The Lahore Resolution in perspective
(March 23 2008): What did the Lahore Resolution (1940) stand for? What did it signify in essence? What did it imply in a broad sense? Since the middle 1960s, several interpretations have been foisted on it, and it is time that they were examined in perspective and in the total context, that some conclusions, even if tentative, be arrived at in the light of hard evidence available in the literature.
The general framework of the Lahore Resolution was laid down in a resolution passed by the Muslim League's Working Committee on February 4, 1946. Inter alia, it sought to spell out a broad outline in respect of India's future constitutional framework. The resolution, which for some obvious reasons was kept confidential and not released to the press at the time (nor included in the AIML's official publications), comprised the following points;
1. Mussalmans are not a minority in the ordinary sense of the word. They are a nation.
2. British system of democratic parliamentary party system of Government is not suited to the genius and condition of the people of India.
3. Those zones which are composed of majority of Mussalmans in the physical map of India should be constituted into Independent Dominions in direct relationship with Great Britain.
4. In those zones where Muslims are in minority their interests and those of other minorities must be adequately and effectively safeguarded and similar safeguards shall be provided for the Hindu and other minorities in the Muslim zone.
5. The various units in each zone shall form component parts of the Federation in that zone as autonomous units. (italics ours) Based on points 3 and 5, the operative part of the Lahore Resolution envisaged that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territional readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are in a majority, as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute Independent States in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.
The confusion, and hence the controversy, arising out of this resolution stems from two points: (i) the Muslim majority areas "should be grouped to constitute Independent States"; and (ii) "the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign". And we would examine these two controversial points in the same order. Since both these points are directly related to the wording of the resolution, the initial questions to be tackled are: who drafted it, and how did it come to be drafted?
Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan has claimed that it was drafted in his house - that is, at Sir Sikander Hayat Khan's residence. On March 11, 1941, Sir Sikander, who was Premier of the Punjab, himself told the Punjab Assembly "that the resolution which I drafted was radically amended by the Working Committee [of the All India Muslim League], and there is a wide divergence in the resolution I drafted and the one that was finally passed.
The main difference between the two resolutions is that the latter part of my resolution which related to the centre and co-ordination of the activities of the various units, was eliminated".
Commenting on Sir Sikander's version, Khalid B. Sayeed says, "it seems that the Working Committee removed the federal elements from the resolution and made the Muslim zones in the North-West and in the North-East 'Independent States', which had no federal relationship with an Indian Federation. This probably explains the origin of the term 'Independent States'."
This also seems a valid explanation in the light of what Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman records about the February 4 meeting. According to him, Sir Sikander, who had earlier published his scheme for the division of India into seven different zones, grouped together under a confederal structure, pled for his confederal scheme, and after two hours' discussion, the Working Committee, with the concurrence of Jinnah, rejected it, and decided to confine its demand to the separation of Muslim zones.
The March 3, 1943 resolution in support of Pakistan, moved by G. M. Sayed in, and adopted by, the Sindh Assembly included the phrase, "national states", which was a little squint-eyed. Inter alia, it said, "whereas the Muslims of India are a separate nation... they are justly entitled to the right as a single, separate nation, to have independent national states of their own, carved out in the zones where they are in majority in the sub-continent of India".
The concept and claim of a single, separate nation logically leads to a demand for a single, separate state, and not to national states. Clearly, the resolution fails to see the asymmetry between the claim and the demand. But, then, the Sindh Assembly resolution seems to have been drawn up on the lines of the Cripps Offer (1942), which had flaunted the provincial option as its basis.
But when Syed talked in terms of the all-India context as he did in his Welcome Address as Chairman, Reception Committee, at the Karachi (1943) League session on December 24, 1943, he described Pakistan as a "National State". This means, the second-cadre League leadership was not too clear whether what was demanded was one or two national states.
However, the key phrase in the original Lahore resolution, "should be grouped to constitute", suggests that what was envisaged was a union of the two "Independent States of the North-Western and Eastern zones".
Fazlul Haq's explanation for omitting a reference to the centre in the Resolution was as follows: "To those who proposed amendments in the Subjects Committee yesterday for providing a central government in the Resolution, my reply is, we assumed power on behalf of Muslims and other people in Bengal in 1937. We have been given an opportunity by the Almighty to serve our people after a couple of centuries and we are not going to barter away that power and opportunity to an imaginary and an unknown central authority."
The speeches, proposing, seconding, or supporting the Lahore Resolution give little indication whether one or two units were sought to be set up. The major problem that the League leaders were preoccupied with was that of promoting and selling the idea of separation and partitioning the subcontinent into Hindu and Muslim homelands, as evidenced by the speeches made on the occasion.
However, Khaliquzzaman, while seconding the Resolution, had said, "they [the Congresites and the British] should consider the circumstances which had forced the Muslims to demand separation, and their own Government where they were in a majority". "Government", instead of governments, mean that what was envisaged was a federation of two units.
Although the Lahore Resolution was adopted in March 1940, it was not incorporated as the supreme objective of the AIML till after the Muslim League session at Madras, if only in order to meet the constitutional requirement under the AIML Rules.
The Madras session, therefore, adopted a resolution (No II) on April 15, 1941, "amending the aims and objects of the All India Muslim League and ... Section 2(a) of the Constitution of the All India Muslim League..." More important, the Madras Resolution inserted the word, "together" after the word, "grouped", rephrasing the Resolution as follows:
"The establishment of completely Independent States formed by demarcating geographically contiguous units into regions which shall be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are in a numerical majority, as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India, shall be grouped together to constitute Independent States as Muslim Free National Homelands in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.
Moving the Resolution, Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan said, "We are altering our creed today and are bringing it into line with the Lahore Resolution, popularly known as Pakistan. Our experience has convinced us that one Federation for the whole of India would create chaos, is impracticable and would lead to the domination of one community over the rest of India. It would never be acceptable to the Muslims..."
In view of the above, the Madras version must hold good for the time being as the basic document on which the AIML's demand for Pakistan was based. And all through 1940-47, one monumental fact stands out. Whatever the interpretation sought to be foisted on the Lahore Resolution, Jinnah was never unequivocal about Pakistan being a single federation.
On April 1, 1940 - ie, barely a week after the adoption of the Lahore Resolution - Jinnah, while dealing with the Indian states, said, "If these States (Kashmir, Bahawalpur, Patiala, etc) willingly agree to come into the federation of the Muslim homeland, we shall be glad to come to a reasonable and honourable understanding." This position was further explicitly spelled out in Jinnah's letter to Gandhi on September 17, 1944, wherein he said that the two zones would form "units of Pakistan".
All this gives credence to Jinnah's explanation, in reply to Abdul Hashim's query, at the League Legislators' Convention (1946; see below) that "the word 'states' was a mistake and had cropped up probably as a result of a typographical error" (as reported by M. A. H. Ispahani in his Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah As I Knew Him). The speech delivered by Abul Hashim at the Convention indicates that he was fully satisfied by Jinnah's explanation.
Furthermore, the statements and speeches of the League leaders on the one hand and the comments and criticism evoked by the "Pakistan" resolution among the British and the non-Muslim circles on the other during 1940-47 also indicate a basic assumption that Pakistan would be a single state.
During the election campaign of 1945-46 as well, the speeches not only of the Quaid-i-Azam but also of other League leaders, including those from Bengal, envisaged a single Pakistan. The position was further clarified and buttressed by the resolution moved by Husain Shaheed Suhrawardy, the Premier of Bengal, and passed by League Legislators' Convention on April 9, 1946. It said, inter alia,
".... That the zones comprising Bengal and Assam in the North-East and the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sindh and Balochistan in the North-West of India, namely, Pakistan zones, where the Muslims are in a dominant majority, be constituted into a sovereign independent State....".
In view of the Convention's Resolution, the controversy whether the Lahore Resolution envisaged one or two Pakistanis becomes redundant. The Lahore Resolution must be interpreted in the light of the Madras resolution, the interpretations offered by Jinnah, the League's election manifesto, the League leaders' election speeches, and the League Legislators' Convention Resolution. The last pronouncement overrides everything else, since it represented the consensus of the newly elected Muslim representatives in the central and provincial assemblies during 1945-46, with a fresh mandate to strive, and struggle for Pakistan.
Now about the constituent units being envisaged as "autonomous and sovereign" in the Lahore Resolution. One could understand these units being autonomous, but not "sovereign". This, again, should be put down to poor drafting. Or, did the drafters take the cue from the early American formulations, or from the USSR's constitution of 1936 which stipulates that
The sovereignty of the constituent republics shall be restricted only within the limits set forth in Article 14 of the constitution of the USSR. Outside of these limits, each constituent republic shall exercise state power independently. The USSR shall protect the sovereign rights of the constituent republics".
(Interestingly though, Ukraine and Bylo-Russia invoked the sovereignty clause, (duly backed by the Soviet Union, to claim admission to the UN in the middle 1950s, although they were, both before and after 1956, were constituent units of the USSR till its dissolution in 1991).
It would also be interesting to note here what two authorities on constitutional developments in India had to say about these constituent units being sovereign. Dr Ambedkar, who did the first serious study on Pakistan (Thoughts on Pakistan, 1941), argues thus:
"It [Lahore Resolution] speaks of grouping the zones into "independent States" in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign. The use of the term "constituent units' indicates that what is contemplated is a Federation. If that is so then the use of the word "sovereign" as an attribute of the units is out of place. Federation of units and sovereignty of units are contradictions."
And Professor Reginald Coupland, the Oxford don, who did a monumental study (entitled, The Constitutional Problem in India, 1944), is also not exactly "clear" about the meaning of the Lahore Resolution's operative part. To him, it could scarcely mean that the constituent units of the independent States were to be really 'sovereign' but it did mean that the States were to be really independent..."
One explanation is that since about 1930 the Muslims were demanding a provincial option to ensure absolute power to Muslims in their majority provinces, they would have liked to see the provinces as independent (and sovereign?) units, entering, if necessary, into confederal relations with other units to form a confederation for the whole of India. Not only this proposal was commended by Liaquat Ali Khan to Sir Stafford Cripps as one of the three options in December 1939, but it also became, more or less, the inspiration behind the Cabinet Mission Plan of May 19, 1946. And this dominant thinking, for good or for ill, had crept into the wording of the Lahore Resolution.
In any case, the drafters did not seem to have paid sufficient attention to the implications of the words and phrases they were using, concerned at the time as they were concerned, if not obsessed, solely with the idea of opposing the imposition of one central government for the entire subcontinent. Also clinchingly is the omission of the clause that "the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign" in the League Legislators' Convention resolution of 1946.
The foregoing discussion boils down to this. By no means could the constituent units be sovereign for the overriding reason that they were to be "constituent units". But autonomous they could be by all means. In actual fact as well, the provinces in Pakistan have had greater autonomy than in The states/provinces in most countries in the Third world.
The thrust in the Indian Constitution and the Indian Republic, for instance, has been towards the centre. Thus, residuary powers under the Indian constitution have been vested in the centre; in Pakistan they were assigned to the Provinces under both the 1956 and 1973 constitutions.
Interestingly, the 1973 constitution was drafted, for the most, by the representatives of the three minor provinces (Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan), with the Punjab having had little say in the constitution committee, claims Senator S. M. Zafar, a constitutional expert, former Law Minister and one of the committee members (this he did in his address to the Islamabad Policy Research Institute's National Seminar on "Pakistan and Changing Scenario: Regional and Global", at Islamabad on March 27, 2007). Not only was the Concurrent List almost solely suggested and approved by the minor provinces representatives, but Balochistan even refused to get Railways included in the Provincial List, arguing that the province couldn't manage and afford financially to run the Railways across such vast swathes of territory which comprise Balochistan - a huge chunk of some sixty-two percent of Pakistan's total land mass. In any case, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had reportedly promised the NAP leadership at the time, though not in writing, that the concurrent List would be scrapped after ten years. But Bhutto didn't last for ten years, and the "promise" got consigned to oblivion.
However, over the yeas a consensus has fortuitously developed that a substantial part of the 47 item Concurrent List be abolished. That would obviously meet the nationalists' demand at least halfway, and the on going bickering controversy over the quantum of provincial autonomy is bound to get its acerbity substantially diluted - hopefully.
Professor Sharif al Mujahid, HEC Distinguished National Professor, is co-editor of UNESCO's History of Humanity, Vol. VI, and edited In quest of Jinnah (2007).
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