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By SUMIT GANGULY
President Obama's visit to India is less than a month away, and most of New Delhi's foreign and security policy communities are asking what India might expect from it. They would be better served to focus not on what Washington can do, but rather, on what New Delhi might offer.
The U.S.-India bilateral strategic relationship is a relatively young one. For more than four decades, Delhi chose a path of nonalignment, placing itself in between the United States and the Soviet Union. It wasn't until President Clinton visited New Delhi in 2000 that relations started to warm between the two democracies.
Since then, India has demanded relief from a host of prior sanctions on its space and nuclear programs, sought increased access to American markets and asked for greater cooperation on fighting terrorism. It has devoted little attention, however, to what it might offer the U.S. in return. This lack of reciprocity encompasses areas ranging from climate change to global trade to expanded military-to-military cooperation. Not surprisingly, the strategic partnership is looking increasingly lopsided.
It's time for this dynamic to changeand there's already evidence that it can. India cooperated with the U.S. at last year's Copenhagen climate-change summit to set nonbinding targets to reduce carbon emissions. This was hardly a stellar achievement, as the accord remains voluntary. However, it did evince a willingness to contend creatively with a matter of concern to both parties. At another level, despite much domestic discord on the issue, India did vote with the U.S. on multilateral sanctions on Iran.
Other areas for bilateral cooperation already exist. Since the late 1990s U.S. and Indian naval forces have steadily expanded the scope and depth of naval cooperation in the Indian Ocean and its littoral zone. They have also played a leading role in the creation of an ad-hoc coalition to provide disaster assistance in the aftermath of the December 2004 tsunami, which affected an area from Indonesia to Thailand. And of course there are wide areas of mutual interest when it comes to trade and economic development.
It's time to build on these foundations. Despite many shared interests in Afghanistanpreventing the return of a reconstituted Taliban comes to mindNew Delhi has failed to delineate any clear-cut strategy for how it might deal with the eventual drawdown of U.S. forces there next year. Instead, policy makers have remained content to trumpet their developmental contributions to the country while counting on the U.S.-led mission to provide security. As a result, the U.S. has been unwilling to grant India a greater security role in Kabul. Delhi could surprise President Obama by proposing a regional dialogue involving the Central Asian states and Russia to guarantee Afghanistan's neutrality, security and stability going forward.
The other major regional strategic issue is China's rise and its growing military assertiveness. Without seeking to forge a formal doctrine of containment, India and the U.S. would both benefit from routinely sharing intelligence, enhancing military cooperation and coordinating policies in other realms of mutual concern. Bolstering maritime cooperation and the protection of critical sea lanes would be a good place to start.
The possibilities for enhancing cooperation are hardly limited to the arena of regional security. Significant differences over agricultural subsidies and questions of market access led to an Indo-American deadlock at the 2008 Doha Round of global trade talks. There is no reason why these discussions cannot be resurrected under the aegis of President Obama's visit. Indeed it may be especially desirable for India to revive these discussions, as the effects of the recent deep recession linger, to fend off growing protectionist sentiments within the U.S.
Then of course there are the unilateral reforms that India could undertake to draw the U.S. closer. Delhi could consider finally addressing large agricultural subsidies that cripple the public purse and retard competition in that sector. It might also consider opening up its lucrative retail sector to foreign investment. Indian firms already import cheap manufactures from China. Allowing American retailers to import such goods as well might ensure greater quality control and at least minimal adherence to consumer-protection standards.
These potential arenas of cooperation do not constitute a complete agenda of burden-sharing. However, they do offer a viable alternative to a rather lopsided agenda that focuses almost exclusively on Indian demands without paying any real heed to the needs of the incipient strategic partnership.
Sumit Ganguly: What Has Delhi Done for Washington Lately? - WSJ.com
President Obama's visit to India is less than a month away, and most of New Delhi's foreign and security policy communities are asking what India might expect from it. They would be better served to focus not on what Washington can do, but rather, on what New Delhi might offer.
The U.S.-India bilateral strategic relationship is a relatively young one. For more than four decades, Delhi chose a path of nonalignment, placing itself in between the United States and the Soviet Union. It wasn't until President Clinton visited New Delhi in 2000 that relations started to warm between the two democracies.
Since then, India has demanded relief from a host of prior sanctions on its space and nuclear programs, sought increased access to American markets and asked for greater cooperation on fighting terrorism. It has devoted little attention, however, to what it might offer the U.S. in return. This lack of reciprocity encompasses areas ranging from climate change to global trade to expanded military-to-military cooperation. Not surprisingly, the strategic partnership is looking increasingly lopsided.
It's time for this dynamic to changeand there's already evidence that it can. India cooperated with the U.S. at last year's Copenhagen climate-change summit to set nonbinding targets to reduce carbon emissions. This was hardly a stellar achievement, as the accord remains voluntary. However, it did evince a willingness to contend creatively with a matter of concern to both parties. At another level, despite much domestic discord on the issue, India did vote with the U.S. on multilateral sanctions on Iran.
Other areas for bilateral cooperation already exist. Since the late 1990s U.S. and Indian naval forces have steadily expanded the scope and depth of naval cooperation in the Indian Ocean and its littoral zone. They have also played a leading role in the creation of an ad-hoc coalition to provide disaster assistance in the aftermath of the December 2004 tsunami, which affected an area from Indonesia to Thailand. And of course there are wide areas of mutual interest when it comes to trade and economic development.
It's time to build on these foundations. Despite many shared interests in Afghanistanpreventing the return of a reconstituted Taliban comes to mindNew Delhi has failed to delineate any clear-cut strategy for how it might deal with the eventual drawdown of U.S. forces there next year. Instead, policy makers have remained content to trumpet their developmental contributions to the country while counting on the U.S.-led mission to provide security. As a result, the U.S. has been unwilling to grant India a greater security role in Kabul. Delhi could surprise President Obama by proposing a regional dialogue involving the Central Asian states and Russia to guarantee Afghanistan's neutrality, security and stability going forward.
The other major regional strategic issue is China's rise and its growing military assertiveness. Without seeking to forge a formal doctrine of containment, India and the U.S. would both benefit from routinely sharing intelligence, enhancing military cooperation and coordinating policies in other realms of mutual concern. Bolstering maritime cooperation and the protection of critical sea lanes would be a good place to start.
The possibilities for enhancing cooperation are hardly limited to the arena of regional security. Significant differences over agricultural subsidies and questions of market access led to an Indo-American deadlock at the 2008 Doha Round of global trade talks. There is no reason why these discussions cannot be resurrected under the aegis of President Obama's visit. Indeed it may be especially desirable for India to revive these discussions, as the effects of the recent deep recession linger, to fend off growing protectionist sentiments within the U.S.
Then of course there are the unilateral reforms that India could undertake to draw the U.S. closer. Delhi could consider finally addressing large agricultural subsidies that cripple the public purse and retard competition in that sector. It might also consider opening up its lucrative retail sector to foreign investment. Indian firms already import cheap manufactures from China. Allowing American retailers to import such goods as well might ensure greater quality control and at least minimal adherence to consumer-protection standards.
These potential arenas of cooperation do not constitute a complete agenda of burden-sharing. However, they do offer a viable alternative to a rather lopsided agenda that focuses almost exclusively on Indian demands without paying any real heed to the needs of the incipient strategic partnership.
Sumit Ganguly: What Has Delhi Done for Washington Lately? - WSJ.com
