Bangladesh:Gunfight at BDR headquarters

[idune]

Obstruction of justice may lead to more tragedy

M. Shahidul Islam

When thunders roar above, birds flee from the sanctuary. The blame for the plight of the birds does not lie with the birds themselves.
The blaming of the media by some senior ministers of the Government for the alleged misreporting of the 311-page investigation report submitted last week to the army chief by the 20-member army investigation team into the BDR rebellion of February 25-26 is as good as unleashing thunder from above, at a time when the other two reports await submission.
The uncalled for controversy over the report - without assessing its authenticity and ramifications - is tantamount to obstruction of justice by directly influencing the outcome of one of the most tragic incidents of our national history. Such a tactic is also aimed at diverting the focus of the investigators and the prospective jurors away from the main concern, suspect analysts.

Allegation unfounded
Blaming the media for reporting selectively from an investigation report that the concerned ministers themselves claim not to have seen is one thing (although one of the principal undertakings of any mass media is to employ expertise to obtain in advance what otherwise may seem a secret), the accusation of spending Taka 15 crore to implicate the Government for the tragedy is quite another.
Such an allegation being unfounded and dangerous in so far as its impact on the ongoing investigations and the upcoming trial is concerned, the proven contradiction in blaming the media and the army team deserves scrutiny.
Also observable is the lack of coordination within the Government. For instance, the Awami League spokesman and LGRD Minister, Syed Ashraful Islam, said on May 17 that certain quarter is spending Taka 15 crore to heap the blame on the Government, and, the "army report was half-done."
If the LGRD minister does not believe the authenticity of the media reports, or have not read the report itself, his criticism of the report being 'half done' and the media being speculative are both presumptuous.
The same day, the Government-appointed coordinator for the three reports, Commerce Minister Faruk Khan, also maintained that the newspaper reports were based on speculations and "Findings of the report were not known to anybody except the investigators."
If one must presume that the concerned ministers did not read the report, how then the Home Minister too says, "They could (army) analyse so many things, why not the colour of the mouth wrappers (cloak) used by the mutineers which are the colour of Islamic militants."

'Colour blind?'
Being in charge of the BDR forces, the Home Minister must not criticise a probing report unless she had seen and analyzed it. Her criticism is also 'colour blind' in nature. For, Shahara Khatun is mistaken by terming those colours with Islamic militancy, given that none of the mutineers wore Green mouth wrappers, which is the colour of Islamic militants.
Then again, there may or may not be any specific reason why the colours of the cloaks were what they were.
Above all, the public declaration by the Commerce Minister that no one had seen the report other than the investigators is not true. Sources say, the army chief, in accordance with standing procedure, had sent copies of the report to the Defence Minister and the Supreme Commander following the report's submission. Thus it may be inferred that certain quarters are aware of the report's contents.
Why then this scathing onslaught against the media and the army probe report? And, why not follow the prescribed method of seeking explanation from the concerned media for 'reporting based on speculations' instead of choosing a tactic to accuse some unspecified quarter of spending money to blame the Government. Do the ministers imply that both the media and the army investigators were bribed by those unspecified quarters?

Political nexus
Be that whatever, sources however confirmed that, the army-prepared report named a retired JCO (Junior Commissioned Officer) of the BDR, Torab Ali (who is a local Awami League leader in the Hajaribagh area), and his son -- a local hooligan named "Leather" Litton -- as being directly involved in the planning of the BDR mutiny of February 25 - 26.
Sources also say, the report named one particular MP from the AL who had campaigned for votes in the Hajaribagh area (where many BDR families are voters) before the parliamentary election of December 29, 2008, with the assurance that the alleged grievances of aggrieved BDR members would be addressed upon his becoming an MP due to the concerned MP being a relative of the PM.
The army-prepared report is learnt to have further stated that, a group of BDR soldiers and Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs) were scheduled to meet with the Home Minister on February 20th to discuss the grievances of BDR soldiers, but the meeting got postponed due to the Home Minister's apparent preoccupation with the incident of grenade explosion in Gazipur that very day.

Recommendations
Sources further say the army-team-prepared report may never see the light of the day, despite serious controversy. That may be another reason for this unwarranted controversy.
Besides, given that the media is unlikely to report on as sensitive a matter as the BDR rebellion investigation by the army itself -- unless there was deliberate leakage for public consumption, knowing that the report itself will never be made public -- the ongoing furore seems deliberately calibrated to achieve a political aim.

BAA: Rules, Instructions
That notwithstanding, those who know how the military commissions any investigation may understand that the mandates to the investigators were strictly delineated pursuant to the guidelines noted in the Bangladesh Army Act - Rules (BAA-R) and Army Act - Instructions (BAA-I). The two books mandate an investigation team to ascertain only (a) causes of a concerned incident (b) apportion blame, and, (c) set out recommendations, only if asked to.
That is exactly what seemed to have happened in this instance too, and, that is precisely why the report has recommended convening of another committee to discover linkages between the BDR rebellion and the involvement of political personalities who are not otherwise subject to the legal dispensation prescribed under the Bangladesh Army Act (BAA).
In order to implicate persons not otherwise subject to the BAA in any act of mutiny or insubordination, the accused must be proven to have, beyond reasonable doubt, either participated, or aided and abated the crime of rebellion pursuant to section 31 (and other allied sections; from section 31 through 37) of the BAA, as well as the other relevant provisions of laws, inclusive of the Bangladesh Penal Code (BPC) and the laws relating to the discipline and Code of Conduct of the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) members.

Trial of non-combatants
Another reason for the pre-emptive screaming of senior AL leaders is that: Pursuant to the 20th Amendment Regulation 1976 - which became an Act of the Parliament and was gazetted on July 31 of that year -- any involvement of non-combatant persons with the mutiny in the disciplined forces is a "crime punishable by death." The same is applicable to anyone propagating political opinion among the members of Bangladesh Armed Forces.
Given that the Bangladesh Rifles Order of 1972 emphatically says about the BDR that the 'force shall be deemed as a disciplined force' as defined in Article 152 of the Bangladesh Constitution, any mutiny or other act of insubordination within that force can either be tried in court martial, or, in civil courts, pursuant to charges enumerated in Chapter Seven (embodying Section 131 through 140) of the Bangladesh Penal Code (BPC).
Observers hence fear, as things stand now, unless the other two reports (led by former bureaucrat Anisuzzaman Khan and the CID team) shed specific lights on the involvement of outsiders in the planning and execution -- or in aiding and abetting -- of the BDR mutiny, there is no prospect of the trial of any one from outside the rank and file of BDR in this heinous conspiracy against the nation and its sovereignty.

DADs and Jawans
That dreaded and unfortunate prospect will simply boil down to one single outcome: The trial will end up punishing perhaps hundreds of BDR Jawans (many of them innocent) and few Deputy Assistant Directors (DADs); unless the reported recommendation of the army probe report is heeded to commission a separate probing body to unearth the involvement of people who are not members of the BDR.
The mass arrests being conducted to nab thousands of BDR members across the country does bear out the bona fide of such an apprehension, as it equally indicates the certainty of the ultimate decimation of this hardy force and the nation's first line of defence.

HOLIDAY > FRONT PAGE

 

[idune]

Why are ministers denouncing army inquiry report?

Sadeq Khan

The representative government of Sheikh Hasina, brought to power by a landslide election victory of its grand alliance at the end of two years of emergency rule, is not yet faced with any serious civic challenge to its lackadaisical style of governance. The Prime Minister enjoys blind loyalty of a countrywide network of activist following, albeit factional feuding over sharing of spoils.
She has an overwhelming majority in the parliament capable of recasting the Constitution in her desired mould, albeit on pain of confirmation by a referendum if such recasting involves structural changes of the Supreme Law. Yet the nervousness that her government is exhibiting by lack of faith in her administrative machinery (as evidenced by frequent transfers and vacancies in posts of executive and plenipotentiary status) is rendering her grip on state power impotent in performance.
Policy coherence is yet to be mustered by her cabinet team, and doctrinaire policy implementation appears to have overburdened her team's capacity, apart from being of feeble public interest under awesome conditions of poor living (electricity failure, water shortage, unemployment). Her garrulous ministers often contradict one another (like one saying India's Tipaimukh barrage may provide welcome help for Bangladesh by hydro-electric supply, another joining the public chorus of protest anticipating the immense harm to our Surma-Kushiyara-Meghna river system and our ecological balance from the upstream intervention).

Chaotic rent seeking
Development programmes of the government are in a quandary, and over rent-seeking in social security programmes and handouts (Food for Work, Vulnerable Group Feeding, Test Relief), the empowered local MP, the subordinated Upozilla and Union Council Chairmen and Councillors, the local mobs of party activists of MP faction and Chairman faction, and the UNO's remain in a state of flux from shifting loyalties and a tug of war for plunder. Post-election violence of settling scores with political opponents continue, and has extended to witch-hunts about naming well-to-do innocents as "Islamic militants" or "war-criminals".
Protection rackets with willing cooperation of local police is going on, charging underhand payments for crossing the names of gullible victims off the lists of jangi (terrorist) or juddhaporadhi (war-criminal) suspects. After the BDR mutiny, surveillance in the borders of Bangladesh has been deplorably weakened. Criminal godfathers of armed gangs have resurfaced from their hide-outs in the country and returned from their safe havens across the border to engage in a field day of violent crimes and expand their respective turfs all over the country. Indeed it is the breakdown of law and order, and the insecurity of life and property that is terribly unsettling for the common citizen, whether living in a city, a small town or in a rural area. The economy is also beginning to show strains under global recession, notwithstanding its resilience on account of simplicity of its basket of products, internal and external trade, manpower deployment and financial instruments. Exports are falling and factories are closing down. A staggering spectacle of social, economic and political adversity may be piling up fast to challenge the incumbent flippant rulers of the nation-state.

Ministers' flippancy
The height of flippancy and insensitivity of some ministers of Sheikh Hasina's cabinet and some office-holders of ruling Awami league is exemplified by the way they reacted to press reports on the report of the army court of enquiry investigating the BDR mutiny. That is the only report that was completed within the stipulated time-frame and submitted to the army chief to be forwarded to our Defence minister and Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. Twenty army officers who were members of the court of enquiry are all oath-bound not to divulge their findings to the media or to anyone other than their military colleagues and superiors.
Diligent investigative reporters, however, managed, like in other cases of sensitive investigations by the CID, to obtain an executive summary of the report of the military court of enquiry, possibly from the Prime Minister's Office or from the Army Headquarters. Several newspapers published more or less similar versions of main findings of that report, mentioning also that the court of enquiry had to prepare it in accordance with its terms of reference and therefore did not include many relevant matters that came to the court's knowledge in course of investigations. It was beyond its jurisdiction also to extend investigation to pursue such clues, and therefore the court of enquiry recommended a high-level judicial enquiry to be instituted to get to the bottom of the mystery behind those clues and expose possible masterminds behind the mutiny.
For some odd reason that defies common sense, the LGRD minister of the ruling cabinet and also the spokesman of the Awami League Syed Ashraful Islam chose to strike a confrontational posture to denounce the report of the Army Court of Enquiry on BDR mutiny, based not on the report itself as available with the Prime Minister who is the boss of the armed forces, but on media reports. On May 17 at a meeting of activists of Awami Youth League, a wing or "associate" organisation of his party, the Awami League spokesman questioned the quality of the investigation report of the army on the February 25-26 rebellion at the Bangladesh Rifles headquarters in Dhaka, saying that the report carried by the press, if true, seemed to be motivated and "an attempt to hide the truth": "it appears from news reports carried by a section of the press that the army probe committee's report on the BDR rebellion is incomplete and an attempt to put up a smokescreen in order to hide the truth about the tragedy."
He complained that the report did not mention who were the perpetrators, who could be the beneficiaries and what was their motive. The report also avoids mentioning who had helped the BDR soldiers flee by boats: "There is nothing in the report about what might have happened had the army gone into action at Peelkhana to quell the rebellion and what the situation would have been at the border outposts. The report is silent about the fact that the country was on the brink of a civil war following the carnage."

Minister's conjectures
The LGRD minister apparently wanted his own conjectures as above to be included in the report of the Army Court of Enquiry. He also forgot that Court of Enquiry report itself said that it was limited by its terms of reference, and a broader, high-powered enquiry was needed for satisfactory completion of the investigation. What is more troubling is that the LGRD minister chose to denounce the government's own army, which submits to the command of the head of government, absolutely unprovoked and without any sign of command failure. What he said further was even more intriguing: "Times are not good. You [party activists] must begin preparing yourselves for all possible contingencies." Why this message of doom? Does this not add to the sense of insecurity and uncertainty amongst the people?
In the same meeting Agriculture Minister and Awami League presidium member Matia Chowdhury alleged: "A vested quarter is trying to implicate some leaders of Awami League and Juba League in the [BDR] incident by spreading falsehood but the people have rejected their claims as Sheikh Hasina's capable and farsighted leadership in tackling the situation has been hailed nationally and internationally."
She also referred to indirect circumstantial evidence which she said showed there were militant links to the Peelkhana carnage. She questioned why the court of enquiry report failed to mention about the implication of coloured scarves worn by some mutineers, and asked who were the people who, with ash yellow and orange-coloured handkerchiefs tied around their mouths, were active inside the BDR headquarters during the carnage. The colours are usually used by a particular militant outfit, she said and urged party leaders and activists to guard against conspiracies against the government.

Terms of reference
Evidently, such political conjectures were not the subject of the military court of enquiry and its terms of reference. Why then this outburst of fiery denouncements of the army court of enquiry, when the report of the Combined Enquiry Committee formed by the government under the aegis of the Home Ministry is being still awaited after missing four (indeed five) deadlines for submission? Is it that the ministers are afraid, not of a reshuffle, but of their collective failure in performance, and of a consequence, as spelled out in the U.S. based Freedom House report on Bangladesh situation: "Sheikh Hasina's government needs to move quickly to fulfil its duties and gain the public's confidence, or there is a strong possibility that the military will retake control."

HOLIDAY > FRONT PAGE

 

[iman_ali]

why bangladeshi always accused pakistan for every thing happening there , i heard they are going to name pakistan connection in the gunfight at BDR headquarters .
also your govt has invited indians to help restructure BDR.

 

[denoo]

why bangladeshi always accused pakistan for every thing happening there , i heard they are going to name pakistan connection in the gunfight at BDR headquarters .
also your govt has invited indians to help restructure BDR.

report has submitted to the govt but no discloser has yet made to public.

 

[idune]

why bangladeshi always accused pakistan for every thing happening there , i heard they are going to name pakistan connection in the gunfight at BDR headquarters .
also your govt has invited indians to help restructure BDR.

Its not Bangladesh but section of people who are funded and domesticated by india and its influence use Pakistan as scapegoat for everything.

Besides, these above articles have rather accused awami govt for their anti state and defense stance.

I not sure relevance of your question here?

 

[Stumper]

"The court of equiry could not ascertain who killed the army officers and where. It could neither collect the names of the main planners of the mutiny"

Four Months and this is what they could produce?

 

[Stumper]

"Its not Bangladesh but section of people who are funded and domesticated by india and its influence"

This includes previous care taker government, Chief of Army, Election Commissioner and the current Government. Pretty small list if you ask me.

 

[Straight]

A summary of the national probe report on the BDR mutiny
The Daily Star Report
May 29, 2009 Friday

Formation of the enquiry committee and its scope
1. The enquiry committee formed with former secretary Anis-uz-Zaman as its chairman and comprising of 12 members started its work with the responsibility of unearthing the background and cause of the BDR mutiny at Pilkhana on February 25 and 26, other related matters and make recommendations.

2. The enquiry committee visited the BDR headquarters and related installations and recorded statements of 107 people, including army officials and BDR members present at Pilkhana during the incident, members of the families of the army men, arrested rebel and detained, local civilians, media personalities, former Director General of BDR, politicians, chiefs of different forces and agencies, ministers and lawmakers. The Committee collected information (as far as possible) from different intelligence agencies and investigating agencies on the planning of the mutiny, its cause and motive, discontent in BDR and Daal Bhat programme.

Background of the rebellion
3. The mentality of not accepting authority of the army had been dormant among the BDR members for long. They had been demanding appointment of their own officers under a system as the BCS cadre, increase of border allowance, 100 per cent ration allowance, sending them to the UN Mission, restructuring of their salary structure in a similar model as that of the army. Besides, the Daal-bhat programme, punishment of sepoys, lack of transparency in running BDR shops, luxurious lifestyle of officials, corruption in running the schools etc gave rise to questions and discontent among the BDR men. They circulated leaflets at different times with the aim of venting their discontent and realising their demands. BDR authorities at different times took initiatives to solve the problems through raising some logical demands to the government.

Plan for rebellion and earlier attempts
4. A group of BDR members started getting organised over these demands centring the national election and tried to meet with different political figures. They became restless after failing to get expected response from the political personalities. In this background they held a number of secret meetings at different places with the aim of taking up action regarding their demands. They also planned to hold army officers, including the director general of BDR, as hostages in the Darbar on February 25. To implement the plan they decided to loot the armoury and take control of different important instillations including different entrances to the BDR headquarters.

Common soldiers thought that the soldiers would take up a stance in the darbar to realise their demands. But they did not have any idea about the real nature of the stand. Only a handful of hardcore mutineers knew about the plan to kill BDR director general and other army officers working with the BDR and other heinous activities.

Those who led the mutiny
5. Among the planners of the mutiny and those who lead it were: DAD Touhid, DAD Habib, DAD Jalil, DAD Nasir, DAD Rahim, Subedar Major Gofran, Nayek subedar Monoranjan, Habildar Assistant Moniruzzaman, sepoy Selim Reza, sepoy Tarek, sepoy Ayub, sepoy Kajal, sepoy Sahabuddin, sepoy Mainuddin, sepoy Rezaul, sepoy Rubel, sepoy Habib, sepoy Muhit, sepoy Nizam, sepoy Shahadat, Lance Nayek assistant Saidur, Ln nayek assistant Lutfor, Ln nayek Zakaria, sepoy Obaed etc.

Distribution of responsibility and start of mutiny
6. In the final meeting held on February 24 night the rebels distributed responsibility among themselves. As per the plan, some rebels of Rifle battalions 13, 24, 36 and 44 took control of gate nos 1, 3, 4 and respectively by 8 am and started looting the central armoury.

When the DG was delivering his address at the Darbar Hall at around 9:27 am two rebels (sepoy Mainuddin and sepoy Kajal) suddenly got on the stage. Sepoy Mainuddin was carrying arms. He aimed his arms at the DG. At that time a blank shot was fired outside which the rebels took as a signal to start the mutiny. Simultaneously some rebels present at the Darbar Hall shouted "Run!" and signaled the soldiers to leave the Darbar.

Afterwards, to instigate soldiers against the army officers throughout the country, outside Darbar Hall at the Pilkhana and later over mobile phones, wireless/walkie talkie, news was spread that officers had shot dead a BDR member at the Darbar Hall. Indiscriminate firing in and around the Darbar Hall started. About 40 army officers got stranded inside the Darbar Hall, others managed to flee. Most of those stranded in the hall were brutally killed.

Government attempt at peaceful solution
7. From the beginning of the mutiny, the government stressed on solving the prevailing problem through dialogue. Alongside, preparations were also taken for an army raid if necessary. In order to not let the visible presence of the army become an obstacle to the ongoing dialogue, the armed forces were told to take up their positions at a safe distance. In the meantime the prime minister handed the responsibility of bringing the rebels to talks to state minister Jahangir Kabir Nanak and whip Mirza Azam. By noon they took initiatives to establish contact with the rebels at Pilkhana gate no 4. At 3:30 pm they took a 14-member team of the rebels led by DAD Touhid to the prime minister's official residence Jamuna for dialogue with the PM. After a two hour-long discussion, the rebels agreed to lay down their arms and return to the barracks and release all hostages and on these terms, they were given assurance that their demands would be met in phases and a general amnesty was announced.

8. After returning to Pilkhana a difference of opinions arose among the rebels regarding surrender of arms. As a result the decision taken at Jamuna was not implemented. Later from 8:00 pm, a second round of talks between a government team, led by the home minister, and the rebels was held at Hotel Ambala Inn in front of Pilkhana's gate no 4. A series of meetings were held with different groups of the mutineers and their demands also changed. The mutineers prolonged the talks to facilitate the shifting of bodies, digging of mass graves, fleeing of BDR men from Pilkhana and looting in the cover of the night. In continuation of the talks, at around 1:00 am the home minister, the state minister for law and the IGP entered the Pilkhana premises. Another round of talks was held there and then at 3:00 am the rebels surrendered some arms to the home minister. But after her departure, they took up arms again. By early morning the home minister rescued 15 families being held hostage and brought them out from Pilkhana.

9. Different political leaders came to Pilkhana gate no 4 on February 26 morning They included minister Matia Chowdhury, state ministers Nanak, Qamrul Islam, whip Mirza Azam, MPs HM Ershad, Tapash, Asaduzzaman Noor, Golam Reza, Segufta Yasmin and Mahbub Ara Gini.

Grand alliance leaders Abdul Jalil, MPs Abdur Razzak, Rashed Khan Menon, Hasanul Haq Inu, Sheikh Selim, Mainuddin Khan Badal, Anisul Islam Mahmud, Nurul Islam BSC and Ziauddin Bablu arrived by noon.

Processions around Pilkhana
10. On February 25 and 26, some processions were brought out around Pilkhana area in support of the mutineers. Residents of Azimpur, Hazaribagh and New Market area participated in these processions. They chanted different slogans in support of the BDR men.

Media's negative role
11. From the start of the incident, private TV channels spread the news of the mutiny at home and abroad through live telecasts. In doing so, they gave preference to the commercial aspects pf the situation over the national security. Where different intelligence agencies, the army and the government itself could not get details form inside the Pilkhana, mutineers in Dhaka and outside of Dhaka were able to get detailed news regarding the position of army and other on goings inside the Pilkhana thanks to the media. In general, the media encouraged the mutineers by publicising the news about the mutiny, and talk shows which created a sentiment against the government and the army among the people.

From the start of the BDR rebellion, it was seen that the media's uncontrolled, irresponsible and biased transmission, and the easy availability of contact over mobile phones caused tension in BDR units outside Dhaka.

Preparation for talks and army operation and its risk
12. To quell the rebellion, preparation for an army operation and talks to solve the crisis was continued simultaneously. Though the army and Rab took up their positions around Pilkhana by 12 noon on February 25, they were not completely aware of the situation inside Pilkhana, the number of mutineers, the heavy weapons inside, or the exact location of the hostages. On one hand there was the risk of heavy casualty of civilian lives and property in an armed attack inside the densely populated Pilkhana area. On the other hand there was also a huge risk of the mutineers causing massive loss to the residents of the houses and other installations around Pilkhana. There also remained the risk that if the army operation was conducted without knowledge of the exact location of the hostages, then the mutineers could put the blame of the killings of army officers and their families, arson and looting on the army itself. In such a situation a civil war like situation would have been created in the country. Any army attack to check the rebellion could endanger the internal security of Bangladesh.

The Prime Minister's address to the nation
13. The prime minister's address was aired over the state TV and radio at 2:30 pm on February 26. She ordered the rebels to surrender their arms and return to the barracks. She warned them not to compel her to take stern measures against them. Preparations for an army operation was also taken as per the government's decision in case the mutineers did not surrender their arms by the deadline given to them in the prime minister's address.

End of mutiny
14. Announcements were made using microphones to people living within the three-kilometre perimeter area adjoining the Pilkhana, asking them to move to safety in order to keep the casualty down during an army drive. The Prime Minister's speech completely shattered the morale of the rebels. They were compelled to accept all government decisions, as they had no other alternative. The rebels started final surrender of their arms to the home minister at 5:50 pm. Then the police, and the army the following morning, took up full control of Pilkhana.

Flight of the rebels and their accomplices
15. From the first day of the BDR mutiny, mutineers and their family members kept fleeing the Pilkhana premises in different ways. Immediately after the mutiny began at Darbar Hall, many of the BDR members (including officers) had fled Pilkhana.

Most of those who participated in the rebellion fled from Pilkhana during the nights of February 25 and 26 (except for around 200 BDR members). The mutineers mainly scaled the boundary walls on the west side and used gate nos 5 and 2 for their flight. Many abandoned their uniforms, boot etc that were found on the bank of a pond near the boundary wall near Bay Tannery.

Some helpful civilians aided the BDR men to flee by supplying them with clothes, food and water. They were led by former BNP ward commissioner Suraiya Begum, her two sons, local criminals Masud and Leather Liton. Many mutineers used the Keraniganj ferry ghat to flee. Former BNP lawmaker Nasiruddin Ahmed Pintu helped them flee by arranging engine-run boats to cross the river. Rab arrested 76 rebels while they were fleeing.

Rescue of hostages
16. Of the 107 army officials present at Pilkhana on February 25 a total of 50 survived. Of them some managed to flee on the start of the mutiny and the rest were rescued on February 26 from hostage. Though rebellion spread to 34 BDR units outside Dhaka none was killed there. 152 army officer and family members posted there could reach safety. All deputy commissioners and police supers as per government order provided them necessary assistance. They also took over the charge of the armoury of the units. Due to uncertain situation there was some confusion over the number of casualties, which was amended later.

Killings
17. Information received from different sources show that most of the army officers were killed by 11 am on February 25. Of the 57 army officers, 52 were killed in Darbar Hall and adjoining areas, 5 others were killed elsewhere inside the Pilkhana.

Nine BDR members were killed during the mutiny. Central subedar major Nurul Islam was killed at the beginning of the rebellion. Though no specific information is available regarding the death of the other eight BDR men, it is assumed that they were killed in cross fires when they obstructed mutineers. Besides an army soldier and four civilians were killed and about 30 others were injured.

Recovery of the bodies of martyred officials
18. After killing the army officers the rebels tried to hide the bodies. Bodies of two senior officers were disposed inside a manhole. Two bodies were recovered from Kamrangir Char area and bodies of seven other officers were recovered from the mouth of the sluice gate at the sewerage line adjacent to the embankment. A total of 53 bodies of officers and others were recovered from inside Pilkhana, most of them from the mass graves dug by the mutineers. Two bodies recovered have still not been identified.

What is the cause of the mutiny?
19. The real cause and motive behind the barbaric incident could not be established beyond doubt. The committee feels that further investigation is required to unearth the real cause behind the incident. The negative attitude among the general BDR members towards the army officers, and their discontent over unfulfilled demands may be identified as the primary cause of the mutiny. Analysis of these demands give the impression that such small demands can not be the main cause of such a heinous incident. These points have been used to influence the general BDR soldiers. The main conspirators may have used these causes to instigate this incident, they themselves working from behind curtains to destabilise the nation.

Subsidiary causes
19. Some subsidiary causes played direct/indirect role in realisation of the rebellion. These are: failure of the main intelligence agencies, their inefficiency and organisational failures, collusion of the Rifles Security Unit (RSU) with the mutineers, lack of necessary coordination between the BDR and the home ministry regarding the demands, instigation of the different demands of the mutineers by the electronic media and the information ministry's overall lack of control over the media.

BDR soldiers also carries out rebellions in 1972 and 1991. But due to limitation of BDR laws, those responsible for the mutinies could not be punished and thus those incidents failed to discourage BDR members from carrying out revolts.

Motive of the mutiny
21. The main aim or motive of the mutiny was to destroy chain of command and render the BDR ineffective, discouraging army officers to work in BDR on deputation in future by brutally killing army officers, putting Bangladesh Army and the BDR on a collision course, destabilising the newly elected government, destroying internal security and stability of Bangladesh, tarnishing the image of the country abroad, and hamper the participation of Bangladesh in UN peacekeeping missions.

Long term impact of the incident
22. The mutiny incident is sure to have a long-term impact in Bangladesh. The BDR rebellion, which was a big threat to democracy, posed a huge challenge to the newly elected government. The rebellion was a threat to stability of the nation. The Army lost many meritorious and efficient officers. Their families lost their dear and near ones and the nation was deprived of their service. As an institution BDR was almost destroyed and has lost people's trust and respect. Overall the army has also been affected. The reputation of Bangladesh Armed Forces earned in the UN Peace Mission also faces a threat. The dent it made on the morale of the armed forces would take time to recover.

Conspirators and their failed attempt
23. Those who do not believe in the independence and sovereignty of the country, those who do not believe in democracy, those who do not want o see Bangladesh as a stable, democratic and developing country, those who does not want Bangladesh to be secure and have a strong armed forces, made an attempt to reach their vile goals by putting the BDR and the army on a collision course through the BDR mutiny. The mutiny was quelled with political sagacity, wisdom and bold leadership.

Recommendations
24. The enquiry committee made some short term and long term recommendations for the government's consideration and taking effective steps:

Short term recommendations
a) Immediate completion of trial of all crimes related to BDR killings under the laws of the army to ensure quick and exemplary punishment;

b) Immediate restoration of BDR command and control for the sake of national security;

c) Steps for proper honour and rehabilitation of the army officers, and families of those killed and affected in the BDR rebellion;

d) Steps for proper honour and rehabilitation of the family members of those BDR personnel, including central subedar Major Md Nurul Islam, who were killed in resisting the rebellion.

e) Proper compensation to the civilians who were killed and affected.

f) Steps for identification of the unidentified bodies- intensifying attempts to recover looted arms and ammunitions;

g) Arrest and trial of the absconding rebels;

h) Immediate formation of a permanent "National Crisis Management Committee (NCMC) at the highest level to face different national crises.

Long term recommendations
a) Reconstitution of BDR;

b) Redistribution of responsibility and duty of all intelligence agencies and formation of a permanent Central Intelligence Coordination Committee (CICC) at highest level;

c) Formation of counter intelligence forces for all intelligence agencies including the RSU;

d) Amendment and updating the laws and acts concerning BDR and other para military forces including the articles of rules concerning mutiny;

e) Updating the existing laws and rules to ensure proper work environment and facilities in the army, para military and law enforcing agencies;

f) Refixing the service tenure of all members of BDR personnel in line with those of the army;

g) Bringing a balance in the benefits, salaries and allowances of the army, para military and law enforcing agency personnel;

h) Avoiding the involvement of members of the army, para military and law enforcing agencies in programmes such as Operation Daal-Bhat, and instead engaging them in professional duties as far as possible;

i) Formulation of effective policies and fixing strategies for increasing coordination among the army, para military and law enforcing agencies under different ministries including the home ministry;

j) Formulation of necessary Code of Conduct for the media specifying their (print and electronic media) role in consolidating national security;

k) Controlling mobile telephone transmission tower (BTS) in the sensitive areas housing army, para-military and law enforcing agency establishments;

l) Separate enquiry into the irregularities in Daal-Bhat programme, BDR shop, Kalyan Trust, School Management, contracting etc;

m) Strict ban on any kind of persuasion in appointments in army, para military and law enforcing agencies, considering qualification as the only yardstick for such appointments and a departmental enquiry to find out and take action against those who were appointed in such ways;

n) Arranging more investigations to identify the main persons responsible for the BDR rebellion.

 

[luckyy]

What is the cause of the mutiny?
19. The real cause and motive behind the barbaric incident could not be established beyond doubt. The committee feels that further investigation is required to unearth the real cause behind the incident.

Motive of the mutiny
21. The main aim or motive of the mutiny was to ...... destabilising the newly elected government, destroying internal security and stability of Bangladesh, .

so the main question is , who are the people like to destabalize BD newly elected AL govt ....

 

[third eye]

The Daily Star - Details News


Pintu instigated BDR mutiny
Says CID report as the ex-BNP MP placed on 10-day remand

Detained former BNP lawmaker Nasiruddin Ahmed Pintu instigated the BDR mutineers, who were involved in the carnage at their Pilkhana headquarters, alleges the Criminal Investigation Department (CID).

The CID made the allegation in its forwarding report submitted to a Dhaka court yesterday when the investigation officer of the mutiny case produced Pintu before the court seeking 10-day remand.

The court granted five days to quiz the former lawmaker in connection with the charges.

Earlier, the national probe committee on BDR carnage revealed Pintu's "involvement" with the BDR carnage in helping mutineers flee by arranging engine boats to cross the Buriganga at Keraniganj ferry ghat.


The allegation has also been mentioned in the forwarding report by the CID.

Another allegation against Pintu came to light from the CID documents submitted to the court that he and his followers encouraged the mutineers by bringing out processions around Pilkhana in support of them on February 25.

CID sources say Pintu's above-mentioned involvement came to light during questioning of arrested BDR mutineers and in the witnesses' accounts.

The investigation officer, CID's Senior Assistant Superintendent Abdul Kahar Akand, said Pintu has been sent to the Taskforce for Interrogation (TFI) cell where he will be kept during his remand period.

He added CID representatives will visit the TFI cell and interrogate him.

The Detective Branch of police picked up Pintu along with his brother-in-law Mainur Rahman Apu on Tuesday afternoon from the High Court premises following a CID requisition to detain him.

Apu was later released on a bond.

The former lawmaker was taken to the Court of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Dhaka around 12:45pm in a prison van amid tight security.

Earlier, Pintu's counsels submitted a petition seeking bail along with cancellation of the remand prayer.

Moving the petition, the defence said their client was implicated in the case for political harassment and damage to his image in the society.

They also told the court Pintu was implicated in the case in an attempt to divert the investigation and save the real perpetrators.

The defence also argued that it is not clear on which basis allegation Pintu was arrested.

COURT PROCEEDINGS SUSPEND

Metropolitan Magistrate Mominul Hassan had to suspend the court proceedings for around 10 minutes and left the courtroom as there was a pandemonium due to the defence's 'unhealthy' competition on who will be the first to make submission.

Pintu himself tried to calm the lawyers, but they did not even pay heed to him.

At one stage Pintu shouted, "Why are you (lawyers) causing damage to me?"

As the lawyers later promised not to indulge in such behaviour, the magistrate took his seat again and allowed Pintu to defend himself as per his earlier appeal to the court.

Pintu argued that if he was involved in the incident, law enforcers could arrest him at that time.

He also said he has been suffering from heart ailment, chest pain, respiratory problem and lost sight in an eye. He said he even begged to a constable to buy him some medicine, but the policeman did not move.

Former president of BNP's student wing Jatiyatabadi Chhatra Dal, Pintu grabbed media spotlight every now and then not only for his alleged involvement in criminal activities, violence, tender snatching and corruption but also for his arrogant behaviour.

During the immediate past BNP-Jamaat alliance rule, the government withdrew as many as 76 cases against Pintu, who still faces several cases.

 

[TopCat]

Pintu is the Leader of Student Front of BNP and who could only pass 8th grade. Dhaka university students of BNP protested against that don but Khaleda made them clear, they should take him or leave BNP. Khaleda herself could barely pass 10th grade so she had a soft corner for illeterates. Even she did not bother educating her own sons. If Ziaur Rahman was alive, things could have been completely different. Zia used to promote well educated, enlightened people whereas his own wife is completely opposite.

 

[Stumper]

Pintu is the Leader of Student Front of BNP and who could only pass 8th grade. Dhaka university students of BNP protested against that don but Khaleda made them clear, they should take him or leave BNP. Khaleda herself could barely pass 10th grade so she had a soft corner for illeterates. Even she did not bother educating her own sons. If Ziaur Rahman was alive, things could have been completely different. Zia used to promote well educated, enlightened people whereas his own wife is completely opposite.

Reminds me of UP/Bihar in India.. and the great Mayawati.
Anyway ..was this idiot capable of such a uprising?

 

[Ratus Ratus]

The Daily Star - Details News

Published On: 2009-06-23

3 battalions to find no room in Pilkhana
BDR reform proposals handed to Faruk Khan
Julfikar Ali Manik



Against the backdrop of last February's bloody mutiny, three out of the four BDR battalions now based in its headquarters at Pilkhana are likely to be moved outside the capital.

Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) sources said a set of proposals for BDR reforms was prepared by a sub-committee, formed earlier and led by the BDR's director general (DG). The committee in a meeting at Pilkhana placed the set of proposals for BDR reforms, including its probable new name, before Commerce Minster Faruk Khan yesterday evening.

The moving of the three battalions was in the proposals, sources said.

Faruk Khan heads a committee, formed in the wake of BDR carnage, for coordinating measures of the Prime Minister's Office and the home and defence ministries.

Maj Gen Md Mainul Islam, DG of BDR, told The Daily Star last night, "Considering all aspects, we gave complete proposals on the reforms of the force. Its organisational structure, functions and all related matters are in the proposals."

"If the government approves the proposals in principle, we will go for the next step--implementation," said Gen Mainul declining to give any details about the proposals.

Representatives of the home ministry, Armed Forces Division, Army, Police, and Ansar are members of the sub-committee. The National Defence College extended support to the secretarial work of the sub-committee.

"We proposed five new names for BDR. Of the five, the most voted names are 'Bangladesh Border Guards' and 'Border Guards of Bangladesh'," said a source.

The source said, "BDR headquarters would remain in Pilkhana but we have proposed to move three of the four battalions out of the headquarters."

Bangladesh Rifles 24, 36, 13, and 44 Battalion are based in the BDR headquarters and soldiers of these battalions took part in the bloody mutiny on February 25-26 which left 74 persons killed including 57 of the army's finest officers who were on deputation there.

A source in the BDR said three battalions were not proposed to be moved out of the capital because those battalions were involved in the mutiny.

The source said, "In fact, the four battalions at the headquarters are reserve forces. If needed we could deploy these battalions anywhere outside the capital. But now we think it is better to move their base out of Dhaka which would allow us to deploy them in the border more quickly when required."

Sources say that the BDR now has 12 sectors and the sector headquarters command their forces. The committee proposed a new modus operandi dividing the map of the country into three regions and bringing the sectors under those regions.

"We have proposed moving the three battalions to three proposed regional headquarters as reserve forces," said a BDR source.

Only one battalion would remain in Pilkhana headquarters as reserve force, the source said.

The committee proposed keeping the old slogan of BDR "Shimanter Otondro Prohori", the sources said, adding that they also proposed changing the existing badge of the BDR.

"We proposed keeping a picture of a border pillar at the bottom of the two crossed rifles in the present badge," source said.

Sources said the committee proposed three possible options for appointing officers and personnel of other ranks in BDR.

As per one of the three options, all officers of the force would be military officers and other personnel of BDR would be recruited directly, the source said.

"As a large number of BDR personnel would lose their jobs for their role in the mutiny, we proposed filling up the vacancies temporarily by bringing in personnel of same rank from the army, police, Rab and Ansar," said another source.

"A few years later when the border force will have enough number of its own personnel, those from the army, police, Rab and Ansar would be sent back," said a source.

The source said another option is to have cent percent officers from the army and fill 70 percent of other positions with BDR and the remaining position with army, police, and Ansar personnel.

"This 30 percent men would join the force on deputation just prior to their retirement," said a source.

Another option is to have 90 percent officers from the army and 10 percent from the police and Ansar. Army, police and Ansar men on deputation would fill half the other posts and the other half would be appointed directly from the BDR.

The sources said they proposed a BDR uniform similar to the army's but of a different colour than that of the BDR.

---------

Does this really solve the underlying problems? To me this looks more like a case of sweeping it under the rug, not seen, not heard, not resolved.

 

[eastwatch]

so the main question is , who are the people like to destabalize BD newly elected AL govt ....

I would like to say a few possibilities who may be behind the BDR carnage in Pilkhana. During the two yrs of CTG, both AL and BNP cronies and their leaders were victimized by the army. They were put into jails, their illegal properties were pinpointed and then confiscated. Their reputations were tarnished.

So, it is possible that some people either from AL or from BNP were the masterminds behind the carnage. BDR mid-ranking officers had been meeting AL leaders even before the election. They tried to meet the Home Minister, but could not. So, they handed over their demand list to her Secretary. When the PM did not say a word about the BDR grievances in her speech in Pilkhana on 2/24, they decided to PROTEST in the Durbar Hall gathering next morning.

However, somehow the protest rally turned out to be a pretext for gunning down the DG and other 56 officers, who were deputed to the BDR from army. It seems that killing was not in the card initially, or the majority did not know about it. Of course, the killing operation could not have been successful if it were known to the Jawans before the operation.

It is possible that among the BDR troops, AL or BNP had their own agents who would start shooting. Once the shooting started every one thought that today's mission is to kill the officers. It is also possible that both AL and BNP had placed their own agents SEPARATELY to do the killings, and both are similarly responsible.

If the Pilkhana operation was a MOSSAD/RAW joint ventrure, then their mission has been half accomplished. Their main mission was to start a CIVIL war, which did not happen only because SH did not allow the army to make an assault. A civil war could also have started if Gen. MUA were as impulsive as that Kijilbush YAHIYA KHAN.

A direct military assault to Pilkhana would have induced a BDR-army war joined by students and others. All the BDR camps across the nation were ready to stage counter attack, should there be an attack on Pilkhana. It would have destroyed the country, all its efforts of 37 yrs would have gone to the gutters.

A civil war may not have been limited between these two military groups. It would have spread among the population, among the students and among the peasants. Result would have been an Afghanistan style situation. USA would have then pressed SH to accept Indian troops. In a reaction, all the patriots, nationalists and Mujahids would have taken arms to fight the Indian army.

I shudder with fear at the thought of the scenerio I have written above. India was probably expecting a Pilkhana assault by the army, and consequently a civil war, which they wanted to use to realize their hegemonist agenda. India had alerted their army and air force bases near the border even before BDR mutiny had started.

MUA had probably foreseen the chain reaction had he assaulted Pilkhana. All blames for the consequence would have then engulfed him. Everyone would have then the latest CONSPIRACY THEORY that he himself had masterminded the killing of his own officers only to stage an army take over of the country, or to sell the country to India. Remember, we are a nation very much fond of conspiracy theories. Population would have then gone completely against the army, and as a result, the army would have faced the bleak prospect it faced in 1972 -1975 August.

I say that if it was MOSSAD/RAW masterminded killing, then it was a half success. Even this half success is giving us hell.

 

[Stumper]

.
India was probably expecting a Pilkhana assault by army, and consequently a civil war, which they wanted to use to realize their hegemonist agenda. India had alerted their army and air force bases near the border even before BDR mutiny had started.

EastWatch: WTF ..... on one hand you guys call GoB as a indian stooge.. and here you accuse us of instigating this carnage and eliminating this very stooge government (without shedding any proof of our involvement). Take your stand. Either we support a pro indian government (in which case dont blame us for this carnage) or we instigate this carnage (in which case i would like forward to some proof)

The Army and IAF was put on alert (as should be for such situation) AFTER this incident. Google it.

If you want to debate, be ready with your facts. Else give your posts the disclaimer of "My Opinion/Theory"

Im fed up of BD members ridiculous theories (without any supporting data). You guys dont own any of your misfortune ... everyone else is responsible for your problems.. how easy.