Why has Pak lost against India every time?

[sword9]

So I guess the IA doesn't get to rout all the time after all huh?

Depends on which idiot is in command.

Oh and a Final point...do not presume to talk down to me with comments like:
"It called maneuver - it is one of the main principle of warfare."

I apologise for sounding rude, but you and balin2 made it sound as if maneuver
was a bad thing.

As I have put a lot of time in uniform (including ACTUAL conflicts).More than you I wager.

Possiably, I have done mearly 4 years in COIN in J&K, of the total 5 yrs of service (excl trg).

"It means you are debating with superficial knowledge."

Ah I am sorry I must not have read the "special secret books" that you obviously have.

Nothing secret, it would have been available in your unit liberary. I just read a lot, books from book side of the border, besides my old man was part of 4 Div during the invasion in Bangaldesh. My own unit was part of the brigade whoese troops were the first to enter Dacca.

OH and I am still awaiting your credentials.......don't worry, not holding my breath

Commissioned in an infantry battalion Indian Army, served for short service, and seen my fair share of combat.

 

[Keysersoze]

Well I apologise for my presumption.

However I will stand by my views.

 

[sword9]

Well I apologise for my presumption.

However I will stand by my views.

Tha's O.K.
What arm/service did you serve in?

 

[Keysersoze]

Army/Infantry

Most of my other info i get is from friends and relatives in other services.Plus I am a bit of a (amateur) military historian.

 

[blain2]

Did I ever deny unit level valour of PA units? Never.

All i know is that a 2 weeks war ending the collapse of an army, qualifies to be a rout.

Chawinda was no payback it took place much before Asal Uttar.

Mr.Steven J. Zaloga would be trying to save the reputation of the M47/M48 that was ripped apart by Centurians and Shermans. Now lets see what is my info...IA 1 Armd Bde (ex 1Armd Div) was in Pillora-Chawinda - if one assumes 120 tank losses that would be the whole brigade....lets see.

Chamb
IA losses - 14 AMX-13s tanks (C Sqn 20 Cav)

Chawinda-Pillora
PA losses - 170 (42 captured by IA)
IA losses - 29 destroyed, 41 damaged (repaired after the war).

Assal Uttar
PA losses - 97 (72 Pattons & 25 Shermans/ Chafees)

Khemkaran
IA losses - 32 (15 Shermans captured by PA)

Other PA losses
2 Shermans - in Hussainiwala
3 Shermans - in Dera Baba Nank enclave
1 Walker Bulldog - Chamb
7 tanks - Dograi

Total Pak losses - 280 (152 captured by IA)
Total Indian losses - 75

How many captured tanks do you actually have? Do they even match the 120 figure claimed by you?

References:
War Dspatches - by Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh
The Indo-Pak Conflict of 1965 - by Maj Sita Ram Johri
The Memoirs of Lt Gen Gul Hasan Khan
Fakhar-e-Hind: The Story of the Poona Horse

120 tanks knocked out. Not everything is towed off the battlefield (read below about the point made wrt the BBC correspondents). Obviously there are claims and counter claims, but IA got some serious mauling in Chawinda and there is no denying it (except from expected Indians quarters like yourself who only seem to think that their mighty Army is the only one capable of dishing out). Pakistan Army museum has more captured and knocked out IA tanks than you would like to see. I can go back and start quoting you from all of the Pakistan Army books as to how many Indian tanks were claimed but overall, it wont be a correct figure since both sides lie out of their asses.

I would admit that even the write-up below has some errors like the claim that a Pakistani Div commander died (when in reality the senior most PA officer who died in the 65 war was Brig Ahsan Shami who was commander Artillery and was killed when his jeep took a hit). I guess this is all the more reason to assume that what you read is not the entire reality.

Just the fact that you have:
Total Pak losses - 280 (152 captured by IA)
Total Indian losses - 75

and the source I quote already has such a huge discrepency that it shows you the problems with your hyperbolic claims...

All i know is that a 2 weeks war ending the collapse of an army, qualifies to be a rout.

Dont make me laugh. Collapse of an Army? Man stop pulling stuff out of your rear...simply compare the Pakistani orbat in the East and then compare what was arrayed against on the Indian side and then claims of rout go out the window. With an equally arrayed force, IA has never been able to claim a rout...Pakistani units were ordered to surrender by the Eastern command and they followed orders...there was no beating into submission (or a rout) as you seem to be claiming anywhere in the entire East Pakistan since no serious fighting even took place. At least half of the Pakistani losses were due to the insurgency ongoing at the time of Indian aggression.

I quote something from a neutral source (which you have not even read) and you claim that it was to redeem the honor of the M-48s...here take a read and try to understand the gist of his writing which accurately says that you guys sucked just as bad as we did when it came to armour tactics in the 1965 war:

M47 & M48 Patton in Pakistani Service
The first real test of the Patton tank came in 1965 during the short Indo-Pakistan War. In the mid-1950s, Pakistan's cavalry regiments began receiving some 230 M47s and 202 M48s, and many tank officers were sent to the US Army Training Centre at Ft. Knox. At the outbreak of war in 1965Pakistan had about 15 armoured cavalry regiments, each with about 45 tanks in three squadrons. Besides the Pattons, there were about 200 M4 Shermans re-armed with 76mm guns, 150 M24 Chaffee light tank and a few independent squadrons of M36B1 tank destroyers. Most of these regiments served in Pakistan's two armoured divisions, the 1st and 6th Armoured divisions - the latter being in the process of formation.

The Indian Army of the time possessed 17 cavalry regiments, and in the 1950s had begun modernizing them by the acquisition of 164 AMX-13 light tanks and 188 Centurions. The remainder of the cavalry units were equipped with M4 Shermans and a small number of M3A3 Stuart light tanks. India had only a single armoured division, the 1st 'Black Elephant' Armoured Division, also called 'Fakhr I Hind' ('Pride of India'), which consisted of the 17th cavalry Poona Horse, the 4th Hodson's Horse, the 16th 'Black Elephant' Cavalry, the 7th Light Cavalry, the 2nd Royal Lancers, the 18th Cavalry and the 62nd Cavalry, the two first named being equipped with Centurions,. There was also the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade, one of whose three regiments, the 3rd Cavalry, was also equipped with Centurions.

Objective assessment of the 1965 war are as yet largely unavailable, and what Indian and Pakistani accounts do exist are as often as not poisoned by propaganda and highly suspect. Particularly contentious are the various claims for enemy tanks destroyed and so forth. The ostensible cause of the war was continuing friction over the Jammu and Kashmir section of the north-east India. The Pakistani Army had been training and equipping Muslim guerrillas in the area, leading India to respond by probing attacks along the border. In late August 1965 India seized the strategic Haji Pir Pass, and the escalating border incidents reached a crescendo on 1 September when the Pakistani Army, including elements of the 6th Armoured Division, advanced into the Chhamb-Akhnur area. The Pakistanis hoped to lure the nearby Indian 1st Armoured Division into the region between the border and the Chenab River so that the Indians would have to fight with the mile-wide river to their back. The Indians had no intentions of accepting this fool's errand, and decided instead to launch a series of blows against Pakistan; the main attacks being in the Lahore and Sialkot sectors.


Although not successful on the Lahore front, M47s of the Pakistani 6th Armoured Division proved very effective in the fighting in Chhamb and in the Sialkot sector during the 1965 war. (Col. M.A. Durrani)

The thrust against Lahore consisted of the 1st Infantry Division supported by the three tank regiments of the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade: they quickly advanced across the border, reaching the Ichhogil (BRB) Canal by 6 September. The Pakistani Army held the bridges over the canal or blew up those it could not hold, effectively stalling any further advance by the Indians on Lahore. Sensing an opportunity to envelop and destroy the Indian formations, the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division was sent to the area south of the main Indian incursion around Kasur with the aim of advancing along the rear of the Indian's left flank, trapping them against the BRB Canal. The Pakistani advance was hampered by the necessity for elaborate bridging operations over the canal and the Rohi Nala River, with the lead elements of the division arriving at Khem Karan on 7 September. The Pakistanis immediately began probing attacks against the Indian positions, which were not executed with any particular vigour and were brushed back. A reconnaissance in force by Pattons and Chaffees towards Mahmudpura on 8 September was ambushed, and several were lost in a flooded plain. The scope of the probes made it clear to the Indians that a major attack was forth coming, but realising that the terrain favoured the defender, they withdrew under light pressure to prepare a trap.

The area north of Khem Karan consists of well-irrigated plains crossed by many waterways, dykes and other channels. The fields were high in sugar cane and other crops, and the plains could easily be flooded by breaching irrigation canals to render the terrain unsuitable foe mechanised advance. Four Centurion and Sherman squadrons were positioned to cover key roadways and approaches, forming a horseshoe into which the Indians expected the Pakistanis to march. The other squadrons were broken up into troops, with two troops assigned to the bridges over the Rohi Nala in the north in case the probes by the Pakistani 12th Cavalry should prove to be more than feints, and another troop allotted to the 4th Infantry Division, which formed the first line of defence in the village of Asal Uttar. The 4th Infantry Division was well equipped with jeep-mounted 106mm recoilless rifles, bazookas and other close-range anti-tank weapons, and the area to the division's rear was well covered by both artillery and the tank squadrons. The commander of the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade, Brig. Thang Raj, issued strict instructions to his tank crew to wait until the Pakistani tanks had approached quite close to their hull-down positions before opening fire so as to take advantage of the concealment offered by the thick sugar cane crop.

Pakistani efforts until 9 September had been desultory and ineffective as the division awaited the arrival of the last of its troops. Indian air attacks failed to destroy many tanks, but succeeded in destroying a supply train which left most of the Pattons with only 30 rounds of ammunition and limited fuel for the forth coming offensive. On Friday 10 September 1965, Maj. Gen. Nasir Ahmed Khan ordered his 5th Armoured Brigade forward. Indian artillery and small arms fire clipped away what little infantry support the Pakistani Pattons had, leaving the tanks exposed to the Indian anti-tank teams. The Pattons were visible to Indian recoilless rifle and tank crews who could see the swaying of the cane as the enemy approached and the upperworks of the Pattons' turrets. The Indians soon began to exact a heavy toll from the Pakistani tanks, striking them from the front and side. As casualties mounted, one Pakistani regiment tried to skirt the defences by attacking the town from the east, but soon found itself bogged down in a plain flooded by a breached nullah. What Pattons did fight their way through the village found themselves faced by a cordon of stationary, concealed tanks and artillery and were quickly decimated. By 1330hrs the 5th Armoured Brigade attack had petered out with terrible losses.

The Battle of Asal Uttar, 10 September 1965

The 4thh Armoured Brigade was ordered to attack the Indian right flank by a drive on Mahmudpura, but the Indians had foreseen this move and had flooded the area. The Pakistani attack bogged down and came under intense artillery and tank fire. The Indians intercepted the following communication between the brigade's commander (BC) and the divisional commander (GOC):

BC: 'It's not possible for us to advance any further due to stiff resistance. Heavy enemy shelling has completely pinned us down.'
GOC: 'It is most important that the advance is continued. Therefore, in the name of Islam, Pakistan and Hillale Jurat, I command you get up and go forward.'
BC: 'I will do my best but as things are I do not know how the hell I am going to do that. This bloody enemy artillery is knocking the hell out of us and I am afraid at the moment that I can't do any better then this.'
GOC: 'Move forward to your objectives forthwith.'
BC: 'I cannot move; Indians are ahead of me.'
GOC: 'Come and see me immediately.'
BC: 'Where do I come? I don't know.'
GOC: 'Move straight on and turn right.'
BC: 'Do you know where I am? If I turn left the Indians get me, if I turn right the artillery gets me. Where do I come and how?'
GOC: 'Turn right till you hit the road, follow it and you will find me at milpost 36.'

The brigadier never found him, but a pair of jeep mounted recoilless of the Indian Army did, destroying the tank of Maj. Gen. N. A. Khan and killing all its crew. By nightfall the ten squares miles around the Khem Karan-Asal Uttar battlefield were littered with 97 Pakistani tanks, more that 65 of which were M47 and M48 Pattons. The area became known as the 'Patton Nagar'-'Patton Graveyard'. Besides the heavy losses in equipment, the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division lost its commanding general, one brigadier and six regimental commanders either dead or captured. The Indians claim to have lost only 12 tanks during the fighting on 10 September 1965.

The crushing defeat of the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division and the he inability of the Indian Army to vault the BRB Canal stalemated the Lahore front. The Indians turned their attention to the main thrust, called Operation 'Nepal', in the Sialkot sector. The aim of the attack was to seize the key Grand Trunk Road around Wazirabad. The striking force of the Indian 1st Corps was the 1st Armoured Division supported by the 14th Infantry and 6thh Mountain divisions. The infantry seized the border area on 7 September: realising the threat, the Pakistani rushed two regiments of their 6th Armoured Division from Chhamb to the Sialkot sector to support the Pakistani 7th Infantry Division there. These units, plus an independent tank destroyer squadron, amounted to 135 tanks; 24 M47 and M48 Pattons, about 15 M36B1s and the remainder Shermans. The majority of the Pattons belonged to the new 25th Cavalry commanded by Lt. Col. Nisar, which was sent to the Chawinda area.

An M48 of 25the Cavalry advances near Chawinda during the 1965 war. The 25th Cavalry had two squadrons of M47s, while 'C' Sqn was equipped with M48s. (Col. M.A. Durrani)

The Indian plan was to drive a wedge between Sialkot and the 6th Armoured Division, which it believed was stationed around Chawinda. In fact there was only a single regiment there at the time. The Indian 1st Armoured Division's drive quickly divided, with the 43rd Lorried Infantry Brigade supported by a tank regiment attacking Gat, while the main blow of the 1st Armoured Brigade was hurled against Phillaura. Pakistani air attacks caused moderate damage to the tank columns, but exacted a heavier toll on the lorry columns and infantry. The terrain features of the area were very different from those around Lahore, being quite dusty, and the approach of the Indian attack was evident to the 25th Cavalry by the rising dust columns on the Charwah-Phillaura road.

The Battle of Chawinda, September 1965The lead elements of the Indian drive fought their way into Phillaura, but were pushed back out towards Gadgor for a loss of 15 tanks. Both sides licked their wounds for two days, engaging in sporadic infantry forays and artillery duels. The next attack on 11 September was spearheaded by the 17th Poona Horse commanded by Lt. Col. Tarapore. The Centurions were bought under fire by recoilless rifles and tanks, and he command tank was knocked out. The skirmished between the 25th Cavalry and the Poona Horse lasted 12 hours, and in the dust and chaos it became difficult to distinguish one side from the other. The Indians made the ludicrous claim of 67 Pakistani tanks destroyed, which was well in excess of the total number in the area at the time. The outnumbered Pakistani forces were obliged to withdraw to Chawinda, where they awaited the next attack. On 13 September, the Poona Horse and Hodson's Horse began combined infantry-tank attacks against Jassoran. The engagements lasted for two days, with the climactic battle being fought on 16 September, when the Poona Horse supported a Gharwal Infantry Battalion attacking the small village of Butur Dograndi. The Indian attack was broken up by Maj. Raza Khan's 'C' Sqn, 25th Cavalry supported by Pakistani anti-tank teams firing Cobra missiles. The commander of the 17th Poona Horse, Lt. Col. A.B. Tarapore, was killed when his second command tank was hit, and the attack faltered. Both sides had suffered heavy losses in the fighting, and confined their attacks to infantry and artillery barrages until the ceasefire on 23 September.

Two British journalists who visited one of the Patton squadrons of the 25the Cavalry after the ceasefire counted 25 burned-out Centurions in a three-mile stretch near Chawinda even after the Indians had begun retrieving destroyed vehicles. Of these, 11 were in a field no more than 800 yards across - a grim testimony to the intensity of these encounters. The Pakistanis admitted losing 44 tanks in the Sialkot sector, but claimed 120 Indian tanks, and the British journalists saw no reason to doubt them.

Following the war India admitted losing 128 tanks, and this probably consisted of about a dozen in the Lahore sector, a similar number in the Chhamb area, and the remainder in the Sialkot sector.

The Pakistanis admitted losing 165 tanks, more than half of which were knocked out in the debacle at Asal Uttar. These losses are probably on the low side, but many tanks damaged in combat were later retrieved and put back into action.

Both sides claimed n excess of 400 tank kills on the ground and about 100 from the air attacks, which is clearly excessive.

The Patton emerged from the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 with a tarnished reputation. The fiasco at Asal Uttar was the source of the disparagement, though a contributory factor was the exaggerated esteem in which the Patton had been held by both the Indian and Pakistani soldier before the war. Yet no vehicle, whatever its technical merits, can survive the kind of gross tactical bungling which characterised the Pakistani charge into the tank trap at Asal Uttar. Much attention has been paid to the supposed advantages of the Centurion over the Patton in these encounters, ignoring the fact that the majority of Patton causalities were caused by recoilless rifles, artillery and anti-tank guns, and that a third of the Pattons lost were simply abandoned due to lack of fuel and ammunition. In the Sialkot sector outnumbered Pattons performed exceedingly well in the hands of the 25th Cavalry and other regiments of the 6th Armoured Division, which exacted a disproportionately heavy toll of Centurions from the Poona Horse and Hodson's Horse. The Indian Army has made much of the fact that some of its Centurions survived repeated hits; yet have failed to point out that the majority of tanks in the Sialkot sector were Shermans whose guns were inadequate even in 1944.

Neither the Indian nor Pakistani Army showed any great facility in the use of armoured formations in offensive operations, whether the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division at Asal Uttar or the Indian 1st Armoured Division at Chawinda. In contrast, both proved adept with smaller forces in a defensive role such a the 2nd Armoured Brigade at Asal Uttar and the 25th Cavalry at Chawinda, where they defeated their better equipped but clumsier foes.

The M47 and M48 did not play a major role in the 1971 war.

(Source: The M47 and M48 Patton Tanks by Steven J. Zaloga) - Courtesy PakDef.

 

[sword9]

120 tanks knocked out. Not everything is towed off the battlefield (read below about the point made wrt the BBC correspondents). Obviously there are claims and counter claims, but IA got some serious mauling in Chawinda and there is no denying it (except from expected Indians quarters like yourself who only seem to think that their mighty Army is the only one capable of dishing out).

It is a well accepted that I Armd Bde (IA) got quite beaten up in Pillora-Chawinda. But your charge of blaming me for hyperbole, is unfair, as I am the one of the few people on this board who gives credit to the PA where it is due. You should try reading your own posts, if it were not for the military lingo, one would not be wrong in mistaking you for a PDF teenager. You are the one who has been laying insult after insult, and I have held back.
I have no interest in proving something at the expense of someone else. Scholarly research and hyperbole are two different things. I am fairly well equipped to refute Indian and Pakistani lies. Either we have a gentlemanly debate or call it quits.

Pakistan Army museum has more captured and knocked out IA tanks than you would like to see.

Sir, If I want I can get a head count of the tanks with photos and details of the war in which they were knocked out. The museum premises does not space to park even a regt., but I know what you mean.

I can go back and start quoting you from all of the Pakistan Army books as to how many Indian tanks were claimed but overall, it wont be a correct figure since both sides lie out of their asses.

Admitted, but one has to sieve through all that info.

I would admit that even the write-up below has some errors like the claim that a Pakistani Div commander died (when in reality the senior most PA officer who died in the 65 war was Brig Ahsan Shami who was commander Artillery and was killed when his jeep took a hit).

Brig Shami was ambushed and killed by a Grenadier battalion. The LMG gunner who killed him was Grenadier Mohd Safi.

I guess this is all the more reason to assume that what you read is not the entire reality.

Just the fact that you have:
Total Pak losses - 280 (152 captured by IA)
Total Indian losses - 75

and the source I quote already has such a huge discrepency that it shows you the problems with your hyperbolic claims...

Are aware that most post war figures state that 480 odd Pak tanks were destroyed? I have sieved through most of the info that seems probable and not hyperbole and gave the figure of 280 tanks. On the other you state that IA lost 120 tanks in Chawinda, when 1 Armd Bde was functioning even after the war with over 70% of their tanks. It was an off the cuff remarks and does’nt hold water.

Dont make me laugh. Collapse of an Army? Man stop pulling stuff out of your rear...simply compare the Pakistani orbat in the East and then compare what was arrayed against on the Indian side and then claims of rout go out the window.

I was’nt the idiot who planned to defend East Pakistan from the West, so don’t blame us for a self imposed handicap. PA had one corps in the east and we put 3 corps against it.

With an equally arrayed force, IA has never been able to claim a rout...

No army can do much against an equally arrayed force.

Pakistani units were ordered to surrender by the Eastern command and they followed orders...

Why?

..there was no beating into submission (or a rout) as you seem to be claiming anywhere in the entire East Pakistan since no serious fighting even took place.

I am not claiming anything, the events speak for themselves.

At least half of the Pakistani losses were due to the insurgency ongoing at the time of Indian aggression.

The MB was made up of 50% chaps who actually were the East Bengal Rifles and East Bengal Regiment. Your army is responsible for who they became and what made them revolt.

I quote something from a neutral source (which you have not even read) and you claim that it was to redeem the honor of the M-48s... here take a read and try to understand the gist of his writing which accurately says that you guys sucked just as bad as we did when it came to armour tactics in the 1965 war:

Much of the extract posted by you has been picked up from other books on the ’65 tank engagements. I prefer to read Pakistani military historians, since foreigners generally have second hand information. The western authors were mainly obsessed with the technological reasons of defeats and victory…

In some books example Centrurion Tank in Battle - Peter Sarson, Tony Bryan and David E. Smith, they state

Both sides claimed victory in the conflict, with the Indians demonstrating greater tactifcal skill in the use of armour due to superior crew training. It must be realized that the Indian Armoured Corps had been seduced by Pakistani propaganda and entered the conflict in considerable trepidation, believing the Patton (i.e. M-47s and M-48s) to be vastly superior in terms of firepower, protection and mobility to any tank possessed by the Indians. This concern was reflected in many of the official citations for heroism following the war, one of which commended an NCO for an action against "several of the supposedly invulnerable Pattons...". Indeed, it appears the Pakistanis were victims of their own propaganda and believed the Patton to be virtually indestructable [my remark: this is illustrated by a photo of two Indian soldiers standing on shot-up Pakistani M-48, and pointing at two neat 105mm holes on the left side of the turet]. This led to their rash tactics in assaulting Indian positions frontally and suffering proportionately higher losses among the Pattons, which invariably led their attacks. In the swirling dust of the Sialkot battles, Centurion fought Patton at ranges seldom exceeding 1,000 yards. The robust Centruion with its simple fire control system proved superior to the M-47 and M-48 Pattons equipped with stereoscopic range-finders and sophisticated ballistic computers, which proved too complex for the ordinary Pakistani "sowar".

You see, those are British researchers singing praises for their own Centurian.
You are correct that both Indians and Pakistanis were found wanting in the employment of armour, this is well analyzed by a retired Pakistani officer Major Amin, in his papers. However, both sides were good in defensive battles example – Asal Uttar and Pillora- Chawinda.

 

[niaz]

Being from an area of Pakistan, where there is hardly a family who doesnt have close relations in the armed services, I am no exception and thus very interested in the military. Also being a keen student of history, I have had the opportunity to read various books on the subject of three wars between India and Pakistan i.e. 1948 Kashmir War, 1965 War including the Rann of Kutch action and the 1971 war. There is not enough material available on the Kargil episode and about Siachin galcier to know the truth.

Most of the debate in this thread appears to be about battles not "War". War is another manifestation of excercise of political power and should not be judged from the outcome of individual battles and the tank and body count.

It is the end result which matters. For example the Coalition ( UK, France and Israel) were winning the battle of the Suez, but they had to give up all the military gains because they lost the political battle. Today, no one denies that Egypt won the Suez war despite its armed forces having lost in air, sea and land to the Allies.


From what I have read about the three wars noted above, in my view the results were as under:

1. 1948.

Against the wishes of the people of Kasmir, Dogra Raja of Kashmir had opted for India. Even though Pakistanis failed in the objective of liberating whole of Kashmir;end result of the war was the present LOC. This is at least part achievement of objective;this was a victory of sorts for Pakistan. The matter is still unresolved, but if there was no war, there would have been no Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas would still be India.

2. 1965.

It was funny war. Both sides had some success in "Battles". Raan of Kutch for Pakistan and Khem Karan ( I read in many the books how ineptly the Ist Armoured Div was handled) for India; even though we claimed it as victory for Pakistan- what a waste of PA's most precious resource. However, since objective of launching the war was to liberate Kashmir, it can be described as an defeat for Pakistan. If each side had to go back to the original positions, what was the point of starting the war in the first place?? Useless waste of lives and resources.

3. 1971.

This was undoubtly a defeat for Pakistan in every which way one looks at it. But this war was forced on us and Pakistan hasnt the werewithal to fight on three fronts( Internal front against Mukti Bahini and Indian Army on two fronts)

What were the reasons for our not winning 1948 and 1965 Wars? IMO the main reason is inability for the Pakistan economy to support a sustained war effort and most importantly; lack of mettle in our leadership to fight against overwhelming odds.

I knew a retired major who fought in Kashmir, ( In the 50's Major was the normal retirement rank, which is now Lt Col.) He was a great fan of Maj Gen Akbar Khan. According to him, Liaqat Ali Khan accepted the ceasefire because he was afraid that the we would lose what we had gained as Pakistan would run out of ammunition. Major Sahib maintains it was actually
cowardice as PA would have fought on regardless. I read one of the accounts of an retired British Officer of Indian Army, who says that Brits didnt want of any of their kins killed. White officers were present on both sides and very reluctant to fight.

Regarding the 1965 war, it is difficult to say as to what would have been the result had we carried on. All accounts suggest that Ayub Khan and the General Staff had no stomach for carrying on fighting because they were afraid they would lose. I cannot say about the Indian side, but about PA, without disrespect to any one, I can say that it is army of Lions led by the Donkeys. There has been lack of foresight and planning and also lack of will to continue fighting despite staring in the face of defeat in individaul battles;as Vietnamese did against the US or Algerians against the French or the Palestinians or the Hizbullah in Lebenon. Either we should not have started the fighting, if we had it should have been to the finish.

Naturally this my private view and open to question.

 

[sword9]

From what I have read about the three wars noted above, in my view the results were as under:

1. 1948.

Against the wishes of the people of Kasmir, Dogra Raja of Kashmir had opted for India. Even though Pakistanis failed in the objective of liberating whole of Kashmir;end result of the war was the present LOC. This is at least part achievement of objective;this was a victory of sorts for Pakistan. The matter is still unresolved, but if there was no war, there would have been no Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas would still be India.

Niaz,
Why did Raja Hari Singh acceed to India, when he wanted an independent Jammu & Kashmir from day one?

 

[niaz]

Niaz,
Why did Raja Hari Singh acceed to India, when he wanted an independent Jammu & Kashmir from day one?

There are conflcting reports, Indian side claims that Raja acceded to India because NWFP tribesman entered the Kashmir. On the otherhand Sardar Abdul Qayuum; who is said to have fired the first shot in 1948 war; thus also known as 'Mujahid Awwal'; have said that the Dogra Raja upon the advice of his Chief Minister - Sheikh Abdullah, had already decided to accede to India, the Tribesman entry was the result. However, it is a fact that Raja asked Mountbatten's help to counter the tribesman and Mountbaten insisted that Raja should accede to India first. The whole situation so muddled that I am not sure which was first. This does not alter my contention that 1948 war a partial victory for Pakistan.

We are not discussing rights or wrong of the three wars. I have noted above my views on the result of the three wars, not why they were fought. For example was India right to train Mukti Bahini and send them across the border; exactly what India is blaming Pakistan for in the current insurgency??
India took Hyderabad by force when they also wanted to remain independent. Junagadh even officially acceded to Pakistan and India also walked in. This is 'real politik'. The wars are history; we are debating the causes why India India appeared to have had the upper hand. My view that India didnot have her way all the time.

 

[Adux]

i have been lurking around in WAB and PFF for a long time...
PFF is the only good pakistani forum and mostly cuz of its openess and learned members,

i have been reading ray,lemontree and everybody from wab from a long long time...
to be honest niaz you are the first pakistani i have come across, who actually knows what he is talkin about.. you strike me as a person who would like analyze and correct..in short wise , ray and lemontree equivalent from the pakistani side

there no better teachers than failures and self introspection

 

[vnomad]

This does not alter my contention that 1948 war a partial victory for Pakistan.

Victory over the Raja not India.

 

[blain2]

It is a well accepted that I Armd Bde (IA) got quite beaten up in Pillora-Chawinda. But your charge of blaming me for hyperbole, is unfair, as I am the one of the few people on this board who gives credit to the PA where it is due. You should try reading your own posts, if it were not for the military lingo, one would not be wrong in mistaking you for a PDF teenager. You are the one who has been laying insult after insult, and I have held back.
I have no interest in proving something at the expense of someone else. Scholarly research and hyperbole are two different things. I am fairly well equipped to refute Indian and Pakistani lies. Either we have a gentlemanly debate or call it quits.

Laying insult after insult? Where? If so then my apologies. I was not trying to make this personal.

Now talking about refuting things then let the games begin.

Sir, If I want I can get a head count of the tanks with photos and details of the war in which they were knocked out. The museum premises does not space to park even a regt., but I know what you mean.

Admitted, but one has to sieve through all that info.

The point I was trying to make was simply that there has been no shortage of encounters where either side has received a mauling from the other...it goes to my point about using the term "rout" which you used rather casually without realizing what a "rout" really would be...In the Indo-Pak context, no war has ended in a rout since the two countries became independent. So your claim of "when IA wants to rout, it routes", holds no factual standing...just a slogan and I would like to leave it at that.

Brig Shami was ambushed and killed by a Grenadier battalion. The LMG gunner who killed him was Grenadier Mohd Safi.

Yes. Brig Shami was killed by enemy action and I conceed that. After driving through the 5FF positions, he came across some Indian troops and told them to surrender, at that point he was fired upon and got hit in the head and died.

Are aware that most post war figures state that 480 odd Pak tanks were destroyed? I have sieved through most of the info that seems probable and not hyperbole and gave the figure of 280 tanks. On the other you state that IA lost 120 tanks in Chawinda, when 1 Armd Bde was functioning even after the war with over 70% of their tanks. It was an off the cuff remarks and does’nt hold water.

Functioning at what strength? So was the Pakistani 1 Armd Div. after taking a beating at Assal Uttar (albeit understrength at that point in time)...the issue is simply a matter of trusting these sources and the veracity of these sources...you seem to have a problem with my numbers by calling them improbable but on the other hand you do not back your rebuttal with anything factual except by points such as "when 1 Armd Bde was functioning even after the war with over 70% of their tanks." Who says 70%? An Indian source probably or you came up with the number yourself..in either case, I guess this is the problem with having discussions of the sort...you cant buy my sources and arguments, yet what you accuse me of is the exact same thing you are guilty of, which is to prove something to me beyond the shadow of doubt...I have quoted my sources, you can do the same and we would end up exactly where we started off....in any case, lets continue....

I was’nt the idiot who planned to defend East Pakistan from the West, so don’t blame us for a self imposed handicap. PA had one corps in the east and we put 3 corps against it.

The issue is not about who was an idiot and who was not. The Pakistani units in East Pakistan "surrendered", which is quite different from getting beaten into submission on the battlefield or running away (which is what a "rout" would be). In any case this particular argument is going nowhere..

No army can do much against an equally arrayed force.

My exact point, thus refrain from usage of high and mighty words like "rout"!

Why?

Many a reasons...but not the place to delve into the details of those here. A good ref. would be Maj Gen Hakeem Arshad Qureshi's "The 1971 Indo-Pak War : A Soldier's Narrative" from a military standpoint as to why the units surrendered.

I am not claiming anything, the events speak for themselves.

Whatever! If you did not claim anything then this whole inane discussion would not be taking place. At least own up to the claims made in this thread.

The MB was made up of 50% chaps who actually were the East Bengal Rifles and East Bengal Regiment. Your army is responsible for who they became and what made them revolt.

Why are you going off on a tangent? I am stating the facts and obstacles that were facing the PA and not discussing the responsibility or the cause of the revolt....IA and GoI had plenty to do with turning them into who they became.

Much of the extract posted by you has been picked up from other books on the ’65 tank engagements. I prefer to read Pakistani military historians, since foreigners generally have second hand information. The western authors were mainly obsessed with the technological reasons of defeats and victory…

Well if I quote from a Pakistani source, its harder for you to swallow it simply because I know for a fact that they will not tally well with your numbers...also while I am on this topic, what does Lt Gen Gul Hassan have to say about the Pakistani losses since you quoted his book as one of your sources?

 

[Neo]

i have been lurking around in WAB and PFF for a long time...
PFF is the only good pakistani forum and mostly cuz of its openess and learned members,

i have been reading ray,lemontree and everybody from wab from a long long time...
to be honest niaz you are the first pakistani i have come across, who actually knows what he is talkin about.. you strike me as a person who would like analyze and correct..in short wise , ray and lemontree equivalent from the pakistani side

there no better teachers than failures and self introspection

Welcome aboard Adux and thanks for appreciating PFF and its members.
I hope you'll contribute to make it even better.
Enjoy! :pff:

 

[sword9]

There are conflcting reports, Indian side claims that Raja acceded to India because NWFP tribesman entered the Kashmir. On the otherhand Sardar Abdul Qayuum; who is said to have fired the first shot in 1948 war; thus also known as 'Mujahid Awwal'; have said that the Dogra Raja upon the advice of his Chief Minister - Sheikh Abdullah, had already decided to accede to India, the Tribesman entry was the result. However, it is a fact that Raja asked Mountbatten's help to counter the tribesman and Mountbaten insisted that Raja should accede to India first. The whole situation so muddled that I am not sure which was first. This does not alter my contention that 1948 war a partial victory for Pakistan.

The Raja wanted to stay independent, and he had equal aversion to join India or Pakistan, since his status during the British raj was special - J&K was a pampered principality. We don't really know if Mountbattan's actions were his own or was is part of the British policy.

We are not discussing rights or wrong of the three wars.

That is rather difficult since the causes and results form part of all conflicts.

I have noted above my views on the result of the three wars, not why they were fought. For example was India right to train Mukti Bahini and send them across the border; exactly what India is blaming Pakistan for in the current insurgency??

The roots for the 1971 war lay in the 1965 conflict. The reasons were strategic, that I shall list. The MB problem was handed on a platter compounded by an influx of 7-8 million refugees.

The numerical superiority that India had over the Pakistani armed forces was blunted due to 3 fronts:-
- After 1962 the Ladhak and Arunachal sectors took up quite a chunk of its armed forces.
- The remianing regular forces had to be divided to address East and West Pakistan.

This distribution of forces kept gave Pakistan an edge as it gained parity against the Indian armed forces. We did'nt even have reserves when we attacked on 6th September 1965. The same was with the airforce, the west had 60% strength and the east had 40%. The 1971 war addressed that problem.

The only time that Pakistan could have had a great military victory against India was in 1965. But it lost that chance.

India took Hyderabad by force when they also wanted to remain independent.

It was geographic compulsions that forced that action. No country an afford an alien viod in its center.

Junagadh even officially acceded to Pakistan and India also walked in. This is 'real politik'.

Junagadh had a plebesite and the result was accepted by both sides.

The wars are history; we are debating the causes why India India appeared to have had the upper hand. My view that India didnot have her way all the time.

My points in this post have given you the reason for that.

 

[niaz]

Honourable Sword's comments are strange !

1. Just because there were refugees in West Bengal, is justification enough for sending infiltrators and then helping them with armed invasion with the aim of breaking the breaking the country in two?

2. Justification for 'Police Action in Hyderabad' is stranger still. Just because you surround a smaller country by land, it is ok to occupy it !

3. Plebecite is ok in Junagadh but not OK in Kashmir because it does not suit India. Despite the fact that India agreed to a plebecite in Kashmir at the UN.

4. It is also Ok for India to go back on its promise of giving a special status to Kashmir. ( that why Sh Abdullah spent years in prison).

Additionally, someone mentioned that partial victory was against the forces of the Raja. Kindly read your history carefully. Raja's forces were defeated and on the point of collapse against the tribesmen. It was only after the Indian Army landed in Kashmir that Quaid e Azam ordered PA to support the Mujahideen in Kashmir and 1948 war ensued.

There is another sore point. It came out in the UN that instrument of accession was signed a day after the Indian forces actually landed in Kashmir and there was a possibility that Raja may have acceded under duress! However India claimed that the Raja was in Jammu; the winter capital, and therefore could not be reached any earlier.

Let us face it; Might is always Right. Once you get yourself in a strong enough position, to hell with all the previous agreements. Thats how Whites in US took over most of the Amerindian lands and Israel has annexed the West Bank and Golan Heights

It is because of this fruitless debate, I had noted no point in discussing rights and wrongs of the past. Countries always justfy their actions and the other party is always in the wrong. Let us just stick to the topic.