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Behind the CeaseFireLine (CFL) ......

That was an interesting concept. Quite unfortunate that it couldn’t be taken to completion

I'm hoping with panzerkiel here, we can make more use of it. I think simply taking some example sectors in more detail is best way forward.

He can simply instruct me which terrain to zoom in for and how much of each kind of stuff need be put in the area and where etc.....to illustrate further what hes getting at in the posts he has been making.
 
I'm hoping with panzerkiel here, we can make more use of it. I think simply taking some example sectors in more detail is best way forward.

He can simply instruct me which terrain to zoom in for and how much of each kind of stuff need be put in the area and where etc.....to illustrate further what hes getting at in the posts he has been making.

for that you’ll also need more info on the Indian side. Additionally, the mods will have to allow it. Not a lot were enthusiastic about your last effort
 
for that you’ll also need more info on the Indian side.

Oh Panzerkiel seems well versed on typical force levels and force mixes for both sides (somewhat shockingly or maybe not so shockingly given what his job is) at the more local sectoral resolution.

So basically rather than brigade (X) and division (XX) size mapping (like I did for the very macro broad picture), we can simply look at maybe regiment(III)-battalion(II)-company(I) kind of thing (somewhat hypothetical ofc for purpose of illustration) and simply have such dotted in a sector in some way he thinks best and proper....and we take every thing from rather than the 100 km feature zoom to like 10 km etc. Basically order of magnitude kind of stuff.

It will basically bring the terrain + logistical reserve situation into play a lot more, which is very key.
 
Oh Panzerkiel seems well versed on typical force levels and force mixes for both sides (somewhat shockingly or maybe not so shockingly given what his job is) at the more local sectoral resolution.

So basically rather than brigade (X) and division (XX) size mapping (like I did for the very macro broad picture), we can simply look at maybe regiment(III)-battalion(II)-company(I) kind of thing (somewhat hypothetical ofc for purpose of illustration) and simply have such dotted in a sector in some way he thinks best and proper....and we take every thing from rather than the 100 km feature zoom to like 10 km etc. Basically order of magnitude kind of stuff.

It will basically bring the terrain + logistical reserve situation into play a lot more, which is very key.

That would be an interesting read. Can’t wait for it to happen. Maybe revive the old thread. It had some very interesting discussions
 
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You can see just how hopeless inadequate the ORBAT map I made is to capture sense of the actual deployment situation (to model any worthwhile tactics etc). It is at best maybe paperweight use for overall strengths present, and even those are not really equivalent 1:1 way between both sides. (BTW for interest of zoom, i left out chunk above this map snapshot that has FCNA way above in skardu I believe).

It may be ok starting point to zoom into a specific sector and break things up in more micro way to get an idea of the terrain etc... as Panzerkiel has stated a few times already now.

I propose lets pick one such sector and get to it. Maybe panzerkiel can give a list of some options, members can vote on it here (or simply panzerkiel can pick a sector himself he thinks is most apt to illustrate)...and then we can zoom into the area and I can make some smaller formations etc for better resolution of the situation present.

It's not as bad as all that. It needs detailing in specific sectors.
 
If an Indian would fill in the Indian side (hypothetically) I'm sure someone from the Pak side can fill in the orbat on the Pak side.
 
That was an interesting concept. Quite unfortunate that it couldn’t be taken to completion

What exactly happened?

I'm hoping with panzerkiel here, we can make more use of it. I think simply taking some example sectors in more detail is best way forward.

He can simply instruct me which terrain to zoom in for and how much of each kind of stuff need be put in the area and where etc.....to illustrate further what hes getting at in the posts he has been making.

What was the objective of this previous exercise undertaken ?
 
What exactly happened?

It was to be a debate on the various offensive/defensive options available for both IA and PA. It was spearheaded by @Signalian @Gryphon @Joe Shearer with @Nilgiri providing graphical representation of various IA and PA formations on maps. Various mods also invited but they were not too keen on the idea and the whole thing fizzled out. Let me find its thread and share.

@PanzerKiel
This was the thread.
https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/retaking-kashmir-after-70-years.603628/page-20
 
It was to be a debate on the various offensive/defensive options available for both IA and PA. It was spearheaded by @Signalian @Gryphon @Joe Shearer with @Nilgiri providing graphical representation of various IA and PA formations on maps. Various mods also invited but they were not too keen on the idea and the whole thing fizzled out. Let me find its thread and share.

@PanzerKiel
This was the thread.
https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/retaking-kashmir-after-70-years.603628/page-20

I also tried to pitch in, however appeared to me that everyone lost interest.....
 
It was to be a debate on the various offensive/defensive options available for both IA and PA. It was spearheaded by @Signalian @Gryphon @Joe Shearer with @Nilgiri providing graphical representation of various IA and PA formations on maps. Various mods also invited but they were not too keen on the idea and the whole thing fizzled out. Let me find its thread and share.

@PanzerKiel
This was the thread.
https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/retaking-kashmir-after-70-years.603628/page-20

Perhaps it would be reasonable to call it a discussion, rather than a debate; it was essentially an effort to update our information regarding the larger formations, an effort that would show us where the mass of the armed forces was concentrated.

@Nilgiri has mentioned drilling down to a more detailed level than the division; this is not a comfortable proposition, for two reasons.

First, it is inappropriate; recall that I was providing all the information about the Indian Army, and recall also that there are numerous 'friends' among the Indian members who would be all too willing to cry 'foul' (that they themselves do not have even a clue as to what is going on is, to them, neither here nor there; they are here as good IT cell warriors with clearly defined objectives, and military analysis and information gathering - for private purposes - or discussions on military history have nothing to do with those objectives).

Second, it is best to let fanboy imaginations range unchecked; an example is the ardent desire expressed to conquer Kathiawad by Aerial Effect Vehicles, and the associated question as to the availability of Indian Army troops on the peninsula. It had apparently been decided that there were none, so a conscript army landed on the beaches and mounted on hovercraft would sweep through the area, herding all armed police and other forces before them, before dealing a death-blow to the kaffir in his lair in Ahmedabad.

The discussion started with sober members such as @Gryphon and @Signalian, who were able to control their patriotic exuberance long enough to part with the formation names and probable locations. However the possibility of enthusiasts hijacking the whole discussion and taking it off to what I understand are war-gaming software packages like DCS, where great battles have been fought and won, and great conquerors and liberators have made their appearance, was clearly present. Don't want to be there..

What next?

Let's see what people want to do.

I also tried to pitch in, however appeared to me that everyone lost interest.....

To be honest, it was slightly different.

Our inputs were not initially clear enough for conversion into situation maps, and there was a bit of back-and-forth between @Nilgiri and ourselves before the picture became clear, and he got something to work with. That led to a gradual erosion of interest and a drop in momentum.

When @PanzerKiel suggested that this be continued, I was reluctant only from one point of view: that of drilling down below division level. The reasons for that are the personal consequences, and also the sheer volatility of the present situation.

There is a major reform going on, some of it good, most of it indifferent, and a small part that is enough to destroy the military, and permanently undermine the national defence situation. Doctrine has been hauled out of its dusty recesses, and has lost its usual position as a destroyer of officer careers for those who fail to understand it or to master the expression of it sufficiently ably to impress the instructors.

So that is a second reason why I was reluctant to go into too much detail.

As a personal exercise, the mapping of the force requirements for a constrained by major principles kind of defence has been done, offline. In doing that, the exact analogy between the position of the Indian Army in Kashmir, and the PLA in Xijang leapt out of the pages. Both control a high-altitude plain; both have to take to advancing through ravines and stream-beds to take the fight to the enemy; both face an enemy very comfortable in its location within a low-altitude plain, bursting at the seams with excellent road networks. We could do with more roads parallel to the division line between the two combatant forces, in Kashmir, but we have started doing it, both in Kashmir/Ladakh and in the north-east.

There is also an effort at assessing the realistic force requirements of the para-military forces fronting the Army in the guarding of Indian borders. One surprising metric that emerged, just to give an example, is that the frontage covered from Himachal to Arunachal is roughly 40 rifles per km.; about a platoon + for every km of border. Since people can't work around the clock, this effectively means a platoon every 3 kms! Still an astounding ratio. [EDIT: This omits the overlapping high-altitude jurisdiction of the ITBP, whose strength of 90,000 (approx.) is spread across 3,500 kms. of border, another 25 per km., effectively another 25 per 3 kms. The total coverage between them and the SSB works out to 65 jawans per 3 kms., the equivalent of two platoons]. All this without counting the BSF, responsible for guarding the entire border between India and Pakistan, 3,300 kms, and another 740 kms of Line of Control (LOC), that comes to except for certain segments in Kargil and in Siachen, directly handled by the Army, {edit and 4,200 kms between India and Bangladesh}; the BSF coverage comes to 31 jawans per km., or effectively 31 jawans (a platoon) per 3 kms.

[EDIT - These numbers also give us an idea of the priorities set for the two borders, the ones with Pakistan and with Bangladesh, and the one with the PRC. The Myanmar border, guarded by the Assam Rifles, is the last of India's land borders, and is an open, porous border, that is best handled by close cooperation with the Myanmar Armed Forces, one reason why we hunker down and accept the irritation of the Bangladesh authorities at our close working relations with the Myanmarese.[END EDIT]

We have those numbers deployed today, as we read and write these, and do not need harum-scarum ideas to supplement our forces. Indeed, the exercise mapping the borders, the actual force requirements, is hoped to yield scope for reduction, but @PanzerKiel has taken the wind out of the sails of this exercise by giving us the logic behind several real-life scenarios.

So the exercise is still going on, but in the absence of encouragement and the apprehension of hostility, in private, behind closed doors.
 
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Ah but Joe likes to troll about things indirectly, however I won't go hard on him because he is an older gentleman.

Just to put the record straight, conscript forces did not participate in the Bhuj salient scenario, they remained support unit in reserve and defensive positions. The scenario painted an assault from 7 different vectors including air assault (heliborne / paratrooper), ambhibious landing (marines), commandos from x craft, direct land attack salient, around the lake, over the lake (deridingly discussed by joe) with artillery support from Karunjhar mountains. None of the assaulting forces presented were conscripted. Sometimes ideology makes us blind and unable to read text and understand what is written.

That the Soviets and current PLA use hovercrafts of a wide variety of sizes must have missed some. Or conversely, they think the USSR and China are just dumb people.
 
It was to be a debate on the various offensive/defensive options available for both IA and PA. It was spearheaded by @Signalian @Gryphon @Joe Shearer with @Nilgiri providing graphical representation of various IA and PA formations on maps. Various mods also invited but they were not too keen on the idea and the whole thing fizzled out. Let me find its thread and share.

@PanzerKiel
This was the thread.
https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/retaking-kashmir-after-70-years.603628/page-20

Coming to the detailed analysis in which you and @Nilgiri have expressed interest, in (sorry for split infinitives), if it were possible to get comments from our very knowledgeable and articulate friend on the following areas in the Leh-Gurdaspur line, it would be fascinating.
  1. Turtuk;
  2. Kargil-Dras, including the almost laughable insistence on both sides to refuse to mention the Deosai National Park, notwithstanding the mysterious, very energetic activities of the PA in the vicinity;
  3. The several examples of 'finger' corridors, a logistical phenomenon very nicely articulated by our friend:
    1. Bandipora - Kilshay
    2. Bandipora (or Baramulla directly) - Teetwal
    3. Baramulla - Uri
    4. Shopian - Poonch
    5. Rajauri - Poonch
  4. The dangers to the IA from the proximity of the beautiful communications set up in AJK
  5. The situation in Akhnoor-Chhamb, already mentioned by him in laconic terms
  6. The consequential weakness in the line Akhnoor- Ajnala;
The Indian defence forces strongest weapon (already mentioned) is its ability to create infrastructure. The recent road up to Daulat Beg Oldi is an example; it replicates the main roadway between Jammu and Kargil. Much, much more remains to be done; first, to create parallel roads another 50 to 100 kms inwards from the Dras - Leh roadway, second, to create ring roads, for instance, Shopian - Gulmarg - Baramulla (avoiding Sopore) - Handwara - Bandipora, and circling down, Sonamarg - Pahalgam back to the Banihal. These links are needed to form the palm to the fingers to be seen here:
  1. Shopian - Poonch
  2. Srinagar - Gulmarg
  3. Srinagar - Baramula
  4. Srinagar - Sopore
  5. Sopore - Teetwal (covers a number of finger segments)
The IA lacks everything; they live in tent camps, no barracks, no defences other than perimeter patrolling, no air defence (the Air Force has collared everything to defend its air bases), no natural defences, located close to civilian locations with the threat of collateral damages, no artillery parks except commandeered school playgrounds (the Panzgam example is festering inside me, so this example keeps poppping out at moments of stress), no defended helipads, no airstrips closer than Kargil outside Srinagar.....

Unfortunately, most of the land needed for building military infrastructure is land used for high-value apple growing, and nobody is selling; in the south, it is even worse, with the saffron fields producing the world's most expensive spice. Exercising eminent domain will create yet another festering sore; it is not advised.

Building in the rocky mountain fastnesses outside the vale is easy enough; it becomes a rock-blasting exercise, but then, what about the water? What about the consequences to a very delicate ecology? Building inside the vale pisses off the apple-growers; building inside the Ladakh hinterland pisses off the ecologically-sensitised Ladakhi.

Might be best just to hand over the whole shooting match to those who want it so desperately, and withdraw to shortened and hugely improved lines of communications, and a far more manageable situation. Two Army Corps, including the monstrous XVI Corps, get released, the pressure on Pakistan in the international border and working border sections increases to that extent (unfortunately there will be major expense in converting mountain divisions to mechanised infantry; an alternative would be shifting all these to the LAC); there will be sharply increased revenue available for building infrastructure from Sri Ganganagar downwards.

But Manstein didn't get his druthers; the Indian Army won't, either.
 
Exercising eminent domain will create yet another festering sore; it is not advised.

This is kind of thing that I like to present as argument, when people come to me hollering why can't we just do the Chinese-Xinjiang model in Kashmir.

The system has been set up certain way for a reason. Apples and Oranges literally.
 
This is kind of thing that I like to present as argument, when people come to me hollering why can't we just do the Chinese-Xinjiang model in Kashmir.

The system has been set up certain way for a reason. Apples and Oranges literally.

I hate those buckos who think they can treat our own citizens, Kashmiris, as dogs and cats, and treat Kashmir as a word in their political slogans during election campaigns.

Ah but Joe likes to troll about things indirectly, however I won't go hard on him because he is an older gentleman.

Just to put the record straight, conscript forces did not participate in the Bhuj salient scenario, they remained support unit in reserve and defensive positions. The scenario painted an assault from 7 different vectors including air assault (heliborne / paratrooper), ambhibious landing (marines), commandos from x craft, direct land attack salient, around the lake, over the lake (deridingly discussed by joe) with artillery support from Karunjhar mountains. None of the assaulting forces presented were conscripted. Sometimes ideology makes us blind and unable to read text and understand what is written.

That the Soviets and current PLA use hovercrafts of a wide variety of sizes must have missed some. Or conversely, they think the USSR and China are just dumb people.

Of course the Russians (the USSR vanished some years ago, but I belong to an older generation that doesn't get muddled so quickly so frequently) and those others are dumb people. If not, they would not be taking such interest in ambhibious landings, when the rest of the world has gone in for amphibious landings.
 

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