Attack on security convoy in NW; 12 soldiers martyred

[muse]

Editorial Printed in today's "The News International" - readers will note that while "The News International" is part of a media conglomerate not at ease with the eradication of insurgency in Pakistan, it nonetheless feels enough pressure to state the obvious, even if with it's own effort to spin the editorial while justifying the Talib actions by claiming something or the other about "Drones":

Waziristan setback



Wednesday, July 01, 2009
The military and the government have suffered a setback in North Waziristan. How severe this is, only time will tell. The tribals with whom a peace deal was reached early in 2008 have decided at a 'jirga' to abandon it. The 'tame Taliban' have in other words proved they are not fully on the leash after all, and are capable of pulling away at any minute. They have now demanded an end to drone attacks and an army pull-out from North Waziristan if the terms of the accord are to be honoured. Meanwhile 30 have died in an attack on a military convoy.

The army's task in Waziristan has become more complicated. Rather than the forces of Baitullah Mehsud alone, they must now also tackle those they had regarded as 'friends'. This is hardly a promising prospect in a territory where the military has in the past struggled against militants. The peace accords with the Taliban factions have in part at least been forced by the lack of success against a committed guerilla force. But the latest situation goes to show such accords, in the longer run, serve little purpose. They have been broken many times before. For all the talk we hear of tribal integrity and a code of honour, the fact is that the Taliban are treacherous allies. It is quite apparent they cannot be relied on.

The facts to be faced up to are tough ones: to win against the militants an all-out battle has to be fought in Waziristan. This of course is not an easy prospect. The army and indeed the government which currently relies on it are well aware of this. An all-out victory against the militants is a demanding task with many possible pitfalls. But the fact also is that it has to be attempted. Had this indeed happened some time ago we may not have faced the perils that confront us now. But, as the saying goes, late is better than never. There is still time to save our country. But more errors and more deals will make this more and more difficult. Victory in Waziristan, over all faction of militants entrenched there must be the goal. Otherwise the battle will simply be prolonged and will result in the loss of still more lives

 

[brilTek]

This is funny.

Though it goes off topic but allow me to proceed. Thanks mod.

Can you please tell us what the purpose of indian consulates (more than 12) operating near Pakistan-Afghan border?

Ohh.....don't come up with issuing visas to afghans eager to visit incredible india.

Doesn't matter whether you accept it or not. India is fully backing talibaans to attack our army and destabalize Pakistan like india did in 1971.

 

[wtf]

Though it goes off topic but allow me to proceed. Thanks mod.

Can you please tell us what the purpose of indian consulates (more than 12) operating near Pakistan-Afghan border?

Ohh.....don't come up with issuing visas to afghans eager to visit incredible india.

Doesn't matter whether you accept it or not. India is fully backing talibaans to attack our army and destabalize Pakistan like india did in 1971.

There are only 4 consulates and one embassy in Afghanistan. You can check their websites Embassy of India, Kabul, Afghanistan

Consulates/embassies are not secret organizations. If you can name the other 8,would be glad.

 

[muse]

Earlier we mentioned attitudes about security as being problematic, Ejaz Haider offers some ideas, one hopes political and military authorities will not only see merit in these ideas but will act with the urgency the issue requires:


Casualties and pro-active operations
Ejaz Haider


In the ongoing operations in Swat, Lower Dir, Buner and the forays into Waziristan, the army has so far lost 144 officers and men; the toll for the injured stands at 450. Among those killed, the ratio of officers is about 10 percent, so nearly 14 have died so far.

Is this rate acceptable?

This is a difficult question; very difficult to answer. But before we get into this issue of what is acceptable and what not, let me flag one point. For those who remain sceptical about the genuineness of the operation(s), these figures should provide the occasion for review.

These figures should also provide an answer to those analysts, inside and outside, who never tire of questioning whether the army and the ISI are on the same page. Unless the DG-ISI is fighting a covert war against the COAS and getting his operatives to help those who are killing the officers and men under the overall command of the army chief, logic would dictate that both are on the same wavelength.

Also, since the DG-ISI serves at the pleasure of the army chief and the ISI’s upper echelon belongs to the three services, including the army, it would stretch one’s imagination to think that a subordinate organisation, even a spy agency, is plotting against the army and getting brother officers and men killed in the process.

But since other than logic seems to be at work in such sceptical assumptions, we shall move on to the issue of casualty rate of the army.

Ideally, every man who falls is a life lost, a family traumatised. But soldiering involves a clear understanding that some day one might be called upon to kill and get killed. A civilian is called a soft target because a civilian does not bind himself to managing or perpetrating violence through such an understanding.

The upshot is that soldiers, in a conflict, do get killed; many more sustain injuries, some are left disabled for life.

Even so, the entire thrust of training during peacetime revolves around developing skills, standard operating procedures and battle drills to keep casualties to a minimum. The entire exercise involves multiple training regimens because no matter how sound the plan — and leaving aside the truism that in any conflict the first casualty is the plan — it is effective execution that ultimately matters, and effective execution involves a range of coordinated activities among elements from fighting and supporting arms and services.

The irregular war the army is fighting, where the adversary begins with an asymmetric advantage over the soldier, requires constant innovation — the need to stay ahead of the opponent. Not an easy thing to do since irregular war essentially presupposes a combination of conventional and unconventional fighting and techniques.

Let’s consider some of the reasons for army casualties. Two stand out: IEDs (improvised explosive devices) and sniping. The third reasons is ambush, which can involve the use of IEDs, snipers and a body of men positioned to take on a convoy at a point of their own choosing (this is what happened two days ago in North Waziristan).

The fourth reason for casualties is ground assaults to capture entrenched positions, especially in built-up areas, orchards and on heights. Attacking troops always have a disadvantage, even when the attacker is using area weapons (and aerial platforms) to soften positions or destroy the enemy’s cover to make the use of general purpose weapons more effective.

The army has used direct fire from tanks to hit houses or visible enemy locations; fire from the tanks’ co-axel guns to clear orchards; indirect artillery fire and TOW (tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided) missiles from Cobra helicopter gunships and in some cases jet fighters. But all said, ground has to be captured and that involves, at the end of the day, boots on the ground. That is where the real danger lies.

Clearing heights is another problem area. The planner can decide to roll up or use helis to land troops on the heights to roll down. Both courses of action have their own downsides and it is difficult to avoid casualties.

To be sure, the army uses jammers with vehicles during convoy movement, especially when the movement is large. But the adversary can work around this by finding a vehicle that is outside the range of the jammers or use wires to activate the IED. Sometimes wires can get entangled with a vehicle’s tyres and activate the device.

Similarly, while large movements are covered from the air, it is difficult to provide that kind of cover to every movement. Also, even when cover is provided, it is virtually impossible for it to be all-pervasive. No area can be hermetically sealed or sanitised. All it takes are a couple of snipers to take out two or three soldiers.

That’s the nub of the matter. The adversary doesn’t have to win. He just has to ensure that the other side doesn’t. This is why, while it is important for the Taliban fighters — I use the term Taliban generically — to retain control of territory already under their control, they can afford to withdraw if and when the going gets tough. They don’t have to necessarily strike as part of a larger plan; they can also strike just simply to kill. That’s exactly what happened to the police and FC contingent in Buner in which Captain Mairaj of 12 Cavalry was killed.

The Taliban could not hope to exploit that operation as part of a larger plan. But they could kill and show that things haven’t returned to normal. And they did that.

Despite all these difficulties, the army must strive to procure equipment for the foot-soldier, make him an expert in the use of such equipment and the handling of general purpose weapons and develop SOPs and drills to minimise casualties. It has to stay ahead of the adversary in terms of innovations and initiative.

Yet, all said and done, pro-active operations will always beget casualties, especially given any number of hostile factors, not least the horrendous terrain and a porous border. The only way to avoid them is to garrison oneself and let the countryside go to the dogs. That is not really an option.

Ejaz Haider is Consulting Editor of The Friday Times and Op-Ed Editor of Daily Times. He can be reached at sapper@dailytimes.com.pk

 

[Xeric]

i could have commented on the article at length but not in the mood now. As far the causality rate (CR) is concerned, i'll first clarify that the CR and the ratio of casualties in terms of Officers Vs Soldiers are two different things, if talking about the CR then it has to vary from operation to operation for the obvious reasons, but when we talk about the Ratio thing what i can tell you by taking lead from the histrory is that when we compare the ratio of casulities of Officers and other ranks in '65 and '71 we find them to be in equilibrium i.e. the ratio remained approximately the same and the high ups and the planners in the Army were contended with it. Again it would be 'comforting' to know that the ratio maintained it self even in the Kargil War. Now again after looking at the figure provided in the article i can comfortably say that the ratio still has not changed much. This shows the enlivening level of Officer involvement and the befitting response given to them by their men!

What exactly the ratio was in '65 and '71 and whether the ratio is a bit higher or lower this time, i'll not tell, but what i can tell you is that the zeal with which our men fought with in the three wars still prevails and Officers and ORs are no exception to it!

 

[MastanKhan]

Hi,

There are one too many commissioned officers dying in this combat and the soldiers as well. We know that soldiers do die as well as the enemy.

But reading the news reports coming after this clash---a different picture is emerging---our news reporters are not far off the truth---they will print everything. Multiple news sources stated---an article posted by Agno---that there was a heightened telephonic transmission amongst the taliban 2--3 days before the troop movement asking for taliban to move into the area.

The pass had a previous history of ambushes against the pak millitary---and regardless of the past history---just because of its geography there should have heightened threat of alertness---that is all we ask.

We know our soldiers are going to say 'Yessir' without asking any question---but it is upto us civilians to take into account the missteps of the millitary.

I bet you that some of the officers and soldiers who laid their lives for the country, knew in advance that they were walking into a death trap---I doubt if anyone had second thought or doubt about the mission.

We have a history of sending brave men to their deaths and the incompetent fools who send them, walk away with promotions.

 

[Conscientious objector]

The pass had a previous history of ambushes against the pak millitary---and regardless of the past history---just because of its geography there should have heightened threat of alertness---that is all we ask.

We know our soldiers are going to say 'Yessir' without asking any question---but it is upto us civilians to take into account the missteps of the millitary.

I bet you that some of the officers and soldiers who laid their lives for the country, knew in advance that they were walking into a death trap---I doubt if anyone had second thought or doubt about the mission.

We have a history of sending brave men to their deaths and the incompetent fools who send them, walk away with promotions.

In all likelihood these men were sent to their deaths in order to score propaganda points.

Such a high profile incident would be just what is required for the GOP to garner support for the upcoming expansion of the current operation.

 

[MastanKhan]

In all likelihood these men were sent to their deaths in order to score propaganda points.

Such a high profile incident would be just what is required for the GOP to garner support for the upcoming expansion of the current operation.

Hi,

That is exactly the feeling that I had as well---cannon fodder.

 

[MilesTogo]

Let GOP say that...

Though it goes off topic but allow me to proceed. Thanks mod.

Can you please tell us what the purpose of indian consulates (more than 12) operating near Pakistan-Afghan border?

Ohh.....don't come up with issuing visas to afghans eager to visit incredible india.

Doesn't matter whether you accept it or not. India is fully backing talibaans to attack our army and destabalize Pakistan like india did in 1971.

 

[SurvivoR]

muse and others I understand your sentiment about the fact that these soldiers died because some ranking officer did not plan the convoy movement properly.

BUT

I do draw a bit of sour taste as it almost smacks of lack of interest and intent by some higher commanders.

If that be the case may your God help your soldiers because someone in the chain of command is not.

May I be wrong.

Lack of planing is also a reason but they were caught by surprise due to trusting Gul Bahadur due to peace deal.

There is clear rift between Maulvi Nazir and Gul Bahadur now. One is still supporting Pakistan whereas Gul Bahadur has joined hands with Baitulllah Mehsud against army thanks to US drone attacks against Pro-Pakistan commanders in Wazirisitan.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

In all likelihood these men were sent to their deaths in order to score propaganda points.

Such a high profile incident would be just what is required for the GOP to garner support for the upcoming expansion of the current operation.

Hi,

That is exactly the feeling that I had as well---cannon fodder.

In the absence of any supportive evidence, this is just another conspiracy theory in very poor taste.

US/NATO troops walk int ambushes all the time in Afghanistan - the difference is force protection and air support minimizing casualties.

This particular incident took place in NW at a time when there was a peace agreement in place. Could there have been complacency - possible, but just the fact that an ambush took place does no automatically establish that.

Had force protection been better and timely air support been available, and PA casualties minimized, we would not have all this mudslinging and conspiracy theories.

We are all aware of what the resource and equipment constraints are - IMO, we need focus on whether that provides a plausible explanation or not and what can be done through existing resources to minimize casualties if and when convoys walk into another ambush.

 

[blain2]

Hi,

That is exactly the feeling that I had as well---cannon fodder.

MK,

Respectfully, sab ko aqal kay nakhun chabaanay ki zarroorat hai. There are no ongoing hostilities in North Waziristan. You think the Army wants to open up another front by simply letting a Lt Col and many others with him get slaughtered just to start off a fight? There are very many other ways to do this and the Army does not need to sacrifice their men in such way just to gain sympathy when 80% of the nation already considers the Taliban to be a major problem and supports army actions.

Sometimes the obvious is really the case. One should not always look for conspiracy theories when there aren't any.

What makes sense is the exact opposite. There are definite plans to go after Mehsud and team. These folks are all linked. In order to distract the Army and relieve pressure due to the up and coming ops, there is a very big possibility that these ambushes were conducted to make the Army lose focus (and they have not fallen for it).

 

[blain2]

In all likelihood these men were sent to their deaths in order to score propaganda points.

Such a high profile incident would be just what is required for the GOP to garner support for the upcoming expansion of the current operation.

Another carte-blanche to the militants at the expense of the Army...nice job!

There is wide support in Pakistan for dealing with Mehsud the fassadi and his henchmen. The Army does not need to do something so silly and self-destructive (from the standpoint of morale) as you propose. You cannot give me one shred of evidence that the Army got their own men martyred to score a propaganda victory and yet offer it with such confidence as if you were involved in the planning.

 

[Kasrkin]

We should not underestimate the enemy the army faces in FATA. These guys are born riflemen, used to shooting - and accurately - from a very young age and their alliances with al-Qaeda means they are given all the latest and refined guerrilla techniques used in battlefields all over the world. Even in Iraq, if you'd ever noticed, the rebels with RPGs and PK machineguns barely knew how to use them, they never aimed and they barely took proper cover – it was just ‘spray and pray’ (I'm not talking about all of the Iraqi insurgents, mind you). But these tribesmen always aim making full use of the iron-sites and cover, now that sort of thing makes an ambush all the more lethal. Furthermore Pakistani army convoys are not armored, they’re civilian pickups and bullets and shrapnel punches right through as if it were tissue. The American and Europeans have developed heavily armored vehicles to replace their HUMVEES most of whom were more armored than our Toyota pickups anyway. That is what would explain the casualties. Also western convoys have powerful .50 cal weapons mounted on almost every vehicle where the gunner is protected by plates of armor and has 360 degree coverage, whereas our LMGs don’t pack that punch or range and are often just tied to the vehicle with a rope and the gunner is completely exposed.

 

[EyelessInGaza]

Hard to believe that a professional army would deliberately let its soldiers walk into a death trap. Mistaken assumptions, yes. Bad luck, yep. Enemy professionalism, likely. Incompetence, perhaps. But doing it deliberately- I don't believe it.

I am not questioning the commitment of PA, not yet. However, I do think one of the things that would send a strong message everywhere, and to everyone, is when the enemy leadership, the very top cadre or those very close to them, begins to go down. And that is when it will change some people's perceptions dramatically.