America's Afghanistan

[deltacamelately]

America's Afghanistan
The best comparison to make for the American adventure in Iraq is not Vietnam, but Afghanistan. And America's future could be most like Russia's in the 1990s
by Kevin Potvin <kpotvin@republic-news.org>

Prior to invading Iraq, senior US government officials frequently compared their mission to the US mission in Europe in the early 1940s. Critics then compared the war-mongering Bush Jr White House to Hitler's regime in 1939. Once the war in Iraq was well engaged and the Iraqi insurgency took shape as a strong and resilient fighting force, the comparison to the American ill-fated adventure forty years earlier in Vietnam was irresistible. In response, US regime supporters drew comparisons instead to successful US military actions in Somalia, Kosovo and even Panama.

Making comparisons between present wars and past wars is a whole side industry of the media. But for good reason: no plans go awry as predictably as war plans. If generals are forever guilty of fighting their previous war, it's because they are desperate in war's fog to discover some pattern that can tell them which way the present war is going.

Everyone knows that history repeats itself for those who don't study and learn from it. In wartime, an unintended repeat can be devastating. Vietnam figures as a poignant comparison for critics and proponents alike of the present US war in Iraq because the consequences for the US in that war were so severe.

Comparisons between past and present wars are therefore a useful and necessary exercise. But the US experience in Vietnam may not be the best comparison available to help understand where the US war in Iraq is going. For one thing, the US rate of death in Iraq, though growing, remains far below the average rate of death for Americans in Vietnam over the course of their major engagement there from 1961 to 1973. Over the course of those 12 years, the US lost an average of about 12 soldiers per day. They have lost so far in Iraq an average of about two per day.

The number of US soldiers stationed in Vietnam in the later 60s was around 500,000 at any one time. The number in the nearly two years so far of the US action in Iraq has usually remained around 130,000.

And the American economy and contemporary society bears no comparison at all. Still flush with cash as the sole big economic power in the world, the US then enjoyed a constant trade surplus and was even a net exporter of oil. And the American people were buoyant and hopeful, driven to fix in one generation, racism, poverty, and illness.

Today, America runs catastrophic trade deficits approaching a staggering US $600 billion annually. It must import huge quantities of nearly every resource, most notably oil. And the American people are not interested in The Great Society any longer.

Only the cost to the US treasury compares. The Vietnam War cost in total US $133 billion over the course of its 12 years, or an average of US $11 billion per year. Expressed in 2005 dollars, it is the equivalent of US $76 billion per year—remarkably close to the US $80 billion per year the Iraq war has cost the US so far, after almost two years.

The remaining comparisons—lack of an exit strategy, difficulty in rooting out insurgents, problems maintaining popular support at home and in the target country, and shifting overall purposes draining morale—are common features in most wars, and though they compare well between Vietnam and Iraq, the comparison is no better than between Iraq and any other war.

Instead of the US war in Vietnam in the 1960s, a more apt comparison might be the Russian experience in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Here, the numbers come out looking strikingly similar.

In the ten years between the Russian invasion in 1979 and their hasty pullout in 1989, the Russians committed about 115,000 troops to Afghanistan at any one time—a figure very close to the US numbers in Iraq. The Russians lost about 15,000 soldiers in that conflict, or about 125 per month. The US and its coalition partners over the last six months have lost a comparable average of 100 per month.

The average Russian military budget during the decade they were engaged in Afghanistan amounted to about US $250 billion annually, or about US $655 billion in today's dollars. The current total US military outlay, including items not counted in the official Pentagon budget—like the costs of the Iraq war—is estimated to be about US $600 billion per year, a number within 8% of the Russian figure. For the Russians in the mid-1980s, their Afghanistan-trapped military soaked up about 12% of their GNP. For the Americans in the mid-2000s, their Iraq-trapped military is soaking up almost 6% of their GNP—a smaller part for sure, but of a much larger and more diversified economy.

However, consider that the Afghan adventure cost the Russian government about 4.9% of its overall annual budget; the Iraq adventure is costing the American government about 3.6% of its overall annual budget. It was the cost to the Russian government budget, not necessarily the cost to the Russian GNP that caused the Russians to give up in Afghanistan. The financial impact of Iraq on the finances of the American government at this early stage is already almost 75% of what the impact of Afghanistan was on the finances of the Russian government by the time they were finished.

This number is surely the most important one to consider when looking for comparisons to the American war in Iraq at least in terms of learning where America may be headed in this conflict, and as a nation. All experts agree that the Soviet Union lost in Afghanistan primarily because they could not keep up to the level of spending required to maintain or win the conflict.

More dramatically, it is widely believed that the financial costs of the Afghan war was the primary cause of the bankruptcy of the Soviet Union itself, and its very disappearance from the world stage. The demise was rapid: in the same year Soviet troops pulled out of Afghanistan, the chief symbol of its empire, the Berlin Wall, was toppled. Nation after nation once under Soviet control declared independence in the following 12 months.

By the end of the following year, the Soviet Union itself was terminated. Within three years, its economy was completely ruined, its currency had collapsed to nearly no value, and its capital and infrastructure was nearly completely looted. Fifteen years later, the Russian population continues to decline rapidly and the life expectancy of Russians, as well as their level of literacy, health, and savings, approaches those of the terminally under-developed third-world nations.

In one generation, Russia had gone from a world-straddling economic and military empire second in almost every respect only to America itself, and busy making a bold foray into Middle Eastern politics, down to a desperate and shrinking third-world nation dependent on foreign aid and loans draining what remains of its natural resources.

Compare this description of Russia from a 1981 issue of Foreign Affairs , to the Russia we know today: “ Russia today is a mighty world power, with the largest territory of any state, a population of 260 million, great mineral resources in a resource-hungry world, and a geopolitical position that gives it a large role in both European and Asian affairs. It is a military superpower with intercontinental and intermediate-range nuclear missiles in large numbers, supersonic airplanes, a huge standing army based on universal military service, and fleets in all oceans. It controls an East and Central European empire extending deep into Germany and the Balkans. Its power and influence radiate into Asia, the Middle East, the Mediterranean, Africa and Latin America.”

Many long-term and complex reasons account for this dramatic reversal of fortune, many lying at the core of a rotted-out economy and society. But what triggered the collapse were the problems the Soviet military encountered in Afghanistan.

Similarly, the US today experiences many long-term and complex problems lying at the core of its economy and society. The huge corporate collapses in the last couple of years, most notably at Enron and Worldcom, are indicative of a rot at the core of the American economy. Though those examples have receded from the popular imagination, they will yet re-emerge in it for the dramatic and larger collapse they will come to be seen to have portended.

Similarly, the exposure of torture and extreme abuse of prisoners in US military custody at Guantanamo Bay and at Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad, and the short-lived public response to them, are indicative of a sharp turn in American social attitudes. The collapse of the Soviet Union has been attributed by some observers to the dispirited Russian polity as much as it has been accounted for by the hollowed-out Russian economy. In recent books by, for example, Thomas Frank ( What's the Matter With Kansas? ) and by Barbara Ehrenreich ( Nickel and Dimed ), we glimpse an American society every bit as tired and unhappy as any described by writers in the Russia of the 1970s. The war in Afghanistan in 1979, it has been argued, was waged in part to distract the restless Russian population from their gloomy lives and dwindling prospects. The same has been suggested of America's war in Iraq.

The Russians would surely have fared better in Afghanistan, and the Soviet Union may well have survived, had it not been for foreign interference in the conflict emanating mostly from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, and orchestrated and financed chiefly by the US.

It was the introduction of US-made Stinger ground-to-air missiles into the conflict in 1986 that made air transport too dangerous and expensive for the Russians, and ultimately doomed their far-flung bases dotted around the country, and ended their invasion. The US funneled US $2 billion through various channels into the conflict to tie down, and ultimately defeat, the Soviet Red Army.

It is unclear if any foreign powers have so far intervened in the Iraq conflict. But then, it took the US, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan about five years to realize that the Afghan resistance was a formidable force willing and able to stand up to the mighty Russian army—and to begin to see the larger geopolitical possibilities available by financing the mujahadin fighters there.

As the Iraqi resistance continues to surprise the world with its obvious willingness and apparent ability to stand up to the even mightier US army, how long will it be before other players in the geopolitical arena begin to make the calculations and see the possibilities available by covertly intervening in the conflict there?

Any number of well-financed players on the world stage could benefit directly from seeing the US military tied down indefinitely, and possibly even eradicated, in Iraq.

China has already been publicly tagged by American political strategists as the next great challenger to US hegemony. Russia under strongman Vladimir Putin seeks a triumphal return from its exile from the world stage. Iran sees a possible return to regional dominance. Saudi Arabia has ever only been to America a partner of convenience and the family running the huge oilfields has at best a tenuous grip on power. Egypt and Syria, erstwhile brothers and progenitors of pan-Arabism, may see in America's problems air to breathe again the dream of one large Arab state.

Once the Iraqi resistance shows its staying power, who's to say which countries wouldn't find benefit in helping them along with weapons here, cash there, not necessarily to defeat the Americans, but not to let them get out, either—at least not until its too late for the whole American enterprise.

This was America's, Pakistan's, and Saudi Arabia's strategy in pumping carefully calibrated quantities of arms and cash into the mujahedin fighters in Afghanistan then confronting the Russian army. And here is where the comparison between Russia's experience in Afghanistan and America's experience in Iraq come closest to a direct match: it was a total surprise for the world when American financing and arming of Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network not only chased the Soviets out of Afghanistan, but triggered the collapse of the whole empire.

It was a surprise because no one then knew how weak were the economic, social and military pillars of Russian society, and no one expected a defeat of the one, much less a collapse of the other two. But a sober consideration of the state of America's economic and social pillars today, plus an appreciation for the dreadfully overstretched state of its military around the world, reveal conditions not too unlike those reminiscent of 1980s Russia.

“ Brezhnev's goal was to make the USSR into one of the strongest political superpowers in the world,” reads a popular history of the country. “The military was richly funded and the authoritative influence of Brezhnev could be felt in the asperity of the population. When Brezhnev died in 1982, he left behind an empire with one of the world's strongest military sectors, but weakest population morale. The Soviet Union was an empty superpower with crumbling financial, social and political sectors.” Can this not be said of America today?

With economic, social and military conditions looking largely the same, and with the war costing in treasure and blood about the same, and with the same kind of confluence of international interests not averse to its failure abroad and utter collapse at home, the Russian experience in Afghanistan may be the best comparison to the American experience in Iraq. And if that is true, then the consequences for Russia and the Russians over the course of the following generation probably best portends the consequences for America and the Americans over the next twenty years or so.

That is to say, the world may sometime very soon be as surprised as it was in 1990 when the Soviet empire disappeared. It is certainly a possibility that ought to be planned for in capitals closely tied to America—most especially Ottawa.
The Republic :: America's Afghanistan

Neo would require your comments on this.
However, from a personal pov, the author has highly exaggerated things.
Breznev rode the high horse on a financially depleted Soviet GDP, same can not be said about the US, or could it be?

 

[muse]

An interesting read and not really much of a stretch - the U.S. is certainly facing severe financial problems, the U.S. currency will face even more considerable challeneges in the near future, Mr. Medvedev's comments with regard to the unacceptablity of the $$ "sole currency" carries weight, as does the chinese effort to safe guard their reserves from the eroding value of the $$ by seeking a new currency with which they can exchange their $$ without significant loss of value.

Additionally, What is it that the U.S. seeks with it's continued presence in Afghanistan? It is holding on, that's all, if ejected or evacuated from Afghanistan, the only place it may be welcome would be Israel and that welcome may not last as long as some in the U.S might hope.

If Afghanistan were to be considered reconstituted and function effectively, exactly what American objective would have been met?? Yes, it is the case of the black swan? After all, Did the U.S. not declare that it is in Afghanistan to oust the Talib and defeat Al Qaida in Afghanistan?? And is it not being asserted by the U.S. and Nato and the Afghan that Talib are no more in Afghanistan but in Pakistan? And do the same not suggest that AQ is no more in Afghanistan but in Pakistan?

The Afghan government, such as it is, does not have a strong hold, does not have capacity to deliver, and if the $$$ should stop flowing or the flow slow down, it will have a negative effect on those who today cooperate with occupation forces, any way you cut it, they are occupation forces.

If the figure of US$ 5.00 Trillion is a conservative figure, as Nobel Prize winning economit Joseph Stiglitz, has suggested for the cost of the American effort, to not just the U.S. but other economies as well, it is not unreasonable to assert that such expenditures are ruinous to any economy.

 

[deltacamelately]

After all, Did the U.S. not declare that it is in Afghanistan to oust the Talib and defeat Al Qaida in Afghanistan?? And is it not being asserted by the U.S. and Nato and the Afghan that Talib are no more in Afghanistan but in Pakistan? And do the same not suggest that AQ is no more in Afghanistan but in Pakistan?

That would vindicate all the allegations that the free world has been lodging on Pakistan vis-a-vis the Taliban and AQ. Nice recipe for the latest speculations on NATO/US attack on the rogues inside Pakistan.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

That would vindicate all the allegations that the free world has been lodging on Pakistan vis-a-vis the Taliban and AQ. Nice recipe for the latest speculations on NATO/US attack on the rogues inside Pakistan.

Criticism for 'inaction' aside, if the economic cost is what the author argues will make war unsustainable, how does attacking Pakistan do anything but astronomically increase both direct and indirect costs for the world?

 

[muse]

delta

Indeed. Another war is just what the doctored ordered. Then lets see if the analysis offered by Mr. potvin may be seen as prescient. And vindication is not required, after all we are not speaking of equals. This machine has to keep on going, doing Gods work, because if it stops, it will not again, start.

 

[muse]

Unrepentant, spitting poison at the world even as it enters the jaws of failure:
One would laugh if it were not so sad - such sad intellectuals call for democracy and consensual government, and then of course refuse to talk governments produced from such -- America is losing because it has over played it's hand and because to the suprise of even it's most ardent supporters, it's so called policy is bereft of inspiring ideas unless of course endless wars are your thing.


Thomas L. Friedman: Drilling in Afghanistan
By Thomas L. Friedman Published: July 30, 2008


Sometimes in politics, particularly in campaigns, parties get wedded to slogans - so wedded that no one stops to think about what they're saying, whether the reality has changed and what the implications would be if their bumper stickers really guided policy when they took office. Today, we Americans have two examples of that: "Democrats for Afghanistan" and "Republicans for offshore drilling."

Republicans have become so obsessed with the notion that we can drill our way out of the current energy crisis that re-opening the coastal waters to drilling has become their answer for every energy question.

Anyone who looks at the growth of middle classes around the world and their rising demands for natural resources, plus the dangers of climate change driven by our addiction to fossil fuels, can see that clean renewable energy - wind, solar, nuclear and stuff we haven't yet invented - is going to be the next great global industry. It has to be if we are going to grow in a stable way.

Therefore, the country that most owns the clean power industry is going to most own the next great technology breakthrough - the E.T. revolution, the energy technology revolution - and create millions of jobs and thousands of new businesses, just like the I.T. revolution did.

Republicans, by mindlessly repeating their offshore drilling mantra, focusing on a 19th-century fuel, remind me of someone back in 1980 arguing that we should be putting all our money into making more and cheaper IBM typewriters - and forget about this thing called the "PC." It is a strategy for making America a second-rate power and economy.

But Democrats have their analog. For many Democrats, Afghanistan was always the "good war," as opposed to Iraq. I think Barack Obama needs to ask himself honestly: "Am I for sending more troops to Afghanistan because I really think America can win there, because I really think that that will bring an end to terrorism, or am I just doing it because to get elected in America, post-9/11, I have to be for winning some war?"

The truth is that Iraq, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Pakistan are just different fronts in the same war. The core problem is that the Arab-Muslim world in too many places has been failing at modernity, and were it not for $120-a-barrel oil, that failure would be even more obvious. For far too long, the region has been dominated by authoritarian politics, massive youth unemployment, outdated education systems, a religious establishment resisting reform and now a death cult that glorifies young people committing suicide.

The humiliation this cocktail produces is the real source of terrorism. Saddam Hussein exploited it. Al Qaeda exploits it. Pakistan's intelligence services exploit it. Hezbollah exploits it. The Taliban exploit it.

The only way to address it is by changing the politics. Producing islands of decent and consensual government in Baghdad or Kabul or Islamabad would be a much more meaningful and lasting contribution to the war on terrorism than even killing bin Laden in his cave. But it needs local partners. The reason the surge helped in Iraq is because Iraqis took the lead in confronting their own extremists - the Shiites in their areas, the Sunnis in theirs. That is very good news - although it is still not clear that they can come together in a single functioning government.

The main reason we are losing in Afghanistan is not because there are too few U.S. soldiers, but because there are not enough Afghans ready to fight and die for the kind of government we want. Take 20 minutes and read the stunning article in last Sunday's New York Times Magazine by Thomas Schweich, a former top Bush counternarcotics official focused on Afghanistan, and dwell on his paragraph on the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai:

"Karzai was playing us like a fiddle: The U.S. would spend billions of dollars on infrastructure improvement; the U.S. and its allies would fight the Taliban; Karzai's friends could get rich off the drug trade; he could blame the West for his problems; and in 2009, he would be elected to a new term."

Then read the Afghan expert Rory Stewart's July 17 Time magazine cover story from Kabul: "A troop increase is likely to inflame Afghan nationalism because Afghans are more anti-foreign than we acknowledge, and the support for our presence in the insurgency areas is declining. ... The more responsibility we take in Afghanistan, the more we undermine the credibility and responsibility of the Afghan government and encourage it to act irresponsibly. Our claims that Afghanistan is the 'front line in the war on terror' and that 'failure is not an option' have convinced the Afghan government that we need it more than it needs us. The worse things become, the more assistance it seems to receive. This is not an incentive to reform."

Before Democrats adopt "More Troops to Afghanistan" as their bumper sticker, they need to make sure it's a strategy for winning a war - not an election.

 

[deltacamelately]

The main reason we are losing in Afghanistan is not because there are too few U.S. soldiers, but because there are not enough Afghans ready to fight and die for the kind of government we want.

This is not an isolated problem. Unless the belligerent Afghans stop getting patronage from their ideological Popes in Pakistan, the west will keep failing in ensuring a modern democracy with progressive values. Million dollar question is, is the US in a position to ensure that? Is the GoP willing to shade off its lascivious lust for strategic depth? If not, then Pakistan and its teeming millions will keep suffering due a belligerent, war torn, simmering neighbour.

 

[muse]

Excellent - thank you for picking up on that, but if I may I should like to highlight something in that statement:


The main reason we are losing in Afghanistan is not because there are too few U.S. soldiers, but because there are not enough Afghans ready to fight and die for the kind of government we want

This from the champion of consensual government.

can the U.S. effect Pakistan's teeming millions?? Sho nuff! What difference will a 165 million more added to the more than a Billion of her enemies.

Unless the U.S. can articulate a policy that identifies clearly it's objectives and is transparent in it's REGIONAL approach leading to it's dignified withdrawl from Afghanistan, the threat of a shooting war will continue.

Allow me to elaborate by posing questions that must be answered by the U.S. - exactly which U.S. strategic objective will be met if greater numbers of Afghans were willing to die for a government that the U.S. wants??

Is it U.S. policy to seek the deaths of greater numbers of Afghans for the furtherane of U.S. objectives?? And do Afghans know this

Look and see, U.S. through it's media outlest, particularly in Czech Republic have tried to "channel" hosility toards U.S. by redirecting it at Pakistan - however; whereas it is true that one can fool some peole some of the time, fooling all the people all the time, well, that's an entirely futile enterprise.

 

[deltacamelately]

Allow me to elaborate by posing questions that must be answered by the U.S. - exactly which U.S. strategic objective will be met if greater numbers of Afghans were willing to die for a government that the U.S. wants??

The US intent is ultra clear. They want a Govt. in Afghanistan that promulgates progressive western values. They want the power of the war lords to vapourise. They want to ensure that the govt. remains viable and strong enough to quell any probability of the Talibs to ressurect. They want to ensure that with the errosion of medivial Islamic mindsets in both Pakistan borders and Afghanistan, broader and modern mindsets assume controll over the average citizen, resulting in permanent assimilation with the free world.
Bluntly, they want to ensure that there is no 9/11 again.

 

[muse]

The US intent is ultra clear. They want a Govt. in Afghanistan that promulgates progressive western values. They want the power of the war lords to vapourise. They want to ensure that the govt. remains viable and strong enough to quell any probability of the Talibs to ressurect. They want to ensure that with the errosion of medivial Islamic mindsets in both Pakistan borders and Afghanistan, broader and modern mindsets assume controll over the average citizen, resulting in permanent assimilation with the free world.
Bluntly, they want to ensure that there is no 9/11 again

Allow me - the state of Afghanistan is now, under the Americans, is the ISLAMIC Republic of Afghanistan -- See, if it is about democracy and consensual government, are you saying that is thatt the ordinary Afhan wasnts Western values?? If yes, you have not been in Afghanistan and are not familar with Afghan culture -- Now, if it is not about democracy and consensual government, we are back to just plain occupation and U.S. plans are for another 20 30 years and beyond.

War lords - Sir, again, you may not be familair with what has been going on in Afghanistan under the U.S. - They rely on War lords to keep U.S. forces safe in the areas they operate - I know what you will say about that, but trust me on that one and do some research and you will see who the police comanders are. Yes, they are relying on war lords because war lords can get the job done, and yes they do no like to rely on them but this is what I meant when I was talking about "capacity" of the Afghan government.

Afghan permanently assimilated into the free world?? It's not realistic, it's a recipe for long term war -- on the other hand there are those who want exactly that.

No more 9/11? Sure no one wants another 9/11 - how to get that? So far making war has not made the U.S, safe and nothing will until the U.S. is seen as a partner by a majority of Muslims.


I think you are mistaken about U.S. policy, and the reason for being in Afghanistan, as we discussd, U.S. says taliban are in pakistan, AQ is in Pakistan and as the Tom Friedman piece points out, to some, the front is immaterial, what counts is that the war go on.

See, here is where the problem is - it exposes the fact that there is no policy beyond war - - and so long as there are luney tunes, and there always will be, the U.S. will be at war with and within the Muslim world -- in effect, this behaviour vindicates AQ's position that this is really a war against Islam - yes it ia most opportunistic suggestion, but it has "legs" as people say, it's a line that sticks.

Now all this suggests that a clear policy with clear objectives is absolutely vital - idiot notions of safe border while occupation troops exist in the country are just that, idiot suggestions. The U.S. has a border with Mexico and all the money and technology and all the public suport against illegals, can they control that border?

Now, I'm not suggesting Talib are the answer to anything, but an answer has to be "formulated" - a situation where occupation troops and war have persisted and is likely to persist is a "REGIONAL" problem. Pakistan is not the only country with a border with Afghanistan and problems in one country have away of reproducing themselves in other countries, is this not so??

American policy OUGHT to represent sobriety.

 

[roadrunner]

The US intent is ultra clear. They want a Govt. in Afghanistan that promulgates progressive western values.

Foolish statement. Afghanistan doesn't need western values, the progressive ones or the regressive ones. It just needs foreign powers to stop meddling and invading it. Then it will develop its own progressiveness. Hopefully for Afghanistan, it will be a uniquely Afghani progressiveness.

 

[deltacamelately]

Foolish statement. Afghanistan doesn't need western values, the progressive ones or the regressive ones. It just needs foreign powers to stop meddling and invading it. Then it will develop its own progressiveness. Hopefully for Afghanistan, it will be a uniquely Afghani progressiveness.

Pious Statement, albeit off the tanjent.
However, the matter isn't what Afghans want.
Rather its all about what the US/NATO wants in Afghanistan.

 

[muse]

the matter isn't what Afghans want.
Rather its all about what the US/NATO wants in Afghanistan

Excellent! And people in hell want ice water. Really it's about what one can get and we must be realistic, we must be sober

 

[muse]

Reader are invited to read the article below, from today's IHT, Carefully, critically:



As the fighting swells in Afghanistan, so does a refugee camp in its capital
By Carlotta Gall

Saturday, August 2, 2008
KABUL, Afghanistan: On a piece of barren land on the western edge of this capital, a refugee camp is steadily swelling as families displaced by the heavy bombardment in southern Afghanistan arrive in batches.

The growing numbers reaching Kabul are a sign of the deepening of the conflict between NATO and American forces and the Taliban in the south and of the feeling among the population that there will be no end soon. Families who fled the fighting around their homes in Helmand Province one or two years ago and sought temporary shelter around two southern provincial capitals, Lashkar Gah and Kandahar, said they had moved to Kabul because of growing insecurity across the south.

"If there was security in the south, why would we come here?" said Abdullah Khan, 50, who lost his father, uncle and a female relative in the bombing of their home last year. "We will stay here, even for 10 years, until the bombardment ends."

Sixty-one families from just one southern district &#8212; Kajaki, in northern Helmand Province &#8212; arrived in Kabul in late July. A representative for those families, Khair Muhammad, 27, said that a major jailbreak last month that freed hundreds of Taliban prisoners was the latest sign of the deteriorating security. "Do you know, the Taliban entered Kandahar city and broke into the prison?" he said. "Do you think that is security?"

The United Nations refugee agency has registered 450 families from Helmand Province at the camp &#8212; approximately 3,000 people. But that is only a part of the overall refugee picture. An estimated 10,000 to 15,000 people have been displaced by the insurgency in the south, but the numbers fluctuate as some have been able to return home when the fighting moves elsewhere.

The International Committee of the Red Cross has warned that the displaced who have reached the cities represent only the tip of the iceberg, and many others are trapped by violence in remote areas without assistance.

Many of the families who have arrived in Kabul have suffered traumatic losses and injuries, and they say that they are pessimistic about the future.

"The Taliban are getting stronger," said Muhammad Younus, a farm worker who abandoned his village after his father, brother and uncle were killed in an airstrike two years ago. "There were armored vehicles on the hill and they were firing. There was a heavy bombardment, and planes bombed, too," he said. "They did not differentiate between the guilty and not guilty."

He, like many of the displaced people, complained that villagers found themselves trapped between Taliban fighters, who used the villages for cover to attack foreign forces, and NATO and American forces, which would often call in airstrikes on village compounds where civilians were living.

"We left our houses because we had no power to resist the Taliban or the government," said Muhammad, the representative who brought families to Kabul from villages in Kajaki.

"Anytime the Taliban fired a shot from our houses, then the coalition, the government and the police came to the area and hit us."

"The government comes and arrests us, and then the Taliban come and arrest us as well," he said. "We are under the feet of two powers."

As a civilian plane circled above the city, Muhammad and the crowd of men around him all looked nervously upward. "We are in trouble with these things," he said, pointing at the plane. "There was fighting in the village a hundred times, roadside bombs, bombardment, firing and shooting."

His strongest complaints were against the Taliban who, he said, had accused a relative of being a spy for the coalition forces and executed him. "I absolutely know he was not," he said vehemently.

"The Taliban are coming during the night, with heavy weapons, riding on vehicles, and we cannot even dare ask them to leave, because if they see someone at night outside they will slaughter them and accuse them of being spies," he said.

But the heavy reprisals by NATO and American forces was what drove them from their homes in the end, he and others said.

Khan Muhammad, 35, came with 40 people from his extended family three months ago after their village, Tajoi, near Kajaki, was bombed and his 4-year-old son, Umar Khan, was killed. "His mother was cooking, and he was lying beside her," he said. "The whole village was destroyed, and after that we left."

He said the villagers did not even see the Taliban but heard them fire as foreign troops were driving along the road outside the village.

"We don't know from which side they fired, but we heard that," he said. "Half an hour or an hour later they bombed."

His father, Sher Ali Aqa, 75, was trapped under the rubble and his leg was shattered. Still unable to walk, he sat on a mat beside a makeshift tent.

"I blame the foreigners," Muhammad said. "If the Taliban fire from over there, do you come and bomb this village?"

He added, "We only want a stable country, whether with the Taliban or the foreigners." But he said that the level of violence made him realize that the foreign forces could not bring security.

That sentiment was echoed by many of the villagers, who said that the civilian deaths were particularly galling given the sophisticated technology of the coalition's warplanes.

"If they kill, if they wound innocent people, we don't want them," said Tauz Khan, a man from the Sangin district who said he lost five members of his family in bombings last year. "If they build and bring peace we will accept them."

His father, brother and a daughter were among those killed. "You cannot take revenge against a plane," he said. "But I will not forgive the foreigners for this crime."

 

[muse]

The growing numbers reaching Kabul are a sign of the deepening of the conflict between NATO and American forces and the Taliban

Curiously Gall does not acknowledge that refugee ranks are swelling because of indiscriminate air bombardment -- Soviets once did the same and reaped as they sowed