Behind the CeaseFireLine (CFL) ......

[Cuirassier]

Turtuk was not loss?

It was lost.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Most interesting, isnt it?? Howz your cooking going on btw?

Very well, thank you very much, to the extent that I can cope with the heat.

1. My mission right now is to deliver, four days apart, two sets of food for the little family that sells me vegetables, for their iftar.
2. The first tiffin carrier will be Chhana'r Daalna (Paneer in a rich gravy); Chhola'r Dal (Bengali style Chana Dal, with bits of coconut and kishmish) and Bengali Sweet Tomato Chutney (dates and mango in a treacly sugary tomato melange);
3. The second tiffin carrier will be Lahsooni Paalak, Tadka Dal and a teekha chutney.
4. I have only ten days to do all this, about five days each, and am taking it on in a systematic manner, over and above my own food.
5. Today I managed to do two smoothies, apple and mango, after sweeping and swabbing the house, and bath; after going out for medicines in the noon-day sun, I answered a couple of posts, drank the apple smoothie and promptly fell fast asleep. Just woke up, finished the mango smoothie and am about to finish cooking for the day - tomato rice, called puliogre in the south.

All this in spite of suffering nightmares about bright young officers who know everything about the Indian Army. I sure do hope we know an equal amount about the PA.

Seems like you missed the whole discussion regarding the difficulties of attacking in mountains.

 

[PanzerKiel]

All this in spite of suffering nightmares about bright young officers who know everything about the Indian Army. I sure do hope we know an equal amount about the PA.

Nightmares about military history also keep me awake and running after knowledge. The race for possessing more knowledge is fierce as ever in the present age... Am just trying to do my bit. History being repeated again means there was no learning.

 

[T90TankGuy]

On a serious note, keeping in view India's recent claims about GB, a replay of a heavily customized Op Trident plan may be on the tables.....since the essence of Op Trident was the capture of GB areas.

Superiority of force is very difficult to achieve here in case long warning times are available. The terrain is so difficult that the absolute number of troops that can be inducted by either side is very limited. So, if Pakistan has sufficient warning time, we can neutralize the Indian buildup, like we did in 87/88.



Lets take a glance at Op Trident....

It was to be an attack by Indian 15 Corps on Skardu and then Gilgit with the aim of capturing GB area.
It involved elements of 3, 19 and 28 Division, all of 15 Corps.....reinforced by the externally inducted 6 Mountain Division (which was the biggest indicator and as we have already seen, gave the game away).

Main attack direction was from Kargil towards Skardu using 121 Brigade + additional brigade, both of 28 Division

Supporting attack was to be from Thoise via Khapplu to Skardu using 102 Brigade, and 70+114 Brigades from 3 Division

A diversionary effort from Gurais to Gilgit using 268 Brigade of 19 Division

6 Mountain Division was to have taken over 3 Division's locations opposite Chinese. Reserves were to be provided by a brigade each of 6, 19 and 28 Division



A word about 6 Mountain Division airlift

Op Trident had, as its key, the rapid shifting of 6 Mountain Division to Leh, which was done in remarkable effort withing 6 days. On one day alone, the peak, 70 landing were made at Leh. Keeping in view that by late morning the weather at Leh closes on, so these 70 sorties, consisting of Il-76s, An-12s and An-32s would have landed within a window of perhaps 5 hours at best.

Things which suddenly went wrong were, insufficient food for these extra 10,00 troops, their heavy equipment delivery was delayed. Date of attack of changed from February 6 to 8, which allowed to 2 more days to the Division to acclimatize as well.

The attack was scheduled for 0430 hours on Feb 8, but 0300 hours, it was cancelled.

Rest , we have already seen what Pakistan Army did, by bringing in two brigades on C130s within 3-4 days to alter force ratios.


Now

Coming to problems which IA faces in this sector

First is the timing, the time required to capture Skardu and Gilgit...
its about 80 air kilometers from Kargil to Skardu which means a minimum of 150 Kms along the valley, from Skardu to Gilgit will somewhat 300-350 kms....this operation can take maybe months....

Just to narrate an example
Indians, in 1971, sent two companies of Ladakh Scouts from Turtok to a location to attack ,objective was 30 kms away. They were opposed by few platoons of FC (not regulars, like it is now). Within two weeks, once the operation ended, the Indians were still short of their objective.

There is nothing wrong with a six or even a twelve week war. Both sides have the capability to wage a six or even a twelve month war (of course not without external assistance)
The problem lies in the mindset of strategic decision makers who may never conceive of a longer war, or may be never agree to it.


Next problem is terrain and weather factors...
Overall , terrain favors India since they will be attacking downhill.
But then, dis-advantage is that, in mountain terrain, Indians have to advance along very predictable routes....Shyok, Indus, and Astor river valleys...
These river valleys are narrow and easily defended by a small force, Indians will have to launch a major effort as well to secure the mountain tops along both sides of the valleys before advancing...

In essence, in mountains, the geography favors the defender heavily.



Then comes the vehicular movement

An Indian infantry division in mountains, in offensive mode, may require 300 to 400 tons of supplies of all types a day...some 2000 vehicles of all sizes will be plying around...
But then the narrow roads in the mountains, full of culverts and small bridges.....interdiction, vehicle breakdowns on a single road
...and then this problem intensifies the more Indians come into GB, with that division having the potential to get cut off




and then ofcourse, the last major problem....

The Pakistan's reinforcements....

In response to Op Trident, the final ratios were....due to PA reinforcements....

On Shyok axis- 3 IA brigades against 2 PA brigades
On Indus axis- same as above
On Astor axis- One against One

No one could or can pretend any quick victory with the problems discussed above.

Op Trident, therefore, had to be called off at the last moment.



@Nilgiri @Joe Shearer
Now the post is complete.

We should meet , When ever you are in the gulf do let me know i can come down , @Joe Shearer I will even sponsor your ticket mate, we need to meet this guy . Its been a while since we met someone of his caliber.

 

[Pan-Islamic-Pakistan]

We're not going to war anytime in the near future, and I vehemently disagree with your policy of recruiting irregulars. Aren't we confident in our own troops? This would be the repeat of what Zia & Co. did and later on we paid the price with Kalashnikov culture and lawlessness, followed by a long WoT which divided the nation on ideological lines, ruined the economy & inage and cost us thousands of lives. We're a professional military - we should fight professionally too.

Mujahideen did not attack us, but Indian terrorism was responsible. How long can we fight this war of attrition over LoC?

Tribals were instrumental in the first war over Kashmir, what makes us think that they will not be this time?

When you play the defensive waiting game for your enemy to attack, you are playing from a disadvantage. Sometimes it is necessary to bring the war to the enemy. Offense is the best defense.

Expansion of irregulars, lashkars, and volunteers are the quickest ways to swell numbers against an already numerically superior foe. It will catch Indians off guard.

It is a proven success in both Kashmir theater and Afghanistan.

 

[Cuirassier]

Mujahideen did not attack us, but Indian terrorism was responsible. How long can we fight this war of attrition over LoC?

Tribals were instrumental in the first war over Kashmir, what makes us think that they will not be this time?

When you play the defensive waiting game for your enemy to attack, you are playing from a disadvantage. Sometimes it is necessary to bring the war to the enemy. Offense is the best defense.

Expansion of irregulars, lashkars, and volunteers are the quickest ways to swell numbers against an already numerically superior foe. It will catch Indians off guard.

It is a proven success in both Kashmir theater and Afghanistan.

Perhaps you overlooked my previous posts on use of NSAs and their actual purpose for Pak High Command. I will not further debate as you seem to be a hardliner. But regarding "offense is the best defense" - that hasn't quite worked well in Indo-Pak context.

 

[Pan-Islamic-Pakistan]

Perhaps you overlooked my previous posts on use of NSAs and their actual purpose for Pak High Command. I will not further debate as you seem to be a hardliner. But regarding "offense is the best defense" - that hasn't quite worked well in Indo-Pak context.

You can disagree, which is fine. I don't think supporting Lashkars is a hardline approach, actually it is quite normative. We Pakistanis are proud of all our heroes, from uniformed men, qabaili lashkar, and civilians.

https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/when...ng-at-the-gates-of-srinagar-and-beyond.666655

 

[Cuirassier]

You can disagree, which is fine. I don't think supporting Lashkars is a hardline approach, actually it is quite normative. We Pakistanis are proud of all our heroes, from uniformed men, qabaili lashkar, and civilians.

https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/when...ng-at-the-gates-of-srinagar-and-beyond.666655

Understand and respect your opinion.

 

[Pan-Islamic-Pakistan]

Understand and respect your opinion.

Thanks for understanding, brother. Same here.

 

[Nilgiri]

Now the post is complete.

Thanks for re-tagging friend....as I hit like before you fleshed out the sustained (sombering for my side) analysis.

May I suggest (only half-jokingly) to PDF admins to create and add a "panzerkiel" emote to PDF selection on basis of your DP.

One representing well earned and tempered acuteness and acumen... balanced by the half-smiling somewhat smug countenance of Manstein

 

[Nilgiri]

@PanzerKiel , I am very unversed with the skardu/gilgit tactical and strategic situation...esp to the specific terrains and logistical flexibilities involved of note.

I am sure PA has wargamed/mapped worst case scenario for itself over there at various times past and present (an earlier example: say the IA did conduct the operation and no airlift was made by Pakistan in time for it as you describe).

How hold-able though is it for IA in such hypothetical (grab and hold) situation (in past and present if you feel proper to delve that way in whatever detail you feel affordable*)?

To me it looks like large chunks will be exposed as salients and can be attrition-ed or even choked away at Pakistan's convenience....given these severe logistical problems in the area (for India). In that manner I feel overall the LoC is somewhat mid term or even long term quite stable w.r.t any localised thrust/grab a side may have modelled or attempted to do (outside of the ones actually done and we have much open study/analysis for).

*Just as an aside: I don't need to tell you ofc (since you have earnestly followed good faith contour/scope in these exchanges), but please continue to respond only what you think is balanced and proper given sensitivities.

 

[Armchair]

Bhai bata dain, would be food for thought for learning members like me who can then think about multiple ways of developing that approach.

@Armchair for all these decades, we have been unable to liberate Kashmir just because we always attacked at the wrong locations... Why ... Because the one location which could benefit us, you kept it to yourself....




@Armchair ... Don't mind dear, on a lighter note...

Its my pleasure my dear teacher @PanzerKiel I get too passionate about my armchair generalship

I do have an idea what needs to be done but I don't want to put it online. There is a way... remember surprise is key and an unexpected approach. Sorry for late reply.

I once got a briefing at the border in the Sialkot sector (I got the privilige because of being related to some famous people), the ISI officer that gave our entire family the audience told us a story that Indians know exactly what Pak is about to do and the Paks know exactly what the Indians are doing.

@PanzerKiel India will not repeat what they did wrong. I think their best bet is heliborne forces taking mountain tops behind Pakistani lines. But then, without air superiority, this will be very risky and will cause tremendous casualties. Also, if they don't succeed, their forces will have to surrender eventually. But if they succeed, it will be a coup.

 

[PanzerKiel]

@PanzerKiel How hold-able though is it for IA in such hypothetical (grab and hold) situation (in past and present if you feel proper to delve that way in whatever detail you feel affordable*)?

To me it looks like large chunks will be exposed as salients and can be attrition-ed or even choked away at Pakistan's convenience....given these severe logistical problems in the area (for India). In that manner I feel overall the LoC is somewhat mid term or even long term quite stable w.r.t any localised thrust/grab a side may have modelled or attempted to do (outside of the ones actually done and we have much open study/analysis for).

*Just as an aside: I don't need to tell you ofc (since you have earnestly followed good faith contour/scope in these exchanges), but please continue to respond only what you think is balanced and proper given sensitivities.

In mountains, fight is always for the peaks since they dominate a wide area all around, you dominate in terms of observation as well as fire.

A buildup in the face of an enemy who is on the peaks cannot be hidden for long. Surprise is difficult to achieve, unless infiltration is resorted to, that too in small groups. 2 Naga, 18 Grenadiers and 8 Sikhs, as part of 192 Brigade, had to face the same kind of domination during their assaults on Tiger Hill.
The defender can easily reinforce his defences if he gets even a whiff of a buildup. (Poonch 1971, 12 Division's 2 brigade attack against Indian 2 brigades)

In simple words, if you have to attack, then you must aim to to capture a peak quickly, then must open the logistics route so tthat the newly captured ground is able to sustain the counter attacks of the defender.

Remember, the defender is already taxed since he has to attack uphill to regain his lost position. He can only succeed if he can deny the attacker on the top urgently needed re-supply of ammo and heavy weapons. If defender can deny that, then with support of heavy artillery ofcourse to keep the heads down of the people at top, he has some chance of success.

LOC is already full of salients and bulges at present. They are being held just because the defences at the tops have been fortified and well stuffed supplies to last for weeks.

While India can induct reinforcements into the sector in wartime, Pakistan may not be able to spare much because of its army is much smaller. Nonetheless, compared to earlier wars, Pakistan is far better off even allowing for land’s reinforcements.

India might seem to have many opportunities to attack in this sector because of its superior strength. The problem is that the Indian line of communications runs very close to LOC. The loss of the road itself would not be fatal because:

All formations have large reserve stockpiles of equipment to enable them to fight for many months..and..
Air re-supply is available on a considerable scale.

The location of existing roads and the need to protect them force India into some very predictable moves. For example, IA always has to attack from Kargil and from Dras to push the PA as far back as possible. This predictability limits IA flexibility and prevents the achievement of surprise.

Moreover, still the force to space ratio in this area is very low. This is to say that given the length of the front, the number of troops is insubstantial. This should provide excellent opportunity for maneuver. The high mountains, however, impose severe constraints on which areas can be used for operations.

While India has good lateral east- west communications, Pakistan has good north-south communication through the river valleys. It is easier for IA to defend than to attack: but the converse is true for Pakistan.

Historically, the only fighting that resulted in strategic gains in North Kashmir took place in 1947-48. Initially, there were no Indian regular troops in the area, and the few levies of the Maharaja of Kashmir proved ineffective. The area was considered inaccessible, though this did not stop the Azad troops from capturing it. India could not even spare a single regular battalion as Army HQ was totally focused towards the valley. This omission, however logical it may have appeared at that time, was to cost us IA badly, especially after the Pakistan-China ties warmed up.

India started to worry about the area only in the late 1950s, when trouble with China began brewing. Then it was discovered that holding Ladakh while simultaneously protecting the cease-fire line against Pakistan was a tough proposition, which it remains to this day.

Both in 1965 and 1971 there were no strategic gains in this sector. Fighting took place for piquets dominating the Leh road. In both cases India did better than Pakistan, because Pakistan depended on the ruggedness of the terrain and therefore had committed few resources. IA had large numbers of regular troops, Pakistan had none.

Coming back to mountain terrain.....
Take the example of 19 Division (IA).
If we conceive this sector as the left half of a lady’s Chinese fan, we see that the roads from the fan’s hinge (Srinagar) to the periphery (Uri, Tithwal, Gurais) are excellent, but that the links along the periphery are inadequate or non-existent. Thus, reserves from Srinagar and Baramula can be sent quickly to Uri, Tithwal and Gurais, but there can be no movement between these three sectors without first returning to the Valley.

This creates the worst possible situation for a military commander: his forces are deployed as long fingers and no finger can support the other. Each sector must fight its own battle and must, then, be correspondingly self-sufficient in forces.

Pakistan, on the other hand, has excellent lateral communications. It holds a shallow part of mountainous Western Kashmir with the plains behind. So it can switch forces and concentrate at will at any point along the line between Jammu and Tithwal.

This gives PA the initiative in the entire area.
Nonetheless, India holds one advantage not enjoyed by Pakistan. IA has to attack downhill, whereas Pakistan has to move uphill.

The complication in all the Jammu and Kashmir sectors is the political importance of the ground. No first strike can be countered without giving up some ground. In Jammu and Kashmir every square kilometre lost no matter what the reason is held against the commander with his superiors and their political superiors.

This unfortunate situation should have been corrected years ago.

The only remedy then becomes to over-ensure in each sector, and to maintain troops right on the line, holding every kilometre as closely as possible, even though this involves violating the principles of war relating to surprise and economy of force. There can be no economy or concentration of force because the enemy is aware of your compulsions to avoid giving up ground, and can, therefore, accurately predict your actions.

This, however, is only one of the two reasons (FOR IA) why such large forces have to be mentioned along LOC. The other, seldom openly stated, is the perceived need to contend with a hostile domestic population in wartime.

The battle will, then, be on two fronts. Take the example of 161 Brigade. Normally, it has the usual five regular and one BSF battalion. The Brigade commander, however, does not regard his forces as equal to 2/3rds of a division. He allots three infantry battalions, a normal brigade, to the front. And he allots the other three battalions to keep open his Line of Communications, with Baramula, 60 kms away.

So the commander, 161 Brigade has, from his viewpoint, only the minimum number of troops required for his job. Given the importance of the ground, we may speculate he would like a minimum of another regular battalion. And the Indian Army, at least, is no stranger to seven battalion brigades.

Because of the mountainous terrain, however, neither side is likely to achieve major gains. As a caveat it should be said that if one side makes a breakthrough for example, if Pakistan took Poonch or India took Kotli, depending on how panicked the defence becomes, it is possible the whole front will unravel and permit a strategic victory. But if both sides hold reasonably firm, neither side will make any strategic gain.

Mountain positions stoutly defended are virtually impossible to assault frontally. They are usually taken by a slow process of infiltration around the position, and then a surprise attack, say from three sides. Cutting roads behind and between positions is of the utmost importance. A brigade attacking battalion position can break through after some time, but not if reinforcements arrive. This not only takes time but, with active/aggressive patrolling the defender can prevent encirclement. The Central Italian campaign of 1944 is an excellent example of how difficult it is to take mountain positions. And, of course, the Italian mountains are quite geographically tame compared to ours.

Either IA has to go around Pakistani defences in AK as General K.P. Candeth started to in 1971, or a large-scale employment of helicopters must be envisaged. However, we all know that Airmobile warfare in the mountains is not the easiest of propositions. If, however, a decisive result is desired there may be little other choice.

Am open to discussion as always. We can also discuss individual sectors.

 

[PanzerKiel]

Chhamb-Akhnur has seen the bloodiest fighting between the two adversaries both in 1965 and 1971 because:

------It represents Pakistan’s best hope of isolating Jammu from Kashmir. the Jammu-Poonch road via Akhnur lying just a few kilometres from Pakistan territory.

-------It represents a great danger to Pakistan because (1) if India takes the Marala Headworks the water in Pakistan’ s anti- tank canals can be switched off in the entire Sialkot sector, (2 ) Sialkot is threatened from two sides and (3) the process of out-flanking Azad Kashmir can begin.

In 1965, Pakistan sent infiltrators to raise havoc, and when the Kashmir Valley was aflame, launched its 12 Division against IA's 168 Brigade and overran its positions. The armor follow-up, however, could not be accomplished because when India crossed the international frontier on September 6, Pakistan 6 Armored Division became bogged down in holding off our 1 Armored Division.

Given the political situation prevailing in Kashmir at that time, with half Indian Army chasing infiltrators and the leadership already on-edge, the loss of Akhnur would have proved disastrous. But luck was with India despite their initial losses.

In 1971 Pakistan launched a fierce attack against Chhamb, using 23 Division heavily reinforced to five brigades plus the 2 (I) Armored Brigade.

It is easy to criticize, but difficult to appreciate that for IA, the area in this sectors should never be held in any event because itis indefensible. Failing that, the defending brigade should be allowed to fall back slowly towards Akhnur, letting the backup brigades stop the enemy.

This area normally has six infantry and one armored brigade and two division HQs, 10 at Akhnur and 26 at Chhamb. The controlling corps HQ is XVI from Nagrota. Reserve brigades of XVI Corps and Northern Command are available for reinforcement. In 1971, for example, an extra brigade was put at Naoshera, with seven army and BSF battalions, and one brigade of 36 Division was put between Naoshera and Akhnur. HQ 26 Division was allotted four brigades, and a corps reserve brigade was given to HQ 10 Division to strengthen it during the Pakistani attack.


Coming to Pathankot Sector

There is a distance of about 110 road kilometers from Jammu to Pathankot. Even with 26 Division at one end (Jammu side) and 39 Division from Yol, H. P. at the other (Pathankot end), this distance has always been considered too long for this vital sector. It has been customary to induct additional forces here. In 1965 (before 39 Division was in place), Indian 1 Corps with 1 Armored, 6 and 14 Divisions attacked from near Jammu with Sialkot as the objective.
So it can be appreciated that there is quite a lot of room for large-scale action in the area. Because India was offensively deployed, the gap was automatically filled.

In 1971, 54 Division from Hyderabad-Secunderabad, a reserve division, took over Kathua-Samba sub-sectors, both defensively and to support the 1 Corps attack toward Shakergarh.

In view of the area’s vulnerability, plus with the spill-over of the 1984 Punjab unrest to Jammu and Kashmir, it was inevitable that a new division be permanently inducted into the area. Now 29 Infantry Division and an armored brigade are located here.

During Brass Tacks, 6 Mountain Division was also designated for this sector, making an already swollen XVI Corps, the biggest in the Indian Army, yet larger, with a total of six divisions plus additional brigades and three armored brigades. This is about the size of the force that took East Pakistan in 1971.

Pathankot is a key point for India because through this 50-km deep corridor passes India’s entire rail and road communications between the mainland and Kashmir.

The potential for Pakistan to cut this corridor, either by a clean advance to the base of the Himalayas or by advancing a short distance and interdicting the main Pathankot-Jammu road with artillery, has always worried India. Its first response was to construct a second road behind the first. Now, however, with maximum ranges of modern artillery increasing to 40 kms, this is no guarantee of safety.

If targets are well dug in, the heaviest of barrages may have no effect. But if targets are soft and moving, as with vehicles, the results will be devastating. So far from just blocking the Pakistanis on the border itself, India has to push Pakistan back at least 20-km to ensure the security of the roads.

The importance of the corridor and its vulnerability, is the reason that XVI Corps has the largest number of independent armored brigades (atleast three), and that 29 and 39 Divisions were the only divisions in the Indian Army, upto recent times, to enjoy the support of an entire armored brigade each.

Come what may, India has to attack first from Pathankot. In the 1971 operations 36 Division was used from here to help in the attack on Shakergarh.

In conclusion, we may note that India has constructed backup roads behind the two Pathankot Corridor roads. These pass throughthe mountain districts of Chamba (H.P.), Kishtwar (J.K.), and Riasi (J.K.). While not a substitute for communications through the corridor, they ensure the movement of troops between the mainland and Kashmir in the event of the loss of Pathankot.


On the Pakistan’s side, that is the Sialkot Sector

Pakistan’s great advantage in this area is that Sialkot is a single sector with excellent internal lines of communications. This is why Pakistan can keep just two infantry divisions, an armored brigade and an (I) infantry brigade in this area. In a short war, these troops are adequate to prevent India from making any major gains.

With a force of 5 Divisions (plus) in Sialkot and Shakergarh sectors, not adding reinforcements located nearby, Pakistan is well- protected in the face of the several Indian divisions in Jammu and Pathankot sectors.

Because of its interior lines of communication, Pakistan can attack Jammu, Samba, Kathua, Pathankot and Gurdaspur with equal facility, or switch forces with ease. Pakistan does not have everything its own way in Shakergarh salient, which is thrusting into India, is vulnerable to being pinched out by India, as IA had started to do in 1971. The problem for India is that by advancing, it pushes Pakistani troops back into a more compact, more easily defended area, and a long war becomes inevitable for decisive results.

To buttress its defense and to utilize the minimum number of troops, Pakistan has fortified the entire area. There are a number of rivers, canals, and tributaries. For example, the Ravi protects the entire south eastern side of the Sialkot sector. The same does not apply to India, because in order to attack Dera Baba Nanak, the gateway to Gurdaspur, Pakistan has only to concentrate on its own side of the Ravi.

To strengthen these water obstacles, Pakistan has also created a series of single and double DCBs. Even a relatively narrow water obstacle can hold up an army for long periods: we have only to remember what happened to the US 36 Infantry Division at the crossings of the Rapido River in Italy in World War II.

It should be noted that when war gainers assign values for the defence against a heavy attack, it is customary to allow defenders behind seriously prepared obstacles almost 3.5 times greater chance of destroying the attacker than in open, hastily prepared defenses. And since the area in question is relatively small, with the entire line fortified, outflanking the line of fortifications is impossible.

 

[Pakistani Fighter]

We need to take back Jammu and Kargil area at all cost