Artillery and Counterinsurgency: The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan

[Contrarian]

Roger....!

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

AM,
NATO/ISAF has done a 360 degree turn in its strategy in FATA. They are going for the hot pursuits not just to ensure kill. They are actually ensuring that either the PA meets the NATO forces upfront which means the PA will be sitting on the retreating lines of the militants or allow the militants to start hitting soft targets within Pakistan, forcing PA to turn back to the ISI. Wonder if this rings bells. But that's max that I can say.

Delta,

The attempts to get the PA/GoP to become more pro-active aside, I was referring to the potential of indiscipline within the Army, due to operations in FATA, to the extent that the PA is reduced to being not that much better off than the FC in conducting military ops.

If you remember, Gen MCNeill's main gripe with the FC, and his argument for deploying the PA as the primary fighting force, was that a highly disciplined force was needed to confront the challenges faced in FATA. If discipline in the PA crumbles (hypothetically speaking, there are currently no signs that it would, and the military seems to have learned from some of its failures earlier) then it doesn't really matter which force is deployed or what NATO does - in terms of getting more positive efforts and outcomes from the Pakistani side.

Going back to the point you raised about 'Hot pursuit' forcing the GoP to react - it might do the trick. The peace deals have failed pretty spectacularly in both Swat and FATA (again!), with even the ANP requesting the military to come into Swat. The combination of the peace deal failures, a possible impeachment/resignation of President Musharraf (resulting in increased support from the masses), and a more aggressive NATO policy of Hot Pursuit (they can already go in up to six miles I believe), might be just what is needed for the GoP to stop waffling around.

 

[su-47]

This is something I've always wanted to know. Sovjets spent billions in Afghanistan but despite having superior weapons they lost in guerilla warfare.
Simply a miscalculation, lack of experience or is it the rigid terrain they fought in?

it is impossible to win against guerilla warfare unless you win the hearts and minds of the population. if u look at the casuality figures you will realise that the afghan guerillas took much more of a beating than the red army. but their resilience paid off.

Guerilla warfare will succeed when the people who support them are willing to suffer the retaliation from the forces they are opposing. In afghanistan, the soviets killed hundreds of thousands, many of the civilians. but they continued their support of the mujahideen and finally forced the red army to retreat.

also, another reason for success of guerilla warfare is that for every guerilla, there has to be atleast 30 soldiers in order to control guerilla warfare effectively. this increases cost of fighting against guerillas. so basically, the guerillas are spending much less in the conflict than their enemies.

so the only way to win against guerillas is to turn public opinion against them, and cut their support.

otherwise the old mongol tactic of wiping out everyone in the regions of dissent has to be adopted, such that no one dares oppose. but obviously that is not a viable solution today.

 

[deltacamelately]

Delta,

The attempts to get the PA/GoP to become more pro-active aside, I was referring to the potential of indiscipline within the Army, due to operations in FATA, to the extent that the PA is reduced to being not that much better off than the FC in conducting military ops.

AM,
The PA is trained in the Anglo-Saxon school of war doctrine. If you refer to the unit books, you will realise that this is a professional army and martial discipline is embedded in the Psyche. IMO, it isn't all about discipline. Even a well disciplined personel may get up a gum tree if ideological/psychological or religio-cultural bounds lay seize on the moral to fight. After all soldiers are also humans, isn't it?

If you remember, Gen MCNeill's main gripe with the FC, and his argument for deploying the PA as the primary fighting force, was that a highly disciplined force was needed to confront the challenges faced in FATA. If discipline in the PA crumbles (hypothetically speaking, there are currently no signs that it would, and the military seems to have learned from some of its failures earlier) then it doesn't really matter which force is deployed or what NATO does - in terms of getting more positive efforts and outcomes from the Pakistani side.

Exactly. This discipline thing is all hypothetical.
I have had my days with the PA, and they are no different to us in most of what matters. Write off the discipline thing.

Going back to the point you raised about 'Hot pursuit' forcing the GoP to react - it might do the trick. The peace deals have failed pretty spectacularly in both Swat and FATA (again!), with even the ANP requesting the military to come into Swat. The combination of the peace deal failures, a possible impeachment/resignation of President Musharraf (resulting in increased support from the masses), and a more aggressive NATO policy of Hot Pursuit (they can already go in up to six miles I believe), might be just what is needed for the GoP to stop waffling around.

AM,
Trends show a divergent path. Now that Musharraf is out and General Kayani is in office, the trade off that seems to have occured between him and the US/NATO, is to avert a protracted invasion of the FATA, an act that could have a ripple effect on the internal unrest inside Pakistan and instead allow the ISAF/NATO forces to go for hot pusuits inside the tribal areas couple of extra miles thereby dislodging the militants retreating lines. Things have been turbulent of late. Jandola, the gateway to South Waziristan has been captured by Baitullah Mahsud led Taliban. Efforts by local Bhittani tribe at the prompting of government to recapture the lost town were frustrated. Soon after, 28 members of peace committee of Bhittani tribe were kidnapped from Jandola and later on slain in Tank. Swat also became restive where several violent incidents took place.
North Waziristan, Bajaur and Mohmand Agencies continue to remain under the sway of Hafiz Gul Bahadur, Faqir Muhammad and Umar Khalid respectively. Their influence has expanded to nearby settled areas and reached up to the suburbs of Peshawar.
Apart from the rapidly expanding threat of Talibinisation, Mangal Bagh led Lashkar-i-Islan comprising 180,000 armed followers based in Bara Tehsil and Ansarul Islam led by Qazi Mehboob with its base in Tirah Valley, and Amr Bilmaruf wa Anil-munkir under Haji Namdar, all tthree part of Khyber Agency, have become a force to reckon with. Lashkar-i-Islam was involved in burning of 70 oill tankers parked at Torkham and destined to carry fuel for US-Nato troops in Afghanistan. Lashkar-i-Islam in its bid to become the predominant force in Khyber Agency has clashed with Ansarul Islam in Tirah and liberal use of heavy weapons and rockets used by both sides. The defenders stood their ground and could not be over powered. The gun battle which ensued for several days gave an indication about the type of firepower they had with them contarary to the ISAF's claims of effective and good tactics employed by the PA. To sum up, let me add that till date, at no place the militants have been decisively defeated by the PA, rather each military operation made the other side more resilient and cohesive. Baitullah has scrapped peace negotiations and threatened retaliatory strikes. Possibility of the three banned groups joining hands with TTP or al-Qaeda as had happened when 6 religious groups were banned in early 03 cannot be ruled out. The spate of suicide bombing that had petered out has recommenced. Now with all these things happening, I seriously doubt the effectiveness of the ISAF/NATO s hotpursuit operations and expectations that the PA can sustain cordon operations to frustrate the Taliban's retreating lines. I have often debated with OoE on another forum regarding this. He nonetheless somehow doesn't seems convinced with my line.

 

[dr.umer]

AM,
NATO/ISAF has done a 360 degree turn in its strategy in FATA. They are going for the hot pursuits not just to ensure kill. They are actually ensuring that either the PA meets the NATO forces upfront which means the PA will be sitting on the retreating lines of the militants or allow the militants to start hitting soft targets within Pakistan, forcing PA to turn back to the ISI. Wonder if this rings bells. But that's max that I can say.

NATO, ISAF & US Military are three different entities difficult to differentiate for a common man. Neither NATO nor ISAF is coming for the hot pursuit in Pakistan. US Military conducted that Operation inside Pakistan.

PA along with ISI is invloved in FATA so no point in saying that PA will turn back to the ISI. ISI is prime intelligence agency, where ever it will be, whether left, right or forward, PA will turn towards it, always, as usual.

ISI Taliban connection is a phobia some western & all indian media suffers with. The concept of retreating lines here is not easy to make in this situation. In Gurilla warfare, attacking party has to retreat after a strike. Militants retreating is not worring, they not surrendring should cause more concern.

Also US, Nato or ISAF while attacking FATA will never engage PA as this will turn nearly all things around. PA will no more be seen as enemy by militants as it will be fighting a "common" enemy and this my friend, you bet, US will never let happen.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Now with all these things happening, I seriously doubt the effectiveness of the ISAF/NATO s hotpursuit operations and expectations that the PA can sustain cordon operations to frustrate the Taliban's retreating lines. I have often debated with OoE on another forum regarding this. He nonetheless somehow doesn't seems convinced with my line.

They won't be effective, especially if they are sustained and widespread - it is going to destabilize Pakistan and make it extremely hard for any government (especially a democratic one) to continue support for the US.

Limited incursions (in quantity and size) after high value targets, while still inflaming sentiment, would perhaps be enough to nudge the leadership towards more action.

I think I agree with you that Pakistan would not be able to sustain cordon operations effectively - I don't think the civilian or military capabilities, without leaving the Eastern front severely lacking, are there yet. This then brings me to a something i have argued repeatedly, that this adminsitration has gone about fighting in Afghanistan with its head up its arse. Without addressing the strategic concerns of all the parties with stakes in Afghanistan, I cannot see how long term stability will be achieved. Something else will crop up after the Taliban.

 

[muse]

Agnostic

You have to keep in mind that DoD is in charge in Afghanistan and not State. DoD does not do "diplomacy", it has it's agenda and is focused on the success of it's agenda by military means. And if Pakistani interests are disregarded, can it be an accident or an oversight that has lasted 8 years?? US military doctrine promotes the exertion of US Will to prevail over an adversarys and if Pakistani interests are sidelined it is because it fits into the adversary mould for the US.

Delta makes a point that has gone unexplored, that is that Pak Fauj has yet to win a decisive victory in any engagement - why is that?

 

[fatman17]

Agnostic

You have to keep in mind that DoD is in charge in Afghanistan and not State. DoD does not do "diplomacy", it has it's agenda and is focused on the success of it's agenda by military means. And if Pakistani interests are disregarded, can it be an accident or an oversight that has lasted 8 years?? US military doctrine promotes the exertion of US Will to prevail over an adversarys and if Pakistani interests are sidelined it is because it fits into the adversary mould for the US.

Delta makes a point that has gone unexplored, that is that Pak Fauj has yet to win a decisive victory in any engagement - why is that?

simple! there hasnt been a sustained, focused operation. it has been stop-go-stop affair with the govt. changing its position on the militants due to its political compulsions. remember it is the govt. which is now driving this strategy and the PA is acting in accordance. dicisive victory will only be achieved if there is clarity in what the govt. wants to do which IMO i dont see happening very soon. deep-down they would like to put the blame squarely on the shoulders of the PA (for any failures) but i think the army high command is cognizant of this and will not fall for this trap.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Muse,

I woudl have to agree with FM on this. Every time the PA has been ascendant against the militants, a ceasefire or peace deal has been announced.

We had Mehsud on the run in S Waziristan right before the new government came in, and all the areas that were under control were abandoned. We had the militants in Swat on the run, and the peace deals with the ANP government came about.

I think it is accurate to say that in the beginning of teh FATA conflicts, it was sheer ham handedness and a lack of understanding perhaps on how severe the threat was ( the incidents of officers being gunned down as they tried to negotiate with holed up Taliban).

Going by the military ops in the past six months to a year however, it seems that many of those lessons have been internalized, and the PA has not suffered the kinds of embarrassing setbacks it did early on.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Agnostic

You have to keep in mind that DoD is in charge in Afghanistan and not State. DoD does not do "diplomacy", it has it's agenda and is focused on the success of it's agenda by military means. And if Pakistani interests are disregarded, can it be an accident or an oversight that has lasted 8 years?? US military doctrine promotes the exertion of US Will to prevail over an adversarys and if Pakistani interests are sidelined it is because it fits into the adversary mould for the US.

That is an interesting point.

But nonetheless, it does suggest that US policy has been flawed, in that it has followed the adage of 'to a man with a hammer, every problem looks like a nail'.

Its not like the US was not forewarned, the conferences and negotiations on Afghanistan's civil war had acknowledged a long time ago that the resolution to Afghanistan's problems lay in all of its neighbors being on board a solution.

To ignore history like that (not surprising given US actions in Iraq), for whatever reason, does not paint a flattering image of the analysts and strategists involved. But then, the question of whether the drive to ignore Pakistani concerns and interests, given the US wooing of India, does seem a bit too coincidental as well.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

"Delta makes a point that has gone unexplored, that is that Pak Fauj has yet to win a decisive victory in any engagement - why is that?"

One other point related to that - what exactly are we referring to when we talk about 'engagements'?

If you are referring to 'battles' while the PA conducts its operations, then it indeed has met with success. If you are referring to its ability to clear out areas in which it conducts operations, it has met success there as well. But if you are referring to clearing out an area (say Swat or Bajaur) and completely defeating militancy, then I think that is too high of a yardstick, one that even NATO and the ANA is nowhere close to accomplishing.

The latter aim will not be accomplished unless the PA clears all those regions of FATA where the Taliban hold sway - otherwise, as we have seen, they simply shift from the agency the ops' are being conducted in, and regroup and attack from elsewhere.

To achieve the latter, especially given the terrain, we are looking at a far greater number of troops and resources than we have deployed currently.

 

[muse]

A greater number of troops? have we any data on the numbers prsently engaged? Why is this task not given to SGS? Have we good data on the numbers of the insurgents?

if these are large numbers perhaps the PAF can be of further assistance. Moving from one regio to another, for large numbers cannot be a stealthy movement, there are vehicles ot procure and service, large numbers of insurgents have to be fed - how is it that even such basic things as monitoring movement has proven beyond the Pak Fauj?

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

A greater number of troops? have we any data on the numbers prsently engaged? Why is this task not given to SGS? Have we good data on the numbers of the insurgents?

if these are large numbers perhaps the PAF can be of further assistance. Moving from one regio to another, for large numbers cannot be a stealthy movement, there are vehicles ot procure and service, large numbers of insurgents have to be fed - how is it that even such basic things as monitoring movement has proven beyond the Pak Fauj?

We have about 40,000 FC I believe, spread out through FATA, PATA And NWFP. Blain, Fatman or someone else correct me if I'm wrong, but I belive we have XI corp. supporting the ops. in Bajaur currently?

The SSG numbers 4000 to 6000 I believe, and is not designed to be deployed as the primary force on the ground, but more along the lines of specific missions (such as we saw in the Lal Masjid, Sararogha fort recapture, hostage rescues, high level targets etc.), and therefore more in support of regular infantry when the situation demands.

The estimates on the number of insurgents diverge wildly - I believe that at any given time we are probably looking at a few thousand followers for most of the major Taliban commanders - but as has been argued in articles and analysis, these numbers swell when you take into account the ability of the Taliban to garner more men from Tribes in the areas they are based in through coercion and calls for 'Jihad'.

The interviews of IDP's from Bajaur indicated that the people fleeing were forced to hand over the young males of the family, teenagers even, by the Taliban.

You are correct that surveillance capabilities of the military have been found severely lacking - the Sararogha fort was attacked, by some estimates, close to a thousand militants. And legitimate questions were raised as to how such a force could not be noticed. I think the gaps in aerial surveillance are starting to be plugged with all of the UAV's Pakistan has been acquiring (and it is producing the FALCO locally now).

Barring incidents like the Sararogha fort however, the militants do not move in large groups, and the ambushes and attacks on NATO patrols (the attack on the US base that killed 9 and the attack on the French patrol killing ten) indicate that even with the technology and resources available to NATO, militants grouping for attack are not always detected.

 

[muse]

Agnostic

Thank you for that response - I am sure we are agreed that FC supplemented by regulars or even SSG is a flawed conception - the idea of the "commando" was to use small numbers to hunt guerrillas/insurgents - perhaps this idea could be revisited with a view to elimination the leadership of the various groups one at a time.

May I also suggest we revist the idea that if NATO are killed or cannot claim success,t hen it may be OK for us to exonerate ourselves -- NATA are thin, seriously - and we, are not. NATO can go home tomorrow, where will we go if we do not succeed?

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Agnostic

Thank you for that response - I am sure we are agreed that FC supplemented by regulars or even SSG is a flawed conception - the idea of the "commando" was to use small numbers to hunt guerrillas/insurgents - perhaps this idea could be revisited with a view to elimination the leadership of the various groups one at a time.

That is true, but the SSG are not supermen - an SSG patrol is just as vulnerable to ambush as regular infantry, and they are just as vulnerable to being overpowered by larger groups of militants. I think utilizing them more on the ground comes into play when you break the organized networks and havens of the militant groups and have them on the run, as we may see now in Swat, and perhaps in Bajaur.

Using them to eliminate the leadership is definitely on the cards, while we may not hear often of such ops. they do happen. But again, one cannot just drop a dozen commando's to take out a taliban leader in a village with hundreds of Taliban blending in with the villagers, if we have accurate intel on locations and identity to begin with.

I believe that using regular infantry in these operations to break the back of the organized Taliban networks is the correct move for this stage of the insurgency.

May I also suggest we revist the idea that if NATO are killed or cannot claim success,t hen it may be OK for us to exonerate ourselves -- NATA are thin, seriously - and we, are not. NATO can go home tomorrow, where will we go if we do not succeed?

Exonerating our failures on the backs of NATO was not my intention - I was merely trying to illustrate that the terrain makes it extremely hard for even forces with extensive reconnaissance assets to detect militants.

Personally I now believe that our approach of 'Jang and Jirga' offers us a far better opportunity of success than NATO, because Pakistan is not the 'outsider' in FATA, and can, to some extent, replace the lack of military manpower with support from the Tribes against Taliban. Support from the Tribes can also be a far better source for intel than UAV's and the like.

How successful this approach ends up being will be seen in Bajaur I believe.