Indira Gandhi dismissed the American threat as irrelevant, saying everyone would be dead if Delhi was nuked. Later, the Americans revealed they never intended to attack Delhi. Their goal was simply to rescue American servicemen trapped in East Pakistan
Slowly and steadily, the 1965
Indo-Pakistan war has shed its mysteries. But it is still unclear why it ended suddenly.
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Ayubââ¬â¢s foreign minister, insinuated that Pakistan was winning the war when Ayub succumbed to foreign pressure. Bhutto also said that the Tashkent Agreement contained a secret clause that compromised Pakistanââ¬â¢s national security and he threatened to ââ¬Ålet the cat out of the bagââ¬Â.
But he never followed through on this threat, probably because merely talking about the cat gave his budding political career a boost. Toward the end of his life, Ayub told G W Choudhry that there was no such clause and the only secret was Bhuttoââ¬â¢s childish behaviour at Tashkent. No secret clause has surfaced thus far.
Another mystery has been Chinaââ¬â¢s role in the conflict. Air Marshal Asghar Khan in his 1979 book, ââ¬ÅThe First Roundââ¬Â, said that a key reason for the warââ¬â¢s indecisive outcome was Ayubââ¬â¢s failure to avail himself of his newfound friendship with China. Asghar Khan flew to Beijing on September 9th on a secret mission to procure arms and ammunition and met Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai.
Chou was up on the military aspects of the situation and assured him that the Chinese would immediately fly the needed combat aircraft over the Karakorums to Pakistan. But to Chouââ¬â¢s surprise, that was not acceptable to Ayub, who wanted the aircraft crated and shipped to Indonesia and then re-shipped to Karachi to hide the transfer from the Americans.
Asghar Khan also conveyed Ayubââ¬â¢s request that the Chinese move the Peopleââ¬â¢s Liberation Army toward the border with India. This deeply concerned the Chinese, because it would have international ramifications. They invited Ayub to Beijing so that Mao could ââ¬Ålook him in the eyeââ¬Â and verify that Ayub intended to see the whole thing through. Alternatively, Chou was prepared to visit Pakistan. In the end, Ayub neither visited China nor did he invite Chou for a visit, knowing that his eyes would have given the show away.
Asghar Khanââ¬â¢s account of how Ayub failed to play the China card has received little attention in the scholarly literature, perhaps because it was based on unsubstantiated evidence. However, a quarter century later, Jung Chang and Jon Halliday have substantiated it. They are the co-authors of a major new biography called ââ¬ÅMao: The Unknown Storyââ¬Â.
This meticulously documented expose portrays the grave harms caused to the Chinese people by a man who was supposedly acting in their interest but who in practice was carrying out a megalomaniacal agenda that took more lives than Stalinââ¬â¢s in the Soviet Union. Regarding the 1965 war, it says that Mao was anxious to score another victory over India, having trounced it conclusively in 1962 in the northeastern portion of the border between Tibet and India.
The authors say that China actually came through on Ayubââ¬â¢s request and moved its troops closer to the border with India. It went a step further and issued two ultimatums to India, demanding that it dismantle alleged outposts on territory claimed by China. India was put on the defensive, but the plan collapsed when Pakistan suddenly accepted a UN call for a ceasefire before Chinaââ¬â¢s deadline had expired.
Ayub told Mao that the costs of continuing the war were too high for Pakistan to bear, both diplomatically and economically. However, Mao pressed Ayub to fight on, saying: ââ¬ÅIf there is a nuclear war, it is Peking and not Rawalpindi that will be the target.ââ¬Â But Ayub demurred.
This episode of history is rich in lessons. First, Ayub should not have gone into a war without thinking through the consequences of sending his forces into Kashmir. He made a fatal error of generalship when he assumed that India would not retaliate against Lahore. This strategic myopia would be imitated by Yahya and Musharraf.
Second, Ayub failed to avail himself of the new ties that Pakistan had cultivated with China and remained a prisoner of the old ties with the US, even though they had gone stale once the US placed an arms embargo on both India and Pakistan just as the war began. The embargo was one-sided since it crippled the Pakistani military, whose equipment then was almost entirely of US origin, without making much of a dent in the Indian ability to make war.
Third, Ayub should have thought through the consequences of going to war with India at a time when Pakistanââ¬â¢s major allies were each otherââ¬â¢s sworn enemies. Ironically, when Pakistan desperately needed Chinaââ¬â¢s aid six years later, it would find that the China card had expired.
It had been disabled by the long-term defence pact that India had signed with the Soviet Union in August 1971. The USSR moved several army divisions to its border with China in Manchuria. China was forced to tell Pakistan that the Soviet Union did not fear China, which ââ¬â translated from the Mandarin ââ¬â meant that China feared the Soviet Union. It could not put pressure on India.
Ironically, by then China and the US had reconciled their differences. Both had a common interest in saving Pakistan. The US moved the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal but this did not deter Indira Gandhi from moving ahead with her war plans to invade Dhaka. According to an interview given many years later by General Sam Maneckshaw, who was then the Indian army chief, Indira Gandhi dismissed the American threat as irrelevant, saying everyone would be dead if Delhi was nuked. Later, the Americans revealed they never intended to attack Delhi. Their goal was simply to rescue American servicemen trapped in East Pakistan.
In the mean time, GHQ was telling Gen. Niazi that he would be bailed out by yellow from the north (Chinese) and blue from the south (Americans). When paratroopers began to land around his HQ, the feckless general sent his assistant to out to check their colours. He came back with really bad news. They were brown.
The fourth lesson is that it is always a bad idea to pick a fight with an adversary who is several times bigger and who has further armed himself with a cogent diplomatic strategy. And the final lesson is to say you won when you did not.
One would think that Pakistanââ¬â¢s military rulers would have figured out these lessons. Alas, evidence is scant. Georges Clemenceau famously said, ââ¬ÅWar is too serious a matter to entrust to military men.ââ¬Â He could well have added, ââ¬ÅEspecially to the men in khaki who are moonlighting in muftis.ââ¬Â
The writer, an economist based in San Francisco, has authored ââ¬ÅRethinking the national security of Pakistan,ââ¬Â Ashgate Publishing, 2003