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Extension may seem to be a sell-out if SC invokes Article 191
Saturday, July 24, 2010
Kayani has great pluses
By Ikram Sehgal
In a dramatic late night announcement by the prime minister on July 22, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani was given an extension as COAS for three years from the date his present term expires on November 29, 2010. By some coincidence in my article last Thursday, I had said: A new COAS of the Pakistan Army must be promoted. It would be severely disappointing if Kayani accepted the offer of extension being dangled in front of him. He hasan image that would suffer for posterity. If he cannot be C-in-C, Kayani should refuse an extension in the Waheed Kakar tradition.
While continuation of his service in the military state of affairs of the Pakistan Armed Forces is certainly correct, the way it has been rushed through is somewhat mystifying, and if he cannot be C-in-C as expected in a phased transition, it will be certainly disappointing. That would very much look like a sell out!
The article, On Extensions and Expectations on July 22, 2010, had further continued: For some weeks now speculation is rife that Kayani, whose term as COAS expires in four months almost to the day, will get a two-year extension. Normally one talks about a one-year extension or the full term, the two-years period seems to be a trial balloon. The public is being conditioned (psy-war technique) to the common belief is that this may likely become a fact.
Kayanis has great pluses, viz, he has: (1) restored the morale and confidence of the Pakistan Army, the one entity that holds Pakistan together, (2) sustained the present democratic process, being run presently by civilians as a dictatorship in contrast to Musharrafs military dictatorship, which to give him his just due, was being run by him more or less as a democracy, and last but most important, (3) won the confidence of the US and other western powers by his professionalism while not allowing the Pakistan Army to be used as a mercenary force (as was being done circa 2003-2007). The ongoing war, the availing geo-political circumstances, and his track record dealing with foreign powers makes Kayani much needed. The respect he commands among all ranks of the Armed Forces as well as the nations citizens must take the continuity factor onto a higher and different plane. As per Murphys Law: if it aint broke, dont fix it.
More importantly he has acquired the prestige to make combined Services a fighting reality. Instead of having a titular head of the Armed Forces as Chairman JCSC, make Kayani the executive head sitting in GHQ as Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of all the three Services, unquote.
Ashfaq Parvez Kayani has remade the Pakistan Army in many ways more than one besides restoring the esteem that the Army was held in by the citizens of the country, and restoring the morale and self-confidence of its rank and file.
One of first acts was to re-call several hundred Army officers on deputation in civil services where they had no reason to be, and the militarys intelligence services were not allowed to interfere in the 2007 elections. This set the stage for the Army to get out of politics.
He oversaw a peaceful transition (with dignity) of Gen Musharraf out of the office of Presidency (and with some difficulty out of the Army House), and stayed neutral in the subsequent process of electing the new President.
Kayani has focused on soldiers welfare and a return to professionalism. COIN training was carried out indigenously on a crash basis before taking soldiers into battle, a peacetime ceremonial outfit was converted into a mean military machine, observers far and wide have been amazed by the effectiveness of the subsequent COIN campaign.
Our young men in uniform in Swat and SWA suffered meaningful deaths, their Shahadats amounted for something. Kayani gently nudged the government into restoring the superior judiciary in the face of the Long March. Kayanis many successes have not gone to his head, instead of Napoleonic tendencies, he remains committed to democracy, even a multi-flawed inherently corrupt one like ours. His will be a difficult act to follow!
Given four months to the countdown on Nov 27, 2010 and the machinations that could have happened in the interim, there is no doubt there was uncertainty - and in that uncertainty - rampant speculation. Obviously this was not good, either for the Army and/or the relentless military campaign against militants that it was engaged in.
The rumour mill had to bring to a stop. To that end the early announcement is correct, one can disagree about the way it was announced, and the fact that it may have been dictated not by circumstances but by political expediency.
There has to be a quid pro quo, what will it be? It is not a secret that the Supreme Court (SC) orders are being flouted at will, who can they turn to if they have to invoke Article 191? The extension will than be seem as a sell-out.
The person of Kayani must seem to be synonymous with conscience instead of pragmatism, unfortunately that has a sorry track record with most of us. Some things cannot be kept secret, the whole process that was followed will eventually come to light. One fears that it will be disappointing of there have been any compromises made or promised, one would not like to see Kayani having feet of clay.
As far back as 18 years ago in 1992, in my article Unified Command, I had suggested that at least Three (and up to Six) Commands should be created. To quote, Given all the requirements, the suggestions for the organisation of Command are, viz, (1) Northern Command including AK, Northern Areas and all areas within Chenab River and the Indus, (2) Eastern Command between Chenab and the Sutlej, (3) Central Command including Sutlej but excluding Sukkur, (4) Southern Command including Sukkur, Hyderabad and Badin but excluding Karachi and the Coastal area, (5) Coastal Command to include Karachi and Pakistans coastal areas, and (6) Western Command to include all areas of Balochistan and NWFP bounded to the east by the Indus, in a war with India it forms the Countrys Strategic Reserve. Corps formations must exist in only those critical areas which we must defend, in AK (two Corps), Lahore and Sialkot (one Corps each), Rahimyar Khan-Pano Aqil belt (one Corps) and Chor-Umerkot-Nabisar-Badin (one Corps), the rest of the Army should be grouped into Brigade-sized Task Forces (Divisional sized only when specifically required) within respective Commands supported by commensurate Air Force elements as well as Artillery and Anti-Aircraft Divisions in addition to their integral supporting arms, e.g. artillery, armour etc. Both Central and Southern Commands should each have Brigade-sized Long Range Desert Groups (LRDGs), fully mechanised and desert-mobile with camel-mounted ancillary troops.
The Army and Air Force must be under command of the Naval effort in the Coastal Command. It must be understood clearly that in the first stage of the war, the PAF will remain under its own central authority, the Chief of Air Staff, to fight the battle for air superiority. The choice of the man to head this new concept of Unified Command becomes important, given the fact we cannot afford to experiment.
Media speculations about promotions in the Armed Forces are usually counter-productive to the national interest. They may be labelled creative journalism, it is more pertinent as creation of sensationalism with or without motive, unquote.
The extension given to Kayani may be to an individual, but it could ensure a smooth transition to a combined services entity as an institution. The telltale indication will be when the senior-most after Kayani, Lt Gen Khalid Shameem Wynne, presently Chief of General Staff (CGS) and a quiet self-effacing professional, is promoted to four-star rank in a newly created Vice Chief of Army Staff (VCOAS) slot.
This along with creation of more Commands (the number may reduce now to three or four in light of changed geo-political circumstances, in particular the present war along the western front) would calm the aspirations of those who would feel frustrated by the blocking of promotions that has certainly resulted by giving Kayani the renewed term as COAS.
Air Chief Marshal Rao Qamar Suleman may well become the Chairman JCSC when Tariq Majeed retires. Kayani and Suleman have worked well together in forging a close Army-PAF relationship in the COIN operations, and the PAF Chief very clearly looks up to the COAS. The media has reported that Lt Gen (R) Athar Ali, Secretary Defence, may be given a two-year extension. Nominally senior to Kayani in the Army before he retired, Athar had a professional reputation as a soldier.
To ensure the anticipated C-in-C arrangement becomes functional, in whatever name yet to be finalised, Athars continuation as Secretary Defence Ministry becomes a necessity. The present arrangement does mean that eventually Kayani will become de-facto C-in-C in all but name. Kayanis extension may be as a COAS, what we may actually have is a C-in-C in place, in all but name. Therefore lets call it a mixed blessing, this extension could well be a necessary camouflage for the phased transition to what should be a reality, a Unified Command.
