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Written by an Indian blogger
Pakistan Army and Anti-Tank Guided Missiles
Source: Internet
Doctrine of Offensive-Defense
The Pakistan Army (PA) strategy against India calls for 'offensive-defense', also known as the Strategy of Riposte. This strategy calls for the armor heavy Strike Corps of Pakistan Army to seize initiative and attack across a narrow front. This is aimed at both unhinging Indian offensive plans in other sectors as well as seizing territory for later bargaining at the negotiating table. The holding Corps of the Pakistan Army are expected to absorb and delay the Indian offensive. And while the armor divisions are concentrated in the Strike Corps, holding corps have also evolved Corps Reserves centered around independent armor brigades and mechanized brigades for countering Indian offensive as well as for counter-penetration.
While it can be correctly argued that Pakistan Army has broadly followed 'offensive-defense' strategy as witnessed in 1965 war, General Mirza Aslam is credited with crystallizing this strategy. The strategy was demonstrated during 1989 army exercise 'Zarb-e-Momin', which was the biggest exercise of the Pakistan Army at the time. And followed the massive Indian Army exercise of late 196-early 1987 'Brasstacks'.
The Pakistan Army is faced with a dilemma - creating strong armor/mechanized strike elements against a much larger adversary while also maintaining enough resources for absorbing/countering Indian offensive. And this needs to be done with less than 1/10th resources of its main adversary. This dilemma becomes still more acute when a comparison is done between mechanized resources of the two armies.
As against Pakistan Army's 2 x Strike Corps, Indian Army has 3 x Strike Corps. Further, while Holding/Pivot Corps in both armies have independent armored brigades, not only are Indian armored formations bigger in terms of armored regiments and no of tanks, IA also has a unique formation known as RAPID - Re-organized Army Plains Infantry Division.
Each RAPID has an armored brigade apart from 2/3 infantry brigades. The armored brigade has 2 x armored regiments + 2 x mechanized regiments. This structure greatly increases the fire-power of a division in question. There is an offensive and defensive RAPID.
Take IA's 10 Corps for example - It has 1 x independent armored brigade (3 x armored regiments + 1 x mechanized infantry regiment) and 2 x RAPIDs ( 4 x armored regiments + 4 x mechanized infantry regiments). In all, this single 'Pivot' Corps has almost the same number of armored regiments as a Strike Corps of Pakistan Army!
Though, over past decade, PA has raised new armor regiments and armor brigades and mechanized more infantry battalions, armor and mechanized elements in IA have also seen expansion.
To offset IA's superiority in the armor/mechanized assets, the Pakistan Army undertakes the following measures:
Anti-tank battalions are a relatively cheap and cost-effective option to counter a superior mechanized force. It relieves the armor from undertaking defensive tasks and allows the higher formation to preserve it's own armor for offensive and counter-penetration tasks. And wherever required, it helps to strengthen the existing anti-tank capabilities.
(A.1) Light Anti-Tank Battalions (LAT)
During the 1965 war, some infantry battalions, at the scale of one battalion per division, were converted into Reconnaissance & Support Battalions (R&S). These battalions had about 60% manpower as compared to standard infantry battalion but were equipped with much higher firepower. Apart from their standard role of reconnaissance, these units were also used to hold the ground through fire-power and act as screening forces.
Sometime in early 90s, the R&S battalions with Infantry divisions were converted into anti-tank battalions. Pakistan Army today has dedicated LAT battalions. LAT battalions are held at Division HQ level and are most likely allocated to infantry brigades under the division at the scale of 1 x LAT Company/Brigade.
The LAT battalions are equipped with Bakhtar-Shikan anti-tank guided missiles; these missiles are mounted on a 4 x 4 vehicle. However, during 2017 Pakistan Day Parade, an APC mounted contingent of Baktar-Shikan missiles from 27 Baloch Regiment was mentioned as LAT battalion. It is likely that some LAT battalions, especially which are part of partially Mechanized Divisions of PA are mounted on M-113 APCs or locally produced Pakistani versions of the same.
Example of some of the LAT battalions are as under:
Pakistan Army also has the concept of Heavy Anti-tank (HAT) Battalions which are are held at Corps HQ level. This includes the two Strike Corps - Army Reserve North (ARN, I Corps, Mangla) and Army Reserve South (ARS, II Corps, Multan). Apart from HAT battalions, there exist Independent HAT Companies as well.
While I don't have the details of exact number of such battalions (I do have names of some battalions), it highly likely that most Corps facing eastern border have a HAT battalion. And some divisions ( mechanized ones in Strike Corps or those in sensitive sectors where large Indian armored offensive is expected) also have HAT Companies.
The HAT battalions and companies are equipped with TOW ATGM missiles and the same are mounted on M-113 APCs or Pakistan's versions/derivatives of this venerable armored personnel carrier. Considering the relatively limited number of TOW missiles imported by Pakistan, some HAT battalions are also equipped with Baktar-Shikan missiles.
Example of some of the HAT battalions are as under:
Contingent of 228 AK (HAT) Independent Company with M-113 APC and TOW-2 ATGMs from 2015 Pakistan Day Parade. Formation sign on the APCs looks like that of Jhelum based 23 Division under Rawalpindi based X Corps. (source: internet)
(A.2.1) M-901 Improved Tow Vehicle
In the early 80s, Pakistan Army also imported 24 M-901 Improved Tow Vehicles from USA. These are dedicated TOW missile platforms based on M-113 APCs. Each vehicle has 2 x 'ready to fire' missiles along with 10 reloads. The reloading is done under the armor.
All them are concentrated under Multan based 2 Corps or Army Reserve South (ARS). ARS is Pakistan Army's premier armor and mechanized heavy strike formation. Given the number of units, these are most likely held by a single HAT battalion.
Pakistan Army officer standing in front of M-901 ITV. The formation sign on the vehicle is that of Multan based 2 Corps or Army Reserve South. (Source: defence.pk)
(A.3) Organization Structure
While I do not have the details of the organizational structure of such anti-tank battalions (LAT or HAT), one can draw a fairly good approximation considering two main points as mentioned below:
(a) Most formations below a brigade have company, platoon and section structure. And number of companies, platoons and sections varies as per the role & nature of the unit.
(b) A missile launcher along with ready-to-fire missiles and first set of reloads will constitute a basic fire unit.
Keeping the above two points in mind, the following deductive reasoning can be applied:
(B) Anti Tank Missiles
Pakistan Army employs three main types of ATGMs. These are as under:
(1) Baktar-Shikan:
Baktar-Shikan missile with complete firing post. Notice the BGM-71 TOW inspired tripod
Maaz APC with Baktar-Shikan anti-tank missile firing post.
Configuration of the 4x4 vehicle mounted Baktar-Shikan missile firing post (Source:armyrecognition.com)
Baktar-Shikan being fired from a 4x4 vehicle. The rounded shape of the front section means this is licensed copy of HJ-8A missile. And does not have tandem warhead.
The picture shows the empty missile tube traveling backwards; considering the back-blast and distance covered by the missile case, the are rear to the missile firing post has to be clear. (Source: tribune.com.pk)
Further, as the picture below shows, given the dimensions of the firing post, the soldier has to be in kneeling position to fire the missile. This is because of the position of the aiming device. While the elevated missile firing post gives better line of sight, it is also a bigger target and exposes the missile pilot during the entire phase of missile flight.
PA soldier firing the Baktar-Shikan missile. Notice the size and dimensions of the missile firing post and location of aiming device. The missile is also HJ-8A version without tandem warhead. (Source: defence.pk)
Another image of Pakistan Army's missile team firing the missile with missile pilot in kneeling position. This one is also the HJ-8A version (Source: tribune.com.pk)
Evolution of HJ-8 series of anti-tank missile
Tandem warhead version of Baktar-Shikan missile displayed during IDEAS 2014. Most likely to be a version of HJ-8E missile. (Source: armyrecognition..com)
Malaysian Army APC mounted Baktar-Shikan missile in action. Notice the probe in front of the missile; this makes it most probably the HJ-8E version. The picture also captures the massive back-blast. (Source:malaysiandefence.com)
Baktar-Shikan 'Light' with a relatively smaller and lighter tripod. The imaging scope is missing.
TOW-2A equipped M-113 APC of the Pakistan Army
Source: army-technology.com
Internal diagrams of TOW-2A and TOW-2B. TOW-2B 'Aero' differs from TOW-2B only in terms of shape of front section. In case RF versions, the rear section of the missile has RF receiver instead of wire-dispenser
(picture source TOW-2A & 2B: army-technology.com. TOW-2B Aero-internet)
(B.2.1) Nos & Type in Pakistan Army
The Arab-Israel war of October 1973, known as the Yom-Kippur war (or the Ramadan War as per the Arabs) offers insight into the tank versus anti-tank missile scenario. It has lessons for India because the adversary (Pakistan) intends to use ATGMs to blunt India's superior armor capabilities.
The 1973 war is a landmark event because it became the proving ground of two new weapon systems in modern warfare – anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) and anti-aircraft missile. Success of these two systems forced a major rethink in tank warfare and air combat in terms of tactics, design of weapon system and development of measures & counter-measures.
Egyptian Army employed thousands of Soviet Union supplied 9M14 ‘Malyutka’ (NATO reporting name: AT-3 ‘Swagger’) ATGM. While the Israeli intelligence and its general staff were aware of this weapon system with Egyptians, they did not consider it as an effective counter-measure to their armour. This faulty assessment caused the Israeli heavily – Israel Defence Forces (IDF) lost about 800 tanks in this war with Egyptian ATGM teams accounting for 20%-25% of the total losses. But the real impact of ATGM was felt in the initial days of the war when the Israelis were completely taken by surprise by the ATGM and the efficacy of Egyptian anti-tank defences. During first two days of the war, Israelis lost about 260 tanks – bulk of these loses were on account of ATGMs.
But the anti-tank teams were highly effective because the Egyptians employed innovative anti-tank tactics. In the words of one Israeli tank commander[1] who led the initial counter-attack against the Egyptian Army:
"We were advancing and in the distance I saw specks dotted on the sand dunes. I couldn't make out what they were. As we got closer, I thought they looked like tree stumps. They were motionless and scattered across the terrain ahead of us. I got on the intercom and asked the tanks ahead what they made of it. One of my tank commanders radioed back: 'My God, they're not tree stumps. They're men!' For a moment I couldn't understand. What were men doing standing out there—quite still-when we were advancing in our tanks towards them? Suddenly all hell broke loose. A barrage of missiles was being fired at us. Many of our tanks were hit. We had never come up against anything like this before....”
Another example of how much thought Egyptians had given to anti-tank warfare based on ATGM is given below[2]:
“According to one report, the Egyptians, with an abundance of SAGGERs, established a defence that lured the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) into a Kill Zone which optimized the potential of both SAGGERs and RPG-7s. The IDF tankers saw Egyptian tanks in the far distance and closed to do battle; however, they were unaware of great numbers of camouflaged RPG-7s and SAGGERs forward of the Egyptian tanks”
This is shown in the image below (taken from the same document):
The Israeli Armoured Corps did evolve tactics to counter the Egyptian anti-tank teams; these tactics meant the armour advancing under the cover of artillery and with supporting infantry (mounted on APC/IFV and dismounted). ATGM placed a restriction on the free reign which the armour had against the infantry.
But the wide-spread use of anti-tank missiles did not make the Main Battle Tank (MBT) obsolete. In words of a CIA Report[3] on analysis of 1973 Arab-Israel War done in 1975:
“Antitank weapons like the Sagger and RPG-7 took a heavy toll of Israeli armour. But they did not render the tank obsolete. The initial impression created by the Egyptian use of antitank missiles was artificially reinforced by the inappropriate tactics used by the Israelis in the first few days of the war
“Antitank weapons like the Sagger and RPG-7 took a heavy toll of Israeli armour. But they did not render the tank obsolete. The initial impression created by the Egyptian use of antitank missiles was artificially reinforced by the inappropriate tactics used by the Israelis in the first few days of the war. It is probably safe to say that no large, modern army will again make the mistake of using unsupported tanks against massed infantry.
The Israelis rediscovered some ancient principles in seeking a response to the antitank weapon threat posed at the beginning of the October war. Foremost, the Israelis found that no single weapon can long dominate the battlefield. Victory requires the use of a balanced force with many complementary offensive and defensive elements. The battlefield, in short, is a complicated environment and no one weapon or arm of service can function effectively on it without the active aid and cooperation of others. This is reassuring for the Israelis, since the effective and flexible use of mobile forces under difficult circumstances is precisely the area in which they hold the greatest comparative advantage over the Arabs”.
The same report also adds the following about Israeli adaptation to this new threat in course of the war:
“Despite all the problems, however, the Israelis once again proved the importance of flexibility in maintaining their superiority. The most striking example of this is provided by the Israeli response to the Arab--particularly Egyptian--antitank weapons. By 8 October the Israelis had recognized the flaws in their armour tactics and adopted a defensive procedure under which they waited for the Arab armour to attack and then took the Arabs under fire from extreme range. This made it difficult for the Arabs to bring their antitank weapons forward. This change of tactics by the Israelis took maximum advantage of the longer range of most of their tank guns and the superiority of their long-range tank gunnery.
The Israeli attack on 8 October appears to have been the last attempt to use tanks in the unsupported 1967 style and even then the Israelis may have been drawn in by their initial success. Within four or five days after the beginning of the war, the Israelis were adopting tactics which reduced the threat from Arab antitank weapons to manageable proportions. This adjustment in the midst of combat provides a fair measure of the flexibility of Israeli leadership and the thoroughness of low-level training.”
(4.0) Conclusion
Indian IBG
Pakistan Army and Anti-Tank Guided Missiles
Source: Internet
Doctrine of Offensive-Defense
The Pakistan Army (PA) strategy against India calls for 'offensive-defense', also known as the Strategy of Riposte. This strategy calls for the armor heavy Strike Corps of Pakistan Army to seize initiative and attack across a narrow front. This is aimed at both unhinging Indian offensive plans in other sectors as well as seizing territory for later bargaining at the negotiating table. The holding Corps of the Pakistan Army are expected to absorb and delay the Indian offensive. And while the armor divisions are concentrated in the Strike Corps, holding corps have also evolved Corps Reserves centered around independent armor brigades and mechanized brigades for countering Indian offensive as well as for counter-penetration.
While it can be correctly argued that Pakistan Army has broadly followed 'offensive-defense' strategy as witnessed in 1965 war, General Mirza Aslam is credited with crystallizing this strategy. The strategy was demonstrated during 1989 army exercise 'Zarb-e-Momin', which was the biggest exercise of the Pakistan Army at the time. And followed the massive Indian Army exercise of late 196-early 1987 'Brasstacks'.
The Pakistan Army is faced with a dilemma - creating strong armor/mechanized strike elements against a much larger adversary while also maintaining enough resources for absorbing/countering Indian offensive. And this needs to be done with less than 1/10th resources of its main adversary. This dilemma becomes still more acute when a comparison is done between mechanized resources of the two armies.
As against Pakistan Army's 2 x Strike Corps, Indian Army has 3 x Strike Corps. Further, while Holding/Pivot Corps in both armies have independent armored brigades, not only are Indian armored formations bigger in terms of armored regiments and no of tanks, IA also has a unique formation known as RAPID - Re-organized Army Plains Infantry Division.
Each RAPID has an armored brigade apart from 2/3 infantry brigades. The armored brigade has 2 x armored regiments + 2 x mechanized regiments. This structure greatly increases the fire-power of a division in question. There is an offensive and defensive RAPID.
Take IA's 10 Corps for example - It has 1 x independent armored brigade (3 x armored regiments + 1 x mechanized infantry regiment) and 2 x RAPIDs ( 4 x armored regiments + 4 x mechanized infantry regiments). In all, this single 'Pivot' Corps has almost the same number of armored regiments as a Strike Corps of Pakistan Army!
Though, over past decade, PA has raised new armor regiments and armor brigades and mechanized more infantry battalions, armor and mechanized elements in IA have also seen expansion.
To offset IA's superiority in the armor/mechanized assets, the Pakistan Army undertakes the following measures:
- Smaller size of formations: The size of armor formations (brigades/division) in PA is relatively smaller as compared to India. For example, armor division of Pakistan and India consist of 5 and 6 armored regiments, respectively. Indian independent armored brigades have 3+1 structure - 3 x armored regiments + 1 x mechanized infantry battalion. Pakistan Army has 2+1 structure. There is also likely slight variation (2-3 tanks) in number of tanks held per armored regiment with IA having a higher number.
- Anti-Tank battalion: Pakistan Army has dedicated anti-tank battalions which are classified as Light Anti-Tank (LAT) battalion and Heavy Anti-Tank (HAT) battalions. These AT battalions are in addition to the anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM) held at an individual infantry battalion level.
Anti-tank battalions are a relatively cheap and cost-effective option to counter a superior mechanized force. It relieves the armor from undertaking defensive tasks and allows the higher formation to preserve it's own armor for offensive and counter-penetration tasks. And wherever required, it helps to strengthen the existing anti-tank capabilities.
(A.1) Light Anti-Tank Battalions (LAT)
During the 1965 war, some infantry battalions, at the scale of one battalion per division, were converted into Reconnaissance & Support Battalions (R&S). These battalions had about 60% manpower as compared to standard infantry battalion but were equipped with much higher firepower. Apart from their standard role of reconnaissance, these units were also used to hold the ground through fire-power and act as screening forces.
Sometime in early 90s, the R&S battalions with Infantry divisions were converted into anti-tank battalions. Pakistan Army today has dedicated LAT battalions. LAT battalions are held at Division HQ level and are most likely allocated to infantry brigades under the division at the scale of 1 x LAT Company/Brigade.
The LAT battalions are equipped with Bakhtar-Shikan anti-tank guided missiles; these missiles are mounted on a 4 x 4 vehicle. However, during 2017 Pakistan Day Parade, an APC mounted contingent of Baktar-Shikan missiles from 27 Baloch Regiment was mentioned as LAT battalion. It is likely that some LAT battalions, especially which are part of partially Mechanized Divisions of PA are mounted on M-113 APCs or locally produced Pakistani versions of the same.
Example of some of the LAT battalions are as under:
- 21 Punjab (LAT) battalion
- 23 Punjab (LAT) battalion
- 26 Punjab (LAT) battalion
- 19 Baloch (LAT) battalion - this is also the parent battalion of Special Service Group (SSG)
Pakistan Army also has the concept of Heavy Anti-tank (HAT) Battalions which are are held at Corps HQ level. This includes the two Strike Corps - Army Reserve North (ARN, I Corps, Mangla) and Army Reserve South (ARS, II Corps, Multan). Apart from HAT battalions, there exist Independent HAT Companies as well.
While I don't have the details of exact number of such battalions (I do have names of some battalions), it highly likely that most Corps facing eastern border have a HAT battalion. And some divisions ( mechanized ones in Strike Corps or those in sensitive sectors where large Indian armored offensive is expected) also have HAT Companies.
The HAT battalions and companies are equipped with TOW ATGM missiles and the same are mounted on M-113 APCs or Pakistan's versions/derivatives of this venerable armored personnel carrier. Considering the relatively limited number of TOW missiles imported by Pakistan, some HAT battalions are also equipped with Baktar-Shikan missiles.
Example of some of the HAT battalions are as under:
- 39 Azad Kashmir (Heavy Anti Tank) battalion or 39 AK (HAT) battalion
- 40 AK (HAT) battalion
- 226 AK (HAT) Company
- 227 AK (HAT) Company
Contingent of 228 AK (HAT) Independent Company with M-113 APC and TOW-2 ATGMs from 2015 Pakistan Day Parade. Formation sign on the APCs looks like that of Jhelum based 23 Division under Rawalpindi based X Corps. (source: internet)
(A.2.1) M-901 Improved Tow Vehicle
In the early 80s, Pakistan Army also imported 24 M-901 Improved Tow Vehicles from USA. These are dedicated TOW missile platforms based on M-113 APCs. Each vehicle has 2 x 'ready to fire' missiles along with 10 reloads. The reloading is done under the armor.
All them are concentrated under Multan based 2 Corps or Army Reserve South (ARS). ARS is Pakistan Army's premier armor and mechanized heavy strike formation. Given the number of units, these are most likely held by a single HAT battalion.
Pakistan Army officer standing in front of M-901 ITV. The formation sign on the vehicle is that of Multan based 2 Corps or Army Reserve South. (Source: defence.pk)
(A.3) Organization Structure
While I do not have the details of the organizational structure of such anti-tank battalions (LAT or HAT), one can draw a fairly good approximation considering two main points as mentioned below:
(a) Most formations below a brigade have company, platoon and section structure. And number of companies, platoons and sections varies as per the role & nature of the unit.
(b) A missile launcher along with ready-to-fire missiles and first set of reloads will constitute a basic fire unit.
Keeping the above two points in mind, the following deductive reasoning can be applied:
- In case of LAT battalion, it is a division level asset.
- Each infantry division in PA generally has 3 x infantry brigades (some divisions are larger)
- Therefore, an assumption can be made that each LAT battalion will most likely provide 1 x LAT Company per brigade with 1 x HQ Company.
- Therefore, a LAT battalion most likely has five (05) companies - 1 x HQ Company, 3 x LAT Companies and 1 x Support Company (for technical support to LAT companies). If each LAT Company has organic technical support elements, than the technical support company can be ruled out. Then each LAT battalion has four (04) companies
- Each LAT company further likely has between 2 or 3 missile platoons
- Missile platoons will be further broken down in missile sections. Each platoon likely has 2 or 3 missile sections.
- Each missile section is equipped with 1 x missile launcher and with 1 ready-to-fire missiles and 3 reloads + 4 x reserves for total of 08 missiles per section/launcher.
- CASE 1
- 3 x Missile Companies with 3 x Missile Platoons/Company and 3 x Missile Sections/Platoon
- 3 x 3 x 3 - 27 launchers
- @ 8 missiles/launcher - 216 missiles
- 3 x Missile Companies with 3 x Missile Platoons/Company and 3 x Missile Sections/Platoon
- CASE 2
- 3 x Missile Companies with 3 x Missile Platoons/Company and 2 x Missile Sections/Platoon
- 3 x 3 x 2 - 18 launchers
- @ 8 missiles/launcher - 144 missiles
(B) Anti Tank Missiles
Pakistan Army employs three main types of ATGMs. These are as under:
(1) Baktar-Shikan:
- This is the licensed produced copy of Chinese HJ-8/Red Arrow-8 ATGM. Employed by infantry and anti-tank battalions.
- A version of the missile has also been adapted for use by AH-1 'Cobra' helicopter gunships.
- The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfer database shows that a total of 23,350 HJ-8 missiles were contracted in 1989. And these were license manufactured between 1990 and 2016
- However, other credible sources say that PA tested first home produced Baktar-Shikan in 1997. It is quite likely that production began in 1997.
- A 19 year period (1997-2016) to produce these number of missiles means a per annum production rate of ~1,229 missiles. This is unlikely to be the case.
- Two things could’ve happened. One, an initial batch was procured off-the-shelf from China and Pakistan devoted its interest to produce the missile locally; and that initial production was at low rate. Secondly, local production and subsequent induction picked steam after 2001 when the US funds started flowing. This is because till September 2001 event happened, Pakistan defense overall was in a bad shape due to lack of funds.
- Used by Heavy Anti-Tank Battalions/Companies and AH-1 'Cobra' helicopter gunships
- The SIPRI database documents three instances of TOW missiles being ordered by Pakistan; these were in 1981, 2004 and 2007.
- Considering the missiles ordered from USA in 2004 and 2007, the number of TOW-2 missiles ordered (and supposedly held) by the PA is 5,205. I've not considered the 1,005 missiles ordered in 1981 and received between 1983-96 because these are beyond their shelf life; these were most probably exhausted in training.
- TOW-2A missiles are a precious resource and this explains why HAT battalions are held at Corps HQ level or in Independent HAT Companies allotted to few important Divisions.
- The use of Baktar-Shikan on AH-1 'Cobra' gunships most likely stems from the lack of enough quantity of TOW missiles and their price. The topsy-turvy nature of US-Pakistan relationship would be another factor; post 1998 nuclear test, Pakistan did not have access to most US systems including TOW-2 missiles. Baktar-Shikan was a good alternative.
Baktar-Shikan missile with complete firing post. Notice the BGM-71 TOW inspired tripod
- Baktar-Shikan missile is Pakistan’s licensed copy of the Chinese HJ-8 or Red Arrow-8 anti-tank guided missile.
- It is second generation, wire-guided, semi-automatic command-to-line-of-sight (SACLOS) anti-tank missile.
- The missile consists of four components. These are (data in parenthesis is weight in Kg):
- Missile inside missile case - 25 kg (missile only is 11.2 kg)
- Tripod - 23 Kg
- Guidance unit - 24 Kg
- IR Goniometer - 12.5 Kg.
- IR Goniometer - As per army-guide.com, "the IR goniometer is mounted on the left side of the launcher and, as well as serving as a day sight, also receives and modulates IR signals from the missile and feeds resulting deviation signals to the guidance unit. A night device can also be fitted."
- Apart from use by the infantry on man-pack basis, the missile is mounted on 4x4 vehicles and Armored Personnel Carriers (APC). APC consist of imported M113 APCs as well as locally manufactured modification of M113 APC by Heavy Industries Taxila (HIT). The base modification of M113A2 APCs is called ‘Talha’ while a Baktar-Shikan mounted version of ‘Talha’ APC is called ‘Maaz’.
- Each Maaz APC has a single missile firing post with further 8 reloads. It is said that the missile firing post is retrieved inside the turret for reload. It has crew of four people.
Maaz APC with Baktar-Shikan anti-tank missile firing post.
Configuration of the 4x4 vehicle mounted Baktar-Shikan missile firing post (Source:armyrecognition.com)
Baktar-Shikan being fired from a 4x4 vehicle. The rounded shape of the front section means this is licensed copy of HJ-8A missile. And does not have tandem warhead.
- As is evident from the weight of each sub-component, Baktar-Shikan is not exactly a man-portable missile. The total weight of the system (missile + firing post) is close to 85 Kg. It can be carried on man-pack basis and would be man-portable only for very short distances.
- The data available about the missile weight and weight of encased tube (with the missile inside) is 11.2 Kg and 25 Kg, respectively. I’ve not come across reason for such high weight of the empty missile tube (~14 Kg). Generally, the empty missile tube weighs about 1-2 Kg.
- Only in case of AT-5B 'Spandrel' or 'Konkur-M' (used by Indian Army) does the missile tube weigh ~10 Kg because the tube has a gas generator. This gas generator ejects the missile from the tube before the main motor kicks-in.
- But in case of HJ-8/Baktar-Shikan, the missile tube is ejected backward and there is considerable back-blast. This rules out any device to eject the missile.
The picture shows the empty missile tube traveling backwards; considering the back-blast and distance covered by the missile case, the are rear to the missile firing post has to be clear. (Source: tribune.com.pk)
Further, as the picture below shows, given the dimensions of the firing post, the soldier has to be in kneeling position to fire the missile. This is because of the position of the aiming device. While the elevated missile firing post gives better line of sight, it is also a bigger target and exposes the missile pilot during the entire phase of missile flight.
PA soldier firing the Baktar-Shikan missile. Notice the size and dimensions of the missile firing post and location of aiming device. The missile is also HJ-8A version without tandem warhead. (Source: defence.pk)
Another image of Pakistan Army's missile team firing the missile with missile pilot in kneeling position. This one is also the HJ-8A version (Source: tribune.com.pk)
- The missile has also been adapted for use on AH-1 'Cobra' helicopter gunships. The video below of Pakistan Army exercise dates from 2006. As the commentary says, it involves adaptation of Baktar-Shikan missile and demonstration of night-firing by AH-1 helicopter gunships
- The weight aspect of HJ-8 flows from the design philosophy where HJ-8 was meant to mirror heavy western ATGMs like BGM-71 ‘TOW’ and Euromissile HOT. The most visible impact is the heavy tripod of HJ-8 or Baktar-Shikan missile which copies from the American TOW missile. It given the missile 360 degree swivel capability.
- Another aspect of HJ-8 missile borrowed from French MILAN anti-tank missile is that fact that the missile tube (in which the missile is encased) is pushed backwards when the missile is fired. Though, the rearward travel of HJ-8/Baktar-Shikan missile tube seems to be much higher as compared to Milan missile.
- The basic HJ-8 missile has evolved over the years. The picture below shows this evolution with various models of HJ-8 leading to HJ-9. PA at this stage does not operate HJ-9.
- The basic HJ-8A missile was followed by HJ-8C missile in early 90s; HJ-8C missile featured a probe in-front with a precursor charge followed by main HEAT warhead.
- This was meant to neutralize the Explosive Reactive Armour (ERA) which had started proliferating on Soviet origin tanks.
- The HJ-8E missile is a further improvement on HJ-8C with range increased from 3,500 meter to 4,000 meter. This missile was ready by late 90s and is supposed to have improved guidance system, thereby increasing the kill probability.
Evolution of HJ-8 series of anti-tank missile
- Considering that Baktar-Shikan is licensed copy of HJ-8 missile, it is but natural that Pakistan Army will also induct the progressive versions of the same missile.
- Pakistan started displaying a tandem warhead version of Baktar-Shikan missile from 2002 onward. This tandem warhead version is most likely to be a licensed copy of HJ-8E missile with tandem warhead and enhanced range.
- The new missile launcher also has option of attaching a thermal imager to allow for acquisition and targeting of enemy mechanized assets at night. As per army-guide.com, "system can be fitted with a PTI- 32 thermal imager which can detect tank sized targets at a range of 4,000 m and identify tank size targets at a range of 2,000 m"
- While it is likely the tandem warhead version will start replacing/supplanting the pure HEAT warhead versions in the PA service, the exact numbers and status of such a program are not known (at least to this author).
Tandem warhead version of Baktar-Shikan missile displayed during IDEAS 2014. Most likely to be a version of HJ-8E missile. (Source: armyrecognition..com)
- Malaysia had placed an order for Baktar-Shikan missiles in 2001 which as per SIPRI database was completed in 2002-2003 period. As the picture of the missile below with a probe in front shows, Malaysia operates the tandem warhead version of the missile.
Malaysian Army APC mounted Baktar-Shikan missile in action. Notice the probe in front of the missile; this makes it most probably the HJ-8E version. The picture also captures the massive back-blast. (Source:malaysiandefence.com)
- Interestingly, in the 2014 International Defense Exhibition and Seminar (IDEAS) exhibition, Pakistan had also displayed the 'Light' version of the Baktar-Shikan missile. This is based on on the NORINCO HJ-8L version. HJ-8L version is an attempt to develop a genuine man-portable ATGM which consists of a much smaller & lighter firing post (smaller tripod and guidance cum aiming device). It retains the same missile. The total weight of this system is said to be under 25 Kg.
- However, apart from redesigned and new guidance units and imaging tools, it is highly likely that Chinese have also developed a new missile case. This is because with older missile+missile tube itself weighing 25 Kg, the overall weight of the missile+firing post cannot be under 25 Kg.
Baktar-Shikan 'Light' with a relatively smaller and lighter tripod. The imaging scope is missing.
- HJ-8 missile variants have seen considerable use in Syria by various forces. These missiles have been credited with taking out many modern MBTs in the civil war.
- The video below, from 2013, is a compilation of use of HJ-8 missile in Syrian Civil War.
TOW-2A equipped M-113 APC of the Pakistan Army
- Tube Launched, Optically Tracked, Wire Guided or ‘TOW’ is the most famous of US anti-tank missiles and one which has been produced the most.
- It is a heavy anti-tank missile with the heaviest warhead amongst land based anti-tank missiles. The missile weighs about 22 kgs with the whole firing post including the missile weighing close to 90 kg.
- Guidance is Semi-Automatic Command to Line of Sight (SACLOS) meaning the missile pilot has to keep tracking the target till impact. The guidance signals are transmitted through wires (wire-guided) or one-way secured radio-frequency link (RF). The RF based guidance does not make the missile ‘fire & forget’. It simply replaces the wire as a medium of delivery guidance.
- From its first version in early 1970s, the missile and attached paraphernalia have undergone continuous upgrade. At present, there are two main avatars of the missile, along with variants of these two dominant types.
Source: army-technology.com
Internal diagrams of TOW-2A and TOW-2B. TOW-2B 'Aero' differs from TOW-2B only in terms of shape of front section. In case RF versions, the rear section of the missile has RF receiver instead of wire-dispenser
(picture source TOW-2A & 2B: army-technology.com. TOW-2B Aero-internet)
(B.2.1) Nos & Type in Pakistan Army
- As discussed earlier, Pakistan Army acquired various versions of BGM-71/TOW missiles in three tranches. These details of the order are as follows (Year of Order/Quantity/Usage):
- 1981 – 1,005 – To be used on AH-1 ‘Cobra’ helicopters and M-901 ITV
- 2004 – 2,007 - TOW-2A variant; to be used on AH-1 ‘Cobra’ helicopters
- 2007 – 3,198 – TOW-2A-RF variants
- The Defence Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notification about the 2007 sale of TOW-2A missiles gives the following break-up of the order:
- Given the quantity of missiles ordered and likely to be held (5,205), TOW-2A is a precious resource for Pakistan Army.
- The stock is most probably divided between the Pakistan Army's Army Aviation Corps (AAC) which operates the AH-1 Cobra helicopter gunships and the Heavy Anti-Tank (HAT) battalions.
The Arab-Israel war of October 1973, known as the Yom-Kippur war (or the Ramadan War as per the Arabs) offers insight into the tank versus anti-tank missile scenario. It has lessons for India because the adversary (Pakistan) intends to use ATGMs to blunt India's superior armor capabilities.
The 1973 war is a landmark event because it became the proving ground of two new weapon systems in modern warfare – anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) and anti-aircraft missile. Success of these two systems forced a major rethink in tank warfare and air combat in terms of tactics, design of weapon system and development of measures & counter-measures.
Egyptian Army employed thousands of Soviet Union supplied 9M14 ‘Malyutka’ (NATO reporting name: AT-3 ‘Swagger’) ATGM. While the Israeli intelligence and its general staff were aware of this weapon system with Egyptians, they did not consider it as an effective counter-measure to their armour. This faulty assessment caused the Israeli heavily – Israel Defence Forces (IDF) lost about 800 tanks in this war with Egyptian ATGM teams accounting for 20%-25% of the total losses. But the real impact of ATGM was felt in the initial days of the war when the Israelis were completely taken by surprise by the ATGM and the efficacy of Egyptian anti-tank defences. During first two days of the war, Israelis lost about 260 tanks – bulk of these loses were on account of ATGMs.
But the anti-tank teams were highly effective because the Egyptians employed innovative anti-tank tactics. In the words of one Israeli tank commander[1] who led the initial counter-attack against the Egyptian Army:
"We were advancing and in the distance I saw specks dotted on the sand dunes. I couldn't make out what they were. As we got closer, I thought they looked like tree stumps. They were motionless and scattered across the terrain ahead of us. I got on the intercom and asked the tanks ahead what they made of it. One of my tank commanders radioed back: 'My God, they're not tree stumps. They're men!' For a moment I couldn't understand. What were men doing standing out there—quite still-when we were advancing in our tanks towards them? Suddenly all hell broke loose. A barrage of missiles was being fired at us. Many of our tanks were hit. We had never come up against anything like this before....”
Another example of how much thought Egyptians had given to anti-tank warfare based on ATGM is given below[2]:
“According to one report, the Egyptians, with an abundance of SAGGERs, established a defence that lured the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) into a Kill Zone which optimized the potential of both SAGGERs and RPG-7s. The IDF tankers saw Egyptian tanks in the far distance and closed to do battle; however, they were unaware of great numbers of camouflaged RPG-7s and SAGGERs forward of the Egyptian tanks”
This is shown in the image below (taken from the same document):
The Israeli Armoured Corps did evolve tactics to counter the Egyptian anti-tank teams; these tactics meant the armour advancing under the cover of artillery and with supporting infantry (mounted on APC/IFV and dismounted). ATGM placed a restriction on the free reign which the armour had against the infantry.
But the wide-spread use of anti-tank missiles did not make the Main Battle Tank (MBT) obsolete. In words of a CIA Report[3] on analysis of 1973 Arab-Israel War done in 1975:
“Antitank weapons like the Sagger and RPG-7 took a heavy toll of Israeli armour. But they did not render the tank obsolete. The initial impression created by the Egyptian use of antitank missiles was artificially reinforced by the inappropriate tactics used by the Israelis in the first few days of the war
“Antitank weapons like the Sagger and RPG-7 took a heavy toll of Israeli armour. But they did not render the tank obsolete. The initial impression created by the Egyptian use of antitank missiles was artificially reinforced by the inappropriate tactics used by the Israelis in the first few days of the war. It is probably safe to say that no large, modern army will again make the mistake of using unsupported tanks against massed infantry.
The Israelis rediscovered some ancient principles in seeking a response to the antitank weapon threat posed at the beginning of the October war. Foremost, the Israelis found that no single weapon can long dominate the battlefield. Victory requires the use of a balanced force with many complementary offensive and defensive elements. The battlefield, in short, is a complicated environment and no one weapon or arm of service can function effectively on it without the active aid and cooperation of others. This is reassuring for the Israelis, since the effective and flexible use of mobile forces under difficult circumstances is precisely the area in which they hold the greatest comparative advantage over the Arabs”.
The same report also adds the following about Israeli adaptation to this new threat in course of the war:
“Despite all the problems, however, the Israelis once again proved the importance of flexibility in maintaining their superiority. The most striking example of this is provided by the Israeli response to the Arab--particularly Egyptian--antitank weapons. By 8 October the Israelis had recognized the flaws in their armour tactics and adopted a defensive procedure under which they waited for the Arab armour to attack and then took the Arabs under fire from extreme range. This made it difficult for the Arabs to bring their antitank weapons forward. This change of tactics by the Israelis took maximum advantage of the longer range of most of their tank guns and the superiority of their long-range tank gunnery.
The Israeli attack on 8 October appears to have been the last attempt to use tanks in the unsupported 1967 style and even then the Israelis may have been drawn in by their initial success. Within four or five days after the beginning of the war, the Israelis were adopting tactics which reduced the threat from Arab antitank weapons to manageable proportions. This adjustment in the midst of combat provides a fair measure of the flexibility of Israeli leadership and the thoroughness of low-level training.”
(4.0) Conclusion
- Pakistan Army possess strong anti-tank capability which will be a challenge to Indian mechanized formations in any future conflict.
- The main objective of these anti-tank formations is to prevent a break-out by Indian armored formations. Using speed, mobility, terrain familiarity and stand-off range of their missiles, they intend to blunt Indian mechanized offensive.
- With ability to engage targets at night, they can spring surprise on any advancing armor column. Working in conjunction with some armor and/or AH-1 'Cobra' gunship helicopters will make for formidable force.
- They will play an important role in next Indo-Pak war. And like the Israelis in 1973 war, Indian Army will have to evolve tactics to counter them. And while Israelis were taken by surprise, Indian Army knows the existence of this capability.
- Apart from counter-tactics, Indian Army also needs to invest in technological solution like Active Protection Systems (APS) for its main battle tanks.
I have seen MG-3 mostly.
Indian IBG
