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Hit and run
By Air Marshal (retd) C. Harikumar February 29, 2020 16:39
IST
Balakot strike was a triumph of planning and execution
THE PUNITIVE AIR strike at Balakot changed the security narrative in
the subcontinent. Having been a victim of the Pakistani deep state’s
sponsored terrorism for too long, India raised the costs for Islamabad with
the punitive air strike. A new normal also emerged. India’s political
leadership realised that use of airpower need not be escalatory; that there
exists a large window for sub-conventional or limited war options
between two nuclear powers.
The action also exposed the existence of state-run terrorist camps in
Pakistan. The proof of the pudding is that there has been no major
terrorist attack since then.
The attack on a CRPF convoy at Pulwama on February 14 killed 40 jawans.
By evening, Jaish-e-Mohammad’s involvement was confirmed. By the time
Operation Parakram was ordered after the 2001 attack on Parliament, in
which the militaries on both the sides were deployed for a full-fledged
conventional war. A sub-conventional plan was formulated, post
Parakram, involving select squadrons. A few fighter squadrons and units
were put on standby 24/7 for short-notice missions. After the Kaluchak
massacre of May 2002, we prepared for air strikes against terrorist camps
in Pakistan. After the 26/11 Mumbai attack of 2008, we had a tacit
clearance from the government for a punitive strike.
This time, Balakot in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, which was across Pakistan-
occupied Kashmir, was finalised as a target when the national security
adviser met the service chiefs, the Research and Analysis Wing chief and
his deputy on February 18. The R&AW had good intelligence on a large
Jaish-e-Mohammed training camp on the crest of a ridge called Jaba Top.
It was an ideal target—the location was on an isolated hill, which reduced
collateral damage; the target was big enough to be clearly identified; and
it was a single target with multiple DMPI, or designated mean point of
impact.
Fresh images of the site were obtained, and the eight-figure GPS
coordinates reverified. The strike was planned to be conducted after Aero
India in Bengaluru ended on February 24. The exact date was left to the
political leadership. February 26 was tentatively picked, though we knew
we could get better weather two days later. The weather was marginal,
with five western disturbances rolling in one after the other. Those who
remember the National War Memorial inauguration on the evening of
February 25 would recollect the thunder showers over Delhi after the
event. The weather affected satellite imagery, which was needed to check
on enemy deployment and defences.
There were more challenges. We had to ensure secrecy. Units not involved
The next problem was to keep it all under cover. Twenty Mirages were to
be armed with multiple weapons; the upgraded Mirages carried six MICA
missiles each. Six Mirages were armed with SPICE bombs and six with
Crystal Maze surface-to-air missiles. Arming these would itself be a major
event involving three Mirage squadrons. So much activity on the Gwalior
tarmac would be noted.
The next worry was, how to fly such a massive force across from Gwalior
to the target without the world and our own civil radars knowing about it.
Sixteen aircraft took off from the runway and taxi track simultaneously to
save time. Once airborne, hiding them was tricky. Commercial aircraft
taking off and landing in Delhi were in the process of climbing or
descending, thus taking up large height bands. We resolved this by
rehearsing the event partially two days earlier and getting a person with
authority at Delhi area control.
The planes flew over 1,500km on a dark night, refuelling in mid-air from
IL-78 aircraft; all the while, real-time information was being relayed from
AWACS. We planned a strike route over the mountains to evade enemy
radars. So the team flew from north of Srinagar in a westerly direction.
Everything was monitored at the operations room in the WAC.
Five impact points were selected. The largest structure in the Balakot
complex, a mosque, was not targeted. The first hit was at 3:28am IST on
February 26, by Mirage 2000s with SPICE-2000 penetration bombs. Each
bomb was planned to be followed by a Crystal Maze, which has a two-way
data link with the aircraft through which it could provide imagery for
assessing battle damage. One SPICE bomb failed for technical reasons;
none of the Crystal Maze missiles were released because of procedural
issues.
The time was selected as 3:28am as it would be 2:58am in Pakistan; the
terrorists would be asleep and the moon would have risen above 30
degrees. (February 19 was a full-moon night.) We knew that the terrorists
prayed five set times a day, starting with salat al-fajr before sunrise. So,
the strike was timed accordingly.
Yes, there was no precise body count. But the issue was not about how
many terrorists were killed; it was about sending a strong message. Was
Pakistan caught off guard? Yes, in spite of their readiness. Pakistan Air
Force (PAF) had moved squadrons to their satellite bases, and increased Combat Air Patrols.
Did we encounter the enemy? Yes, we picked up the PAF’s Saab 2000 early
warning aircraft holding south of Kamra on a north-south pattern. At
3:05am, we spotted two F-16s getting airborne and flying east–west over
Murid. This was a close call. To divert them, we sent two Su-30s and four
Jaguars towards Bahawalpur. The decoy pilots were ordered not to cross
the border. The ruse worked beautifully. When the first bomb hit the
Balakot camp, the closest PAF combat air patrol was 230km away.
As soon as the Mirages reached their bases, we declared a pan-India air
defence alert. We were prepared for a full-blown conventional war, but
we made all out efforts not to escalate the conflict.
Yet, we were certain that Pakistan would retaliate quickly. The next day,
February 27, saw action from their side. Our air defence was on full alert;
the AWACS was on station northeast of Adampur in the morning and so
were the aircraft on combat air patrol. At 9:42am, the Integrated Air
Command and Control Station warned of an increase in air activity over
Pakistan. Fighters were launched from Kamra, Murid, Chander, Sargodha,
Rafiqui and Jacobabad. They were at medium altitude, and some had their
friend-or-foe identification on initially. That was a decoy—they were
showing themselves on our radar to make it seem like routine activity;
some aircraft tried to hide at low altitude. Some of these airfields are close
to the border and fighters are routinely airborne for training. Unless
hostile intent is seen, taking action would require a lot of effort.
Soon, PAF fighters regrouped and turned east for the attack. The first
enemy package approached towards the Line of Control sector at 9:58am
on the Akhnoor axis, and approached the LoC around 10:06am. Another
package approached the Poonch axis, staggered by five to seven minutes.
A third package was opposite Anupgarh sector.
Each package had eight to ten aircraft, supported by multiple combat air
patrols, Saab 2000s and Dassault Falcon 20s for electronic support. On our
side there were two upgraded Mirages on combat air patrol east of
Udhampur, and two Su-30s near Srinagar. Two MiG-21 Bisons were
scrambled in two lots (10:01am and 10:03am) from Srinagar, two Bisons
from Awantipur, two MiG-29s from Adampur and two Su-30s each from
Halwara, Bathinda and Jodhpur.
The PAF ensured that they did not cross the International Boundary or the
Line of Actual Control. Two MiG-21 Bisons, flown by Wing Commander
Abhinandan Varthaman and Squadron Leader Vyas, were scrambled from
Srinagar at 10:03am for the package on the Poonch axis. On reaching the
sector, Abhinandan spotted enemy aircraft at low level, and the radar
informed him that all aircraft to his west were hostile. He went for the
target in contact on close combat mode with R-73 missiles.
The radar had asked the formation to turn back because of the threat
developing on them. Vyas heard the call and turned around. Jammers
prevented Abhinandan from getting the call. In the melee, it is presumed
that the Bison shot down an F-16D, while breaking off from the attack.
There was no damage. The debris indicated use of H4 bombs (range 120km) and range
extension kits (60km) on Mk-83 bombs.
Why did the weapons not cause damage? I see two reasons. One, the
enemy was forced to turn back by IAF interceptors before weapon
release. Or, they were not allowed effective follow-through. Five
AMRAAM missiles were fired by the F-16. Debris of AMRAAM AIM-120C5
were picked up and shown on national TV at 7:30pm on February 28.
Why were such beyond-visual-range missiles ineffective? One theory is
that PAF wanted to draw our air defence forces to a planned kill box
without crossing the LoC and use their superior AMRAAM to get aerial
kills. Since this ploy did not succeed, they launched their missiles at longer
ranges. We simply defeated their superior weapons with superior
manoeuvring. Anyway, Pakistan’s retaliation was a giveaway that our
Balakot strike was successful.
There were many tactical lessons for us. One, the PAF’s superior beyond-
visual-range missiles give them an advantage of first-shot capability with
better kinematic range. Our planned induction of the Meteor missile with
Rafale fighter jets would change that. Two, weather and mountains do
impose physical limitations on aerial surveillance. Good and real-time
intelligence will always be the most critical requirement in any conflict.
Three, communication jamming was a vulnerability. The IAF has been
crying hoarse for years for securing communications and progressing the
case for operational data link. The case has got traction now. Four,
dominance in the electromagnetic spectrum will play a key role in future
conflict. Five, clear rules of engagement are important in less-than-war
situations. These rules need to be reviewed quickly. Seven, combatants
need to be trained to quickly switch from peacetime rules to wartime
activities.
The shooting down of our own Mi-17V5 helicopter is unpardonable. It was
a combination of many mistakes, including personnel being trigger-happy
at the first exposure to a conflict. The conflicts of 1965, 1971 and 1999
have shown that the maximum attrition for any air force is in the first
three days of conflict, when we experience the ‘fog of war’. The US air
force, which leads in combat experience, realised this over years of
iteration. The main objective of the Red Flag exercise in the US is to train
personnel in handling the first three days of combat with reduced
attrition.
Our response reflected a strong political will, quick decision-making, good
intelligence in selection of target, meticulous planning, good tactical
acumen, maintenance of secrecy, excellent execution in adverse weather,
robustness of the Integrated Air Command and Control System and
excellent tactics and training.
Total war between countries is slowly becoming history. We need to be
prepared and trained for border conflicts like Kargil, heightened tensions
at Doklam or punitive surgical strikes, as in Pakistan and Myanmar.
The bigger message: If major terrorist strikes reoccur, we will hit again
and hit harder.
Air Marshal C. Harikumar was the air officer commanding-in-chief of
Western Air Command during the Balakot strike.
https://www.theweek.in/theweek/specials/2020/02/28/hit-and-run.amp.html
By Air Marshal (retd) C. Harikumar February 29, 2020 16:39
IST
Balakot strike was a triumph of planning and execution
THE PUNITIVE AIR strike at Balakot changed the security narrative in
the subcontinent. Having been a victim of the Pakistani deep state’s
sponsored terrorism for too long, India raised the costs for Islamabad with
the punitive air strike. A new normal also emerged. India’s political
leadership realised that use of airpower need not be escalatory; that there
exists a large window for sub-conventional or limited war options
between two nuclear powers.
The action also exposed the existence of state-run terrorist camps in
Pakistan. The proof of the pudding is that there has been no major
terrorist attack since then.
The attack on a CRPF convoy at Pulwama on February 14 killed 40 jawans.
By evening, Jaish-e-Mohammad’s involvement was confirmed. By the time
Operation Parakram was ordered after the 2001 attack on Parliament, in
which the militaries on both the sides were deployed for a full-fledged
conventional war. A sub-conventional plan was formulated, post
Parakram, involving select squadrons. A few fighter squadrons and units
were put on standby 24/7 for short-notice missions. After the Kaluchak
massacre of May 2002, we prepared for air strikes against terrorist camps
in Pakistan. After the 26/11 Mumbai attack of 2008, we had a tacit
clearance from the government for a punitive strike.
This time, Balakot in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, which was across Pakistan-
occupied Kashmir, was finalised as a target when the national security
adviser met the service chiefs, the Research and Analysis Wing chief and
his deputy on February 18. The R&AW had good intelligence on a large
Jaish-e-Mohammed training camp on the crest of a ridge called Jaba Top.
It was an ideal target—the location was on an isolated hill, which reduced
collateral damage; the target was big enough to be clearly identified; and
it was a single target with multiple DMPI, or designated mean point of
impact.
Fresh images of the site were obtained, and the eight-figure GPS
coordinates reverified. The strike was planned to be conducted after Aero
India in Bengaluru ended on February 24. The exact date was left to the
political leadership. February 26 was tentatively picked, though we knew
we could get better weather two days later. The weather was marginal,
with five western disturbances rolling in one after the other. Those who
remember the National War Memorial inauguration on the evening of
February 25 would recollect the thunder showers over Delhi after the
event. The weather affected satellite imagery, which was needed to check
on enemy deployment and defences.
There were more challenges. We had to ensure secrecy. Units not involved
The next problem was to keep it all under cover. Twenty Mirages were to
be armed with multiple weapons; the upgraded Mirages carried six MICA
missiles each. Six Mirages were armed with SPICE bombs and six with
Crystal Maze surface-to-air missiles. Arming these would itself be a major
event involving three Mirage squadrons. So much activity on the Gwalior
tarmac would be noted.
The next worry was, how to fly such a massive force across from Gwalior
to the target without the world and our own civil radars knowing about it.
Sixteen aircraft took off from the runway and taxi track simultaneously to
save time. Once airborne, hiding them was tricky. Commercial aircraft
taking off and landing in Delhi were in the process of climbing or
descending, thus taking up large height bands. We resolved this by
rehearsing the event partially two days earlier and getting a person with
authority at Delhi area control.
The planes flew over 1,500km on a dark night, refuelling in mid-air from
IL-78 aircraft; all the while, real-time information was being relayed from
AWACS. We planned a strike route over the mountains to evade enemy
radars. So the team flew from north of Srinagar in a westerly direction.
Everything was monitored at the operations room in the WAC.
Five impact points were selected. The largest structure in the Balakot
complex, a mosque, was not targeted. The first hit was at 3:28am IST on
February 26, by Mirage 2000s with SPICE-2000 penetration bombs. Each
bomb was planned to be followed by a Crystal Maze, which has a two-way
data link with the aircraft through which it could provide imagery for
assessing battle damage. One SPICE bomb failed for technical reasons;
none of the Crystal Maze missiles were released because of procedural
issues.
The time was selected as 3:28am as it would be 2:58am in Pakistan; the
terrorists would be asleep and the moon would have risen above 30
degrees. (February 19 was a full-moon night.) We knew that the terrorists
prayed five set times a day, starting with salat al-fajr before sunrise. So,
the strike was timed accordingly.
Yes, there was no precise body count. But the issue was not about how
many terrorists were killed; it was about sending a strong message. Was
Pakistan caught off guard? Yes, in spite of their readiness. Pakistan Air
Force (PAF) had moved squadrons to their satellite bases, and increased Combat Air Patrols.
Did we encounter the enemy? Yes, we picked up the PAF’s Saab 2000 early
warning aircraft holding south of Kamra on a north-south pattern. At
3:05am, we spotted two F-16s getting airborne and flying east–west over
Murid. This was a close call. To divert them, we sent two Su-30s and four
Jaguars towards Bahawalpur. The decoy pilots were ordered not to cross
the border. The ruse worked beautifully. When the first bomb hit the
Balakot camp, the closest PAF combat air patrol was 230km away.
As soon as the Mirages reached their bases, we declared a pan-India air
defence alert. We were prepared for a full-blown conventional war, but
we made all out efforts not to escalate the conflict.
Yet, we were certain that Pakistan would retaliate quickly. The next day,
February 27, saw action from their side. Our air defence was on full alert;
the AWACS was on station northeast of Adampur in the morning and so
were the aircraft on combat air patrol. At 9:42am, the Integrated Air
Command and Control Station warned of an increase in air activity over
Pakistan. Fighters were launched from Kamra, Murid, Chander, Sargodha,
Rafiqui and Jacobabad. They were at medium altitude, and some had their
friend-or-foe identification on initially. That was a decoy—they were
showing themselves on our radar to make it seem like routine activity;
some aircraft tried to hide at low altitude. Some of these airfields are close
to the border and fighters are routinely airborne for training. Unless
hostile intent is seen, taking action would require a lot of effort.
Soon, PAF fighters regrouped and turned east for the attack. The first
enemy package approached towards the Line of Control sector at 9:58am
on the Akhnoor axis, and approached the LoC around 10:06am. Another
package approached the Poonch axis, staggered by five to seven minutes.
A third package was opposite Anupgarh sector.
Each package had eight to ten aircraft, supported by multiple combat air
patrols, Saab 2000s and Dassault Falcon 20s for electronic support. On our
side there were two upgraded Mirages on combat air patrol east of
Udhampur, and two Su-30s near Srinagar. Two MiG-21 Bisons were
scrambled in two lots (10:01am and 10:03am) from Srinagar, two Bisons
from Awantipur, two MiG-29s from Adampur and two Su-30s each from
Halwara, Bathinda and Jodhpur.
The PAF ensured that they did not cross the International Boundary or the
Line of Actual Control. Two MiG-21 Bisons, flown by Wing Commander
Abhinandan Varthaman and Squadron Leader Vyas, were scrambled from
Srinagar at 10:03am for the package on the Poonch axis. On reaching the
sector, Abhinandan spotted enemy aircraft at low level, and the radar
informed him that all aircraft to his west were hostile. He went for the
target in contact on close combat mode with R-73 missiles.
The radar had asked the formation to turn back because of the threat
developing on them. Vyas heard the call and turned around. Jammers
prevented Abhinandan from getting the call. In the melee, it is presumed
that the Bison shot down an F-16D, while breaking off from the attack.
There was no damage. The debris indicated use of H4 bombs (range 120km) and range
extension kits (60km) on Mk-83 bombs.
Why did the weapons not cause damage? I see two reasons. One, the
enemy was forced to turn back by IAF interceptors before weapon
release. Or, they were not allowed effective follow-through. Five
AMRAAM missiles were fired by the F-16. Debris of AMRAAM AIM-120C5
were picked up and shown on national TV at 7:30pm on February 28.
Why were such beyond-visual-range missiles ineffective? One theory is
that PAF wanted to draw our air defence forces to a planned kill box
without crossing the LoC and use their superior AMRAAM to get aerial
kills. Since this ploy did not succeed, they launched their missiles at longer
ranges. We simply defeated their superior weapons with superior
manoeuvring. Anyway, Pakistan’s retaliation was a giveaway that our
Balakot strike was successful.
There were many tactical lessons for us. One, the PAF’s superior beyond-
visual-range missiles give them an advantage of first-shot capability with
better kinematic range. Our planned induction of the Meteor missile with
Rafale fighter jets would change that. Two, weather and mountains do
impose physical limitations on aerial surveillance. Good and real-time
intelligence will always be the most critical requirement in any conflict.
Three, communication jamming was a vulnerability. The IAF has been
crying hoarse for years for securing communications and progressing the
case for operational data link. The case has got traction now. Four,
dominance in the electromagnetic spectrum will play a key role in future
conflict. Five, clear rules of engagement are important in less-than-war
situations. These rules need to be reviewed quickly. Seven, combatants
need to be trained to quickly switch from peacetime rules to wartime
activities.
The shooting down of our own Mi-17V5 helicopter is unpardonable. It was
a combination of many mistakes, including personnel being trigger-happy
at the first exposure to a conflict. The conflicts of 1965, 1971 and 1999
have shown that the maximum attrition for any air force is in the first
three days of conflict, when we experience the ‘fog of war’. The US air
force, which leads in combat experience, realised this over years of
iteration. The main objective of the Red Flag exercise in the US is to train
personnel in handling the first three days of combat with reduced
attrition.
Our response reflected a strong political will, quick decision-making, good
intelligence in selection of target, meticulous planning, good tactical
acumen, maintenance of secrecy, excellent execution in adverse weather,
robustness of the Integrated Air Command and Control System and
excellent tactics and training.
Total war between countries is slowly becoming history. We need to be
prepared and trained for border conflicts like Kargil, heightened tensions
at Doklam or punitive surgical strikes, as in Pakistan and Myanmar.
The bigger message: If major terrorist strikes reoccur, we will hit again
and hit harder.
Air Marshal C. Harikumar was the air officer commanding-in-chief of
Western Air Command during the Balakot strike.
https://www.theweek.in/theweek/specials/2020/02/28/hit-and-run.amp.html
