed.
1967/87 - Sino India Border skirmishes - PLA couldnt move ahead.

Anyone boasting can walk over in living in Illusion...

IAF - 660 Fighters after sqn being number plated, 190 MKIs
IN - 8 Destroyer, 15 Frigates, 24 Corvettes, 15 Subs
Army - Standing Army 1.3 Million + 3,50000 BSF + 30000 Assam Rifles, 1,50000 ITBP, 50,000 (Ladakh Scouts/Arunachal Scouts). Not Including Paramilitary which stand at 1.2 Million

Lets not Talk nukes as its MAD.

 

[Alphacharlie]

I feel pity for Indians. You are really our weakest neighbour. We want make peace with you but should not invite us to humiliate you a second time.

You are much poorer, less developed, not respected as G8 or UN5, largest importer of weapons, worlds' focus of toilet problems...

Let the Chinese play the 21 century and Indians the 22 century...

No Wonder Philipines gave you a Boot

 

[Paan Singh]

I feel pity for Indians. You are really our weakest neighbour. We want make peace with you but should not invite us to humiliate you a second time.

You are much poorer, less developed, not respected as G8 or UN5, largest importer of weapons, worlds' focus of toilet problems...

Let the Chinese play the 21 century and Indians the 22 century...

 

[Bobby]

In 1962 ...China was poor..means nothing to loose in any war but now they are growing and want to become no. 1.....if they go to war so they have everything to loose...they can lose their development path....so no need to fear them....Chinese are good in giving warning only

 

[Sanchez]

I love your Indian babies...

 

[KingMamba]

B Raman is a trained diplomat and he knows what to say in public and what not. His tactic is similar to what H S Wong did after the bombing of Shanghai South Station to gain world wide sympathy and support. But in reality, in 1962, neither India nor China lost the war as the war could not come to its culminating point. It was, however, India which gained more than what China could achieve as it lost its lands to India. India lost more lives but was able to snatch lands from the Chinese. So, the Indian sacrifice of lives was worth of it. Its a propaganda to say that India lost the war in 1962 because if anybody examines the course of war, he will surely understand that the war stopped before its natural ending. It was like cease fire and that is why still there is LAC.

But what will happen the moment this ceasefire like situation comes to an end? I have analysed that situation in this thread: Please read and comment.

http://www.defence.pk/forums/world-...paradrop-training-near-lac-2.html#post3417112

Um no you guys lost as simple as that. Perhaps you should do some research as to why the Chinese called a ceasefire in the first place? Why did they RETURN the lands in NE India? You guys did not take any lands they vacated it when they called the ceasefire. Also why oh why did the Chinese maintain their hold over Aksai Chin and the strategic importance of that land?? Why did India begin militarizing after that war if they were not defeated?? Last but not least why Mao Zedong was a military genius and what have we learned from the 1962 war?

 

[Tshering22]

Tezpur was evacuated in advance because the entire northeast India was considered as the theater of war by the Indian strategists. It does not necessarily mean Chinese had the intention to come to Tezpur. And also, Indians from Uttar Pradesh and Bihar who had earlier settled in Assam were temporarily evacuated not the Chinese looking tribals or low caste mountain dwellers of Assam and other northeast states. Please study more about that evacuation.

You better mind your language kid. What the fcuk do you mean "Chinese looking" and "low caste"?