Hephaestus
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It was the smallest of sounds, too soft for human ears but deemed loud enough to potentially doom an Australian submarine.
Two weeks ago, behind closed doors in a shipyard in the German port of Kiel, the secrets behind Australia’s $150 billion submarine decision were finally revealed. It was a moment that left the Germans stunned. They were told for the first time that they had lost the bid because their proposed Australian submarine had an “unacceptable’’ level of “radiated noise’’.
In the world of submarines, noise equals potential detection and death, but when the Germans pressed the Australian officials in the room that day to explain further they were rebuffed. That information was classified, the Australians told them.
In a short and testy exchange, the truth became clear — France had won the largest defence contract in the nation’s history because it had best achieved the sound of silence. As a spying platform against China, and in the case of war, the proposed French submarine was seen to be more stealthy than those proposed by Germany or Japan.
But this is a $150bn judgment call — the construction phase is worth $50bn, with the sustainability of the submarines running to an extra $100bn over the life of the vessels — that the Germans fiercely contest, at least in private. It is also one that threatens to undermine relations with Berlin in the same way as the rejection of Japan’s bid has harmed Canberra’s ties with Tokyo.
The confidential debriefing for the failed German submarine bid took place inauspiciously on Friday the 13th this month, inside the historic Kiel shipyards.
Five Australian defence officials, led by the director-general of the Future Submarine Program Commodore Mike Houghton, stood in front of 11 senior representatives of German shipbuilder TKMS and representatives from the German ministries of defence, economic affairs and the foreign office. The presence of the government officials reflected what Germany had invested in the bid, up to and including lobbying by Chancellor Angela Merkel.
The Australian delegation, which one German observer described as “sheepish in their body language’’, handed out a document marked “PROTECTED — Sensitive”, summarising the reasons for its decision.
At the same time, on the other side of the world, the head of the Future Submarine Program, Rear Admiral Greg Sammut, was leading an Australian delegation on May 12 and 13 around various ministries in Tokyo, including the Ministry of Defence, to tell Japan why its bid failed.
Stealth issues also played a key role in Japan’s defeat.
If the Australian officials in Kiel hoped the Germans would be a passive audience, they were quite mistaken.
Led by TKMS deputy chief executive Dieter Rottsieper, the Germans doggedly questioned every key assumption the Australians had made. The Australian delegation began the two-hour debrief by assuring the Germans that the decision to reject their bid was not swayed by politics, the media or other factors. It was based entirely on the need to choose a regionally superior submarine that could be sustained through its life in Australia.
But, they said, the truth was that despite Germany putting forth an excellent plan for the local defence industry to sustain the boats, the submarine itself was not good enough.
The Germans were told that the “critical issue’’ was that their submarine was too noisy.
Specifically they were told, with deliberate vagueness, that the boat would be too noisy at a particular frequency that was very important to the Royal Australian Navy — an apparent reference to the submarine’s ability to collect close-to-shore intelligence without detection.
The Germans countered by asking what the frequency was and why it was not emphasised in the bidding process.
The Australians responded that this information was classified, but that they were not convinced TKMS understood the significance of this issue for Australia. They said the problems with stealth meant that the German proposal could never have delivered a regionally superior submarine for Australia.
The Germans persisted, asking where the excess noise was coming from — internal machinery, the propellers, the hull?
Again the Australian officials declined to comment.
One German observer said: “The might of Germany’s military-industrial complex could easily solve a technical issue like this if only the Australians had been more forthcoming about the issue itself before we submitted the bid.”
The successful French bidder, DCNS, worked hard behind the scenes last year to cast doubt in the minds of Australian officials about the noise level of the TKMS submarine.
DCNS modelled its estimate of the noise projection of the proposed German boat using the noise signature of its own, smaller, Scorpene-class submarine. It then compared this estimate with the noise signature for the quieter new French Barracuda submarines upon which the French-Australian submarine will be substantially based.
The French also loudly touted their revolutionary pump jet propulsion system, which will replace propellers on the Australian boat, the Shortfin Barracuda.
Paris claimed this would give its submarine a higher tactical silent speed than the German Type 216 submarine and Japan’s evolved Soryu-class submarine, both of which would have propellers. Australian officials were said to have been highly impressed by the fact that when the Barracuda submarine accelerated, the French design was significantly quieter than either the German or the Japanese alternatives.
While the German delegation at the Kiel briefing was told that noise was the critical factor in the final decision, they were also informed about other perceived problems with the German bid.
The Australians told them the pre-concept design submitted to Defence at the end of November last year was “not balanced” and design optimisation “was not achieved”.
They said they had reservations about the safety of the proposed lithium ion batteries that were to be installed on both the German and the Japanese submarines. Both those nations maintain that lithium ion batteries, which are four times more efficient than traditional lead acid batteries, are safe, despite small fires that have occurred in those batteries in hobby equipment, cars and airlines.
In March, France publicly warned about the dangers lithium ion batteries might pose in a submarine. The Australian delegation made it clear in Kiel that it too had reservations.
The Australians also expressed scepticism about the ability of TKMS to upscale the size of both its Siemens motors and its submarine hulls to build a 4000-plus tonne submarine — almost double the size of previous submarines built by the company.
In addition, the Germans were told that their cost projections were overly optimistic, including their claim that there would be only a negligible premium for building all of the submarines in Australia.
Germany’s bid claimed that the price of building eight submarines (not including the combat system) would be just less than $12bn, while 12 submarines including the combat system would cost $20bn.
Defence sources say the Australian delegation told the Germans in the Kiel debriefing that this cost estimate did not reflect the technical challenges and was “well below expectations’’.
TKMS had argued that building all 12 submarines in Australia would cost no more than building them all in Germany.
This contrasted with internal government estimates of about a 15 per cent premium on costs for an Australian build.
The Australian officials debriefed the Germans that there was not enough analysis in their bid proposal to make a convincing case that the premium for an all-Australian bid would be so low.
After an awkward, sometimes tense and occasionally feisty two-hour meeting, the Australian delegation and the German shipbuilders went to lunch.
The lunch was no less tense, according to those present.
The Germans who attended were far from satisfied with the explanations they had received.
“This has caused significant damage to the relationship,” one told The Australian.
“We don’t think the material was assessed fairly and we don’t think our bid was considered properly.
“We are very disappointed.”
Link: http://www.theaustralian.com.au/nat...d/news-story/4b3d69b49a8371e9837ed59e4f0faac2
@PARIKRAMA @Picdelamirand-oil @anant_s
@abingdonboy.- Is banned...why???
Seems like Soryu was also noisy.
Sirs,
I was wondering. What are India's plans for SSN's. The
1. Is there a necessity for SSN's in India.
2 If so is there a plan. The followup on scorpenes is going to be more Diesel-Electric ones with AIP. (My understanding)
3. Are we gonna build them here like Scorpene. Do we even have the bandwidth to do so.
4. How can the above win also help us in short listing our SSN's. If we havent done that already.
My personal opinion is. India should have at least 13 SSN's.
Thank you.
Two weeks ago, behind closed doors in a shipyard in the German port of Kiel, the secrets behind Australia’s $150 billion submarine decision were finally revealed. It was a moment that left the Germans stunned. They were told for the first time that they had lost the bid because their proposed Australian submarine had an “unacceptable’’ level of “radiated noise’’.
In the world of submarines, noise equals potential detection and death, but when the Germans pressed the Australian officials in the room that day to explain further they were rebuffed. That information was classified, the Australians told them.
In a short and testy exchange, the truth became clear — France had won the largest defence contract in the nation’s history because it had best achieved the sound of silence. As a spying platform against China, and in the case of war, the proposed French submarine was seen to be more stealthy than those proposed by Germany or Japan.
But this is a $150bn judgment call — the construction phase is worth $50bn, with the sustainability of the submarines running to an extra $100bn over the life of the vessels — that the Germans fiercely contest, at least in private. It is also one that threatens to undermine relations with Berlin in the same way as the rejection of Japan’s bid has harmed Canberra’s ties with Tokyo.
The confidential debriefing for the failed German submarine bid took place inauspiciously on Friday the 13th this month, inside the historic Kiel shipyards.
Five Australian defence officials, led by the director-general of the Future Submarine Program Commodore Mike Houghton, stood in front of 11 senior representatives of German shipbuilder TKMS and representatives from the German ministries of defence, economic affairs and the foreign office. The presence of the government officials reflected what Germany had invested in the bid, up to and including lobbying by Chancellor Angela Merkel.
The Australian delegation, which one German observer described as “sheepish in their body language’’, handed out a document marked “PROTECTED — Sensitive”, summarising the reasons for its decision.
At the same time, on the other side of the world, the head of the Future Submarine Program, Rear Admiral Greg Sammut, was leading an Australian delegation on May 12 and 13 around various ministries in Tokyo, including the Ministry of Defence, to tell Japan why its bid failed.
Stealth issues also played a key role in Japan’s defeat.
If the Australian officials in Kiel hoped the Germans would be a passive audience, they were quite mistaken.
Led by TKMS deputy chief executive Dieter Rottsieper, the Germans doggedly questioned every key assumption the Australians had made. The Australian delegation began the two-hour debrief by assuring the Germans that the decision to reject their bid was not swayed by politics, the media or other factors. It was based entirely on the need to choose a regionally superior submarine that could be sustained through its life in Australia.
But, they said, the truth was that despite Germany putting forth an excellent plan for the local defence industry to sustain the boats, the submarine itself was not good enough.
The Germans were told that the “critical issue’’ was that their submarine was too noisy.
Specifically they were told, with deliberate vagueness, that the boat would be too noisy at a particular frequency that was very important to the Royal Australian Navy — an apparent reference to the submarine’s ability to collect close-to-shore intelligence without detection.
The Germans countered by asking what the frequency was and why it was not emphasised in the bidding process.
The Australians responded that this information was classified, but that they were not convinced TKMS understood the significance of this issue for Australia. They said the problems with stealth meant that the German proposal could never have delivered a regionally superior submarine for Australia.
The Germans persisted, asking where the excess noise was coming from — internal machinery, the propellers, the hull?
Again the Australian officials declined to comment.
One German observer said: “The might of Germany’s military-industrial complex could easily solve a technical issue like this if only the Australians had been more forthcoming about the issue itself before we submitted the bid.”
The successful French bidder, DCNS, worked hard behind the scenes last year to cast doubt in the minds of Australian officials about the noise level of the TKMS submarine.
DCNS modelled its estimate of the noise projection of the proposed German boat using the noise signature of its own, smaller, Scorpene-class submarine. It then compared this estimate with the noise signature for the quieter new French Barracuda submarines upon which the French-Australian submarine will be substantially based.
The French also loudly touted their revolutionary pump jet propulsion system, which will replace propellers on the Australian boat, the Shortfin Barracuda.
Paris claimed this would give its submarine a higher tactical silent speed than the German Type 216 submarine and Japan’s evolved Soryu-class submarine, both of which would have propellers. Australian officials were said to have been highly impressed by the fact that when the Barracuda submarine accelerated, the French design was significantly quieter than either the German or the Japanese alternatives.
While the German delegation at the Kiel briefing was told that noise was the critical factor in the final decision, they were also informed about other perceived problems with the German bid.
The Australians told them the pre-concept design submitted to Defence at the end of November last year was “not balanced” and design optimisation “was not achieved”.
They said they had reservations about the safety of the proposed lithium ion batteries that were to be installed on both the German and the Japanese submarines. Both those nations maintain that lithium ion batteries, which are four times more efficient than traditional lead acid batteries, are safe, despite small fires that have occurred in those batteries in hobby equipment, cars and airlines.
In March, France publicly warned about the dangers lithium ion batteries might pose in a submarine. The Australian delegation made it clear in Kiel that it too had reservations.
The Australians also expressed scepticism about the ability of TKMS to upscale the size of both its Siemens motors and its submarine hulls to build a 4000-plus tonne submarine — almost double the size of previous submarines built by the company.
In addition, the Germans were told that their cost projections were overly optimistic, including their claim that there would be only a negligible premium for building all of the submarines in Australia.
Germany’s bid claimed that the price of building eight submarines (not including the combat system) would be just less than $12bn, while 12 submarines including the combat system would cost $20bn.
Defence sources say the Australian delegation told the Germans in the Kiel debriefing that this cost estimate did not reflect the technical challenges and was “well below expectations’’.
TKMS had argued that building all 12 submarines in Australia would cost no more than building them all in Germany.
This contrasted with internal government estimates of about a 15 per cent premium on costs for an Australian build.
The Australian officials debriefed the Germans that there was not enough analysis in their bid proposal to make a convincing case that the premium for an all-Australian bid would be so low.
After an awkward, sometimes tense and occasionally feisty two-hour meeting, the Australian delegation and the German shipbuilders went to lunch.
The lunch was no less tense, according to those present.
The Germans who attended were far from satisfied with the explanations they had received.
“This has caused significant damage to the relationship,” one told The Australian.
“We don’t think the material was assessed fairly and we don’t think our bid was considered properly.
“We are very disappointed.”
Link: http://www.theaustralian.com.au/nat...d/news-story/4b3d69b49a8371e9837ed59e4f0faac2
@PARIKRAMA @Picdelamirand-oil @anant_s
@abingdonboy.- Is banned...why???
Seems like Soryu was also noisy.
Sirs,
I was wondering. What are India's plans for SSN's. The
1. Is there a necessity for SSN's in India.
2 If so is there a plan. The followup on scorpenes is going to be more Diesel-Electric ones with AIP. (My understanding)
3. Are we gonna build them here like Scorpene. Do we even have the bandwidth to do so.
4. How can the above win also help us in short listing our SSN's. If we havent done that already.
My personal opinion is. India should have at least 13 SSN's.
Thank you.
