Intelligence failure caused BDR disaster
M. Shahidul Islam
Every crisis must traverse a slotted path to come to its end. The BDR mutiny of February 25 was just the beginning of a major crisis that has long way to cross the finishing line.
That is why the carnage and the genocide of February 25 have begun to alter the internal political dynamics of the country while the prospect of foreign military intervention remains as vibrant as it was on February 25.
Threat to sovereignty
The Hindustan Times reported on March 2 that the crisis in Bangladesh had put on alert the armed forces of India who remain stand by for what they said 'humanitarian intervention' inside Bangladesh.
The paper claimed, since the day of the BDR mutiny, Indian Air Force (IAF) transport bases - equipped with IL-76 heavy-lift and AN-32 medium-lift aircrafts- were asked to stay prepared to assist the Bangladesh government, if requested by Dhaka. Quoting an unnamed senior IAF officer, the paper claimed that the largest Indian airbase located in Jorhat, Assam, - which is also the closest one to Bangladesh- stands ready to conduct such a mission.
The Indian readiness to intervene was reinforced further by another statement made on March 4 in Hyderabad by the Director General of the BSF, M L Kumawat. "After this crisis in Bangladesh, we have given direction to all our troops and personnel deployed on Indo-Bangladesh border to remain on high alert," he said.
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina also said on March 3 in a local seminar that the "Conspiracies against Bangladesh are not over yet...There is still a plot to foil the country's democracy, independence and sovereignty," she said, adding, "My own safety is at risk."
Yet, the squabbling between the government and the opposition continues in disregard to a host of impending internal and external threats to the country's stability and the sovereignty. The internal political ambiance has been sharply polarized since the Prime Minister pointed a finger of suspicion toward the opposition leaders for the BDR carnage in the parliament, resulting in the opposition leaders to be more aggressive in blaming the government for the tragedy and its handling.
Meanwhile, the victims - the military officers, their families, colleagues in the service and outside - kept blaming the higher command of the military for its failure to launch a rescue mission soon after the massacre began. The higher command, on the other hand, keeps making excuses that it had no order to intervene militarily to subdue the mutineers despite there being a quickly- organized- preparedness to do so.
Crisis mishandled
The pain is made more unbearable when certain facts are made known. For example, observers were awestruck at the PM's disclosure that the assassinated Director General (DG) of the BDR, Maj. Gen. Shakil Ahmed, had called her from his cell phone upon being shot at and requested for help. Although the PM had called the army chief instantly who is learnt to have said, "The military needs an hour and a half, or two, to launch an appropriate mission," no further instruction came from the political leadership to enter the BDR compound during the more than 30 hours long stand off in order to see where thousands of bullets were being fired, and, at who.
The military mission thus aborted, a visibly uncoordinated political mission kept the crisis prolonged for nearly 40 hours. During that time, none had the clue that one of the most heinous carnages of history had occurred within the Pilkhana BDR compound, at a time when the Prime Minister declared a general amnesty to the mutineers and sent her political colleagues to talk to the rebel soldiers inside the BDR head quarters without ensuring first the safety of the entrapped officers and their family members.
Consequently, serious uproars are being raised about the failure of the PM to order the launching of a rescue mission and the absence of pressure for the release of the hostages first, unharmed, as a precondition to the declared amnesty. Besides, the PM, as the country's defence minister, failed to gather enough intelligence to know the true extent of the killings that were going inside the BDR head quarters.
Also surprising is the fact that the PM allowed an MP of the ruling party to launch a publicity campaign to clear the three miles radius of the BDR headquarters, which has further facilitated the fleeing of the murderers from the spot.
Horrendous discovery
All that being part of history now, one wonders how it all happened, who did it, and why?
While that is precisely the undertaking of the investigators who will unearth the real intent of the carnage and identify the culprits, the incident demonstrates a serious lapse in military intelligence. The following facts, gathered from over a dozen of reliable sources, further corroborate that fact.
One: Investigators have learnt that a team of 25 trained foreign commandos entered Bangladesh illegally from India through various bordering areas on or within January 11, 2009. They were received and sheltered in Dhaka by individuals working under cover as diplomats.
Two: At the same time, a small group of 10-12 BDR members, including two Deputy Assistant Directors (DADs), were recruited as the internal moles and coordinators to provide precise information to the foreign team via three senior political leaders of the country until the hours of the carnage.
Three: The occasion for the operation was chosen carefully to ensure availability of all senior BDR officers who had gathered in Pilkhana for the annual BDR day celebration. Over 3,000 extra troops also came to Pilkhana for various administrative duties as well as to launch a tattoo show for which the BDR has been historically famous.
Four: The mutiny was slated for February 24, while the PM was in Pilkhana to take salute in the BDR day parade. In consideration of likely collateral harm to the political personalities and other dignitaries who accompanied the PM, the date was changed. However, final coordination and reconnaissance were done that day by some guests who attended the parade, masquerading as VIPs.
Five: Upon conclusion of final reconnaissance, at about 10.30 PM, on February 24, a segment of the foreign killing squad and over 25 BDR soldiers - plus three young - leading politicians of the country - met in a briefing in one of suburban Dhaka residences. The precise timing of the operation and the responsibilities of each small group were decided in that meeting.
Six: As per plan, one of the DADs ensured that members of the BDR cell would be posted on duty on gate number 4 that morning when the DG would sit for the slated Darbar in the Darbar hall.
Seven: On February 25, the D-day, the foreign commando team entered the Pilkhana compound through gate number 4, at 8.10 AM, using a BDR vehicle (Bedford) which the designated DAD had arranged to send for them about an hour ago. Dressed in sports gear (long camouflage trouser, vest, and PT shoe) - in order to be able to quickly change into civil clothes while fleeing after the massacre - the killers entered the Pilkhana compound undetected.
Eight: The BDR vehicle that carried the killers was followed by an ash-colour pick up van which carried initially used arms and ammunition from outside. In order to begin the massacre, one of the Bengali speaking commandos, armed, was ordered to enter the Darbar hall without permission to engage the DG into a provoking altercation.
Nine: Once the DG was shot, other officers, all unarmed, tried to obstruct the lone killer. Within seconds, the action group of the killer team entered the Darbar hall and started killing other officers while the cover up group cordoned the area.
Ten: In the following hours, part B of the mission began by inducting other troops into the team under gun point and the armoury - as well as the intelligence equipments - was looted. The foreign killers and their local henchmen used BDR soldiers on gunpoint to show the locations of other officers, their families, and the offices where vital national security documents remained preserved. Highly classified border security maps, troop deployment plan and initial action plan, etc. were taken away by the foreign commandos.
Eleven: Eyewitnesses say, two of the last foreign commandos - one male and one female - left the BDR compound in the afternoon on February 26, following the surrendering of arms by BDR members who knew nothing about the mutiny even a minute before. These two are presumed to be the leaders of the foreign commando team.
None of the above could have been materialized if the two main national intelligence outfits of the country (DGFI and NSI) have had prior clues about what was being conspired to destroy the armed forces of the country. The foreign commandos took control of BDR's own intelligence outfit, RSU, at the initial stage and used RSU equipments to communicate among themselves during the mutiny. The commanding officer of RSU too was assassinated during the carnage.
That aside, there were other intelligence lapses during the mutiny. In the more than 30 hours while the mutiny prolonged, neither the NSI, nor the DGFI, had any clue about who were being shot at and what exactly went on inside. They also ignored SMS messages from fellow officers, on ground that there was no order from the government to do anything.
In reality, these two agencies were too busy, as they often are, in ensuring security to the VVIPs and VIPs; not the country and its vital institutions that they are oath-bound and mandated to serve and protect.
Failure of security
This horrendous lack of intelligence also led to the absence of any special security being arranged at the venue of the DG's Darbar from where the carnage began and spread, despite Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) dictating military commanders to post armed sentry around any gathering of troops or officers, in peace and in war.
As such, the entire security of the day was as usual; the main gates manned by regimental guards, and, gate number four manned by soldiers from that tiny cell created by the two alleged DADs, indoctrinated to be part of a mutiny that tried to rid the BDR of its military command for ever.
Now that the threats to the nation's sovereignty has exacerbated following this tragedy, the wishes of the foreign powers and their henchmen must be thwarted at any cost.
In order to do that, the political leadership and the armed forces must ensure that innocent BDR members do not face any persecutions while the force itself may be renamed as Border Guards Regiment (BGR) and its command may be vested to a newly created Para-Military Division (PMD) within the Armed Forces Division (AFD) of the ministry of defence.
That having done, all eligible BGR members must be sent to the country's borders to uphold the nation's sovereignty at any cost, with a renewed sense of dedication and determination. It's time for the nation to prove: greater the challenge, more determined we are.
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