Coming to the detailed analysis in which you and
@Nilgiri have expressed interest,
in (sorry for split infinitives), if it were possible to get comments from our very knowledgeable and articulate friend on the following areas in the Leh-Gurdaspur line, it would be fascinating.
- Turtuk;
- Kargil-Dras, including the almost laughable insistence on both sides to refuse to mention the Deosai National Park, notwithstanding the mysterious, very energetic activities of the PA in the vicinity;
- The several examples of 'finger' corridors, a logistical phenomenon very nicely articulated by our friend:
- Bandipora - Kilshay
- Bandipora (or Baramulla directly) - Teetwal
- Baramulla - Uri
- Shopian - Poonch
- Rajauri - Poonch
- The dangers to the IA from the proximity of the beautiful communications set up in AJK
- The situation in Akhnoor-Chhamb, already mentioned by him in laconic terms
- The consequential weakness in the line Akhnoor- Ajnala;
The Indian defence forces strongest weapon (already mentioned) is its ability to create infrastructure. The recent road up to Daulat Beg Oldi is an example; it replicates the main roadway between Jammu and Kargil. Much, much more remains to be done; first, to create parallel roads another 50 to 100 kms inwards from the Dras - Leh roadway, second, to create ring roads, for instance, Shopian - Gulmarg - Baramulla (avoiding Sopore) - Handwara - Bandipora, and circling down, Sonamarg - Pahalgam back to the Banihal. These links are needed to form the palm to the fingers to be seen here:
- Shopian - Poonch
- Srinagar - Gulmarg
- Srinagar - Baramula
- Srinagar - Sopore
- Sopore - Teetwal (covers a number of finger segments)
The IA lacks everything; they live in tent camps, no barracks, no defences other than perimeter patrolling, no air defence (the Air Force has collared everything to defend its air bases), no natural defences, located close to civilian locations with the threat of collateral damages, no artillery parks except commandeered school playgrounds (the Panzgam example is festering inside me, so this example keeps poppping out at moments of stress), no defended helipads, no airstrips closer than Kargil outside Srinagar.....
Unfortunately, most of the land needed for building military infrastructure is land used for high-value apple growing, and nobody is selling; in the south, it is even worse, with the saffron fields producing the world's most expensive spice. Exercising eminent domain will create yet another festering sore; it is not advised.
Building in the rocky mountain fastnesses outside the vale is easy enough; it becomes a rock-blasting exercise, but then, what about the water? What about the consequences to a very delicate ecology? Building inside the vale pisses off the apple-growers; building inside the Ladakh hinterland pisses off the ecologically-sensitised Ladakhi.
Might be best just to hand over the whole shooting match to those who want it so desperately, and withdraw to shortened and hugely improved lines of communications, and a far more manageable situation. Two Army Corps, including the monstrous XVI Corps, get released, the pressure on Pakistan in the international border and working border sections increases to that extent (unfortunately there will be major expense in converting mountain divisions to mechanised infantry; an alternative would be shifting all these to the LAC); there will be sharply increased revenue available for building infrastructure from Sri Ganganagar downwards.
But Manstein didn't get his druthers; the Indian Army won't, either.
