‘Aridaman’, India’s second nuclear-armed submarine, is ready for launch

[ashok321]

Why all think tank Indian analysts are running away from this thread?
This admiral can take them head on. Anytime on this or any other naval matters.

 

[Dark Lord Forever]

And what generation is Sodium cooled fast breeders moron ?wh

Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prototype_Fast_Breeder_Reactor

lol. only small prototype. that too begged from russia. tell us when there is big working model.

ITER (Latin for "the way", formerly International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) is an international nuclear fusion research and engineering megaproject, which will be the world's largest magnetic confinement plasma physics experiment. It is an experimental tokamak nuclear fusion reactor that is being built next to the Cadarache facility in Saint-Paul-lès-Durance, which is in southern France.

The project is funded and run by seven member entities—the European Union, India, Japan, China, Russia, South Korea, and the United States

indian contribution to that project is....is.... is.... drum roll......is... heat pipes.

Our arsenal depends on plutonium

where plutonim comes from???

it comes from enriched uranim. unless india has develop vedic cow piss plutonium enrichment technology.



please stop stop embaracing yourself further.



here learn something.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plutonium#Production_during_the_Manhattan_Project

In another meeting on 6 September 2008, the NSG participating governments agreed to grant India a "clean waiver" from its existing rules, which forbid nuclear trade with a country which has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

With France...

A landmark Framework Agreement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation was signed between India and France on 30 September 2008 during the visit of Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh to France. Subsequently, during the visit of President Nicolas Sarkozy to India from 4–7 December 2010, the General Framework Agreement and the Early Works Agreement between NPCIL and Areva for implementation of EPR NPP Units at Jaitapur were signed.

Japan...

Japan-India civil nuclear pact

https://www.google.co.in/url?sa=t&r...-pact/&usg=AFQjCNEb9crHAfG5Iw_jfVVm60TioSKuIQ

where is france reactor in india?

where is japan reactor in inida?

do you know that NSG actually forbids them from selling their reactors to India ?

yes you prove my point. i am correct because india isn't nsg member other contries won't give reactor to india.

while we arm our BMs with thermonuclear warheads & develop fusion reactors...

wake up wake up. how many times will you fall sleep? you have to go to school roket boy.

BTW, just searched ASME website & found Pakistan doesn't even have one nuclear certified vendor. Not even one...

so do you know pakistan has fastest developing nuke program?

do you know pakistan has more nuke bombs then india?

do you know pakistan has miniture nuclear bombs?

do you know in 10 years pakistan will be 3rd larget nuclear bomb country in world only after us and russia?

no you don't know anything. so please go and learn first.

 

[gslv mk3]

lol. only small prototype. that too begged from russia

Dumbfck, that is a 500 MW reactor developed in India- in no manner small or Russian. No whine like a....

Meanwhile your new sugar-daddy China just bought a small Chinese fast reactor, lol.

indian contribution to that project is....is.... is.... drum roll......is... heat pipes

More ignorant rants from a moron

The Institute for Plasma Research (IPR), located in Ghandhinagar, western India, forms the Indian Domestic Agency, empowered to design, build and deliver those contributions to ITER which have been agreed in the procurement sharing.

One of the only 5 superconducting Tokamaks in operation, developed by IPR

Just one of the contribution- World's second largest vacuum vessel

ITER-India signed the contract for manufacturing of ITER Cryostat on 17 August 2012 with Larsen & Toubro (L&T) Ltd.

The Cryostat will be a fully welded cylindrical vacuum/pressure chamber with overall dimensions of roughly 29.4 meters in diameter, 29 meters in height and a finished weight of 3850 metric tons. Material of construction is stainless steel with thickness ranging from 50 mm to 250 mm. This will make it the largest vacuum vessel made of stainless steel. It will be evacuated to ultra high vacuum required to keep the superconducting magnets cool at cryogenic temperatures, thus essentially acting as a very large refrigerator. It is an essential part of ITER and acts as a secondary confinement barrier for the reactor. It will take the entire mechanical and seismic loads of the reactor and absorbs all the electromagnetic loads that arise during the operation of the fusion reactor.

where is france reactor in india?

where is japan reactor in inida?

The Areva reactor will definitely would be built & being a deal is being worked out.

The Japanese deal is to deal with Japanese owned US suppliers such as Westinghouse doofus.

t. i am correct because india isn't nsg member other contries won't give reactor to india.

Dumbfck what is then the waiver for ? It overcomes the restrictions !!

where plutonim comes from???

it comes from enriched uranim.

Dmbfck, It's from natural uranium...

Designed as a larger version of the CIRUS reactor, Dhruva was an Indian designed project built to provide an independent source of weapons-grade plutonium free from safeguards. The Dhruva project cost 950 million rupees. The reactor uses heavy water as a moderator and coolant. Aluminum clad fuel rods containing natural uranium are used to obtain a maximum power output of 100MW

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dhruva_reactor

We have enough uranium mines to run a nuclear weapons program stupid.

Uranium supplied by other countries are under safeguards & cannot be used for nuclear weapons program.

In July 2017, eight reactors – 2400 MWe (gross) – of nuclear capacity was fuelled by indigenous uranium and being operated close to their rated capacity. The 14 units (4380 MWe gross) under safeguards were operating on imported uranium at rated capacity.

http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/india.aspx

Also

Together, these unsafeguarded reactors have 2350 MW of electricity generation capacity and could produce about 1250 kilograms of reactor-grade plutonium every year.


''please stop stop embarrassing yourself further. ''

do you know pakistan has more nuke bombs then india?

And when did we give out the exact number of our devices stupid?

do you know pakistan has miniture nuclear bombs?

not miniature. 'tactical' warheads. With sub-kiloton yields. Nothing exciting or needed for us.

The point still stands- you're a country which don't have ONE, SINGLE certified nuclear supplier.

You can cry about it though !!!

wake up wake up. how many times will you fall sleep? you have to go to school roket boy.

Keep crying ...while we develop fusion reactors.

BTW Pakistan isn't even a part of ITER & a Pakistani nuclear scientist lurking anywhere close to ITER will be probably be arrested & tried for espionage & even nuclear terrorism...

 

[Dark Lord Forever]

that is a 500 MW reactor developed in India.

wong. still developing... at vedic speed.

This will make it the largest vacuum vessel made of stainless steel. It will be evacuated to ultra high vacuum required to keep the superconducting magnets cool at cryogenic temperatures, thus essentially acting as a very large refrigerator.

so baiscly large heat pipes. i am correct. once again.

The Areva reactor will definitely would be built & being a deal is being worked out.

yeah sure sure. and it will be mother of deal right?

The Japanese deal is to deal with Japanese owned US suppliers such as Westinghouse

please read news westinghouse is bankrupted. waiting for india to join NSG.

what is then the waiver for ? It overcomes the restrictions !!

then go buy plutonim for bombs.

It's from natural uranium...

yellow cake???? black powder????

please rocket boy please. just stop. you are insulting school childreans's knowlege.

We have enough uranium mines to run a nuclear weapons program.

india has little ammount of uranium. all that little uranium is inside naxal areas. where even indian hijara army can't go.



do you know how many toons of uranium india has??? do you know how many toons are needed to enrich 1 kg of plutonium????

Uranium supplied by other countries are under safeguards & cannot be used for nuclear weapons program.

again prove my point. no one trust india.

And when did we give out the exact number of our devices stupid?

every intelighant expert knows truth. there are reports everywhere. india is lower then pakistan. soon india will be lower then north korea too.

read more watch bollywood less.

https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat

not miniature. 'tactical' warheads. With sub-kiloton yields. Nothing exciting or needed for us.

exiting part is those nukes droping on indian hijara army formations.

While we develop fusion reactors.

wake up. wake up. you are dreaming agin.

A Pakistani scientist lurking anywhere close to ITER will be probably be arrested & tried for espionage & even nuclear terrorism...

pakistan is major scince producer. no need outside help. pakistan is member of cern.

 

[gslv mk3]

wong. still developing... at vedic speed.

Says someone from a country which is a big zero in developing nuclear reactors !!!

so baiscly large heat pipes

Basic Mechanical Engineering 101. What is heatpipe ?

''A heat pipe is a heat-transfer device that combines the principles of both thermal conductivity and phase transition to effectively transfer heat between two solid interfaces.

At the hot interface of a heat pipe a liquid in contact with a thermally conductive solid surface turns into a vapor by absorbing heat from that surface. The vapor then travels along the heat pipe to the cold interface and condenses back into a liquid – releasing the latent heat. The liquid then returns to the hot interface through either capillary action, centrifugal force, or gravity, and the cycle repeats. Due to the very high heat transfer coefficients for boiling and condensation, heat pipes are highly effective thermal conductors. ''

Now learn what a cryostat is...

Again, quite rich coming from a country that has zero heavy/precision engineering capabilities...

yeah sure sure. and it will be mother of deal right?

please read news westinghouse is bankrupted. waiting for india to join NSG

Too moronic. Ignored...

every intelighant expert knows truth. there are reports everywhere. india is lower then pakistan. soon india will be lower then north korea too.

Yawn...

https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/India's Nuclear Exceptionalism.pdf

Also

India is, so far, the only country after the United States to have tested a nuclear device made of reactor-grade plutonium, which makes its unsafeguarded civilian nuclear facilities a source of concern for others

from your media- https://www.dawn.com/news/1331405

pakistan is major scince producer. no need outside help.

You're a what ?

Show me one commercial n-reactor developed/built by in Pakistan ?

again prove my point. no one trust india.

You know what safeguards are ? No you don't.

india has little ammount of uranium. all that little uranium is inside naxal areas.

Stupidity reached a new level...

Mining and processing of uranium ore in India is done by the Uranium Corporation of India Ltd. (UCIL). The corporation operates in Jharkhand state with seven mines at Jaduguda, Bhatin, Narwapahar, Turamdih Bagjata Banduhurang, Mohuldih and two processing plants at Jaduguda and Turamdih. A new mine and a processing plant are also under construction at Tummalapalle, Andhra Pradesh.

“Tummalapalle in A.P. could have one of world's largest uranium reserves''

The Jaduguda Mine (also spelt as Jadugoda or Jadugora) is a uranium mine in Jaduguda village in the Purbi Singhbhum district of the Indian state of Jharkhand. It commenced operation in 1967 and was the first uranium mine in India.

hijara army

You mean these hijras ?

exiting part is

exciting part is that the next thing would be vermins in Lahore & Karachi getting roasted...allthough cockroaches such as you may be able to survive...

wake up. wake up. you are dreaming agin.

Yawn..reality check for dumb cockroaches...

do you know how many toons are needed to enrich 1 kg of plutonium????

toons ? How old are you kid ?

In July 2017, eight reactors – 2400 MWe (gross) – of nuclear capacity was fuelled by indigenous uranium and being operated close to their rated capacity. The 14 units (4380 MWe gross) under safeguards were operating on imported uranium at rated capacity.

http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/india.aspx
Together, these unsafeguarded reactors have 2350 MW of electricity generation capacity and could produce about 1250 kilograms of reactor-grade plutonium every year.

then go buy plutonim for bombs.

We will rather buy reactors & uranium for our safeguarded plants. See we are not deranged Islamic nuclear power...

 

[GuardianRED]

wong. still developing... at vedic speed.


so baiscly large heat pipes. i am correct. once again.


yeah sure sure. and it will be mother of deal right?


please read news westinghouse is bankrupted. waiting for india to join NSG.


then go buy plutonim for bombs.




yellow cake???? black powder????

please rocket boy please. just stop. you are insulting school childreans's knowlege.







india has little ammount of uranium. all that little uranium is inside naxal areas. where even indian hijara army can't go.



do you know how many toons of uranium india has??? do you know how many toons are needed to enrich 1 kg of plutonium????




again prove my point. no one trust india.


every intelighant expert knows truth. there are reports everywhere. india is lower then pakistan. soon india will be lower then north korea too.

read more watch bollywood less.

https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat



exiting part is those nukes droping on indian hijara army formations.



wake up. wake up. you are dreaming agin.


pakistan is major scince producer. no need outside help. pakistan is member of cern.

Showing your true Colours - False Flag!

 

[Gurjeet Walia]

lol. only small prototype. that too begged from russia. tell us when there is big working model.


indian contribution to that project is....is.... is.... drum roll......is... heat pipes.



where plutonim comes from???

it comes from enriched uranim. unless india has develop vedic cow piss plutonium enrichment technology.



please stop stop embaracing yourself further.



here learn something.



where is france reactor in india?

where is japan reactor in inida?



yes you prove my point. i am correct because india isn't nsg member other contries won't give reactor to india.


wake up wake up. how many times will you fall sleep? you have to go to school roket boy.


so do you know pakistan has fastest developing nuke program?

do you know pakistan has more nuke bombs then india?

do you know pakistan has miniture nuclear bombs?

do you know in 10 years pakistan will be 3rd larget nuclear bomb country in world only after us and russia?

no you don't know anything. so please go and learn first.

forget about France reactors, where does Pakistani Stolen Nuclear bombs & gifted missiles came from?

Says someone from a country which is a big zero in developing nuclear reactors !!!



Basic Mechanical Engineering 101. What is heatpipe ?

''A heat pipe is a heat-transfer device that combines the principles of both thermal conductivity and phase transition to effectively transfer heat between two solid interfaces.

At the hot interface of a heat pipe a liquid in contact with a thermally conductive solid surface turns into a vapor by absorbing heat from that surface. The vapor then travels along the heat pipe to the cold interface and condenses back into a liquid – releasing the latent heat. The liquid then returns to the hot interface through either capillary action, centrifugal force, or gravity, and the cycle repeats. Due to the very high heat transfer coefficients for boiling and condensation, heat pipes are highly effective thermal conductors. ''

Now learn what a cryostat is...

Again, quite rich coming from a country that has zero heavy/precision engineering capabilities...



Too moronic. Ignored...



Yawn...

https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/India's Nuclear Exceptionalism.pdf

Also

India is, so far, the only country after the United States to have tested a nuclear device made of reactor-grade plutonium, which makes its unsafeguarded civilian nuclear facilities a source of concern for others

from your media- https://www.dawn.com/news/1331405



You're a what ?

Show me one commercial n-reactor developed/built by in Pakistan ?



You know what safeguards are ? No you don't.



Stupidity reached a new level...

The Jaduguda Mine (also spelt as Jadugoda or Jadugora) is a uranium mine in Jaduguda village in the Purbi Singhbhum district of the Indian state of Jharkhand. It commenced operation in 1967 and was the first uranium mine in India.



You mean these hijras ?

exciting part is that the next thing would be vermins in Lahore & Karachi getting roasted...allthough cockroaches such as you may be able to survive...



Yawn..reality check for dumb cockroaches...

toons ? How old are you kid ?

In July 2017, eight reactors – 2400 MWe (gross) – of nuclear capacity was fuelled by indigenous uranium and being operated close to their rated capacity. The 14 units (4380 MWe gross) under safeguards were operating on imported uranium at rated capacity.

http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/india.aspx
Together, these unsafeguarded reactors have 2350 MW of electricity generation capacity and could produce about 1250 kilograms of reactor-grade plutonium every year.



We will rather buy reactors & uranium for our safeguarded plants. See we are not deranged Islamic nuclear power...

nailed it bro, can't figure out after getting so much Shame & embarrassment how false flaggers come again & again here

 

[Mustang06]

You've got to hand it to @gslv mk3. The patience he has shown in dealing with so called 'Submarin Expart' is amazing!
He should be given positive rating on this only!
This expart dumbass has single handedly destroyed this thread and the HAL Dhruv one with his stupid opinion originating from his bum hole!

 

[Dark Lord Forever]

exciting part is that the next thing would be vermins in Lahore & Karachi getting roasted...allthough cockroaches such as you may be able to survive...

i could report you for this kind of senseless trolling. but this time i am letting you go because i know you are school boy. but be careful next time. rules in pdf are very strict. no trolling about genocide or killing innocents will be tolerated.

______________________________________________________________________

Says someone from a country which is a big zero in developing nuclear reactors !!!

i know being indian is shamefull so please don't cry.

Basic Mechanical Engineering 101. What is heatpipe ?

any piping or coil system that transfers hear or cold. is heat pipe.

Again, quite rich coming from a country that has zero heavy/precision engineering capabilities...

yes i know india is backwards hellhole but please stop your selflothing.

Yawn...

are you feeling sleepy again???

selective posting.

every expert in all world has said pakistan is ahead of india in nuclear but you did find one paid indian gov source. bravo you did hard work. but you still get F

India is, so far, the only country after the United States to have tested a nuclear device made of reactor-grade plutonium

of course india is the only country with vedic shupa powa technology.

You're a what ?

Drak Lord

You know what safeguards are ?

yes i do.

Stupidity reached a new level...

i know but i am trying my best to help you.

Mining and processing of uranium ore in India is done by the Uranium Corporation of India Ltd. (UCIL). The corporation operates in Jharkhand state

what is jarkhand known for??? oh yes maowadi. naxalwadi.

https://www.google.co.in/url?sa=t&r...07.ece&usg=AFQjCNH4Lf1M7NY7QubtqCEBcokTviP2CA

“Tummalapalle in A.P. could have one of world's largest uranium reserves''

based on what reserch? ....................... ........................... oh i forget vedic science.

you know acording to vedic science cow piss is largest source of yellow uranium. quick go get your cow and start enriching india's most important resource.

on serious. india has very little uranium. unlike you i have source.

here go read.

http://www.mining-technology.com/fe...-five-biggest-uranium-rich-countries-4274059/

In July 2017, eight reactors – 2400 MWe (gross) – of nuclear capacity was fuelled by indigenous uranium and being operated close to their rated capacity. The 14 units (4380 MWe gross) under safeguards were operating on imported uranium at rated capacity.

first. the corect speling is fueled.

two. you prove me correct again. out off 22 majority was operated on forign fuel.

Together, these unsafeguarded reactors have 2350 MW of electricity generation capacity and could produce about 1250 kilograms of reactor-grade plutonium every year.

agin corect speling is "non-safeguarded"

two. that produce plutonim is sent back.

We will rather buy reactors & uranium for our safeguarded plants.

it is not for sale. all used material goes back to seller country. but of course you don't know this.


@Mustang06 @Gurjeet Walia here we go cheerlears are here for IPL match.

 

[gslv mk3]

i could report you for this kind of senseless trolling. but this time i am letting you go because i know you are school boy. but be careful next time. rules in pdf are very strict. no trolling about genocide or killing innocents will be tolerated.

STFU Vermin...

know being indian is shamefull so please don't cry.

yes i know india is backwards hellhole but please stop your selflothing.

Keep crying, low Vermin from a low HDI hellhole !!!

what is jarkhand known for??? oh yes maowadi. naxalwadi.

Dumbass, you know shit about India's internal security situation. We have been mining Uranium since 1967 fro Jharkhand & we are doing it even today.

Now what was your point ? India's uranium mines are under naxal control ?

That lie has been exposed.

based on what reserch?

Dumbfck forever, it's called a 'survey' not 'research'.

first. the corect speling is fueled.

In American English, the verb fuel is inflected fueled and fueling—with one l. In all other main varieties of English, it becomes fuelled and fuelling—with two l‘s. The spelling difference extends to refuel, which makes refueled and refueling in American English and refuelled and refuelling everywhere else. It likewise extends to other, rarer derivatives such as fueler/fueller.

two. you prove me correct again. out off 22 majority was operated on forign fuel.

Doofuss, you have no point. The point is we have 14 unsafeguarded reactors & they are producing reactor grade plutonium.

Together, these unsafeguarded reactors have 2350 MW of electricity generation capacity and could produce about 1250 kilograms of reactor-grade plutonium every year.

agin corect speling is "non-safeguarded"

Stupid much ?

Unsafeguarded Special Nuclear Material

two. that produce plutonim is sent back.

To where dumbass ?

It's our plutonium generated from our own fuel fabricated in our NFC in turn from our own mines stupid !!

it is not for sale

Really ? Then how was it offered to India ?

on serious. india has very little uranium.

enough to make our own reactor grade plutonium stupid, for N weapons or simply for use in, again unsafegarded FBRs.

every expert in all world has said pakistan is ahead of india in nuclear but you did find one paid indian gov source

'Paid Indian gov source'. 'every expert in the world'

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

The Robert and Renée Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (also known as the Belfer Center) is a permanent research center located within the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

of course india is the only country with vedic shupa powa technology.

Why dumbass, couldn't accept the reality...??

Keep whining like a female Canis lupus

all used material goes back to seller country

Produced special fissionable material that would otherwise be subject to safeguards only because it has been produced in or by the use of safeguarded nuclear material shall in part be exempted from safeguards if it is produced in a reactor in which the ratio of fissionable isotopes within safeguarded nuclear material to all fissionable isotopes is less than 0.3 (calculated each time any change is made in the loading of the reactor and assumed to be maintained until the next such change)

Agreement between the Government of India and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities

What do you say now, genius ?

Here is your compatriots crying about it...

The IAEA should also revoke its special provision granted to India under Article 25 of their agreement, which exempts fissionable material, like plutonium, produced by using safeguarded material from safeguards.

https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/150156-Indias-commitments

 

[Dark Lord Forever]

India's uranium mines are under naxal control ?

The most vulnerable naked nukes of India | Fact and Truth
https://facttruth.wordpress.com/2010/05/01/the-most-vulnerable-naked-nukes-of-india/

Uranium ore ferried through Naxal belt sans security
http://www.financialexpress.com/archive/uranium-ore-ferried-through-naxal-belt-sans-security/323733/

In American English

first british and now american slaves. some indians love gora master's slavery.

The point is we have 14 unsafeguarded reactors & they are producing reactor grade plutonium.

why not all 100%??? but it doesn't matter because it is useless for weapons.

Together, 1250 kilograms of reactor-grade plutonium every year.

source?

Unsafeguarded Special Nuclear Material

making it bold doesn't cahange true speling.

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

paid by indian gov. such people are dime a dozen.

Agreement between the Government of India and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities

and this agreement has poured cold water on indian nuke bomb dreams.

 

[gslv mk3]

The most vulnerable naked nukes of India | Fact and Truth

Moron, no one is interested in your Wordpress & Blogspot sites...

You claimed that even the Indian army can't mine Uranium from our Mines.

Now that your lies were called out & exposed, you're resorting to such such third rate antics?

Either prove your claim that 'India can't mine Uranium ore from Jharkhand'...

...Or just STFU& GTFO.

paid by indian gov. such people are dime a dozen.

Why beta, did that give you burns ??

first british and now american slaves. some indians love gora master's slavery.

More rants from an retard who lack basic comprehension skills...

It was probably written by an American, stupid.

why not all 100%??? but it doesn't matter because it is useless for weapons.

really ? Your favorite Carnegie Endowment think tank believes otherwise.

Some education...

http://www.ccnr.org/plute.html

source?

read up

https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/India's Nuclear Exceptionalism.pdf

making it bold doesn't cahange true speling.

Dumbfck, That is the definition of a US law. The term unsafeguarded is used for nuclear facilities, fuels etc.

and this agreement has poured cold water on indian nuke bomb dreams.

Some more rants from an retard who lack basic comprehension skills...

Doofus, it even allows us to use plutonium, produced from safeguarded material for our unsafeguarded facilities.

Now cry...

any piping or coil system that transfers hear or cold. is heat pipe.

With this kind of knowledge in engineering, you just might be the next Watt or Tesla

 

[Dark Lord Forever]

@gslv mk3

enough fooling around. time for some hard schooling.

India is estimated to have produced enough plutonium for 150–200 nuclear warheads but has likely produced only 120–130. Nonetheless, additional plutonium will be required to produce warheads for missiles now under development, and India is reportedly building two new plutonium production facilities.

India continues to modernize its nuclear arsenal with development of several new nuclear weapon systems. We estimate India currently operates seven nuclear-capable systems: two aircraft, four land-based ballistic missiles, and one sea-based ballistic missile. At least four more systems are in development. The development program is in a dynamic phase, with long-range land- and sea-based missiles emerging for possible deployment within the next decade.

India is estimated to have produced approximately 600 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium (International Panel on Fissile Materials International Panel on Fissile Materials. 2015. Global Fissile Material Report 2013: Nuclear Weapon and Fissile Material Stockpiles and Production. sufficient for 150–200 nuclear warheads; however, not all the material has been converted into nuclear warheads. Based on available information about its nuclear-capable delivery force structure and strategy, we estimate that India has produced 120–130 nuclear warheads (Table 1). It will need more warheads to arm the new missiles it is currently developing. In addition to the Dhruva plutonium production reactor near Mumbai, India reportedly is building two new plutonium production reactors (International Panel on Fissile Materials International Panel on Fissile Materials. 2015. Global Fissile Material Report 2013: Nuclear Weapon and Fissile Material Stockpiles and Production. The unsafeguarded Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor under construction at the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research near Kalpakkam could potentially increase India’s plutonium production capacity significantly in the future, although the reactor is continuing to experience delays.

Arms control groups overestimated India’s nuclear arsenal size in the late 1990s and early 2000s. It was often assessed in the mid-2000s as 100, a nice round figure that remains resilient. But it has variably been estimated as 50 (1998), 65 (2000), 80-100 (2012), 75-125 (2015) and 110-120 (2015).

Although India’s entry into the NPT as a nuclear weapon state is all but impossible, it has largely been successful in achieving normal nuclear status, particularly with the 2008 unanimous waiver by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) – a 48-country cartel initially formed in response to India’s 1974 peaceful nuclear explosion. Nonetheless, India’s waiver remains subject to the whims of other countries, and NSG membership (rather than simply a waiver) represents a way of permanently consolidating India’s nuclear status by giving it a vote and a voice in the international nuclear order. In the run up to the 2016 NSG plenary, at which India’s membership was to be discussed, some countries evinced scepticism about India’s entry due to its being a non-signatory of the NPT. It is therefore important that India’s membership application continue to be assessed on its official behaviour, statements and intentions, rather than conjecture, hearsay, and questionable assumptions and logic.

Two, mischaracterising India’s nuclear program and exaggerating its belligerent intentions justifies Pakistan’s continued nuclear build-up. Already, the past few years have witnessed Pakistan’s shift to plutonium weapons, miniaturisation and the development of smaller ballistic missiles as delivery systems intended for battlefield use.

How many nuclear weapons can India make with its existing fissile material stockpile? Recently, two different sources have produced wildly divergent estimates. In September 2015, the Pakistani newspaper Dawn reported that India possessed “enough fissile material … for more than 2,000 warheads.” In contrast, a report released by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) in November 2015 concluded that India’s stockpile of fissile material was only sufficient to make approximately 100 nuclear weapons. What accounts for the order-of-magnitude difference between these estimates?

Estimates of fissile material have significant real-world policy implications. Pakistan, for example, seems to base requirements for its own nuclear weapons program in no small part on the projected size and composition of India’s nuclear arsenal, as well as perceptions of Indian conventional military superiority. At a time when both India and Pakistan seem increasingly at risk of sliding into an arms race, in spite of their efforts and protestations to the contrary, inflated nuclear weapons projections run the risk of inflaming the public discourse and heightening this competition unnecessarily.

Estimating stockpiles. The estimate reported by Dawn that India has enough fissile material to produce 2,000 nuclear weapons can be traced back to a 2014 assessment by Mansoor Ahmed, a Pakistani nuclear analyst. He estimated that at the end of 2013, India’s fissile material stockpile included 800 to 1,000 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium, 2 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU), and 15 metric tons of reactor-grade plutonium. Assuming that 4 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium, 50 kilograms of HEU, or 8 kilograms of reactor-grade plutonium would be necessary to make one nuclear warhead of each type, Ahmed estimated that India could produce 250 warheads from weapons-grade plutonium, 40 from HEU (gun-type implosion devices, not thermonuclear weapons), and 1,875 from reactor-grade plutonium—for a total arsenal of 2,165 nuclear weapons.

In contrast, the recent report from ISIS concluded that at the end of 2014, India likely possessed about 550 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium, 100 to 200 kilograms of HEU intended for use in thermonuclear weapons, and 2.9 metric tons of separated reactor-grade plutonium. The study assessed that this fissile material was sufficient to produce about 75 to 125 nuclear warheads, with 100 nuclear weapons as the median estimate. ISIS arrived at this number mainly through an appraisal of India’s weapons-grade plutonium stockpile; the authors assume that India would not use reactor-grade plutonium in nuclear warheads, and that HEU would only be used to produce a handful of thermonuclear weapons at most. ISIS also considered that some plutonium is in weapons production pipelines or held in reserve, meaning that only about 70 percent of India’s stockpile is available to be made into weapons. Consequently, assuming that it would take 3 to 5 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium for each warhead, ISIS calculations yielded an arsenal that could range from 75 to 125 nuclear weapons.

Reactor-grade plutonium. The biggest difference between these two estimates comes from their assessments of, and assumptions about, reactor-grade plutonium. Not only does the ISIS study discount the possibility that India would use reactor-grade plutonium in its nuclear weapons, but its estimate of India’s reactor-grade plutonium stockpile is also significantly lower than Ahmed’s: 2.9 metric tons as opposed to 15 metric tons.

Interestingly, Ahmed himself has given much lower estimates of India’s reactor-grade plutonium stockpile in other instances. In a post on the Stimson Center’s South Asian Voices blog, also from 2014, Ahmed cited India’s reactor-grade plutonium stockpile as just 5 metric tons rather than the 15 metric tons that he posits in the Defense News article. In a private email communication with me, Ahmed explained that this disparity is due to the distinction between separated plutonium and plutonium found in spent fuel. Ahmed clarified that he estimates India possesses 5 metric tons of reactor-grade plutonium that has already been separated, and an additional 10 metric tons in spent fuel that has not yet been separated. The estimate of 2,000 nuclear warheads reported by Dawn included both of these types of reactor-grade plutonium, whereas Ahmed’s lower estimate included only the 5 metric tons of plutonium that he estimates has already been separated.

Other estimates of fissile material stockpiles typically do not include plutonium in spent fuel that has not been reprocessed, for the good reason that such fissile material is not available for use in nuclear weapons. Reprocessing is complicated and expensive, and India in particular has historically had trouble achieving consistent operations in its reprocessing facilities. One of the most highly respected sources on fissile material stockpiles, the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), recently released a report that sheds useful light on this question. In its Global Fissile Material Report 2015, the IPFM does not include unseparated plutonium as part of its estimate of India’s fissile material stockpile, citing the historically poor performance of India’s reprocessing plants at Tarapur and Kalpakkam.

The report notes that India’s reactor-grade plutonium stockpile is most likely intended as fuel for the country’s Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor—not for nuclear weapons, as Ahmed assumes—but that the reactor’s start date has been pushed back several times. This is likely due to difficulty that India has reportedly experienced in separating sufficient plutonium to fuel the reactor. Considering this historically low rate of separation and the problems it has caused for India’s fast breeder reactor program, it seems difficult to imagine that the country’s reprocessing plants will support a future sprint to rapidly separate its remaining stockpile of reactor-grade plutonium from the spent fuel and turn that fissile material into an exponentially larger nuclear arsenal.

Assessing motivation. Setting aside the question of capability, would India decide to make nuclear weapons from reactor-grade plutonium? As the name would suggest, reactor-grade plutonium is not as suitable for nuclear warheads as weapons-grade plutonium. Weapons-grade plutonium is irradiated for a shorter period of time in order to maximize the proportion of the more desirable plutonium 239 isotope. In contrast, reactor-grade plutonium is irradiated much longer to maximize its energy potential, and consequently contains a lower level of plutonium 239 and a higher concentration of plutonium 240. Weapons made from material that contains a higher amount of plutonium 240 are much more likely to fizzle (to produce a much smaller explosive yield than expected) and require a larger amount of fissile material for critical mass. Although it is possible to make nuclear warheads from reactor-grade plutonium, experts consider it more complicated and risky than using weapons-grade plutonium.

Nuclear weapons tend to be viewed in India more as political symbols than as usable weapons, and they occupy a less salient place in India’s national security strategy than is the case for many other nuclear weapons states. Given that, it seems unlikely that India’s leaders would feel the need to use reactor-grade plutonium that is otherwise intended for fast breeder reactors in order to make lower-quality warheads when they already have the capacity to make 100 or more from superior weapons-grade plutonium alone. India has committed to a doctrine of both “No First Use” and of credible minimum deterrence, and accordingly seems to place much more importance on developing a secure second-strike capability than on the size of its arsenal.

India values its international reputation surrounding nuclear weapons—it has reaped dividends from being perceived internationally as a responsible nuclear power. India’s leaders seem unlikely to risk this carefully maintained image by engaging in a rapid nuclear weapons build-up that might alarm the international community, particularly when substantially greater numbers of warheads are not viewed in India as strategically necessary or even beneficial. In light of these attitudes, it seems doubtful that New Delhi would feel the need to manufacture large numbers of weapons using reactor-grade plutonium.

Revising the math. What is the most plausible estimate of India’s fissile material stockpile and the number of nuclear weapons that it could build? After discounting unseparated plutonium in spent fuel as a source of proliferation in the near future, even Ahmed’s generous estimate from the South Asian Voices blog post is only equivalent to a potential Indian arsenal of 844 nuclear warheads—a significant number to be sure, but nowhere near 2,000 weapons.

If one discounts reactor-grade plutonium entirely, that estimate drops even further to an arsenal of just 219 weapons. In addition, it is likely that much, or even most, of India’s HEU is intended for use in naval reactors rather than in nuclear warheads. It is also clear that some of India’s weapons-grade plutonium was already used in nuclear tests or is contained in process waste. Taking into account those factors, the estimate quickly begins to drop to something much more along the lines of the ISIS estimate of roughly 100 nuclear warheads. This estimate is in the same ballpark as the September 2015 estimate by Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris in the Bulletin, of 110 to 120 nuclear warheads.

The implications of estimates. Fissile material estimation, particularly when based on open-source information, is an inexact science. The uncertainty in such estimates must be properly contextualized in order to make sound projections of an adversary’s future arsenal. Because nuclear arsenals are the result of political decisions as well as scientific ones, it is important to consider a country’s strategic calculus rather than focusing on technical capabilities alone.

Much like the imaginary missile gap fueled public fears and heightened the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, improperly contextualized estimates of India’s fissile material stockpile risk skewing the public discourse and pushing South Asia toward a competition that both countries wish to avoid. The stakes are high: nothing less than a nuclear arms race on the subcontinent could hang in the balance.

 

[gslv mk3]

India is estimated to have produced enough plutonium for 150–200 nuclear warheads but has likely produced only 120–130. Nonetheless, additional plutonium will be required to produce warheads for missiles now under development, and India is reportedly building two new plutonium production facilities.

India continues to modernize its nuclear arsenal with development of several new nuclear weapon systems. We estimate India currently operates seven nuclear-capable systems: two aircraft, four land-based ballistic missiles, and one sea-based ballistic missile. At least four more systems are in development. The development program is in a dynamic phase, with long-range land- and sea-based missiles emerging for possible deployment within the next decade.

India is estimated to have produced approximately 600 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium (International Panel on Fissile Materials International Panel on Fissile Materials. 2015. Global Fissile Material Report 2013: Nuclear Weapon and Fissile Material Stockpiles and Production. sufficient for 150–200 nuclear warheads; however, not all the material has been converted into nuclear warheads. Based on available information about its nuclear-capable delivery force structure and strategy, we estimate that India has produced 120–130 nuclear warheads (Table 1). It will need more warheads to arm the new missiles it is currently developing. In addition to the Dhruva plutonium production reactor near Mumbai, India reportedly is building two new plutonium production reactors (International Panel on Fissile Materials International Panel on Fissile Materials. 2015. Global Fissile Material Report 2013: Nuclear Weapon and Fissile Material Stockpiles and Production. The unsafeguarded Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor under construction at the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research near Kalpakkam could potentially increase India’s plutonium production capacity significantly in the future, although the reactor is continuing to experience delays.

Arms control groups overestimated India’s nuclear arsenal size in the late 1990s and early 2000s. It was often assessed in the mid-2000s as 100, a nice round figure that remains resilient. But it has variably been estimated as 50 (1998), 65 (2000), 80-100 (2012), 75-125 (2015) and 110-120 (2015).

Although India’s entry into the NPT as a nuclear weapon state is all but impossible, it has largely been successful in achieving normal nuclear status, particularly with the 2008 unanimous waiver by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) – a 48-country cartel initially formed in response to India’s 1974 peaceful nuclear explosion. Nonetheless, India’s waiver remains subject to the whims of other countries, and NSG membership (rather than simply a waiver) represents a way of permanently consolidating India’s nuclear status by giving it a vote and a voice in the international nuclear order. In the run up to the 2016 NSG plenary, at which India’s membership was to be discussed, some countries evinced scepticism about India’s entry due to its being a non-signatory of the NPT. It is therefore important that India’s membership application continue to be assessed on its official behaviour, statements and intentions, rather than conjecture, hearsay, and questionable assumptions and logic.

Two, mischaracterising India’s nuclear program and exaggerating its belligerent intentions justifies Pakistan’s continued nuclear build-up. Already, the past few years have witnessed Pakistan’s shift to plutonium weapons, miniaturisation and the development of smaller ballistic missiles as delivery systems intended for battlefield use.

How many nuclear weapons can India make with its existing fissile material stockpile? Recently, two different sources have produced wildly divergent estimates. In September 2015, the Pakistani newspaper Dawn reported that India possessed “enough fissile material … for more than 2,000 warheads.” In contrast, a report released by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) in November 2015 concluded that India’s stockpile of fissile material was only sufficient to make approximately 100 nuclear weapons. What accounts for the order-of-magnitude difference between these estimates?

Estimates of fissile material have significant real-world policy implications. Pakistan, for example, seems to base requirements for its own nuclear weapons program in no small part on the projected size and composition of India’s nuclear arsenal, as well as perceptions of Indian conventional military superiority. At a time when both India and Pakistan seem increasingly at risk of sliding into an arms race, in spite of their efforts and protestations to the contrary, inflated nuclear weapons projections run the risk of inflaming the public discourse and heightening this competition unnecessarily.

Estimating stockpiles. The estimate reported by Dawn that India has enough fissile material to produce 2,000 nuclear weapons can be traced back to a 2014 assessment by Mansoor Ahmed, a Pakistani nuclear analyst. He estimated that at the end of 2013, India’s fissile material stockpile included 800 to 1,000 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium, 2 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU), and 15 metric tons of reactor-grade plutonium. Assuming that 4 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium, 50 kilograms of HEU, or 8 kilograms of reactor-grade plutonium would be necessary to make one nuclear warhead of each type, Ahmed estimated that India could produce 250 warheads from weapons-grade plutonium, 40 from HEU (gun-type implosion devices, not thermonuclear weapons), and 1,875 from reactor-grade plutonium—for a total arsenal of 2,165 nuclear weapons.

In contrast, the recent report from ISIS concluded that at the end of 2014, India likely possessed about 550 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium, 100 to 200 kilograms of HEU intended for use in thermonuclear weapons, and 2.9 metric tons of separated reactor-grade plutonium. The study assessed that this fissile material was sufficient to produce about 75 to 125 nuclear warheads, with 100 nuclear weapons as the median estimate. ISIS arrived at this number mainly through an appraisal of India’s weapons-grade plutonium stockpile; the authors assume that India would not use reactor-grade plutonium in nuclear warheads, and that HEU would only be used to produce a handful of thermonuclear weapons at most. ISIS also considered that some plutonium is in weapons production pipelines or held in reserve, meaning that only about 70 percent of India’s stockpile is available to be made into weapons. Consequently, assuming that it would take 3 to 5 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium for each warhead, ISIS calculations yielded an arsenal that could range from 75 to 125 nuclear weapons.

Reactor-grade plutonium. The biggest difference between these two estimates comes from their assessments of, and assumptions about, reactor-grade plutonium. Not only does the ISIS study discount the possibility that India would use reactor-grade plutonium in its nuclear weapons, but its estimate of India’s reactor-grade plutonium stockpile is also significantly lower than Ahmed’s: 2.9 metric tons as opposed to 15 metric tons.

Interestingly, Ahmed himself has given much lower estimates of India’s reactor-grade plutonium stockpile in other instances. In a post on the Stimson Center’s South Asian Voices blog, also from 2014, Ahmed cited India’s reactor-grade plutonium stockpile as just 5 metric tons rather than the 15 metric tons that he posits in the Defense News article. In a private email communication with me, Ahmed explained that this disparity is due to the distinction between separated plutonium and plutonium found in spent fuel. Ahmed clarified that he estimates India possesses 5 metric tons of reactor-grade plutonium that has already been separated, and an additional 10 metric tons in spent fuel that has not yet been separated. The estimate of 2,000 nuclear warheads reported by Dawn included both of these types of reactor-grade plutonium, whereas Ahmed’s lower estimate included only the 5 metric tons of plutonium that he estimates has already been separated.

Other estimates of fissile material stockpiles typically do not include plutonium in spent fuel that has not been reprocessed, for the good reason that such fissile material is not available for use in nuclear weapons. Reprocessing is complicated and expensive, and India in particular has historically had trouble achieving consistent operations in its reprocessing facilities. One of the most highly respected sources on fissile material stockpiles, the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), recently released a report that sheds useful light on this question. In its Global Fissile Material Report 2015, the IPFM does not include unseparated plutonium as part of its estimate of India’s fissile material stockpile, citing the historically poor performance of India’s reprocessing plants at Tarapur and Kalpakkam.

The report notes that India’s reactor-grade plutonium stockpile is most likely intended as fuel for the country’s Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor—not for nuclear weapons, as Ahmed assumes—but that the reactor’s start date has been pushed back several times. This is likely due to difficulty that India has reportedly experienced in separating sufficient plutonium to fuel the reactor. Considering this historically low rate of separation and the problems it has caused for India’s fast breeder reactor program, it seems difficult to imagine that the country’s reprocessing plants will support a future sprint to rapidly separate its remaining stockpile of reactor-grade plutonium from the spent fuel and turn that fissile material into an exponentially larger nuclear arsenal.

Assessing motivation. Setting aside the question of capability, would India decide to make nuclear weapons from reactor-grade plutonium? As the name would suggest, reactor-grade plutonium is not as suitable for nuclear warheads as weapons-grade plutonium. Weapons-grade plutonium is irradiated for a shorter period of time in order to maximize the proportion of the more desirable plutonium 239 isotope. In contrast, reactor-grade plutonium is irradiated much longer to maximize its energy potential, and consequently contains a lower level of plutonium 239 and a higher concentration of plutonium 240. Weapons made from material that contains a higher amount of plutonium 240 are much more likely to fizzle (to produce a much smaller explosive yield than expected) and require a larger amount of fissile material for critical mass. Although it is possible to make nuclear warheads from reactor-grade plutonium, experts consider it more complicated and risky than using weapons-grade plutonium.

Nuclear weapons tend to be viewed in India more as political symbols than as usable weapons, and they occupy a less salient place in India’s national security strategy than is the case for many other nuclear weapons states. Given that, it seems unlikely that India’s leaders would feel the need to use reactor-grade plutonium that is otherwise intended for fast breeder reactors in order to make lower-quality warheads when they already have the capacity to make 100 or more from superior weapons-grade plutonium alone. India has committed to a doctrine of both “No First Use” and of credible minimum deterrence, and accordingly seems to place much more importance on developing a secure second-strike capability than on the size of its arsenal.

India values its international reputation surrounding nuclear weapons—it has reaped dividends from being perceived internationally as a responsible nuclear power. India’s leaders seem unlikely to risk this carefully maintained image by engaging in a rapid nuclear weapons build-up that might alarm the international community, particularly when substantially greater numbers of warheads are not viewed in India as strategically necessary or even beneficial. In light of these attitudes, it seems doubtful that New Delhi would feel the need to manufacture large numbers of weapons using reactor-grade plutonium.

Revising the math. What is the most plausible estimate of India’s fissile material stockpile and the number of nuclear weapons that it could build? After discounting unseparated plutonium in spent fuel as a source of proliferation in the near future, even Ahmed’s generous estimate from the South Asian Voices blog post is only equivalent to a potential Indian arsenal of 844 nuclear warheads—a significant number to be sure, but nowhere near 2,000 weapons.

If one discounts reactor-grade plutonium entirely, that estimate drops even further to an arsenal of just 219 weapons. In addition, it is likely that much, or even most, of India’s HEU is intended for use in naval reactors rather than in nuclear warheads. It is also clear that some of India’s weapons-grade plutonium was already used in nuclear tests or is contained in process waste. Taking into account those factors, the estimate quickly begins to drop to something much more along the lines of the ISIS estimate of roughly 100 nuclear warheads. This estimate is in the same ballpark as the September 2015 estimate by Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris in the Bulletin, of 110 to 120 nuclear warheads.

The implications of estimates. Fissile material estimation, particularly when based on open-source information, is an inexact science. The uncertainty in such estimates must be properly contextualized in order to make sound projections of an adversary’s future arsenal. Because nuclear arsenals are the result of political decisions as well as scientific ones, it is important to consider a country’s strategic calculus rather than focusing on technical capabilities alone.

Much like the imaginary missile gap fueled public fears and heightened the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, improperly contextualized estimates of India’s fissile material stockpile risk skewing the public discourse and pushing South Asia toward a competition that both countries wish to avoid. The stakes are high: nothing less than a nuclear arms race on the subcontinent could hang in the balance.

Copypasted from here, without the link.

Ignored

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2017.1337998

 

[Dark Lord Forever]

Copypasted from here, without the link.

Ignored

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2017.1337998

i posted so many links did you read any?