Analyzing North Waziristan

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Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan on the run?

Army wants end to drone attacks in return for North Waziristan operation.
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The Pakistan Army is said to have conveyed to Washington its willingness to go into North Waziristan but in the trade off wants immediate end to drone attacks in the region.

In the first place Pakistan Army, it is said, is not willing to be caught in the drone crossfire and suffer unnecessary casualties by way of collateral damage. And secondly the army does not want to move in without first conducting thorough scouting of the area which it is further said, it does not believe was possible with drone sorties continuing their deadly attacks on a daily basis.

Most unofficial strategic analysts, therefore, consider as totally uncalled for the US demand that Pakistan Army should launch an offensive in North Waziristan against Taliban “as soon as possible” while Washington continued its drone missions. ”The decision whether or not to launch the offensive against the outlawed Tehreeki- Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in North Waziristan and if at all when, should be left entirely to the Pakistan Army,” said these analysts.

In their opinion the army has so far done an excellent job of uprooting the TTP from its strong holds in most of the areas it has moved into and if at all it felt the need to go into NW it would certainly do so but would pick its own time for launching such a campaign. Meanwhile, according to these analysts signals emanating lately from the TTP camp indicate a willingness on the part of the Tehreek to put an end to its militant activities and resolve all issues through negotiations with the government in Islamabad.

Those who believe such to be the case point to what they said tapering off of suicide attacks and bombings in major cities in recent weeks. The elements who keep a close watch on the activities of militants inside Pakistan and Afghanistan also acknowledge having observed an all round weakness in the rank and file of TTP, especially among its leadership.

“This could be because the army has successfully defanged the TTP and now the latter is left with no option but to seek a ceasefire perhaps in order to regroup and recoup” observed one of the analysts on condition of anonymity. However, he thought in view of the past experience the army was hardly likely to ease off its military campaign against the militants and was also not likely, in his opinion, to agree to negotiations until the TTP agrees to dismantle its camps, give up its arms caches and stop its militant activities completely.

In the past, the TTP has used peace agreements only to regroup and rearm and then resume their terrorist attacks with redoubled ferocity and viciousness. In his opinion Pakistan should not negotiate with the TTP until its fire power is totally decimated. He further claimed that the signs were very clear that the Tehreek was in total disarray and on the run.

He said those who refer to the so-called offers of peace by Washington to Afghan Taliban and Hizb-i-Islami of Afghan warlord Gubuddin Hekmatyar to advance their argument in favour of starting dialogue with the TTP by Pakistan government ignore the fact that all these US offers of negotiations are conditional to total surrender by Afghan Taliban. Maulana Fazalur Rehman has repeatedly offered his services for brokering a peace deal between the government and the TTP. And two former army generals, Aslam Baig and Hameed Gul have also been advocating a dialogue between government and the TTP.

Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan on the run? – The Express Tribune

 

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The danger zone
By Huma Yusuf
Sunday, 23 May, 2010

Tribesmen gather around an injured boy at a hospital in Miranshah, the main town in North Waziristan on May 22, 2010, following a US drone attack. - Photo by AFP.


The United States and Nato have long been pressuring Pakistan to launch a military operation in North Waziristan. Now that the army has indicated it will open that Pandora’s box of militancy, the instigators are dissociating themselves from the operation.

US Defence Secretary Robert Gates has announced that his country is not ‘pushing’ Pakistan to make this move, while Nato has declared that the timing and strategy of the operation are to be fully of the Pakistan Army’s choosing.

This magnanimity does not signal a shift in policy, nor does it indicate that the US has truly come to trust Pakistan as an equal partner in its prolonged war against terror. No, western security forces are backing off from plans to launch the offensive because it’s going to be messy, very messy.

North Waziristan has long been home to Hafiz Gul Bahadur’s militant group, which has struck two peace accords with the Pakistan government (in 2006 and 2008) and therefore refrains from launching attacks against government and army personnel and property in Fata or elsewhere. Previously, Bahadur has prevented other militants, including Baitullah Mehsud, from launching attacks against Pakistan from his territory, and is responsible for expelling many Arab and Central Asian militants from the agencies.

In return for this cooperation, the Bahadur group has been allowed to flourish and is now well-entrenched in North Waziristan: it runs a parallel administration boasting recruiting offices for militants, training camps, madressahs, separate courts and jails and its own taxation policy. If an offensive in the tribal agency disrupts the Bahadur group, the army will face a well-armed and well-organised force that will no longer have any reason to keep foreign fighters at bay.

North Waziristan also serves as a base for the Jalaluddin Haqqani network, which primarily targets coalition forces in Afghanistan. The Haqqanis are old friends of Pakistan’s intelligence agencies, and continue to be cultivated as contacts that could prove useful as political allies in a post-US Afghanistan. This network, too, has not attacked the Pakistani state, but may change its modus operandi if a military operation were to be directed against its fighters.

As practically the only one of Fata’s seven agencies that has not been the site of a military operation, North Waziristan has recently seen an influx of TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan) militants fleeing army action elsewhere. Indeed, a list of all the groups whose activities have been traced to the tribal agency reads like a who’s who of regional militancy. The agency is also believed to be the hiding place of Al Qaeda leaders such as Osama bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri.

Taking on this hornet’s nest of militancy will be no small task for the Pakistan Army. Its job is made even harder by the shifting allegiances of the various militant groups themselves. There have been reports of a brewing conflict between the Afghan militant groups that maintain ties with the Pakistani establishment and elements of the Punjabi Taliban that have started to act independently. The recent murder of former ISI official Khalid Khwaja was another sign of the shifting ground on which the security establishment has to operate. Under these circumstances, any attempts at backchannel negotiations or plans to maintain a ceasefire with certain groups will be tenuous — militant groups that have historically sided with Pakistan may splinter into more dangerous entities.

Matters are made worse by the complete lack of intelligence from the agency. Militants have killed hundreds of people suspected of spying for the US or Pakistani governments — just the other day, two men were strapped with explosives and blown up in public on similar charges. The intensified drone attacks in North Waziristan since the start of this year have made the militants extremely cautious about leaking information. Hakeemullah Mehsud’s recent ‘resurrection’ indicated just how little is known about what’s happening in the agency.

Given this scenario, a botched operation in North Waziristan could further decentralise and disperse the terror threat. If the Pakistan Army moves into the agency without a clear sense of its goals or confidence in certain allegiances, up to 50,000 fighters from various groups could spread across the country causing mayhem. Movement towards cells in Karachi and the southern Punjab would also be likely, leading to the creation of new North Waziristans in the heartland of Pakistan.

To prevent this nightmare from becoming a reality, the army should consolidate the gains it has made in other parts of Fata and create a network of locals willing to stem infiltration by militants from North Waziristan. Rather than launch a full-fledged, indiscriminate campaign, the army should also stick to earlier plans of launching contained attacks against specific targets. Given the potential horrifying consequences for Pakistan, this is not the time to kowtow to foreign demands for a grander operation.

A limited operation will also rule out the need to bring more troops into the vicinity (there are currently about 140,000 troops in the agency, mostly stationed in Miramshah). This is important because military action in Fata since 2005 has earned the ire of non-combatant agency residents who complain they have lost more lives and property because of army action rather than the militant presence.

This perception has fuelled the rate of militant recruitment in the area, and the last thing the North Waziristan operation should do is win more youngsters over to the militant cause. To this end, the army should work with the civilian government to raise enough funds beforehand to accommodate the IDPs who will escape the operation, and to compensate civilians for property damage.

More importantly, the army should also limit US involvement in the form of sustained drone attacks in any operation. This must be Pakistan’s fight, fought on Pakistan’s terms, with Pakistan’s best interests in mind.



huma.yusuf@gmail.com


DAWN.COM | Columnists | The danger zone

 

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Taliban leaving North Waziristan?[/U]

MIRAN SHAH, Pakistan, May 26 (UPI) -- A committee in North Waziristan has persuaded members of the Taliban to leave the area for tribal regions in the south, Pakistani sources claim.

A source to Pakistani news agency News International said members of the Pakistani Taliban are leaving North Waziristan. Talks leading up to the departure involved Taliban leaders Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Hakimullah Mehsud, the source added.

An associate of Bahadur told the news agency that nearly all of the militants have left North Waziristan for the south.

"Before leaving, announcements were made from loudspeakers in mosques of various villages by the Mehsud Taliban to thank the tribespeople of North Waziristan for their cooperation and assistance to the displaced Mehsud militants," the source added.

Bahadur, who oversees Taliban activity in North Waziristan, was said to be upset of the "law and order situation" in the north, the News International report said.

The source close to Bahadur added that Pakistani military and government officials said Taliban fighters must choose between conflict and expulsion from North Waziristan.

Taliban leaving North Waziristan? - UPI.com

 

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Hakimullah, Allies Said to Leave North Waziristan
Pakistani Taliban Returning to South Waziristan
by Jason Ditz, May 25, 2010

According to reports citing an unnamed Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) source, TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud and his followers have agreed to leave the North Waziristan Agency after being asked to by warlord Hafiz Bahadur, who has a tenuous peace deal with the Pakistani government.

Since taking control of the TTP last August, Hakimullah has turned the group from a little known umbrella group in Pakistani tribal regions into one of the most aggressive militant outfits in central Asia, and has cultivated a personal reputation for surviving assassination attempts that has become almost ridiculous: Hakimullah has been “confirmed” killed on at least seven separate occasions since August.

Having apparently left North Waziristan at the very time when the US government is agitating for a Pakistani military invasion of the region, Hakimullah and the TTP leadership are said to be returning to South Waziristan, their traditional home territory.

South Waziristan was invaded late last year by the Pakistani military, an offensive that officals lauded as a great “success” but which failed to kill or capture any significant TTP figures. The military has virtually left South Waziristan at this point and is attacking Orakzai Agency, which will leave the TTP free to return to their starting positions unchallenged.

It is a story which has recurred in many parts of northern Pakistan, including the Swat Valley and twice in Bajaur. While the Pakistani military is good at blowing up “suspected” homes and driving hundreds of thousands of civilians from their homes, the offensives ultimately accomplish very little and the militants simply move on until the attack finishes and then return. The “victory” in South Waziristan, as with so many other places, has proven short-lived.

Hakimullah, Allies Said to Leave North Waziristan -- News from Antiwar.com

 

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Hakeemullah’s pullout from North Waziristan an ‘excuse’ for Pakistan not to move

The leader of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan has agreed to withdraw his forces along with some allied Punjabi Taliban fighters from North Waziristan in an effort to prevent a Pakistani Army operation there.

Hakeemullah Mehsud, the leader of the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, and Waliur Rehman Mehsud, the leader of the Taliban in South Waziristan, agreed to leave North Waziristan after conducting talks with Hafiz Gul Bahadar, the top Taliban leader in North Waziristan, according to a report in The News. US intelligence officials contacted by The Long War Journal said the report is accurate and noted the shift of Taliban fighters.

“Almost 98 per cent of the Mehsud militants along with some Punjabi Taliban have left North Waziristan,” a source close to Bahadar told The News. “Before leaving, announcements were made from loudspeakers in mosques of various villages by the Mehsud Taliban to thank the tribespeople of North Waziristan for their cooperation and assistance to the displaced Mehsud militants.”

Hakeemullah and Waliur’s forces are said to have returned to the Shaktoi and Makeen regions in South Waziristan, where the military has claimed it has ousted the Taliban after an operation last fall.

“Most of them went to Shaktoi and Makeen in South Waziristan where they had their sanctuaries in the forest-covered mountains,” a Taliban official told The News. “In summer, militants can easily survive in the mountains but the security forces might face tough resistance there.” The Taliban had previously promised to wage a guerrilla war in South Waziristan in the spring; however, the Taliban campaign never materialized.

Hakeemullah and Waliur’s forces have left North Waziristan just as the Pakistani government has come under pressure by the US and Western countries to invade the Taliban-controlled tribal agency. North Waziristan is the home to top al Qaeda leaders as well as Bahadar and the Haqqani Network. Both Taliban groups provide shelter to al Qaeda and other Pakistani jihadist groups, and allow them to operate training camps and conduct attacks into Afghanistan.

The US has traced multiple terror plots back to North Waziristan. The latest plot, the failed Times Square car bombing, was carried out by a Pakistani-American who trained with Hakeemullah’s forces in North Waziristan. Hakeemullah and his deputy Qari Hussain Mehsud released tapes on the Internet that confirmed their involvement in the failed attack.

Hakeemullah's withdrawal from North Waziristan took place as the Pakistani government and military have pressured Bahadar to eject Hakeemullah and the Punjabi Taliban, which includes members and factions of the Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami. The Pakistani government has rebuffed Western calls for an operation in North Waziristan, as so-called 'good Taliban' groups such as the Haqqani Network and Bahadar’s group are based there. The 'good Taliban' do not advocate attacks against the Pakistani state yet openly support the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan.

US military and intelligence officials contacted by The Long War Journal said the withdrawal of Hakeemullah from North Waziristan is a ruse to keep the 'good Taliban' intact.

“This so-called pullout is just the excuse the Pakistanis needed to call off a North Waziristan operation,” a senior military intelligence official said. “The timing could not be any better for the Pakistani military, who clearly engineered this, could it?”

“Make no mistake, the Pakistani government will now say it doesn’t have a reason to go into North Waziristan, that Hakeemullah and all of the bad guys have now fled, and we can deal with the remaining Taliban,” a senior intelligence official said. “We’ve heard this all before, in past peace deals [in North and South Waziristan], when the tribes claimed they ejected al Qaeda. But they never did.”

According to another official, Bahadar’s request for Hakeemullah to leave North Waziristan is an admission that Bahadar never intended to honor a peace agreement with the Pakistani military that was signed just prior to the invasion of the Mehsud tribal areas last fall. In that agreement, Bahadar promised he would not shelter fighters and leaders from South Waziristan, and agreed to keep his fighters from attacking Pakistani military forces in North Waziristan.

“Yet again, the Pakistanis have agreed to a farcical peace agreement that no one believed would be honored by the Taliban,” observed a military intelligence official who closely tracks the region. “Bahadar gave safe haven to Hakeemullah and company, and the Pakistani military was attacked in North Waziristan. The military’s response was to ignore the violations, because in the end they didn’t care if the agreement was honored or not. They [the Pakistani Army] just want to stay out of North Waziristan.”

Hakeemullah’s pullout from North Waziristan an ‘excuse’ for Pakistan not to move - The Long War Journal

 

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Dynamics of a N Waziristan operation
By Khalid Munir

May 27, 2010

Dynamics of a N Waziristan operation
By Khalid Munir

May 27, 2010
http://tribune.com.pk/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/Khalid-Munir1.jpg

The writer is a retired officer who served in Fata and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (khalid.munir@tribune.com.pk)


Comments (19)

Once again the media is buzzing with news about American pressure on Pakistan to carry out an operation in North Waziristan Agency. Every visit by American generals gives rise, rather confirms this speculation. Pakistan has said that it will choose the timing itself, that is amounting to agreeing to carry out the operation.

If we look at the ground situation prevailing in Fata and Pakhtunkhwa, the army is overstretched. Stiff resistance is being faced in Orakzai Agency. Tirah valley in Khyber Agency will be a big thorn when the time comes to clear it. And parts of Mohmand and Bajaur have yet to be cleared. Swat is in a state of consolidation state which means that its civil administration needs the army to be around, at least for one more year. Also, there have been signs of the militants re-emerging, albeit not on the same scale as before. In South Waziristan the army is there but most of the its residents are currently in Tank and Dera Ismail Khan as IDPs.

In these conditions making troops available for a major operation in NWA will not be feasible. Already a major chunk of army is busy in active operations. Relocating troops from any operationally active area may result in providing breathing space to Taliban and thus giving them a chance to reorganise. Besides, keeping in mind North Waziristan’s terrain, there may be heavy causalities to our troops. The same goes for artillery guns, not counting the wear and tear to the rest of the equipment.

Another factor which needs to be kept in mind is how to safeguard Pakistan’s interests when Nato forces leave Afghanistan. The Taliban in the agency such as Hafiz Gul Bahadur, Maulvi Nazir and Jalaluddin Haqqani have rarely attacked the Pakistan army or carried out terrorist activities inside the country. Hence, eliminating all pro-Pakistan elements before any meaningful dialogue takes place in Afghanistan will not be in our interest. We may be left with only Gulbadin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i-Islami as the only pro-Pakistan group. Also, Kashmiri mujahideen and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (commonly known as Punjabi Taliban) are present in the area and dealing with them requires an altogether different strategy than the tribal militants.

Pakistan should think about reformulating its policy regarding Afghanistan. Afghanistan was a never a satellite state of Pakistan and never will be. All we should strive for is a non-hostile Afghanistan. And while the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was allied with Pakistan, it had a profound influence on Pakistani society and this is turn gave rise to militancy in Fata and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.

Though Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani has said that there are no good or bad Taliban, we know that he is not the one who is calling shots in formulating the Afghan policy. The army chief must understand this as well and ensure that the next generation does not suffer because of the mistakes and lack of vision of the older generation.

Dynamics of a N Waziristan operation – The Express Tribune

 

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Army to decide about operation in NW: Kayani

Staff Report

ISLAMABAD: Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani said on Saturday that decision to launch a military offensive in North Waziristan will be taken by the army.

Army Chief, while talking to SAMAA during a visit to an exhibition held in National Arts Council, said time and nature of military operation in North Waziristan will be decided by army.

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani, while talking to media, reaffirmed that operation against terrorists in North Waziristan will be taken with the consent of army.

Defense budget is to be enhanced; however, salaries of army men will not be increased as they had been incremented in January last, he added. SAMAA

.:: SAMAA - Army to decide about operation in NW: Kayani

 

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The ties that kill: Pakistan militant groups uniting | Reuters

Pakistan (Reuters) - Pakistani militant groups are increasingly supporting each other and penetrating into the country's heartland, threatening not only Pakistan but the region.

The Pakistan Taliban who attacked two Ahmadi mosques in Lahore on Friday trained in the militant stronghold of North Waziristan and arrived in the city a week before the assaults.

"They have links with Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the arrested attacker told us that his brother is working with the group in Miran Shah," said Akram Naeem Bharoka, a police spokesman in Lahore.

Miran Shah is the main town of North Waziristan, a rugged land which has been a traditional rebel hideout, and considered a stronghold for TTP militants.

Ties like these between the Pakistan Taliban and Punjab groups and organizations are worrying to Pakistan and its ally, the United States.

The mosque attacks in Lahore, capital of Pakistan's Punjab province, killed between 80 and 95 people and wounded more than 100. It was the worst attack on the Ahmadi minority group in Pakistan's 63-year history.

The Ahmadis consider themselves Muslims, but many in Pakistan, including the government, do not. In 1974, Pakistan became the only Muslim state to declare Ahmadis non-Muslims and prohibited the open practice of their faith.

Mohammad Umer, a Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan spokesman, told the daily newspaper, The News, that the attacks had been carried out by their agents in eastern Punjab -- Pakistan's heartland and center of economic and political power.

Such links reflect those found in the failed Times Square bombing, in which the main suspect, Faisal Shahzad, said he contacted members of Jaish-e-Mohammad, a Punjabi group, who delivered him to the TTP in the northwest.

The United States is now pushing Pakistan to go into North Waziristan, where it has run its own campaign of drone strikes that have killed hundreds of low-level fighters.

That's going to be a hard sell, as Pakistan has no wish to attack North Waziristan right now. But the Shahzad case and now Lahore show that the notorious militant sanctuary near the Afghan border is fast becoming a major threat for Pakistan itself.

MILITANT GROUPS LINKING

A land of high and difficult hills with deep and rugged valleys suitable for guerrilla warfare, North Waziristan has served as a safe haven for Islamist militants since the 1980s, when Pakistan acted as a frontline state in the U.S.-backed jihad, or holy war, against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The ethnic Pashtun tribal lands, particularly North and South Waziristan, became a hub of Islamist militants after al Qaeda and Taliban operatives, fleeing a U.S.-led offensive in Afghanistan following the September 11 attacks in 2001, took refuge there and forged ties with Pakistani militants.

But the area has since turned into a hub for a wide variety of militant groups.

The militants operating from North Waziristan can roughly be divided into four categories:

* al Qaeda linked militants, including Arabs, Uzbeks, Chechens and Chinese Muslims who have focused their fighting in their native countries as well as in the West

* Afghan Taliban, led by militant commander Jalaluddin Haqqani, who are fighting Western forces in Afghanistan

* Pakistani Taliban fighting the Pakistani state

* "Punjabi Taliban" suspected of fuelling militancy in central Pakistan

These militant groups apparently pursue independent agendas, but cooperate if they share objectives, security officials say.

"These groups are inter-linked. Sometimes they will collaborate directly. Sometimes they will provide logistical support and sometimes they will have just an understanding," a security official said.

PAKISTAN SAYS MILITARY STRETCHED

Suspected links between Times Square suspect Shahzad and militants in the northwest have seen the United States add pressure on Pakistan to take concrete steps to tackle the mounting threat from North Waziristan.

The mosque attacks in Lahore will now add domestic pressure to the military to move against North Waziristan.

The military has conducted offensives in six of the seven tribal regions, known as Federally Administered Tribal Areas, in recent years except in North Waziristan where authorities struck a peace deal with militants in 2007.

Pakistani officials say they are over-stretched, with rising attacks in South Waziristan, and do not have enough resources to open another front.

Some analysts and security officials say any action in North Waziristan may also depend on political and military developments in Afghanistan. A traditional gathering of Afghan tribal elders starts this week to discuss prospects for peace while NATO plans a major offensive in Taliban strongholds in the south.

(Additional reporting by Mubasher Bukhari in Lahore and Kamran Haider in Islamabad; Editing by Chris Allbritton and Michael Perry)

 

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The looming twin offensives



Tuesday, June 01, 2010
By Rahimullah Yusufzai
For sometime now, there has been talk about two major offensives in the coming weeks and months against the Taliban and other militants across the Pakistani-Afghan border. One in Kandahar, in southeastern Afghanistan by the US-led Nato forces, the other in North Waziristan by the Pakistani military. The two campaigns apparently aren't linked, but their outcome could determine the course of the conflict in the region.

As usual, the US military commanders would prefer coordinated offensives by the Nato forces and Pakistani army on both sides of the Durand Line around the same time, in a bid to squeeze the militants out and stop their cross-border infiltration and escape. During its past military campaigns, including the one in Tora Bora against Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda fighters and the Afghan Taliban in December 2001, the Pentagon has been urging the Pakistani military command to try and seal the border to prevent the militants' escape. This hasn't been easy in view of the long and porous border. Like Pakistan's security forces, Nato and Afghan troops too have been unable to fully check cross-border infiltration of militants. In fact, Pakistan's military authorities have been highlighting the fact that they set up many more border posts compared to the US-led coalition forces, and that the Americans dismantled some of their outposts in Afghan territory just when the Pakistani army undertook major offensives in Bajaur, Mohmand and South Waziristan.

The US and Nato military commanders would be satisfied if the Pakistani military finally agrees to move against all militants, both local and foreign and, in particular, the Haqqani network, in North Waziristan. And they would be happy if this offensive was timed to coincide with their own military campaign against the Afghan Taliban in Kandahar. The Pakistanis, though, may decide to partially oblige the Americans by choosing their own timing for undertaking any action in North Waziristan and being selective in their approach in going against their targets in this tribal region.

If they are undertaken, the two battles will be fought on different terrains. Kandahar is largely flat, with fertile agricultural land dotted with low hills and a harsh desert. North Waziristan is mostly mountainous. The populations in both places are overwhelmingly Pakhtun, the ethnic group to which the Taliban belong. There could be some urban warfare in Kandahar, which is inhabited by around a million people, and classic guerrilla-style attacks in rural Arghandab, Zhari and Panjwai districts encircling the city, with their orchards of apples, pomegranates and grapes. In North Waziristan, the major population centres of Miramshah, Mir Ali and Dattakhel would have to be controlled to defend the military posts and supply lines.

The US and Nato military commanders have been publicly talking about the Kandahar offensive and have even indicated its timeline. It was to begin around June and end in August before the onset of Ramazan. Any delay in launching the military campaign or altering its objectives would be due to the reported differences between the US and Hamid Karzai, the beleaguered Afghan president who is sensitive about the military operation's fallout in his native province. Any sensible politician would be concerned if military action largely depended on the use of airpower, displaced people and caused unusually high numbers of civilian casualties.

The Kandahar campaign could drag on beyond August and still remain inconclusive. It could be a repeat of the recent military campaign in the small town of Marjah in the adjoining Helmand province, where the offensive by 15,000 Nato and Afghan forces against a few hundred Taliban fighters took longer than anticipated and was unable to accomplish its goals. Skilful at manipulating the media, the US army was able to sell the idea that, as the first test of President Barack Obama's new Afghan strategy based on the troops surge, the Marjah offensive would turn the situation around. In the words of Nato military commander in Afghanistan Gen Stanley McChrystal, it would halt the Taliban momentum. This didn't happen, with even the largely supportive American media now reporting that Taliban guerrillas are back in Marjah and the population is still unwilling to switch sides in favour of the government. The Western media described Marjah as a "city" and the hit-and-run Taliban attacks there were mentioned as a major battle. This was obviously done to exaggerate the challenge at hand in Marjah and present it as a major military campaign against a formidable enemy. If Marjah was such a difficult battle, one can imagine the much bigger challenge posed by Kandahar.

And now the looming battle in Kandahar is being referred to as a make-or-break struggle. The goalposts are being changed to suit the political objectives of the offensive. The American and Afghan military commanders and politicians are struggling to find a suitable word to describe the Kandahar offensive due to the widespread public opposition to the military operation. Terms like "offensive," "military operation," "action" and "battle" are no longer being used. President Karzai, who unsuccessfully tried to win support for the offensive a couple of months ago by undertaking a rare visit to Kandahar and addressing skeptical tribal elders, has now settled on the term "process" to explain the coming military campaign. The US authorities are now increasingly calling it "Hamkari Baraye Kandahar," a Dari Persian term meaning "Cooperation for Kandahar." It is not the first time that a non-Pashto term is being used in the Pakhtun-populated southern Afghanistan. It is insensitive, but it seems the Americans haven't grasped the cultural sensitivities inherent in multi-ethnic Afghanistan even eight-and-a-half years after invading the country.

In Pakistan, selecting a name for the likely North Waziristan offensive won't pose any problem. The military has been choosing names of its operations without any input from the government or the politicians, who are largely unaware of the details and complications of the army's strategies. Pashto names were chosen for the military campaigns in Khyber Agency while Urdu terms such as Rah-e-Raast, Rah-e-Haq and Rah-e-Nijat were selected for the offensives in Swat and South Waziristan.

Names are important, but the strategy adopted to win the military campaigns in North Waziristan and Kandahar and minimise the suffering of the people would be far more crucial. The US military authorities reiterate after every incident in which civilians are killed and injured that they would be more careful the next time in pursuing strategic objectives as their policy centred on protecting the Afghan population against Taliban militants. Hillary Clinton and other US officials have made it clear that lessons from Fallujah, which was destroyed by the US military in Iraq, have been learnt and that Kandahar won't be meted out the same treatment. However, the reality will become known once the Kandahar offensive is undertaken and, in case of failure, the way the US-led coalition forces vent their anger and frustration.

In case of North Waziristan, the Pakistani security forces could follow the Swat and South Waziristan models in which towns and villages are emptied of the population, every known militant target is bombed and shelled, and vantage points are occupied to allow for the ground forces to move in and take control. This strategy certainly minimises civilian deaths and isolates the militants. But the damage to infrastructure and properties is substantial and the displacement of population causes suffering and creates additional challenges in the repatriation and rehabilitation of the displaced persons.

The US and Pakistani military commanders will be trying their own strategies in dealing with the challenges in Kandahar and North Waziristan. The fate of their campaigns will largely depend on public support in the areas of their operations. The Pakistani military would be better placed in this respect as it would be operating among its own people unlike the Nato forces fighting in an alien country and generally hostile population.

Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan

 

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VIEW: New zones for militancy –Arif Ansar

The emerging collaboration between the TTP and Punjabi Taliban of southern Punjab means that one cannot end the war by simply driving terrorists out of the tribal areas and that Pakistan must prepare itself to fight on several fronts

The most disquieting aspect of the recent spate of terrorist activity in Pakistan (including Friday’s massacre in Lahore) and abroad is that the planning seems to be the work of the Pashtun Taliban and Punjabi groups originating in southern Punjab, possibly at the behest of al Qaeda. Apparently, the North Waziristan operation will not be the Pakistani Army’s final task now that Pakistan’s heartland is gradually becoming embroiled as well. Furthermore, the Western media is once again pointing fingers at what they perceive as military-extremist collusion.

Conventional wisdom, which says that once the US exits from Afghanistan, the extremists in Pakistan will simply disband and all will be well, is fast losing validity. The reality, on the contrary, is that Pakistani extremists, Taliban militants and the Punjabi jihadists are not going anywhere soon. Only one simple fact is required to prove this: the Punjabi jihadists, like the Pakistani Taliban, have lost faith in the Pakistani Army. The result is an increasing number of attacks on civilian and military targets across the country. The North Waziristan operation might very well succeed in destroying any residual trust the Afghan Taliban extremists might still feel regarding the Pakistani Army. If this happens, the focus of the war could dramatically shift from Afghanistan to Pakistan.

If we study the evolution of major political parties’ views on the extremist threat since the end of Musharraf’s rule, we will see a disturbing pattern emerging. As the US pressure increases on Pakistan to act in North Waziristan, political parties of Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are taking different positions on how to approach and tackle the grave issues at hand. From the recent statements emanating from the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), one might conclude that the situation in FATA is the cause of all the troubles and that once these areas have been properly dealt with, the extremist threat will vanish. The Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) has exhibited similar views, as it relates to the situation in Karachi. On the other hand, the Awami National Party’s (ANP’s) stance makes some form of military operation necessary in southern Punjab as well, as it believes it is here that the masterminds and chief ideologues of local and regional extremism reside. The ANP’s position is closer to the views of some in the Balochistan province, India and Afghanistan. The Pashtuns are paying a very heavy price indeed for the army’s endeavours since the days of the Afghan jihad against the Soviets.

If these new fronts open in the manner we anticipate, the fissures within the Pakistan Army will obviously grow. The alienation of the Pashtun and Punjabi elements in the military will make it impossible to avoid an adverse outcome for the Pakistani state. The emerging collaboration between the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Punjabi Taliban of southern Punjab means that one cannot end the war by simply driving terrorists out of the tribal areas and that Pakistan must prepare itself to fight on several fronts.

Similarly, there is increasing evidence of the collusion between international terrorists and the local extremists in the region. This is extending the war against extremism into new territories, thus reinforcing the perception that it is not confined to the Pak-Afghan region alone. General Petraeus is well aware of this. Recently, the New York Times revealed that, in late 2009, he signed a secret order, which authorises special operations forces to increase their activities in both allied and hostile nations in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Horn of Africa. This newly unveiled US national security strategy has dispensed with the limitations imposed by current international borders. The US appears to have finally reached the conclusion that if the extremists refuse to accept international borders, any effort to counter terrorism must do likewise.

Obviously, militarisation of society, a result of the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and FATA, has yet to be fully actualised. Just like the consequences of the 1980s Afghan jihad continue to manifest themselves in the region, the fallout of what is occurring now will take many years to fully emerge. Faced with these scenarios, the US exit strategy has focused on weakening the local and global extremists, but without much success in addressing the causes which leads them to adopt extreme positions in the first place. Add to this the worsening crisis in Iran and the Horn of Africa and it appears that the region is heading towards chaos. It may well take decades before any semblance of order finally emerges.

It seems that if events continue on their present trajectory, the region will gradually revert to the condition it was in prior to the establishment of nation-states. The next phase of the war against extremism will probably involve cross-border strategies; the actors will no longer be restricted by the nation-state mindset. The unpopular and often undemocratic governments of these regions will be caught in the crossfire between extremists and the ‘coalition of the willing’, with both exerting tremendous pressure on the often ineffective and corrupt governments. These tensions inadvertently weaken the basic structures and institutions that sustain the nation-state system, as we see in the case of Pakistan. If history is any lesson and the nation-state-based order prevailing in this region since the end of World War II was to go, religion and tribalism will, perhaps, replace it as the glue, holding society together.

Arif Ansar is the Chief Analyst at the future-oriented think tank, POLITACT (POLITACT). He can be reached at
aansar@politact.com

Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan

 

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Pakistan plays long game in Afghanistan peace drive
By Michael Georgy

An Afghan assembly touted by President Hamid Karzai as a home-grown peace initiative is unlikely to produce a blueprint for reconciliation because the drafters do not include regional power Pakistan’s Taliban clients.
Heavyweights such as Pakistan’s key asset, the Haqqani group, are not attending the June 2-4 “jirga”, although Taliban sympathizers may take part.
Islamabad sees the powerful anti-American network as leverage against the influence of rival India in Afghanistan, and is unlikely to help broker peace as long as leader Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Sarajuddin are excluded from the process. Islamabad is playing the long game, hoping to persuade both Karzai and the White House that peace will not be possible without the participation of the Haqqani network, the most potent force in Afghanistan, analysts say.
“Pakistan is hedging its bets that sooner or later ‘if we can hold out on the Haqqani factor’, the US will be ready to include the Haqqani faction on the peace train,” said Simbal Khan, Director of Eurasian Studies at Pakistan’s Institute of Strategic Studies.
But there is little chance the White House will change its position anytime soon and it would prefer to see the Haqqanis dead.
The US is pushing Islamabad to dismantle Haqqani’s network in Pakistan’s North Waziristan, but Islamabad is resisting because members of its powerful security establishment says that could trigger a full-scale tribal revolt that would be catastrophic for the country.
A history of ties and influence may not translate into control of Haqqani’s seasoned fighters, who could easily turn on Pakistan’s forces, and call on extra support from thousands of Pashtun tribesmen along the forbidding border with Afghanistan. Government troops are already exhausted from drawn-out efforts to contain insurgents, and can ill-afford to open another front.
“The Pakistanis are very pragmatically aware that it would be a difficult task for (the Pakistani military),” said Khan. “We would have to take them on for 15 to 20 years.”

Unpredictable ally
Although getting Haqqani’s name on a peace settlement would officially remove one of the biggest threat to US troops and stability in Afghanistan, the militant leader’s history suggests he would be a highly unpredictable participant.
He has a track record of lining up with whoever can fund or support him. He was believed to have received money and arms from the CIA when he was fighting Soviet troops in Afghanistan.
Then Haqqani pledged his support for the Taliban, while maintaining his own fiefdoms in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and ties to Pakistani intelligence. So he could be a spoiler in any peace process.
Kamran Bokhari, Middle East and South Asia director at STRATFOR global intelligence firm, says that despite Haqqani’s past, Washington must abandon its notion that talking with his network would be like “doing business with the devil.”
“That’s the kind of thing that prevents any movement and it’s frustrating the Pakistanis and they know it’s an uphill path,” he said.
Out of all the militant groups in Afghanistan, Haqqani is Islamabad’s best bet for continuing influence in future. Pakistan forged close ties with Afghan mujahideen when they fought Soviet occupiers in the 1980s, but the internecine fighting that followed Moscow’s defeat fractured many resistance groups.
The triumph of the Taliban, their subsequent ouster by US-backed Afghan forces and a renewed insurgency caused further fragmentation and realignment of loyalties.
That’s why Pakistan will keep pushing Washington to give Haqqani – with whom ties have remained fairly steady – a chance.

Time to wait
While Islambad believes only wide political reconciliation that includes the US’s Taliban enemies can bring peace, Washington is pursuing an entirely different strategy.
It aims to undermine the Taliban by offering foot soldiers economic incentives to lay down their arms, while pursuing leaders to kill or capture them.
The US hopes that strategy will start stabilizing Afghanistan before a gradual troop withdrawal next year.
Karzai, hoping to regain credibility after corruption charges tarnished his reputation, has put forward a proposal offering insurgent leaders exile in third countries in an effort to end the war.
Analysts say this strategy could backfire – and unless Western forces turn the tide on the battlefield, the Taliban will be in a position of strength and will see no need to negotiate.
“By placing Taliban in exile, all you do is give them the opportunity to plan their return and continue to help, at a minimum, plan disruptions, and at worst, plan the overthrow of the government,” said Lt. Col Tony Shaffer, a former US intelligence officer in Afghanistan now at the Center for Advanced Defence Studies in Washington.
“The process must be inclusive of all.”
Pakistan’s trump card is that it is in no rush – and influential enough that any deal without it is unlikely to stick. – Reuters

Saudi Gazette - Pakistan plays long game in Afghanistan peace drive

 

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Without the haqqanis on board any solution to or peace deal for Afghanistan is not viable to succeed

 

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N Waziristan: why only the military option?


Thursday, June 03, 2010
By Ayaz Wazir
Only one telephone call knocked our valiant Commando down. Without seriously considering the long-term repercussions of his action on the country, or taking the nation into confidence, Musharraf chose to become a close ally of the US in its war. He brought to our doorstep the war which, obviously, was not ours. Since then we are paying for his sins. The civilian setup that succeeded him has not only owned but continued with gusto the fight to which there seems to be no end.

On its part, to cover its failures in Afghanistan, the US government has consistently continued to increase pressure on us to extend military action yet further within Pakistani territory, on one pretext or another. Although our rulers acted like the proverbial obedient servants and carried out every military demand made of us, often to utter disregard for life and the safety of our civilian populations, but they have failed to win the confidence or approval of their masters in Washington.

Drone attacks within Pakistani territory further complicated the situation. Initially we tried to cover up these attacks by claiming that our own forces hit the militants in these incidents. It did not take too long for the lie to be exposed. The government's asking for drone technology to be transferred to Pakistan further exposed its connivance in these attacks. Now even senior army generals are conceding on television talk shows that a number of our airbases have been handed over to the US for covert actions on our soil and our armed forces personnel are not permitted entry beyond the perimeters of these bases.

All hell broke loose, and the "good character certificate" we had earned after arresting Mullah Barader and other senior Taliban leaders was revoked when Faisal Shahzad, a naturalised American national, was arrested for an attempted car explosion at Times Square in New York. Reacting to the incident, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton used harsh and threatening language for Pakistan. This was the most humiliating and embarrassing moment for a close ally. Our sacrifices were forgotten in no time.

US security agencies, meanwhile, claimed to have established Faisal Shahzad's links with Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in North Waziristan. This lent further pressure to the existing demand to our government to launch a military operation there. Two senior officials of the US Homeland Security and the CIA visited Islamabad and held meetings with the president, the prime minister and the army chief to examine how best the security environment could be improved to stop the TTP from causing loss to life and property in the US. It is generally believed that the government has agreed to launch the operation, and is weighing options as to the timeframe of its launch.

Whether or not the military operation is launched, the question that comes to mind is: will that serve our national interests? Is a military operation the only option? Will that bring peace and stability to the area, and to the country as a whole? Will it stop the bleeding of the country's resources in terms of men and material? Have the military operations conducted in other parts of FATA achieved the desired results? If not, we have to take stock of the situation, and tell our friends that killing our own people on our own soil is not in our interest. If some of these people are misguided and do cross the border into Afghanistan to cause mayhem, then the NATO forces stationed there should take whatever action against the infiltrators they consider appropriate.

If the US drones can target wanted people on Pakistan's soil in total disregard of our sovereignty, why do the Americans hesitate to take similar action when such elements cross the border into Afghanistan? We have rendered enough sacrifices. Both our armed forces and the civilian population have suffered a great deal, but that has hardly earned us any laurels from Washington.

People in the tribal areas have rendered the supreme sacrifice of abandoning from their hearths and homes for the success of military operations. They and their families suffered immensely as internally displaced persons wandering on roadsides and in camps in Peshawar, Dera Ismail Khan, Tank. Nobody paid any real attention to their plight. Their sacrifices earned them nothing but lip service from the government or its functionaries who would turn up only for photo-ops.

Other equally important questions that come to mind are whether the countless operations conducted so far in FATA have earned a place of honour for us with the West? Have they eliminated militancy from the area or, to the contrary, contributed to the spread of the menace deeper into other parts of the country? If the reply to these questions is in the negative, then we need to look at the problem afresh and redraw our parameters. We should formulate and follow a policy which is not only in line with but also reflective of the aspirations of the general public. Unless we do that, we will be fighting successful battles but not a successful war.

Again, an operation in North Waziristan will not be that easy. This will require additional troops and equipment from an already overstretched army. Will we still be able to maintain an effective vigil on our eastern border? Will we be able to contain the spread of this battle to the border with Afghanistan which the army has not touched in all the operations conducted in FATA so far. Also, will the army be able to prevent it from spreading to other areas inhabited by the Wazir tribe (South Waziristan, as well as those across the border in Afghanistan). If launched, the operation is likely to become a bushfire engulfing the entire region of the two Waziristans and across the Durand Line.

Where will the IDPs go? Bannu, which is in close proximity to the east, remains mostly under curfew. Adjacent is South Waziristan, where a military operation is underway in the Mehsud area. To its north is Kurram. Kurram is already suffering from sectarian violence which has caused the closure of the road link with the rest of the country. Its inhabitants travel to Peshawar via Kabul. Unless special arrangements are made to open the roads for traffic in those areas, which is unlikely in view of the operation, people will have no choice but to cross the border into Afghanistan and take refuge there. Will we be able to effectively counter enemy propaganda that the Pakistani army has made its own people refugees in another country? How will the international community react is another matter. I do not believe these repercussions have been taken into consideration.

We have not yet rehabilitated the IDPs of Bajaur and South Waziristan. They are braving the summer heat in camps with only the barest possible essentials at their disposal. The operation will not only increase the number of IDPs but will also uproot those displaced Mehsuds who had found some shelter in the Wazir areas of the two Waziristans.

How many times are we going to conquer Fata? Each tribal agency has experienced at least two military operations in the last nine years. The people are fed up and have no capacity or patience left for any more sacrifices. The treatment meted out to the tribesmen so far is certainly not commendable. There is every likelihood of the same treatment following a fresh operation.

Let us reconsider our policy options if we really want peace and
harmony to return to the area.

The writer, a former ambassador, is from FATA.
Email: waziruk@hotmail.com

N Waziristan: why only the military option?

 

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N Waziristan: the final frontier

Saturday, June 05, 2010

Sherry Rehman

There is a saying that if you can't defeat your enemy, befriend him. This is particularly applicable to the tribal areas that border Afghanistan, where in six agencies the army is in the midst of an unprecedented military offensive against the militants. The cornerstone of security policy here is to attack militants close to Al Qaeda, but spare armed syndicates that protect Pakistan's flanks.

The turbulence in the border zone has led to Washington putting out ill-advised strategic leaks about a possible military intervention inside Pakistan's borders. North Waziristan, and what the Pakistan army is able to do there, seems to have become the litmus test for relations between Islamabad and Washington. After the Faisal Shehzad incident in Times Square, Washington's pressure has mounted on Islamabad to act against the Taliban operating out of North Waziristan.

After the United States' failure to build institutional structures in Afghanistan and install governance or central authority there, for Washington, the test of US-Nato ground offensives in the south and Loya Paktiya is now being linked to Pakistan's push on the Haqqani-led groups from North Waziristan. Despite a massive offensive in the Afghan town of Marjah, the expected Taliban reversals have not materialised.

For Pakistan this is a battle for its stability and survival. The imperative to act against terrorist and sectarian groups in Punjab and Balochistan, as well as Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, are long overdue. After the massacre of nearly a hundred Ahmadis in Lahore last week at the hands of banned sectarian outfits, the need to act against entrenched extremist groups is compelling. In Punjab, the provincial government needs to go in with a police-run counter-terror sweep against militants embedded in the warrens of its cities. The federal government needs to back up this action with pro-minority legislation to show support for victims of extremist actions.

The challenge in North Waziristan is that Islamabad does not have the military or civilian capacity to open all fronts at the same time. Despite impressive successes in other tribal agencies, the Pakistani army faces a 50,000(??)-strong critical mass of armed guerrilla combatants in North Waziristan. They have learnt to avoid set-piece battles. After army operations in surrounding areas, a hardened assortment has sought sanctuary there. From the Tehrik-e-Taliban that attacks Pakistan, to the Haqqani-group that doesn't, and Punjab-jihadist outfits like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Lashkar-az-Zil, Al Qaeda veterans and Salafists, all the hardcore elements are said to be holed out there. Islamabad's fear is that if it disturbs this hornets' nest, maintaining the fragile consensus against terrorism at home will be as difficult as protecting its cities from bombings.

This will be no shock-and-awe exercise that can be switched off with a remote-control device. Pakistan has already lost over 3,000 people as a result of backlash terrorist attacks and taken an economic hit of $35 billion. The question is: will the US be around to even hold down the hammer to Pakistan's fist when its army swoops down on this final frontier for targeted strikes at Al Qaeda strongholds like Mir Ali? In any counterinsurgency initiative in mountainous terrain, the military gains tactical advantage from choking the escape routes of enemy combatants. The Waziristan trails that run through some of the world's highest mountains are legendary for affording escape routes to Afghanistan, so without the obvious rush to block contiguous border conduits from NATO commanders in Afghanistan, the whole exercise will lead to enemy dispersal into hospitable terrain.

Given the asymmetry in border check-posts on both sides of the Durand Line, it is unlikely that any permanent flush-out of the two Waziristans is possible. If North Waziristan is grand central for terrorists, then Afghan border provinces provide their strategic depth. For the whole terrorism endeavour to turn the tide, it is actually the US and Nato that will have to pull weight on their own side. Pakistan too will have to step up border checks and review unwritten peace deals with tribal leaders that play too many sides.

Another key question is: how long can the Pakistani army stay bogged down in the agencies it has actually secured? What capacity do we have for a civilian build, hold and transition component to the project? Once again, before pressuring Pakistan with warnings of escalation of a war that the US itself cannot manage in Afghanistan, huge governance commitments like ROZ assistance will have to roll off the US machine.

Why expect Pakistan to do more than reverse the tide of the Taliban in some areas when Washington has not been able to broker a new post-insurgency model for Afghanistan? Pakhtun alienation is not a concern for exiting nations, but it has huge potential for blowback in Pakistan, where Karachi is host to five million Pakhtuns, who are mostly undocumented in the formal sector.

What will help is a phase-by-phase plan for securing the area, holding it until the tribes that have been terrorised by the Taliban are able to return and do business. Secondly, while lessons are useful, Waziristan is not Malakand. The elites in the tribal areas have been marginalised by the Taliban for a much longer time, yet they will resist governance models that diminish their pre-Taliban political powers. The military will have to stay in Waziristan until the police and FC there are strengthened by quantum proportions, and the tribal leadership prepared for critical reforms and political activity by mainstream parties.

Fata reform will only work if introduced incrementally, and the government's recent announcements, if implemented, will be a very brave start. At the federal level, security-sector reform is critical to this project, because peace deals with militants that promise not to attack government installations at one time almost always have turned against the hand that fed them. As a temporary tactical move that gives one flank relief doing an operation where defeat is not an option, there is some use to neutralising militants to focus on the first-line enemy, but never in the long-run. Tribal lashkars too fall into that category. The state must start assuming charge of security.

The politics of a military operation are never easy. No military relishes fighting inside its own borders, and no civilian, elected government embraces the use of force as a first, or even second, option. Clearly, this cannot be a hair-trigger plan. The government has put its full weight behind the operations, despite the costs that invariably accrue from such initiatives. Pakistan now has a generation of lost people, human tragedies, economic crises, internal strife and political instability.

While the military presses an offensive in Orakzai Agency, there will be little room to divert forces for anything more than strategic strikes on North Waziristan areas where the terrorists cluster. Pakistan must dismantle Al Qaeda as a priority, as well as the India-centric jihadist outfits. It also must allow Kabul to form its own stable government and hope for a friendly partner. But it will need Pakhtun reconcilables to maintain stability from Afghan border provinces after the expected US troop drawdown in 2011, and seeking more than surgical raids in North Waziristan is asking too much. Pakistan must act decisively against terrorists, but on its own game-plan.



The writer is member of the National Security Committee in parliament, and former federal minister for information

 

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VIEW: North Waziristan, the Punjabi Taliban and the Durand Line —Naeem Tahir

Baitullah Mehsud and Maulvi Fazlullah supported the violent Punjabi Taliban who had a sectarian agenda and turned a blind eye towards criminals, smugglers and the drug mafia and took their share of the booty

The recent attack on the Ahmedis, Faisal Shahzad’s terror attempt in New York, Fazlullah’s presence in Nuristan and a new warning by the Taliban of attacks on army personnel, minorities, Shias and the MQM, have stressed the urgency of an army operation against the Taliban and al Qaeda in North Waziristan. The US is even considering an independent attack.

The operation against terrorists in North Waziristan will need to take place, but when? The timing is very important. Some issues will need to be settled before the operation. They are: consolidation of the successes of Operation Rah-e-Rast and Operation Rah-e-Nijat, the clearance of the Punjabi Taliban and future control at the Durand Line for the stoppage of infiltration to and from Afghanistan.

The operations in Swat and South Waziristan met with success after a great deal of sacrifices. Swat and Malakand were terrorised and, as they were settled areas of Pakistan, they had to be cleared first. Next was South Waziristan, which was a tribal territory but the operational centre of the Taliban and al Qaeda for their terror activities against Pakistan. Perhaps most people already know that as a division of operational strategy, the terrorists had decided upon South Waziristan as their headquarters against Pakistan and North Waziristan as their headquarters for Afghanistan.

Baitullah Mehsud and Maulvi Fazlullah were the main instigators against Pakistan, with foreign ‘specialists’ and ‘consultants’ as supporters. They also supported the violent Punjabi Taliban who had a sectarian agenda and turned a blind eye towards criminals, smugglers and the drug mafia and took their share of the booty. The atrocities committed by them in Swat and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa were horrendous and the people’s suffering unimaginable. The Swat action was the first to be undertaken under the rubric Operation Rah-e-Rast and it included many heroic deeds that the world should know about, including, in particular, the Peochar heliborne attack, which is said to be the largest since World War II. Normalcy has been restored, by and large, although it is still feared that Maulvi Fazlullah may have escaped to Nuristan in Afghanistan along with some 5,000 criminals involved in terror activities. He may be marking his time (if he is alive) to sneak back through the porous border marked by the Durand Line.

Rah-e-Rast was followed by Rah-e-Nijat. This was a very large operation in most of the areas of South Waziristan where terrorist strongholds were attacked. The much objected to drones of the CIA also participated. The Taliban, the covert supporters of the Taliban in the political parties and the elite society including the media, termed drone attacks to be an attack on Pakistan’s sovereignty. This was an effort to raise public sentiment to get rid of the drones and, thus, provide relief to the Taliban-al Qaeda combination. Ultimately, the valiant armed forces of Pakistan gave several sacrifices and overpowered the terrorists, whilst the drones got Baitullah Mehsud. The surviving terrorists must have escaped to the safe haven of North Waziristan or Afghanistan, taking advantage of the porous Durand Line. Some splinter groups have been formed and are still operating.

The Punjabi Taliban of Muridke, Jhang and elsewhere are also operating and they coordinate with their headquarters in North Waziristan. These groups must be dealt with to secure the lives of Pakistani citizens. The urgency of this task has been underlined by the recent attacks in Lahore and the many subsequent threats. Splinter groups like the Asian Tigers and others have adopted different strategies. To eliminate them, the federal government and the army needs to get full support from the Punjab government, and this has not been forthcoming so far. The PML-N leadership has had relations with the Taliban and it is time they finally decide which side they are on. This should be a deciding factor before the next ‘operation’.

The Durand Line is of critical importance for the future. The loose demarcation of the boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan is the main source of problems. The Durand Line refers to the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which is poorly marked and is approximately 2,640 km long. It was established after the 1893 Durand Line Agreement between the government of colonial British India and Afghan Amir Abdur Rahman Khan for fixing the limits of their respective spheres of influence. On the plea of facilitating the tribes to meet their co-tribals on either side with ease, controls are so relaxed that most of them can walk through the openings in the mountainous terrain almost without any check. This becomes the most convenient method of infiltration into Balochistan and areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Waziristan. Proper administration of this border has been resisted by Afghanistan, primarily because of the revisionist baggage of history. Some Afghan elements still cherish the dream of Afghanistan to include within its territory the areas up to Bahawalpur as it was in the time of Sher Shah Suri in the early 16th century and up to 1840. Then, following the British, the Sikhs took this territory. This historical baggage must be shed, and ground realities faced by the Afghan leadership. The porous Durand Line is the most dangerous place in the world .A settlement on effective controls must be arrived at for the success of an army operation. This will block runaway terrorists from escaping to Pakistani territory and avoiding action by the Afghan and international forces.

The operation in North Waziristan is indeed unavoidable and urgently required, but the considerations of protecting the people in mainland Pakistan and control of the infiltrators through the Durand Line must take precedence. At this time the operation is as important for Afghanistan and the US as it is for us, perhaps more for them. It will help the US complete its assignment and get out of Afghanistan and for Afghanistan it could mean lasting peace. For Pakistan it will mean safety of life and property.

Action in North Waziristan must be undertaken, but the timing must be decided by the government of Pakistan and the armed forces, and it should follow the settlement of these issues.

Naeem Tahir is a culture and media management specialist, a researcher, author, director and actor. He can be reached at naeemtahir37@gmail.com