When Our Brave Lashkars Were Knocking at the Gates of Srinagar and Beyond

[Nilgiri]

India did a Kargil on Pakistan in 1983, sixteen years before Pakistan dreamed the Kargil.

I get what you are saying (operationally)...but the Kargil border area was defined in the simla agreement...and thus in 1999 you chose (well fauj at least) to not respect it, somewhat akin to CFL for gibraltar in 65.

Not so for siachen....where the LoC simply stopped and left that chunk undefined.

@Joe Shearer @jbgt90

 

[MastanKhan]

Was Nawaz supposed to fight?

Yes---in washington.

 

[Indus Pakistan]

Yes---in washington.

Wars are fought on the battlefield. Not Washington.

 

[MastanKhan]

Wars are fought on the battlefield. Not Washington.

AA ni Bhena Larriyay

 

[Indus Pakistan]

AA ni Bhena Larriyay

Ffs can you tell us how Nawaz cost victory.

Kargil border area was defined

The substance of this is the change of status quo. Whatever existed before [defined or not] was disturbed or changed after 1983 Indian military action. 1999 was also intended to change the status quo by military action.

 

[Nilgiri]

The substance of this is the change of status quo.

Fair enough. Its a broad thing in the end.

1999 was also intended to change the status quo by military action.

Yah but it went against something Pakistan specifically signed to and agreed to.

It thus carries more ramification both in the response at that time, and lingering downstream stuff from all of that. I'd say the exact same thing if India signed to on paper that say siachen is undefined and will be left to be undefined and cannot be occupied by it etc. But no such thing was negotiated and signed....it resided in grey area actionably as result.

It is all a matter of degree I suppose.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Not possible. The Indians hold the high ground. While Gen Zia was dreaming of taking on the Soviet armies in Afganistan and laying the ground for a caliphate in Pakistan he failed to detect the sly Indians slip into the Siachen, grab the high ground. By the time Pak reacted the game was over. Stalemate 2020. India did a Kargil on Pakistan in 1983, sixteen years before Pakistan dreamed the Kargil. Only Pakistan messed up.

Just to remind you, big man, the 'sly Indians' went shopping for Arctic protective clothing, and found that the Pakistan Army had been around some weeks earlier placing orders. That tipped them off and they - we - launched a pre-emptive attack. Otherwise you would have been writing that the insight and forethought of Pakistani forces gained them the high ground, and kept out the baffled not-so-sly Indians.

The mess-up was due to the atypical quick Indian reaction, so akin to the quick Pakistani reaction that we have seen so often.

Hi,

Our planners did not count for the cowardice of Nawaz Sharif---.



Hi,

Zia was informed that the Indians were on a buying spree for extreme cold weather equipment---.

And the real porblem with pakistani Generals is---that they are in majority " YESSIR "---cannot speak their mind or do not have a mind to speak of---.

If Zia did not catch onto it---then what happened to the other generals---were they sleeping---.

It was the other way around, according to Indian accounts.

Yes---in washington.

Strobe Talbot's account makes it clear that Nawaz Sharif was given a brief.

Ffs can you tell us how Nawaz cost victory.

The substance of this is the change of status quo. Whatever existed before [defined or not] was disturbed or changed after 1983 Indian military action. 1999 was also intended to change the status quo by military action.

I would like to know why Pakistan should have been planning a change of status quo in 1983, through military action, and when beaten to the draw, went on planning to change the status quo through military action in 1999. Is it perhaps included in the role-definition that Pakistan should plan to change the status quo through military action, and India should, in all cases, simply react?

Leaving aside the instance with which this thread began, Pakistan seeking to change the status quo through military action in 1947-48, we have Pakistan seeking to change the status quo in 1965, in the Rann of Kutch, tanks against border policemen, in Kashmir, special forces trained by General Meetha against the inattentive Indian military, and in the Chhamb sector, NOT in the ceasefire line that became the LOC, but a sector defined as akin to the International Boundary, in Operation Grand Slam.

In the east, please check Z. A. Khan's account of the ISI sponsorship of the Mizo rebels, and of his meeting those rebels in their well-organised base outside Chittagong; more seeking to change the status quo, after 1965, and long before the events of Operation Searchlight.

All this well before the seeking to change the status quo through military action at Kargil.

Is there a pattern?

@Nilgiri

It isn't a matter of degree; it is clearly a Standard Operating Procedure.

 

[Nilgiri]

It isn't a matter of degree; it is clearly a Standard Operating Procedure.

A reply I can expect of you. I have retreated somewhat lately and self-demoted myself temporarily on some topics...I prefer to be as cautious as possible given infliction I receive and continue to receive from those assigned to watch over...so its almost 2nd nature now (so I will say degree and stop there, though I know better).

I am thus maybe a lancer-scout at best on these sensitive topics (my depth and expertise is also not so great). I increasingly conserve my steel and dry powder for where its best expended on various other topics where I feel ground of engagement is more certain.

But I expect, respect and have grown accustomed to heavy cavalry stuff from you..and you dismount like dragoon as your sage experience and convenience calls for too...

So I will summon you occasionally in topics like this one, as I expect you to pay back by similar occasional summons elsewhere.

You are simply of far greater station on these topics and many worthies (allies, spectators and opponents) in PDF know it. You are also around lot more compared to @jbgt90 whom I hold in similar station for these. The others I hold there (from our lot) more or less have absconded all together.

 

[waz]

We as a nation will always regret missing two golden opportunities to take Kashmir, one in 1947/48 and the other in 1962. Both mainly due to the slow reaction of the top brass than.Today i will not focus on the details of operations conducted by the volunteers who took part in the freedom of Kashmir.
COMPOSITION OF THE VOLUNTEER FORCES
The volunteer Lashkars comprised mainly from.
1)22 Lashkars from similar no of tribes with a strength of 25000-30000 men.
2)AJK irregular forces led by Sardar Ibrahim with a strength of 6000 men.
3)Scots from different agencies mainly Kurrum and Gilgit 1500 men.
4)Retired army personnel and Muslim league guards 2000 men.
5)State soldiers of Swat,Dir and Chitral 3000 men.
6) Some volunteers from religious outfits 1000 men.
(The above numbers are approximately correct)

VOLUNTEERS IN PICTURES
a) Tribemen from Waziristan

b) Afridi Volunteers

View attachment 632963

c)Mohmand Tribesmen

d)Miscellaneous Tribemen

e)Men from Swat state

f)Volunteer from Kurrum Militia

There are many more images of volunteers.

VICTORIES OF THE VOLUNTEER LASHKARS
What these brave men achieve in the initial days of the conflict was unprecedented. In the very first month they had reached the outskirts of Srinagar and had the Dogra forces surrounded.

Within a year they were near Leh, the capital of Ladakh.

The Royal Pakistan army could not join the War initially because of Field Marshall Auchinleck. The Army entered a year later in 1948, by that time it was a bit too late.
We are all praise for these brave men who endured a lot for Pakistan. They remained away from their homes for months,many embraced martyrdom and many got injured. We Pakistanis will always be grateful for their sacrifices for the motherland. Hazrat Allama Iqbals poetic phrase below truly depicts these brave men.
View attachment 632968

Bro lovely thread, small correction AJK troop strength was 90,000 men, not the 6,000 stated, which is the number of men in around Poonch that served and fought.

Here is an Indian source referencing the numbers I wrote above;


A further factor concerned the Poonchis’ weakening ability to defend themselves. Hari Singh was aware that many more Poonchis and Mirpuris had military capabilities and experience than the numbers serving in his army. He also had been ‘specially impressed and alarmed’ by a gathering of some 40,000 men, ‘almost all ex-servicemen of the British Army from Sudhnutti and Bagh Tehsils of Poonch, assembled to greet him on April 21, 1947 at Rawalakot’ during his tour of the ‘frontier areas’ of J&K. In July 1947, the ‘spooked’ Maharaja’s government ‘encouraged’ military-capable Poonchis and Mirpuris to disarm, including those ‘on leave with arms and ammunition’ from the Pakistan Army. These Muslims then became ‘alarmed’ when the J&K Police, with whom they had deposited their arms, redistributed these to Sikhs and Hindus for self-defence


According to Sardar Ibrahim, during September 1947, some 50,000 men were organised into a people’s militia variously known as the ‘Azad Army’, ‘Azad Forces’ or ‘Azad Kashmir Regular Forces’. This locally-officered volunteer ‘army’ comprised 90 per cent ex-servicemen, except in Bagh, where the percentage was lower. A ‘very small percentage of Pakistani volunteers’ fought with them, as may have twelve women. According to the Azad Kashmir Defence Minister, Colonel Ali Ahmad Shah (a former captain in the J&K State Force), the ‘Azad Forces had been recruited locally or had risen spontaneously’. They comprised ‘seasoned troops’ with experience fighting in both world wars and the serious ‘Waziristan Operations’ (1920-21). After Azad Kashmir came into being, its ‘Defence Council’ assumed administrative control of ‘Azad Jammu and Kashmir Forces’.


More to the looseness of the command structure;


Communications were an issue, with men fighting ‘in separate groups on many fronts … [with] no links with each other’. Couriers carried messages between Muzaffarabad and Bagh; elsewhere, post and telegraphic exchanges went via locations in Pakistan.


Taken from;

https://www.india-seminar.com/2013/643/643_christopher_snedden.htm

However the source is referenced from one of the most respected and historically accurate accounts of the war, a book titled

Kashmir: The Unwritten History by Christopher Snedden.





There was central leadership but the command structure was sporadic in many areas, with officers leading their own men in various actions.
My grandfather and my entire elder generation fought this war tooth and nail.

Kargil is a very very small town in terms of land. Poonch and Rajouri are just across LOC.

These tribals did keep Muzafarrabad, Mirpur, Bagh and Neelam Valley. The point is that these tribals did not lose as much land as they saved it what was in their possession.

The lands comprising Azad Kashmir were freed by the ex-British army servicemen before the tribals arrived. The fighting was only in small pockets.
The Laskers added numerical strength to the push through to Srinagar.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Bro lovely thread, small correction AJK troop strength was 90,000 men, not the 6,000 stated, which is the number of men in around Poonch that served and fought.

Here is an Indian source referencing the numbers I wrote above;


A further factor concerned the Poonchis’ weakening ability to defend themselves. Hari Singh was aware that many more Poonchis and Mirpuris had military capabilities and experience than the numbers serving in his army. He also had been ‘specially impressed and alarmed’ by a gathering of some 40,000 men, ‘almost all ex-servicemen of the British Army from Sudhnutti and Bagh Tehsils of Poonch, assembled to greet him on April 21, 1947 at Rawalakot’ during his tour of the ‘frontier areas’ of J&K. In July 1947, the ‘spooked’ Maharaja’s government ‘encouraged’ military-capable Poonchis and Mirpuris to disarm, including those ‘on leave with arms and ammunition’ from the Pakistan Army. These Muslims then became ‘alarmed’ when the J&K Police, with whom they had deposited their arms, redistributed these to Sikhs and Hindus for self-defence


According to Sardar Ibrahim, during September 1947, some 50,000 men were organised into a people’s militia variously known as the ‘Azad Army’, ‘Azad Forces’ or ‘Azad Kashmir Regular Forces’. This locally-officered volunteer ‘army’ comprised 90 per cent ex-servicemen, except in Bagh, where the percentage was lower. A ‘very small percentage of Pakistani volunteers’ fought with them, as may have twelve women. According to the Azad Kashmir Defence Minister, Colonel Ali Ahmad Shah (a former captain in the J&K State Force), the ‘Azad Forces had been recruited locally or had risen spontaneously’. They comprised ‘seasoned troops’ with experience fighting in both world wars and the serious ‘Waziristan Operations’ (1920-21). After Azad Kashmir came into being, its ‘Defence Council’ assumed administrative control of ‘Azad Jammu and Kashmir Forces’.


More to the looseness of the command structure;


Communications were an issue, with men fighting ‘in separate groups on many fronts … [with] no links with each other’. Couriers carried messages between Muzaffarabad and Bagh; elsewhere, post and telegraphic exchanges went via locations in Pakistan.


Taken from;

https://www.india-seminar.com/2013/643/643_christopher_snedden.htm

However the source is referenced from one of the most respected and historically accurate accounts of the war, a book titled

Kashmir: The Unwritten History by Christopher Snedden.





There was central leadership but the command structure was sporadic in many areas, with officers leading their own men in various actions.
My grandfather and my entire elder generation fought this war tooth and nail.

The lands comprising Azad Kashmir were freed by the ex-British army servicemen before the tribals arrived. The fighting was only in small pockets.

The Laskers added numerical strength to the push through to Srinagar.

I wish most posts would be of this quality. It would need less effort correcting details and impulsive claims by impulsive contemporary liberators.

Snedden is one of the few references at my side, after losing my library, and he makes very good reading, except for some passages that are painful for a secular Indian to read.

 

[Psychic]

Yes---in washington.

He did what Mush asked him to do.

Kargil operation was a disaster to begin with. Facts are out now, no point in toeing Musharraf's line in this day and age.

 

[MastanKhan]

He did what Mush asked him to do.

Kargil operation was a disaster to begin with. Facts are out now, no point in toeing Musharraf's line in this day and age.

Hi,

Those facts may make you happy---but I know a different side of the story---.

 

[ARMalik]

It is the Political and Military Elites who have really destroyed Pakistan and its citizens from within. These are the real corrupt and ruthless enemy. They had chances in 1947/48 and in 1962 was literally a gift from China. But these corrupt Junta on the behest of US and UK did no dare to venture into an empty Kashmir. And look at what is going on today. Kashmir is a flashpoint which is capable of killing millions and millions of people, and destroying vast areas on both sides. Just imagine if these gutless rulers would have done the right thing, it would be highly likely that Pakistan and India would have been economically much, much better off, and most likely having less regional and border issues.

 

[Ahmet Pasha]

Me and the boys when the five o rolls up in the hood

no need to be disheartened , give another try .
1998 musharraf was good effort .

I will personally come and show you the film Ghalib.

 

[sohailbarki]

We as a nation will always regret missing two golden opportunities to take Kashmir, one in 1947/48 and the other in 1962. Both mainly due to the slow reaction of the top brass than.Today i will not focus on the details of operations conducted by the volunteers who took part in the freedom of Kashmir.
COMPOSITION OF THE VOLUNTEER FORCES
The volunteer Lashkars comprised mainly from.
1)22 Lashkars from similar no of tribes with a strength of 25000-30000 men.
2)AJK irregular forces led by Sardar Ibrahim with a strength of 6000 men.
3)Scots from different agencies mainly Kurrum and Gilgit 1500 men.
4)Retired army personnel and Muslim league guards 2000 men.
5)State soldiers of Swat,Dir and Chitral 3000 men.
6) Some volunteers from religious outfits 1000 men.
(The above numbers are approximately correct)

VOLUNTEERS IN PICTURES
a) Tribemen from Waziristan

b) Afridi Volunteers

View attachment 632963

c)Mohmand Tribesmen

d)Miscellaneous Tribemen

e)Men from Swat state

f)Volunteer from Kurrum Militia

There are many more images of volunteers.

VICTORIES OF THE VOLUNTEER LASHKARS
What these brave men achieve in the initial days of the conflict was unprecedented. In the very first month they had reached the outskirts of Srinagar and had the Dogra forces surrounded.

Within a year they were near Leh, the capital of Ladakh.

The Royal Pakistan army could not join the War initially because of Field Marshall Auchinleck. The Army entered a year later in 1948, by that time it was a bit too late.
We are all praise for these brave men who endured a lot for Pakistan. They remained away from their homes for months,many embraced martyrdom and many got injured. We Pakistanis will always be grateful for their sacrifices for the motherland. Hazrat Allama Iqbals poetic phrase below truly depicts these brave men.
View attachment 632968

I always say that Pak army is a blessing in disguise for India if they know. Pak army serve a wall or barrier protecting India from the Tribes of Pakistan and Afghanistan, whom throughout the history raided and invaded them