Okay now my two cents ! I've had the opportunity of having a correspondence with a Pakistani soldier who fought in the '71 war and was taken a POW along with Niazi's men ! I corroborated many of the integral facts that the gentleman mentioned by asking around the few people I know from the '71 War; including my paternal uncle who was a major in the army at that time on the Western Front and my Grandfather, who was there in Dhaka as part of the MES, a few months before the eventual fall. And so I have no reason to believe that he isn't what he says he is ! Thank You, Colonel Nazir Ahmed for sharing this with us ! Unfortunately I forgot about your unit name.
So here are the Colonel's reflections :
Some reflections on the whole tragic drama could be summarised as:
Bengal was a different country in all respects. Its language, culture and the distance, over one thousand miles of hostile Indias territory separating it from West Pakistan were important factors in creation of Bangladesh.
The people of Bengal had gone more than half way to remain part of united Pakistan. In the first constitution adopted in 1956 after a delay of about nine years after creation of Pakistan, Bengalis accepted the arrangement of parity despite being more in numbers. That constitution should have provided workable arrangements between the two wings so that the country remained united while both wings could enjoy considerable freedom in internal matters and distribution of resources.
Although 1970 Elections gave majority to Sheikh Mujibs Awami League, he could not form the government. Mr Z A Bhutto who had won more seats in Punjab and Sindh stopped his party members and threatened others not to attend the National Assembly Session called at Dacca on 3 March 71, precipitating the crisis.
Military action was no solution to the political problem. The military commander in East Pakistan, General Sahibzada Yaqoob Khan refused to undertake the operation. He was removed and replaced by Tikka Khan who was willing to act on orders.
In East Pakistan there was one infantry division of Pakistan Army comprising about fifteen thousand persons including about three and half thousand Bengalis. Since the start of non cooperation movement in 1st week of Feb 71, these troops scattered all over East Pakistan in different cantonments had been confined to their locations. Their supplies had been cut off and they were virtually prisoners living in great tension and hardship. When the military action was ordered, the troops from Dacca Cantonment started with indiscriminate firing by tanks in the city of Dacca on the night of 24/25 March 1971. In two days over one thousand people were killed in the city. The city was almost deserted when additional troops started arriving from West Pakistan.
Two infantry divisions less their heavier elements like the armour regiments and medium artillery were flown from West Pakistan to undertake the operations. The initial phase of operation starting from Dacca to reach the borders on different routes was completed by fourth week of April 71. In this all the columns starting from Dacca were opposed at two different positions. This pattern suggested Indian involvement in planning and presence of some of their men physically supporting the rebels.
As the operations by freshly arrived troops commenced from Dacca to reach out to the borders and link up with isolated troops, the pace of movement was severely restricted due to blowing up of bridges on the routes. During this period of about two months, atrocities and massacre of non Bengali population was committed by the rebels at massive scale in different parts of the country. Hundreds of thousands of people were killed and their women raped.
As the troops reached the borders after clearing opposition en route, the period from end of April up to June passed without much opposition except that a few areas could not be cleared because of their peculiar locations. The focus of the Army during this period was to restore normalcy by giving confidence to the population to resume normal activity.
After the month of June, the rebels, organised by the Indians into a force called Mukti Bahini started their sabotage activity, planting mines on the tracks, blowing up small bridges/culverts. Also by this time the Indians started shelling our posts in the border areas.
Activities of the rebels did not escalate to a scale which could disrupt normal activity. Main reason was that the population was not supportive of them. They had seen that the Army was not interfering in their routine affairs and was striving hard to restore peaceful living conditions.
The people of East Pakistan had voted for Awami League who had promised to get maximum autonomy based on a six point formula. The people had not voted for breakup of Pakistan. While a small percentage of the population was actively engaged in fighting the Pakistan Army, much larger number of Bengali young men was fighting as volunteers alongside the Army against the rebels.
Had it not been for the Indian invasion, the rebel activity had been brought under control creating conditions for a favourable political solution. Unfortunately the Pakistan government of General Yahya Khan was in state of paralysis and had no capacity to solve the problem. People around him like Z A Bhutto who saw no chance of coming to power in united Pakistan was working for break up to secure his chance of ruling remaining Pakistan.
The rumours or the langar gup since the month of Aug that GHQ considered the three Divisions in East Pakistan as written off, was taken a joke. But this proved right. On declaration of war by Pakistan on 3rd Dec, news was deliberately spread through the command channel that Pakistan Army had captured Jammu. This joyful news proved wrong resulting in greater disappointment. Such cheap tactics by callous rulers caused unnecessary frustration.
The Indian invasion came from three directions i.e. west, east and north. From the south, the sea was dominated by the Indians and the ports of East Pakistan effectively blocked.
General A A K Niazi, the commander of troops in East Pakistan acted on the orders of GHQ to defend every inch of the land, a most unrealistic directive. He failed to deploy available troops to counter the threat of invasion which had become very clear when the Indian troops had completed their concentrations on the three sides of the borders by Oct 71.
Disobeying orders is a dilemma at the time of crises. In hindsight it looks simple but at the moment of taking such decision it becomes very difficult. I have two examples which will elaborate the point. Chittagong was to be occupied as fortress by the troops deployed in the sector in counter insurgency role after withdrawal from the border areas. Special Service Group (SSG) troops deployed on the borders with Burma had a chance to cross over to Burma when they were ordered to come back to Chittagong for fortress defence. These highly trained troops are not meant to be used for static defences. In our POW Camp No 25 located at Ramgarh near Ranchi in then Behar province, Major Saeed (later DIG Police) a famous commando would blame his company commander Major Iqbal (later Brig) for the ordeal of becoming a prisoner of war. Major Iqbal had stopped him from crossing over to Burma when he had already boarded the speed boat at Kaptai lake to cross over. Major Iqbal could not disobey the orders from Brig Atta Muhammad at Chittagong. Conversely Major Asif Ali Rizvi of my unit posted to the EPCAF at Coxs Bazar on the border with Burma crossed over to Burma when he felt isolated from Chittagong. He reached Pakistan and was awarded with the gallantry award of Tamgha e Jurrat (TJ). However, when the POWs came back, Brig Atta made a point that the officer was prosecuted for disobeying orders to join force at Chittagong. Major Rizvi was deprived of the award and punished.
This however does not justify that a man of Generl Niazis rank should not have taken decisions according to the situation confronting him, particularly when nobody at GHQ was listening to him and his problems.
The Indian invasion came through our deployment for the counter insurgency operations, our troops scattered in penny packets all over East Pakistan. Like the water flows through terrain avoiding high ground, the Indians with deliberate and cautious movement reached undefended Dacca in less than two weeks after declaration of war on 3 Dec 71.
The Indians had complete mastery of the skies which facilitated their move to a large extent
The Indian mostly avoided fighting to clear defensive positions wherever they came across, by passing such positions to continue the move. Wherever they tried to fight through the defensive positions they suffered heavy casualties and failed to overcome the resistance. I have given example of 34 Punjab positions south of Birganj on Thakurgaon Dinajpur road and that of fighting in the area of 205 Bde in Hilli sector which I know of and was a participant.
Had the positions of available troops in East Pakistan been adjusted to counter the Indian invasion, Dacca could have been strongly defended by taking up positions north of it between the two rivers. Besides this the Chittagong area could also be effectively defended because of it layout, the long border with Burma and the mountainous tribal area inhabited by friendly tribes. In this scenario the extended line of communications of the Indians reaching to contact our defences could be severely disrupted by the Bengali young men fighting on our side. Such situation would have resulted in different outcome.
Chittagong area could still be part of Pakistan had the bulk of non Bengali population, now languishing in slums of Dacca for so long, was shifted to the area in the months of September to November 71. With the friendly tribes and the common Bengali man not supporting break up of Pakistan this was a viable option even if rest of East Pakistan opted to become Bangladesh. But alas the men at the helm of affairs lacked that vision.
The first message received by the units was that of ceasefire. Later when the troops concentrated at different locations we had to hand over weapons.
The Indians shifted the POWs, starting 01 Jan 72 to different cantonments in their three provinces, i.e. Bihar, Uttar Pardesh and Madhia Pardesh. They took two weeks to complete the process. They were very polite in their dealings till we reached their camps. They told us that we were in transit and were soon to be sent to Pakistan. This seemed logical as the war had ended.
Total strength of the prisoners was not more than about forty thousand. In this about thirty to thirty two thousand were from the Pakistan Army, about five to six thousand from the civil armed forces i.e. three Scouts and four Rangers Wings, two Mujahid battalions, some men from the Police and very few civilians.
The figure of ninety three thousand was concocted to defame the Army. The prisoners were kept in India till Mr Bhutto could consolidate his hold on the New Pakistan. The repatriation was spread over about eight months making sure that the personnel of those units who served in East Pakistan could not get together.
Repatriation of prisoners was trumpeted to be a very big achievement of Mr Bhutto to deceive people. But those of us affected knew and some thought of doing something to get him. They were apprehended and punished through a court martial conducted by Major General Zia ul Haq (later President). After Bhutto was hanged by Zia, reportedly one of those punished told Zia that this was what they wanted earlier and that Zia had realised it late.
Breakup of Pakistan, the largest Muslim country of the world which enjoyed great prestige in the comity of nations is tragic story. It was done by men blinded by lust for power. Remaining Pakistan continues to be afflicted by even worse rulers.
Cheers !