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U.S. Marines look to train with Vietnamese as partnerships in the Pacific expand
https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/ar...tnamese-as-partnerships-in-the-pacific-expand
As a sign of how much the Asia-Pacific region has changed in recent years, U.S. Marines could soon begin training alongside Vietnamese military personnel.
“Growing up as a kid, watching the Vietnam War on TV every night, it was almost unimaginable that later on in my life I would be representing the United States at meetings in Vietnam and looking for opportunities to train with Vietnamese armed forces,” Lt. Gen. Lawrence Nicholson, commander of III Marine Expeditionary Force, told Marine Corps Times.
“Vietnam and Malaysia, they have small patrol craft,” he said. “They have a naval infantry that they would like us to come take a look at and look for opportunities to do some training.”
Training with the Vietnamese would be an “amazing opportunity” for Marines, Nicholson said, and it represents a dramatic shift in relations between the two countries since the Vietnam War. The three-star general who oversees all forward-deployed Marines in the Pacific Rim expects to travel to Vietnam in October to talk about what types of training events are possible, he said.
“I’m very excited to get in there and explore what it is that they’re looking for and how we can do more together,” Nicholson said. “I was just at a conference in San Diego -- the Pacific Amphibious Leaders Seminar -- [where] the Vietnamese showed up. The Vietnamese army and navy folks were there. Got a chance to meet a few of them and certainly they expressed their willingness to looking forward to doing more and doing some work together.”
Vietnam is not the only country eager to train with Marines in the Pacific. South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia all want to do more with Marines and sailors aboard amphibious assault ships, Nicholson said. Japan has also asked for help turning its Western Army on Kyushu into an amphibious force.
“I had not anticipated being this busy or being this popular,” Nicholson said.
In contrast to years past, Marines who rotate through Okinawa, Japan, through the unit deployment program do not stay on the island during their six month rotations, Nicholson said.
“Today, I think, we’re in 22 different countries,” he said. “There was an example of 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines out of Lejeune: They were in six countries in six months. They barely spent any time in Okinawa.”
In the coming year, Marines will take part in more than 100 exercises and exchanges with countries throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, said Lt. Gen. John Toolan, former commander of Marine Corps Forces, Pacific. Some of the larger exercises include Cobra Gold in Thailand; Balikatan in the Philippines; Ssang Yong in South Korea; Talisman Saber in Australia; Khaan Quest in Mongolia; and "many more,” Toolan said.
“During Landing Force Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT), we plan to work with Singapore, Cambodia and Vietnam in the upcoming year,” he added.
Toolan is retiring after 40 years in the Marine Corps. On Aug. 26, he handed command of MARFORPAC to Lt. Gen. David Berger.
More Marines on more decks
One of the best ways to move about the vast Asia-Pacific region is by ship. Marine Corps officials have said that the combatant commanders need 50 amphibious assault ships, but the Gator Navy currently stands at 29 ships.
That’s why the Marines have been using other types of ships for exercises with other countries, Toolan said.
During Koa Moana, a six-month theater security exercise that ends in November, Marines have embarked on maritime prepositioning ships Pililaau and Sacagawea, both Military Sealift Command cargo ships, for training missions in Australia, New Guinea and Peru.
“The additional lift capacity gained through the use of these alternatives to amphibious ships allows us to be more places and engage in locations that are important but difficult to reach,” Toolan said.
A three-ship amphibious ready group with an embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit is expected to head to Australia in late 2018. Officials have not identified the ships, but then-Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Greenert told Navy Times last year that the amphibious assault ship America is a “prime candidate” to visit Australia on such a deployment.
Toolan said there are no plans to significantly increase the number of Marines in the Philippines. The two countries work together on the full spectrum of operations, including responding to natural disasters, theater security cooperation and preparing to defend the Philippines, Nicholson said.
“I was just there a couple weeks ago inspecting a suite of gear,” Nicholson said. “We’ve got about 80 vehicles that are there, principally for humanitarian and disaster relief operations. But every time we do a large scale exercise, we try to pull that gear out, make sure it’s fresh; make sure it’s ready to go.”
Nicholson stressed that the team of roughly 80 Marine planners in the Philippines and other Marines who come to the country for exercises are not permanently assigned there. In mid-September, the president of the Philippines has said he will not allow Filipino forces to conduct joint patrols in the South China Sea with U.S. or other foreign militaries. He has also suggested expelling U.S. special operations from the Mindanao region.
Relations are much warmer with Australia, where a full Marine Air-Ground Task Force of 2,500 Marines is expected to rotate through starting in 2020.
“I think there are some negotiations yet to be had but we don’t see any show stoppers," Nicholson said. "We see this thing moving to fruition.”
Initially, all 2,500 Marines were expected to arrive in Australia this year, but the current Marine Rotational Force-Darwin is 1,250 Marines.
"We continue to work with our Australian counterparts on the best way forward with our rotational deployments to Darwin to include the size of the force and its composition," Toolan said. We take many things into consideration for each rotation including, but not limited to: cost, billeting space, unit and airframe availability, logistical support requirements, community impact, training area availability, etc."
Meanwhile, the Navy Department is continuing with efforts to move 5,000 Marines and 1,300 dependents from Okinawa to Guam from 2021 to 2023.
“Before we can move Marines from Okinawa to Guam, an entirely new base must be constructed on undeveloped land, and spaces on existing military installations must be enhanced,” Toolan said. “New unit operational facilities, training ranges, barracks, roads, utilities, and quality-of-life enhancements must be built over an approximately ten-year construction timeline.”
Other major issues that need to be resolved include clearing unexploded ordnance from World War II on Guam, protecting endangered species and the logistics of supporting $1 billion in simultaneous construction projects, Toolan said.
Jeff Schogol covers Marine Corps leadership, gender integration, aviation, and Pacific-based Marines for Marine Corps Times. He can be reached at jschogol@marinecorpstimes.com.
https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/ar...tnamese-as-partnerships-in-the-pacific-expand
As a sign of how much the Asia-Pacific region has changed in recent years, U.S. Marines could soon begin training alongside Vietnamese military personnel.
“Growing up as a kid, watching the Vietnam War on TV every night, it was almost unimaginable that later on in my life I would be representing the United States at meetings in Vietnam and looking for opportunities to train with Vietnamese armed forces,” Lt. Gen. Lawrence Nicholson, commander of III Marine Expeditionary Force, told Marine Corps Times.
“Vietnam and Malaysia, they have small patrol craft,” he said. “They have a naval infantry that they would like us to come take a look at and look for opportunities to do some training.”
Training with the Vietnamese would be an “amazing opportunity” for Marines, Nicholson said, and it represents a dramatic shift in relations between the two countries since the Vietnam War. The three-star general who oversees all forward-deployed Marines in the Pacific Rim expects to travel to Vietnam in October to talk about what types of training events are possible, he said.
“I’m very excited to get in there and explore what it is that they’re looking for and how we can do more together,” Nicholson said. “I was just at a conference in San Diego -- the Pacific Amphibious Leaders Seminar -- [where] the Vietnamese showed up. The Vietnamese army and navy folks were there. Got a chance to meet a few of them and certainly they expressed their willingness to looking forward to doing more and doing some work together.”
Vietnam is not the only country eager to train with Marines in the Pacific. South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia all want to do more with Marines and sailors aboard amphibious assault ships, Nicholson said. Japan has also asked for help turning its Western Army on Kyushu into an amphibious force.
“I had not anticipated being this busy or being this popular,” Nicholson said.
In contrast to years past, Marines who rotate through Okinawa, Japan, through the unit deployment program do not stay on the island during their six month rotations, Nicholson said.
“Today, I think, we’re in 22 different countries,” he said. “There was an example of 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines out of Lejeune: They were in six countries in six months. They barely spent any time in Okinawa.”
In the coming year, Marines will take part in more than 100 exercises and exchanges with countries throughout the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, said Lt. Gen. John Toolan, former commander of Marine Corps Forces, Pacific. Some of the larger exercises include Cobra Gold in Thailand; Balikatan in the Philippines; Ssang Yong in South Korea; Talisman Saber in Australia; Khaan Quest in Mongolia; and "many more,” Toolan said.
“During Landing Force Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT), we plan to work with Singapore, Cambodia and Vietnam in the upcoming year,” he added.
Toolan is retiring after 40 years in the Marine Corps. On Aug. 26, he handed command of MARFORPAC to Lt. Gen. David Berger.
More Marines on more decks
One of the best ways to move about the vast Asia-Pacific region is by ship. Marine Corps officials have said that the combatant commanders need 50 amphibious assault ships, but the Gator Navy currently stands at 29 ships.
That’s why the Marines have been using other types of ships for exercises with other countries, Toolan said.
During Koa Moana, a six-month theater security exercise that ends in November, Marines have embarked on maritime prepositioning ships Pililaau and Sacagawea, both Military Sealift Command cargo ships, for training missions in Australia, New Guinea and Peru.
“The additional lift capacity gained through the use of these alternatives to amphibious ships allows us to be more places and engage in locations that are important but difficult to reach,” Toolan said.
A three-ship amphibious ready group with an embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit is expected to head to Australia in late 2018. Officials have not identified the ships, but then-Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Greenert told Navy Times last year that the amphibious assault ship America is a “prime candidate” to visit Australia on such a deployment.
Toolan said there are no plans to significantly increase the number of Marines in the Philippines. The two countries work together on the full spectrum of operations, including responding to natural disasters, theater security cooperation and preparing to defend the Philippines, Nicholson said.
“I was just there a couple weeks ago inspecting a suite of gear,” Nicholson said. “We’ve got about 80 vehicles that are there, principally for humanitarian and disaster relief operations. But every time we do a large scale exercise, we try to pull that gear out, make sure it’s fresh; make sure it’s ready to go.”
Nicholson stressed that the team of roughly 80 Marine planners in the Philippines and other Marines who come to the country for exercises are not permanently assigned there. In mid-September, the president of the Philippines has said he will not allow Filipino forces to conduct joint patrols in the South China Sea with U.S. or other foreign militaries. He has also suggested expelling U.S. special operations from the Mindanao region.
Relations are much warmer with Australia, where a full Marine Air-Ground Task Force of 2,500 Marines is expected to rotate through starting in 2020.
“I think there are some negotiations yet to be had but we don’t see any show stoppers," Nicholson said. "We see this thing moving to fruition.”
Initially, all 2,500 Marines were expected to arrive in Australia this year, but the current Marine Rotational Force-Darwin is 1,250 Marines.
"We continue to work with our Australian counterparts on the best way forward with our rotational deployments to Darwin to include the size of the force and its composition," Toolan said. We take many things into consideration for each rotation including, but not limited to: cost, billeting space, unit and airframe availability, logistical support requirements, community impact, training area availability, etc."
Meanwhile, the Navy Department is continuing with efforts to move 5,000 Marines and 1,300 dependents from Okinawa to Guam from 2021 to 2023.
“Before we can move Marines from Okinawa to Guam, an entirely new base must be constructed on undeveloped land, and spaces on existing military installations must be enhanced,” Toolan said. “New unit operational facilities, training ranges, barracks, roads, utilities, and quality-of-life enhancements must be built over an approximately ten-year construction timeline.”
Other major issues that need to be resolved include clearing unexploded ordnance from World War II on Guam, protecting endangered species and the logistics of supporting $1 billion in simultaneous construction projects, Toolan said.
Jeff Schogol covers Marine Corps leadership, gender integration, aviation, and Pacific-based Marines for Marine Corps Times. He can be reached at jschogol@marinecorpstimes.com.
Viet
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Maybe a glimpse of Vietnam future satelitte network. According to the director of Vietnam national space agency, Japan will develop a 550kg light satellite radar version especially for Vietnam. That is first time ever Japan will develop such satellite radar for a foreign country.
Viet
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One of the mainstays of Vietnam air defence: Pechora-2TM ground to air missile. Range 35km, capable destroying advanced, small-size aerial attack platforms flying at low altitudes. can also be deployed against ground and water-surface targets that are visible to radar. The missile acquisition radar can detect targets at 100km distance.
The missile complex will be complemented by short range missile system T38 STILET and radar TRS-2D, with the assistance by Tetraedr company (Belarus)
The missile complex will be complemented by short range missile system T38 STILET and radar TRS-2D, with the assistance by Tetraedr company (Belarus)
Silent Knight
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Good thing that Tetraedr transferred all technologies in the S-125-2TM project, meaning Vietnam can locally upgrade the remaining S-125M systems to 2TM standard.
Nilgiri
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Maybe a glimpse of Vietnam future satelitte network. According to the director of Vietnam national space agency, Japan will develop a 550kg light satellite radar version especially for Vietnam. That is first time ever Japan will develop such satellite radar for a foreign country.
We would like to launch this for you hehe. Light sats are our speciality
Viet
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You are welcome my friend together mastering the spaceWe would like to launch this for you hehe. Light sats are our speciality
2,500 ton patrol ship for the Coast Guard. 5 more are coming
I am glad to see that both Your two goverment could work hand in hand to resolve the Scs problem and then creating more peaces and harmony world.Filipino president to discuss maritime disputes on Vietnam visit
By VnExpress September 23, 2016 | 03:14 pm GMT+7
Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte speaks during a news conference in August, 2016. Photo by Reuters
The South China Sea dispute is likely to be the focal point during Duterte's visit later this month.
Filipino President Rodrigo Duterte will visit Vietnam next week and take part in discussions with local leaders on maritime disputes.
Communications Secretary Martin Andanar said that maritime disputes over the South China Sea (known in Vietnam as the East Sea) will be discussed during the visit, which is scheduled for September 28-29. The visit comes in response to an invitation made by Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc during the recent ASEAN summit in Vientiane, Laos.
Vietnam hailed the ruling of an international tribune in The Hague in July that decreed Beijing has no legal basis to claim historic rights to resources in the East Sea. The ruling came after the Philippines filed a case in January 2013 accusing Beijing of violating the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
The three all claim the Spratly Islands, besides Brunei and Malaysia.
Sources from the Filipino government said the president also plans to visit Japan in late October and Beijing by the end of the year.
Duterte assumed office last June and has caused controversy with blunt comments about other countries’ leaders. Most recently, an insult directed at U.S. President Barack Obama prompted the latter to cancel a scheduled bilateral meeting.
He has also received criticism at home for a ruthless drug war that has killed nearly 2,000 people.
I am very happy to see that someday in future our children will hail the day of peaces treaty in these area.
Silent Knight
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The opening ceremony for foreign cadets in Vietnam Military Science Academy.
During the 2016-2017 semester, we'll train dozens of foreign officers from 14 different countries.
During the 2016-2017 semester, we'll train dozens of foreign officers from 14 different countries.
Carlosa
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Russia and China: Colluding on a South China Sea Policy?
Carlyle A. Thayer
September 27, 2016
http://www.realcleardefense.com/art...uding_on_a_south_china_sea_policy_110129.html
At the G20 Hangzhou summit earlier this month, China made clear that Russian president Vladimir Putin was a top guest. Both China and Russia claim that their bilateral relations are the ‘best ever’ and demonstrate an ‘unprecedentedly high level of trust’. Putin described the relationships as a ‘comprehensive partnership and strategic collaboration’.
The China–Russia relationship is based on a mutual wish to push back against the United States, for its expansion of NATO in Europe and its rebalance in the Asia–Pacific. Sanctions imposed on Russia by the US and Europe have hurt the Russian economy, and Russia needs markets for its energy exports, especially gas. China has signed a major deal to import Russian gas and it is a large market for Russian manufactured weapons and technology.
However, Russian and Chinese interests always aren’t congruent. Russia is suspicious of Xi Jinping’s ‘One Belt, One Road’, which aims to expand into Central Asia. Moscow also faces the difficult challenge of improving relations with China while at the same time not undermining its traditional ties with India and Vietnam, which both feel pressure from Beijing.
That tension is manifested in Russian positions on the South China Sea. The first is that it takes no side in disputes and supports freedom of navigation, including overflight and the peaceful settlement of disputes directly between the parties concerned on the basis of international law. But Russia concurrently opposes the involvement by third parties outside the region because their involvement, according to Putin, ‘will only hurt the resolution of these issues… [and] is detrimental and counterproductive’.
Putin supported China’s position on the recent Arbitral Tribunal ruling on the grounds that it was conducted without China being present or China’s views being considered. Putin argued that it was a legal rather than a political matter. In fact, he is ill- informed about (or is choosing to ignore) the procedures established under Annex VII of UNCLOS, Article 9 of which makes clear that the ‘absence of a party or failure of a party to defend its case shall not constitute a bar to the proceedings’.
The conclusion to be drawn is that Putin’s definitely trying to curry favour with China, even at a cost to its long-standing friends in the region. Russia and Vietnam are in agreement that territorial disputes in the South China Sea should be resolved peacefully by the parties concerned. But Russia hasn’t respected Vietnam’s position that when the interests of third parties in the region are involved, those third parties must be included in discussions. Vietnam takes note of the interests of third parties outside the region, especially relating to freedom of navigation and overflight.
China’s excessive claims in the South China Sea and its artificial islands are aimed a dominating the South China and ultimately restricting the movement of US (and other) naval ships. In other words, China’s actions in both those respects threaten freedom of navigation and overflight by regional and external powers. So Russia is being duplicitous, because in practice the interests of third parties outside the region are the freedom of navigation and overflight threatened by China. Putin supports freedom of navigation for the Russian Navy but is unconcerned if China makes it difficult for the US Navy.
Despite their new found closeness, both Russia and China have been careful not to use the word alliance to describe their political and military relations. Formal alliances are usually directed at a third party and involve a commitment by the signatories to meet and take joint action in certain circumstances, such as an armed attack on one of the parties. Clearly a China-Russia alliance would be aimed at the US and its allies and would in effect bring about a new Cold War.
And it’d likely be counterproductive. A Russia–China alliance would result in a reinvigoration of the US alliance system in both Europe and in the Asia–Pacific. Individual members of ASEAN would come under great pressure to take sides to bolster their security. Finally, such a hypothetical alliance would likely provoke a global arms race, heighten tensions and raise the risk of conflict in the East and South China seas, where three major powers have material interests.
China and Russia will continue to work together when it suits them, coordinating actions and cooperating on security and strategic matters that affect them, most notably against US ballistic missile defence in Europe and THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Air Defence) in South Korea. But they’ll cooperate with the United States as well if it suits them. Russia and the US are working together to resolve the conflict in Syria (however difficult that may turn out to be), while China and the US cooperate on a wide variety of international issues, from climate change to non-proliferation by North Korea. What we’re seeing can therefore be more accurately described as a transient confluence of limited interests, rather than a deep strategic commitment between Russia and China.
Carlyle A. Thayer is an emeritus professor, University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy in Canberra.
This article originally appeared at The Strategist (ASPI).
Carlyle A. Thayer
September 27, 2016
http://www.realcleardefense.com/art...uding_on_a_south_china_sea_policy_110129.html
At the G20 Hangzhou summit earlier this month, China made clear that Russian president Vladimir Putin was a top guest. Both China and Russia claim that their bilateral relations are the ‘best ever’ and demonstrate an ‘unprecedentedly high level of trust’. Putin described the relationships as a ‘comprehensive partnership and strategic collaboration’.
The China–Russia relationship is based on a mutual wish to push back against the United States, for its expansion of NATO in Europe and its rebalance in the Asia–Pacific. Sanctions imposed on Russia by the US and Europe have hurt the Russian economy, and Russia needs markets for its energy exports, especially gas. China has signed a major deal to import Russian gas and it is a large market for Russian manufactured weapons and technology.
However, Russian and Chinese interests always aren’t congruent. Russia is suspicious of Xi Jinping’s ‘One Belt, One Road’, which aims to expand into Central Asia. Moscow also faces the difficult challenge of improving relations with China while at the same time not undermining its traditional ties with India and Vietnam, which both feel pressure from Beijing.
That tension is manifested in Russian positions on the South China Sea. The first is that it takes no side in disputes and supports freedom of navigation, including overflight and the peaceful settlement of disputes directly between the parties concerned on the basis of international law. But Russia concurrently opposes the involvement by third parties outside the region because their involvement, according to Putin, ‘will only hurt the resolution of these issues… [and] is detrimental and counterproductive’.
Putin supported China’s position on the recent Arbitral Tribunal ruling on the grounds that it was conducted without China being present or China’s views being considered. Putin argued that it was a legal rather than a political matter. In fact, he is ill- informed about (or is choosing to ignore) the procedures established under Annex VII of UNCLOS, Article 9 of which makes clear that the ‘absence of a party or failure of a party to defend its case shall not constitute a bar to the proceedings’.
The conclusion to be drawn is that Putin’s definitely trying to curry favour with China, even at a cost to its long-standing friends in the region. Russia and Vietnam are in agreement that territorial disputes in the South China Sea should be resolved peacefully by the parties concerned. But Russia hasn’t respected Vietnam’s position that when the interests of third parties in the region are involved, those third parties must be included in discussions. Vietnam takes note of the interests of third parties outside the region, especially relating to freedom of navigation and overflight.
China’s excessive claims in the South China Sea and its artificial islands are aimed a dominating the South China and ultimately restricting the movement of US (and other) naval ships. In other words, China’s actions in both those respects threaten freedom of navigation and overflight by regional and external powers. So Russia is being duplicitous, because in practice the interests of third parties outside the region are the freedom of navigation and overflight threatened by China. Putin supports freedom of navigation for the Russian Navy but is unconcerned if China makes it difficult for the US Navy.
Despite their new found closeness, both Russia and China have been careful not to use the word alliance to describe their political and military relations. Formal alliances are usually directed at a third party and involve a commitment by the signatories to meet and take joint action in certain circumstances, such as an armed attack on one of the parties. Clearly a China-Russia alliance would be aimed at the US and its allies and would in effect bring about a new Cold War.
And it’d likely be counterproductive. A Russia–China alliance would result in a reinvigoration of the US alliance system in both Europe and in the Asia–Pacific. Individual members of ASEAN would come under great pressure to take sides to bolster their security. Finally, such a hypothetical alliance would likely provoke a global arms race, heighten tensions and raise the risk of conflict in the East and South China seas, where three major powers have material interests.
China and Russia will continue to work together when it suits them, coordinating actions and cooperating on security and strategic matters that affect them, most notably against US ballistic missile defence in Europe and THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Air Defence) in South Korea. But they’ll cooperate with the United States as well if it suits them. Russia and the US are working together to resolve the conflict in Syria (however difficult that may turn out to be), while China and the US cooperate on a wide variety of international issues, from climate change to non-proliferation by North Korea. What we’re seeing can therefore be more accurately described as a transient confluence of limited interests, rather than a deep strategic commitment between Russia and China.
Carlyle A. Thayer is an emeritus professor, University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy in Canberra.
This article originally appeared at The Strategist (ASPI).
Viet
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Not really a Vietnam military news
Since March 2016, Chief of Staff of US central command or CENTCOM, US army Brigadier General Viet Luong. In his position he doesn't act as the commanding General of Centcom, that is Lt. Gen. Michael X. Garrett, rather a military adviser to US president and US defense secretary.
Not too bad for a man, that fled with his parents to the United States, one day before South Vietnam collapsed.
what is the scope of US central command?
The US military divides the world in theaters of operation, with the central theater or command encompassing 20 countries in Asia and Middle East.
So the US military campaign against IS in Iraq and Syria fall under the command of Centcom.
U.S. Air Force F-15 Strike Eagles conducting combat operations in Iraq against ISIS targets. (CENTCOM)
ARABIAN GULF (Nov. 6, 2014) USS Ponce (AFSB(I) 15), left, comes alongside Military Sealift Command fast combat support ship USNS Rainier
(T-AOE 7) and cargo ship USNS Charles Drew (T-AKE 10) during an underway replenishment. (CENTCOM)
Since March 2016, Chief of Staff of US central command or CENTCOM, US army Brigadier General Viet Luong. In his position he doesn't act as the commanding General of Centcom, that is Lt. Gen. Michael X. Garrett, rather a military adviser to US president and US defense secretary.
Not too bad for a man, that fled with his parents to the United States, one day before South Vietnam collapsed.
what is the scope of US central command?
The US military divides the world in theaters of operation, with the central theater or command encompassing 20 countries in Asia and Middle East.
So the US military campaign against IS in Iraq and Syria fall under the command of Centcom.
U.S. Air Force F-15 Strike Eagles conducting combat operations in Iraq against ISIS targets. (CENTCOM)
ARABIAN GULF (Nov. 6, 2014) USS Ponce (AFSB(I) 15), left, comes alongside Military Sealift Command fast combat support ship USNS Rainier
(T-AOE 7) and cargo ship USNS Charles Drew (T-AKE 10) during an underway replenishment. (CENTCOM)
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