Now even the kill ratio is in ttp's favour, if they can't fight these cavemen than how on earth they protect against india. you people take almost half the budget yet can't get one job done
@Signalian
@PanzerKiel
@Signalian
@PanzerKiel
Bajwa was 100% right about the army's combat readiness
- Thread starter Falcon34
- Start date
Enigma SIG
ELITE MEMBER
- Joined
- Feb 20, 2009
- Messages
- 8,593
- Reaction score
- -5
- Country
- Location
KD against Awam is 1000:1.
Reichsmarschall
ELITE MEMBER
- Joined
- Feb 16, 2016
- Messages
- 12,109
- Reaction score
- 3
- Country
- Location
N.Siddiqui
ELITE MEMBER
- Joined
- Nov 21, 2015
- Messages
- 9,714
- Reaction score
- 13
- Country
- Location
The bad condition is because of him, and not inspite of him.
Ulta Chor kotawal ko dantay.
And 'cause of black sheeps, and bad apples like him, some others top ranks. Simply remove them, sideline them, get them removed from the top slots and the situation in the Army will improve, the trust deficit between the Awam and Army will subside...
Ulta Chor kotawal ko dantay.
And 'cause of black sheeps, and bad apples like him, some others top ranks. Simply remove them, sideline them, get them removed from the top slots and the situation in the Army will improve, the trust deficit between the Awam and Army will subside...
Joe Shearer
PROFESSIONAL
- Joined
- Apr 19, 2009
- Messages
- 27,493
- Reaction score
- 162
- Country
- Location
The joke is that the PA doesn't need to protect Pakistan against India.
It simply has to stop attacking India.
villageidiot
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Jul 29, 2022
- Messages
- 4,653
- Reaction score
- 17
- Country
- Location
Sir, ab to aap log, rona dhona chor dn. Pak Army ne 2021 ceasefire ke baad se se India ko to kuch nhi kha. Aur 2022 se onwards, Pakistan ko hi conquer karne me lge hn.
Agar Pakistani civilians ke saath empathize nhi kar skte to kam az kam acknowledge to kren. Abhi tak ISI ki saajish chal rhi he India me. Actual karwaai to idhar daal rhi he ISI.
IceCold
PDF VETERAN
- Joined
- May 1, 2007
- Messages
- 19,236
- Reaction score
- 10
- Country
- Location
I doubt that PA will ever attack India, in fact it is India that is smelling the blood here and may even make a move.
Respect4Respect01
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- Sep 20, 2010
- Messages
- 3,899
- Reaction score
- 0
- Country
- Location
Bechare aam faujiyon ko frontline pe b proper equipment nahi mila aur GHQ walon ko apny gharon men b dar lagta hai
Joe Shearer
PROFESSIONAL
- Joined
- Apr 19, 2009
- Messages
- 27,493
- Reaction score
- 162
- Country
- Location
Frankly, nobody, not a single person, in India believes that the Pakistan Army, directed by ISI, does not continue to maintain a clandestine campaign against India.
It is their past that leads to this unshakable suspicion.
In every case but one, there has been clandestine activity in order to achieve explicit national goals. There is no mystery, no concealment of these objectives and goals.
While many - most - liberals stand aloof from the right-wing political sections, and do not actively wish for isolation from Pakistan, they also mostly would rather stay away until there is genuine change in attitudes.
For me, I deeply regret the agonising trouble that your country is going through. That does not stop me from asking why, even at this difficult moment, your establishment does not stop badgering the neighbouring country, why, even today, a policy of restraint and abstention from force in the first instance, is rewarded with such venom.
O bhai who is attaching india, 2 years have heard about any major cease fire violation by the army of cucks, no right, And second thing Mr joe we pakistani's and indians can never get along, there will be only one survivor in the region either you guys or us currently it looks like you guys, but if those cucks really started doing what they should be doing your in trouble, to me the situation looks like the battle of moscow, even if we overcome this current situation and turn the tables around, we still have long journey ahead to become one unified nation, which we don't have any time for, i really hope we do survive this current clusterfuck and make a strong, resilent and unified nation and f u pagans but reality says otherwise.
Last edited:
Joe Shearer
PROFESSIONAL
- Joined
- Apr 19, 2009
- Messages
- 27,493
- Reaction score
- 162
- Country
- Location
There is NO appetite in India for any act of aggression.
If you have an open mind, I can explain why, in the simplest possible terms.
I can confidently refute that, from direct, and ongoing, personal experience.
Joe Shearer
PROFESSIONAL
- Joined
- Apr 19, 2009
- Messages
- 27,493
- Reaction score
- 162
- Country
- Location
This is the most unusual explanation of neutral or passive feelings due to incapacity, and an implicit threat to change for the worse if conditions begin to favour you, that I have read for a long, long time.
so can i, i have interacted with alot of indians, your women i got along with but your men i wanna screw the living shit out of them, These thongs aside the biggest factor is religion either you guys become muslims or we the h**, which can't happen, so.
Joe Shearer
PROFESSIONAL
- Joined
- Apr 19, 2009
- Messages
- 27,493
- Reaction score
- 162
- Country
- Location
We do empathise with the Pakistani citizen. Why else do you think an ailing, elderly man would post here?
That your institutions have turned against you and are harming you does not stop them from continuing in their dangerous path of trying to achieve through clandestine means what cannot be achieved through open actions.
Good for you.
There is nothing that can meaningfully respond to such hatred, is there?
We are mixing up a whole bunch of issues due to the political overhang.
I think there is a lot of context which was missed in Nasim Zehra+Hamid Mir discussion. A general set of statements was used to make it look like PA is incapable of facing the Indian military.
None of this is entirely true. What is true is that we have gaps. We have limitations in our wherewithal and I think any fair-minded officer would state those.
For those always reverting to statements like "you people take almost half the budget", do understand that this budget, whether half or even all of it, is still relative to what your adversary spends. I cannot be expected to deliver on overwhelming results when what I have at my disposal does not offer me the best possible tools to deal with a numerically superior adversary.
The following article sheds some light on these issues. I like the Test, One-day and T-20 cricket analogy.
by Ejaz Haider
May 1, 2023
669
SHARES
Share on FacebookShare on Twitter
Discussions in the media over the past week about the Pakistan Army’s combat readiness is a disconcerting experience for anyone invested seriously in such matters. Unfortunately, triteness has so thoroughly colonized the media landscape that informed voices find no space in that territory. Yet, it’s important to put the concept of combat readiness in its proper context.
The brouhaha began with a statement attributed by a journalist to the former army chief, General Qamar Bajwa, who is said to have told a group of journalists in 2021 that peace with India was imperative because the Pakistan Army was in no position to fight the Indian Army.
Not being privy to that meeting, I do not have the context in which to situate the former chief’s remarks. And context is invariably crucial. I also do not have the exact phrasing of what General Bajwa said. Nor do I know if the meeting was on, or off the record. My assumption is that it was off the record, or what he said would have been reported immediately. That clearly raises the question of why the journalists chose to “reveal” what General Bajwa allegedly said nearly two years after that meeting.
Be that as it may, let’s get down to what combat readiness means. Since the issue can be assailed from various dimensions, I will be parsimonious and restrict myself to some general observations regarding operational readiness. This, therefore, is not a comparison of Pakistani and Indian armies. That would demand a different treatment. I do intend, however, to offer some oblique observations with reference to the regional context through a general overview.
At a very basic level, combat readiness is the ability of a military to fight and sustain that fight. The crucial element here is sustainment. Operational planning looks at various scenarios and calculates the costs for those scenarios. In doing so, one has to play both sides, one’s own as well as the adversary’s.
Planning, no matter how extensive and intensive, also has an endpoint in mind. It cannot be open-ended. But no matter how elaborate and nuanced the process of planning, information about the adversary and potential scenarios will always remain incomplete. In other words, after hostilities break out, despite meticulous planning, no one can control all the circumstances to one’s advantage. War (its many battles) shapes itself around ever-changing situations.
Take a more recent example, the Russo-Ukraine War. When President Vladimir Putin sent his army into Ukraine, the aim was to move on Kyiv, take control of the city, install a Kremlin-supporting government, which presumably would have bludgeoned the Ukrainian morale, and then negotiate with the US-NATO alliance. If the plan had succeeded, the situation in Ukraine would likely be very different. It did not. The Ukrainian resistance and Russia’s inability to provide for the force and sustain the advance on Kyiv resulted in the Kremlin abandoning the main effort and shifting the focus to the eastern and southern theatres. Since then, the war has dragged on with both sides trying to attrit each other. Both have run out of steam for any major combined arms offensive.
What are the takeaways? Initial planning can go awry; initial supplies can run dry or troops can run low on them; logistics are crucial — you can have the best troops and equipment, but battles take their toll. Men get killed; material gets destroyed. Nothing remains in prime shape.
The report, which was used as a textbook at the Naval College, remains spot-on. Even though the conduct of war, given new systems and platforms, continues to change, the fundamentals remain the same. Trained human resource, equipment, logistics and replenishment and a state’s ability to take a battering are as crucial today as they were in the 1900s.
Modern war requires a very complex logistics and supply system with multiple tiers. The Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE), a document in modern militaries, not only details the wartime mission, capabilities, organizational structure, and mission-essential personnel but also supply and equipment requirements for military units.
Tanks, Armored Personnel Carriers and Self-Propelled Artillery – all essential components of maneuver warfare – are very logistics-heavy. In his book, Technology and War, Martin van Creveld writes: “In 1940-41, a German Panzer division engaged in active operations already required 300 tons a day. By 1944-45, an American armored division was consuming twice that amount, and the most recent estimates are of the order of 1000-1500 tons and more.”
A typical armored division would have supplies based on troop strength, such as rations; items listed and identified in the TOE (clothing, personal equipment, vehicle replacements, etc); POL (Petrol, oil, lubricants); supply requirements for damaged equipment which cannot have a fixed quantity and would depend on attrition rates; and, yes, ammunition.
Offensive combined arms maneuvers increase the probability of attrition. Such maneuvers also rely on speed and speed creates its own logistics problems. Supplies have to be transported by road. The supply points remain vulnerable (especially in modern war where a number of technologies allow adversaries to locate fixed positions and target them), as do long convoys of vehicles carrying supplies.
Then there’s the nexus between fighting and sustaining a war and a state’s economy. To quote US Rear Admiral Henry Eccles, “logistics is the bridge between military operations and a nation’s economy.” The linkage is not just about existing stocks and how reduced human resources and material can be replenished but also the industrial base which can supply to the fighting troops what they need. You can hold the best rifle in the world but if you are out of ammo, it is about as good as a wooden club. And that’s just a basic, banal example. Rations, POL, replacement of damaged equipment, cannibalizing equipment and vehicles, replenishing ammunition, evacuating casualties…the list of what needs to be done is long and everything that needs to be done gets done (or doesn’t) under fire.
The point is that a Test match will favor a bigger economy and higher quantities in men, material and reserve stocks. While that asymmetry will reduce in an ODI, the scales can tilt one way or another in favor of either, whether militarily or more broadly diplomatically. The T20 result will depend on who could concentrate force better at the point of conflict and dominate the spectrum in that episode. On February 27, 2019, PAF dominated the point of conflict.
The important point to note, leaving aside the technical discussion, is that while Test matches are out, ODIs and T20s have the potential of escalating beyond the area/point of conflict.
In a nutshell — and the foregoing is a sketchy treatment of a very complex set of phenomena — calculating the strengths and weaknesses of two adversaries is not a function of TV soundbites and choreographed revelations. How the two sides would fare is a question that depends on multiple factors and the nature of the armed clash itself. A drawn-out war generally favors bigger numbers; short, sharp conflicts, on the other hand, give a weaker adversary the chance to offset the advantage of bigger numbers.
P.S. On the issue of the FC troops killed in FATA, a simple exercise to equip each FC and PA jawan with more effective personal equipment and body armor would run up the costs by a couple of billion dollars easily. Also keep in mind that the annual, per capita spend on a US soldier for equipment is about $18,000 USD. Compared to this, we typically spend less than $1,000 USD on each soldier. For us to do better in terms of force protection, the economy has to give more.
I think there is a lot of context which was missed in Nasim Zehra+Hamid Mir discussion. A general set of statements was used to make it look like PA is incapable of facing the Indian military.
None of this is entirely true. What is true is that we have gaps. We have limitations in our wherewithal and I think any fair-minded officer would state those.
For those always reverting to statements like "you people take almost half the budget", do understand that this budget, whether half or even all of it, is still relative to what your adversary spends. I cannot be expected to deliver on overwhelming results when what I have at my disposal does not offer me the best possible tools to deal with a numerically superior adversary.
The following article sheds some light on these issues. I like the Test, One-day and T-20 cricket analogy.
Military Readiness: Why Soundbites Should Not Trivialize Serious Issues
Given the complexity of modern military operations, it is best to avoid politicized discussions of combat readiness
May 1, 2023
669
SHARES
Share on FacebookShare on Twitter
Discussions in the media over the past week about the Pakistan Army’s combat readiness is a disconcerting experience for anyone invested seriously in such matters. Unfortunately, triteness has so thoroughly colonized the media landscape that informed voices find no space in that territory. Yet, it’s important to put the concept of combat readiness in its proper context.
The brouhaha began with a statement attributed by a journalist to the former army chief, General Qamar Bajwa, who is said to have told a group of journalists in 2021 that peace with India was imperative because the Pakistan Army was in no position to fight the Indian Army.
Not being privy to that meeting, I do not have the context in which to situate the former chief’s remarks. And context is invariably crucial. I also do not have the exact phrasing of what General Bajwa said. Nor do I know if the meeting was on, or off the record. My assumption is that it was off the record, or what he said would have been reported immediately. That clearly raises the question of why the journalists chose to “reveal” what General Bajwa allegedly said nearly two years after that meeting.
Be that as it may, let’s get down to what combat readiness means. Since the issue can be assailed from various dimensions, I will be parsimonious and restrict myself to some general observations regarding operational readiness. This, therefore, is not a comparison of Pakistani and Indian armies. That would demand a different treatment. I do intend, however, to offer some oblique observations with reference to the regional context through a general overview.
At a very basic level, combat readiness is the ability of a military to fight and sustain that fight. The crucial element here is sustainment. Operational planning looks at various scenarios and calculates the costs for those scenarios. In doing so, one has to play both sides, one’s own as well as the adversary’s.
Planning, no matter how extensive and intensive, also has an endpoint in mind. It cannot be open-ended. But no matter how elaborate and nuanced the process of planning, information about the adversary and potential scenarios will always remain incomplete. In other words, after hostilities break out, despite meticulous planning, no one can control all the circumstances to one’s advantage. War (its many battles) shapes itself around ever-changing situations.
What does this mean? Perhaps an example would be instructive. Contrary to popular belief, Napoleon did not miscalculate Russia’s vastly expansive terrain. If anything, he understood it perfectly. This is why he diligently focused on logistical preparations for the campaign for an entire year, forward deploying ammunition and supply depots, using artillery train battalions to keep his army supplied (since he had shed the old system of contracting civilian teams to handle horses for hauling artillery guns), establishing hospitals for the wounded et cetera. Despite these extensive preparations and excellent organizational skills, Napoleon’s campaign extended, both in time and space, beyond his original calculation because the Russians didn’t give him an early decisive victory.
Take a more recent example, the Russo-Ukraine War. When President Vladimir Putin sent his army into Ukraine, the aim was to move on Kyiv, take control of the city, install a Kremlin-supporting government, which presumably would have bludgeoned the Ukrainian morale, and then negotiate with the US-NATO alliance. If the plan had succeeded, the situation in Ukraine would likely be very different. It did not. The Ukrainian resistance and Russia’s inability to provide for the force and sustain the advance on Kyiv resulted in the Kremlin abandoning the main effort and shifting the focus to the eastern and southern theatres. Since then, the war has dragged on with both sides trying to attrit each other. Both have run out of steam for any major combined arms offensive.
What are the takeaways? Initial planning can go awry; initial supplies can run dry or troops can run low on them; logistics are crucial — you can have the best troops and equipment, but battles take their toll. Men get killed; material gets destroyed. Nothing remains in prime shape.
To quote from a 1942 US Naval College report titled Sound Military Decision: “Success is won, not by personnel and materiel in prime condition, but by the debris of an organisation worn by the strain of campaign and shaken by the shock of battle. The objective is attained, in war, under conditions which often impose extreme disadvantages.”
The report, which was used as a textbook at the Naval College, remains spot-on. Even though the conduct of war, given new systems and platforms, continues to change, the fundamentals remain the same. Trained human resource, equipment, logistics and replenishment and a state’s ability to take a battering are as crucial today as they were in the 1900s.
Modern war requires a very complex logistics and supply system with multiple tiers. The Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE), a document in modern militaries, not only details the wartime mission, capabilities, organizational structure, and mission-essential personnel but also supply and equipment requirements for military units.
Tanks, Armored Personnel Carriers and Self-Propelled Artillery – all essential components of maneuver warfare – are very logistics-heavy. In his book, Technology and War, Martin van Creveld writes: “In 1940-41, a German Panzer division engaged in active operations already required 300 tons a day. By 1944-45, an American armored division was consuming twice that amount, and the most recent estimates are of the order of 1000-1500 tons and more.”
A typical armored division would have supplies based on troop strength, such as rations; items listed and identified in the TOE (clothing, personal equipment, vehicle replacements, etc); POL (Petrol, oil, lubricants); supply requirements for damaged equipment which cannot have a fixed quantity and would depend on attrition rates; and, yes, ammunition.
Offensive combined arms maneuvers increase the probability of attrition. Such maneuvers also rely on speed and speed creates its own logistics problems. Supplies have to be transported by road. The supply points remain vulnerable (especially in modern war where a number of technologies allow adversaries to locate fixed positions and target them), as do long convoys of vehicles carrying supplies.
Then there’s the nexus between fighting and sustaining a war and a state’s economy. To quote US Rear Admiral Henry Eccles, “logistics is the bridge between military operations and a nation’s economy.” The linkage is not just about existing stocks and how reduced human resources and material can be replenished but also the industrial base which can supply to the fighting troops what they need. You can hold the best rifle in the world but if you are out of ammo, it is about as good as a wooden club. And that’s just a basic, banal example. Rations, POL, replacement of damaged equipment, cannibalizing equipment and vehicles, replenishing ammunition, evacuating casualties…the list of what needs to be done is long and everything that needs to be done gets done (or doesn’t) under fire.
Pakistan and India are a conflict dyad; they are also a nuclear dyad. They have fought two Test matches (’65/’71), two ODIs (Rann of Kutch and Kargil) and counting out India’s claim of 2016 surgical strikes, one T20 (February 2019). Given the presence of nuclear weapons, ideally both should stay away from armed conflict. In this context, India’s desire to find a band where it can punish Pakistan short of a Test match or even an ODI is highly destabilizing. That is of course a different discussion and outside the scope of this article.
The point is that a Test match will favor a bigger economy and higher quantities in men, material and reserve stocks. While that asymmetry will reduce in an ODI, the scales can tilt one way or another in favor of either, whether militarily or more broadly diplomatically. The T20 result will depend on who could concentrate force better at the point of conflict and dominate the spectrum in that episode. On February 27, 2019, PAF dominated the point of conflict.
The important point to note, leaving aside the technical discussion, is that while Test matches are out, ODIs and T20s have the potential of escalating beyond the area/point of conflict.
In a nutshell — and the foregoing is a sketchy treatment of a very complex set of phenomena — calculating the strengths and weaknesses of two adversaries is not a function of TV soundbites and choreographed revelations. How the two sides would fare is a question that depends on multiple factors and the nature of the armed clash itself. A drawn-out war generally favors bigger numbers; short, sharp conflicts, on the other hand, give a weaker adversary the chance to offset the advantage of bigger numbers.
P.S. On the issue of the FC troops killed in FATA, a simple exercise to equip each FC and PA jawan with more effective personal equipment and body armor would run up the costs by a couple of billion dollars easily. Also keep in mind that the annual, per capita spend on a US soldier for equipment is about $18,000 USD. Compared to this, we typically spend less than $1,000 USD on each soldier. For us to do better in terms of force protection, the economy has to give more.
Last edited:
