Solomon2
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T O N Y B A D R A N
May 4, 2013
Back to Israel
Hezbollah (and Iran) reconsider their priorities
A screen shot of a recent speech by Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah. (AFP photo)
When Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah made his televised address on Tuesday, he was reportedly in Tehran – his second trip there in the last two weeks. During his first visit to Iran, Nasrallah met with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani. Nasrallah apparently received strategic guidance on how to present Hezbollah’s escalating – and increasingly unpopular – involvement in Syria.
Hezbollah has been having trouble messaging its involvement in Syria. Consequently, Nasrallah devoted much of his speech to the war there. In laying out the rationale for his group’s participation in the fight alongside the Syrian regime, Nasrallah repeated the old excuse that Hezbollah was merely lending support to the Lebanese Shia residents of towns across the border in Syria. Then, he relayed the second argument—that his fighters have been protecting Shiite shrines, such as the Zaynab shrine in Damascus. This particular argument also has been on display especially in the various death notices and funerals of Hezbollah fighters believed to have been killed in action in Syria.
The nature of this argument is overtly sectarian – as further evidenced by the charged names chosen for the fighting formations around Sayyida Zaynab, such as the Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas brigade. Hezbollah needs such a mobilizing call to justify the increasing number of dead fighters in Syria. Conjuring up the specter of hostile Sunnis coming after Shiite villages and religious places serves that purpose. In addition, according to an unnamed Hezbollah commander cited in the Kuwaiti newspaper al-Rai, the Iranian leadership agreed with Nasrallah on the continued use of the “protection of sacred sites” line. It does, furthermore, serve as a cover for other Shiite fighters from Iraq and elsewhere who are also on the ground in Sayyida Zaynab, from where Hezbollah is directing operations.
However, Hezbollah has long sought to avoid the perception that it was merely a sectarian Shiite militia. Instead, it has tried to enhance its own legitimacy, and expand Iran’s reach, in the Sunni Arab world by cultivating an image of a non-sectarian, pan-Islamic resistance movement against Israel.
It’s possible that a decision was taken on how to message Hezbollah’s involvement during Nasrallah’s meetings with the Iranian leadership two weeks ago. For around the same time, Hezbollah began marketing a new line in its statements and in the media. For example, Nabil Qaouq, the deputy head of the group’s executive council, declared at the memorial service of a Hezbollah fighter killed in action in Syria that Hezbollah does not “change the direction of the resistance’s rockets nor do we change its priorities no matter how bad the domestic and regional crises get… our priority is to increase military capabilities… any position [Hezbollah takes] regarding what is happening in Syria and Lebanon has to do, first and foremost, with protecting this equation [of the resistance].”
These talking points were then picked up in the pro-Hezbollah media. An article in the Lebanese newspaper As-Safir criticized how Hezbollah’s detractors were portraying “Israel’s tormenter as a sectarian party.” The author then echoed Qaouq’s language, asserting that Hezbollah’s “priority today, tomorrow and the day after, will remain Palestine.”
Hezbollah’s effort to link its role in Syria with the struggle against Israel explains the decision to send the drone over Israel last week. Although Nasrallah reiterated his party’s denial that it was behind the drone he, and the group more broadly, were clearly taking credit for it and boasting about it as an achievement, while refraining from claiming responsibility. For example, in its news editorial on the day of the drone incident, Al-Manar TV gloated by using language that evoked Nasrallah’s old threats of being able to reach “beyond Haifa.”
Nasrallah summarized the message behind the drone in his speech on Tuesday when he warned “anyone in Lebanon or the region” against thinking “that the resistance, as a result of what’s happening in Syria or the pressures on Iran, is in a moment of weakness, exhaustion, or confusion.” Rather, he added, “the resistance is vigilant, with its finger on the trigger.”
In other words, the drone was Hezbollah’s attempt to focus the narrative back on Israel. However, there are limits to how far Hezbollah can run with that narrative, hence its denial of responsibility. The Iranians can ill afford a devastating Israeli attack on Lebanon at this time as they prefer to safeguard Hezbollah’s retaliatory capabilities in case of a strike on their nuclear program.
That the drone was launched after Nasrallah’s first visit to Tehran two weeks ago suggests that the decision ultimately had to receive the blessing of Khamenei and Soleimani. In fact, some in the Israeli military believe that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard contingent in Lebanon took charge of operating the drone. This shouldn’t come as a surprise, as the presence of IRGC personnel in Lebanon is well known.
Last year, Qassem Soleimani confidently proclaimed that Iran controlled south Lebanon. Soleimani's claim is hard to dispute. Nasrallah’s April visit to Iran, with the ensuing drone operation and adjustment to Hezbollah’s Syria narrative, only serves to underscore that the Party of God’s ultimate command center is in Tehran.
Tony Badran is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He tweets @AcrossTheBay.
May 4, 2013
Back to Israel
Hezbollah (and Iran) reconsider their priorities
A screen shot of a recent speech by Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah. (AFP photo)
When Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah made his televised address on Tuesday, he was reportedly in Tehran – his second trip there in the last two weeks. During his first visit to Iran, Nasrallah met with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani. Nasrallah apparently received strategic guidance on how to present Hezbollah’s escalating – and increasingly unpopular – involvement in Syria.
Hezbollah has been having trouble messaging its involvement in Syria. Consequently, Nasrallah devoted much of his speech to the war there. In laying out the rationale for his group’s participation in the fight alongside the Syrian regime, Nasrallah repeated the old excuse that Hezbollah was merely lending support to the Lebanese Shia residents of towns across the border in Syria. Then, he relayed the second argument—that his fighters have been protecting Shiite shrines, such as the Zaynab shrine in Damascus. This particular argument also has been on display especially in the various death notices and funerals of Hezbollah fighters believed to have been killed in action in Syria.
The nature of this argument is overtly sectarian – as further evidenced by the charged names chosen for the fighting formations around Sayyida Zaynab, such as the Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas brigade. Hezbollah needs such a mobilizing call to justify the increasing number of dead fighters in Syria. Conjuring up the specter of hostile Sunnis coming after Shiite villages and religious places serves that purpose. In addition, according to an unnamed Hezbollah commander cited in the Kuwaiti newspaper al-Rai, the Iranian leadership agreed with Nasrallah on the continued use of the “protection of sacred sites” line. It does, furthermore, serve as a cover for other Shiite fighters from Iraq and elsewhere who are also on the ground in Sayyida Zaynab, from where Hezbollah is directing operations.
However, Hezbollah has long sought to avoid the perception that it was merely a sectarian Shiite militia. Instead, it has tried to enhance its own legitimacy, and expand Iran’s reach, in the Sunni Arab world by cultivating an image of a non-sectarian, pan-Islamic resistance movement against Israel.
It’s possible that a decision was taken on how to message Hezbollah’s involvement during Nasrallah’s meetings with the Iranian leadership two weeks ago. For around the same time, Hezbollah began marketing a new line in its statements and in the media. For example, Nabil Qaouq, the deputy head of the group’s executive council, declared at the memorial service of a Hezbollah fighter killed in action in Syria that Hezbollah does not “change the direction of the resistance’s rockets nor do we change its priorities no matter how bad the domestic and regional crises get… our priority is to increase military capabilities… any position [Hezbollah takes] regarding what is happening in Syria and Lebanon has to do, first and foremost, with protecting this equation [of the resistance].”
These talking points were then picked up in the pro-Hezbollah media. An article in the Lebanese newspaper As-Safir criticized how Hezbollah’s detractors were portraying “Israel’s tormenter as a sectarian party.” The author then echoed Qaouq’s language, asserting that Hezbollah’s “priority today, tomorrow and the day after, will remain Palestine.”
Hezbollah’s effort to link its role in Syria with the struggle against Israel explains the decision to send the drone over Israel last week. Although Nasrallah reiterated his party’s denial that it was behind the drone he, and the group more broadly, were clearly taking credit for it and boasting about it as an achievement, while refraining from claiming responsibility. For example, in its news editorial on the day of the drone incident, Al-Manar TV gloated by using language that evoked Nasrallah’s old threats of being able to reach “beyond Haifa.”
Nasrallah summarized the message behind the drone in his speech on Tuesday when he warned “anyone in Lebanon or the region” against thinking “that the resistance, as a result of what’s happening in Syria or the pressures on Iran, is in a moment of weakness, exhaustion, or confusion.” Rather, he added, “the resistance is vigilant, with its finger on the trigger.”
In other words, the drone was Hezbollah’s attempt to focus the narrative back on Israel. However, there are limits to how far Hezbollah can run with that narrative, hence its denial of responsibility. The Iranians can ill afford a devastating Israeli attack on Lebanon at this time as they prefer to safeguard Hezbollah’s retaliatory capabilities in case of a strike on their nuclear program.
That the drone was launched after Nasrallah’s first visit to Tehran two weeks ago suggests that the decision ultimately had to receive the blessing of Khamenei and Soleimani. In fact, some in the Israeli military believe that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard contingent in Lebanon took charge of operating the drone. This shouldn’t come as a surprise, as the presence of IRGC personnel in Lebanon is well known.
Last year, Qassem Soleimani confidently proclaimed that Iran controlled south Lebanon. Soleimani's claim is hard to dispute. Nasrallah’s April visit to Iran, with the ensuing drone operation and adjustment to Hezbollah’s Syria narrative, only serves to underscore that the Party of God’s ultimate command center is in Tehran.
Tony Badran is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He tweets @AcrossTheBay.
except for the title, and I think many are like me considering the "likes" he has gotten.
