Artillery and Counterinsurgency: The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan

[deltacamelately]

Neo,
Any comments on my reasoning about the retreat of the 40th Army?

 

[Neo]

Sir,

I'll comment later tonight as soon as I finish reading articles on 40th Army and her deployment in Afghanistan in 1978, a year prior to the invasion.

 

[Neo]

Non aligned nations voted in the United Nations against the Soviet troop presence in Afghanistan, and Western countries restricted ties with the USSR. All these had a negative impact on the mental resolution to stay put. However, militarily speaking, the 40th Army, as vindicated by its operation accomplishment report, had cleary accomplished all the tasks assigned to it. The decission to retreat was a combination of internal opposition by the Russian population, increasing financial burden, alienation not just from the western world but also with the NAM countries and political imbalance post Brazenev's departure.

Note that, Mikhail Gorbachev after becoming the Soviet leader in March 1985, had openly stated that the economically staggering USSR needed to improve relations with the West to reduce its military spending burden and obtain technical aid. He recognized the Afghanistan war as an obstacle to better Western relations as well as a source of Soviet public malaise.

Sir after reading various articles I conclude that your well worded post reflects the events as they happened and indeed 40th army succeeded in tasks assigned to her.

Victory may be claimed by Afghans purely because they survived the invasion but it was international pressure and probably the deadly stinger missle that made the Sovjets retreat.

 

[fatman17]

Sir after reading various articles I conclude that your well worded post reflects the events as they happened and indeed 40th army succeeded in tasks assigned to her.

Victory may be claimed by Afghans purely because they survived the invasion but it was international pressure and probably the deadly stinger missle that made the Sovjets retreat.

i think we r letting the Bear off the hook too easily. now i am not depending on the Bear Trap or any Rambo movies but one thing was crucial (besides the stingers) that the soviet conscript was not in a mood to fight someone else's war.

 

[fatman17]

POINT OF VIEW

The Problem Is Pakistan

By Morton Abramowitz | NEWSWEEK

Published Aug 2, 2008

Barack Obama has said that the United States needs to send an extra 10,000 troops to Afghanistan. John McCain wants to send 15,000. But before ordering more soldiers into the fray, the next U.S. president should think about Afghanistan's history—and how such surges there have failed in the past.

Three decades ago, the Soviet Union tried to subdue a fundamentalist Islamic insurgency in Afghanistan by deploying 108,000 troops (at the conflict's height in 1985–86), including special forces and substantial air power. But in 1989 the Red Army withdrew in defeat, having lost 13,000 soldiers, killed and maimed more than a million Afghans and sent 5 million refugees fleeing into nearby countries.

The single biggest reason for the Soviets' failure was Pakistan. And if Washington isn't careful, Pakistan could have the same effect today.

To understand why, start with the fact that Pakistan and Afghanistan share a 2,250-kilometer-long, highly porous border. During the Soviet occupation, Pakistan served as the essential conduit for U.S. and Saudi aid to the Afghan mujahedin. The Pakistanis funneled massive amounts of weapons to the Afghan fighters; the flow reached $1 billion annually by the late 1980s, some of it new, advanced U.S. arms.

At times the Soviets, knowing full well where the mujahedin's guns and Stinger missiles were coming from, must have considered invading Pakistan or conducting cross-border strikes. In the end they decided against it, fearing a wider conflict and thinking they had the military means to deal with the problem inside Afghanistan proper. Had the Soviet Union moved against Pakistan, it's impossible to know how things would have turned out. As it is, the Soviets' Afghan strategy failed, and the mighty Red Army, despite its sophisticated equipment, was ultimately beaten back by bands of local insurgents.

The similarities between then and now are striking. The U.S.-led Coalition has been in Afghanistan for seven years. There are now 70,000 Coalition troops in the country, including approximately 36,000 Americans. To date, more than 800 service members have been killed, and the numbers and pace of casualties are rising. Worse, despite the presence of these forces and billions of dollars in Western reconstruction aid, the Taliban seem to be getting stronger.

Just as in the '80s, the main problem is Pakistan. Border areas nominally ruled by Islamabad have become Taliban safe havens, with weapons, drugs and Qaeda fighters being smuggled across with impunity. Despite Pakistani denials, the CIA has made well-grounded allegations that some government elements, including officers in Inter-Services Intelligence, are supporting the radicals.

So how should the next U.S. president tackle this problem and avoid falling into the Soviets' trap? The Taliban insurgency is smaller than the anti-Soviet one was, although it's apparently better coordinated. And the Allies' technological advantage is greater than the Soviets' was. A surge of forces might help better control Afghanistan's borders and target insurgents. But simply throwing soldiers at the problem, especially at the levels the candidates have proposed, won't stop the infiltration of fighters from Pakistan or resolve Afghanistan's many domestic difficulties.

Periodically targeting Qaeda elements in Pakistan's lawless border regions—an option Obama has said he would consider under some circumstances—might be helpful, too, but it would do little to stop the influx of gunmen into Afghanistan. And such military strikes would infuriate Islamabad and throw Pakistani politics into turmoil. A full-fledged invasion would be immensely costly and likely have even worse consequences.

It would be far better to find some way to get the Pakistanis to help voluntarily. The United States has already tried this tack using diplomatic persuasion and large amounts of mostly military aid, but to no avail. Washington could increase pressure by threatening to shut off the tap unless Islamabad played ball. But such a confrontational approach would also be dangerous and likely not work either.

The harsh realities of the situation in Afghanistan—including Pakistan's meddlesome role—can no longer be ignored. The stakes for the United States and the region are enormous, and good options are in short supply. No quick fix will solve the problem—certainly not the infusion of a few more American brigades. The Soviet saga shows the danger of a focused, military-only approach. Talking tough, as the presidential candidates try to bolster their national-security credentials, is not likely to help, and the sooner we recognize that, the better. Building a stable Afghanistan will be a long-term, uncertain effort. Without a concerted bipartisan approach, no policy is likely to survive or succeed. Meanwhile, the political warfare is distracting us from the necessary fight.

 

[Neo]

i think we r letting the Bear off the hook too easily. now i am not depending on the Bear Trap or any Rambo movies but one thing was crucial (besides the stingers) that the soviet conscript was not in a mood to fight someone else's war.

Sir,

Could you elaborate what you mean by someone else's war? I consider Sovjet invasion of Afgahnistan as a preplanned step in Kremlin's quest for access to warn waters. Sovjets eneterd to defeat Afghanistan and annex it.

 

[fatman17]

Sir,

Could you elaborate what you mean by someone else's war? I consider Sovjet invasion of Afgahnistan as a preplanned step in Kremlin's quest for access to warn waters. Sovjets eneterd to defeat Afghanistan and annex it.

the soviet soldiers did not see eye to eye with their officer corps. granted that the soviets wanted afghanistan to be another proxy state like the CARs. after 10 years of fighting a "un-seen" enemy, they had had enough.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

the soviet soldiers did not see eye to eye with their officer corps. granted that the soviets wanted afghanistan to be another proxy state like the CARs. after 10 years of fighting a "un-seen" enemy, they had had enough.

Hmmm... I wonder if we potentially will face the same issue in FATA, if we are not already, as has been suggested by some.

Arguably the Americans at least face no such issues at this point, with the war sold well and good as the 'right war', and all the fluff about 'defending our freedoms and blah blah blah'. The remainder of NATO members are doubtful on this count over the long run though IMO.

 

[fatman17]

Hmmm... I wonder if we potentially will face the same issue in FATA, if we are not already, as has been suggested by some.

Arguably the Americans at least face no such issues at this point, with the war sold well and good as the 'right war', and all the fluff about 'defending our freedoms and blah blah blah'. The remainder of NATO members are doubtful on this count over the long run though IMO.

we already have with elements of the FC (same tribes), although the PA has ensured that only punjabi dominated units are being used in the FATA.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

we already have with elements of the FC (same tribes), although the PA has ensured that only punjabi dominated units are being used in the FATA.

That could backfire for a different reason, however the counter to that at this point is that the ANP seems fully on board, and has not backed away form accepting responsibility for requesting Army action in Swat.

And as much as I would hate to see it happen, all of these dynamics would indicate that the best thing for Pakistan right now would be for Musharraf to gracefully resign, so as to no put the Army in any awkward position, directly or indirectly, and continue to focus on the insurgent threat.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

however the counter to that at this point is that the ANP seems fully on board, and has not backed away from accepting responsibility for requesting Army action in Swat.

Apparently I spoke too soon:

NWFP cabinet demands end to military operation​

Updated at: 2320 PST, Saturday, August 09, 2008
PESHAWAR: The provincial cabinet of Awami National Party (ANP) has called for halting the ongoing military operation in tribal areas.

The NWFP cabinet meeting held under the chairmanship of Provincial President of ANP, Afrasyab Khattak.

The meeting expressed concern over the present situation in tribal areas and demand was made to the federal government to discontinue the ongoing operation there.

The meeting endorsed the ruling coalition’s decision to impeach the President and restore the deposed judges.

NWFP cabinet demands end to military operation

I am not sure if this also applies to Swat though...

 

[fatman17]

Apparently I spoke too soon:


I am not sure if this also applies to Swat though...

the reason for this demand is political - without the 25 FATA MNA's (who traditionally are under the influence of the president (read ISI)) vote in the impeachment process, the coalition will fall short of the required numbers.however, i agree the president should resign gracefully and let the idiots fight it out.

 

[deltacamelately]

Hmmm... I wonder if we potentially will face the same issue in FATA, if we are not already, as has been suggested by some.

Arguably the Americans at least face no such issues at this point, with the war sold well and good as the 'right war', and all the fluff about 'defending our freedoms and blah blah blah'. The remainder of NATO members are doubtful on this count over the long run though IMO.

AM,
NATO/ISAF has done a 360 degree turn in its strategy in FATA. They are going for the hot pursuits not just to ensure kill. They are actually ensuring that either the PA meets the NATO forces upfront which means the PA will be sitting on the retreating lines of the militants or allow the militants to start hitting soft targets within Pakistan, forcing PA to turn back to the ISI. Wonder if this rings bells. But that's max that I can say.

 

[Contrarian]

AM,
NATO/ISAF has done a 360 degree turn in its strategy in FATA. They are going for the hot pursuits not just to ensure kill. They are actually ensuring that either the PA meets the NATO forces upfront which means the PA will be sitting on the retreating lines of the militants or allow the militants to start hitting soft targets within Pakistan, forcing PA to turn back to the ISI. Wonder if this rings bells. But that's max that I can say.

OoE's view i believe. Its not that its happening already deltacamelately.

 

[deltacamelately]

OoE's view i believe. Its not that its happening already deltacamelately.

I saw you there.
Yes, I and the good Col have had a lot of debate on this and it seems they have finally decided it to be the only effective tool, i.e. to put PA under the scanner. Visit the thread "India Pakistan Strife may hurt NATO in Afghanistan".