The New York Times has a terrific article up explaining the ‘long road to chaos in Pakistan.’ The piece is written by Dexter Filkins, who has covered the Afghanistan and Iraq wars for the newspaper and is the author of “The Forever War.”
In short, it is a man who knows what he is talking about.
Although we often spend time these days to the current situation in Pakistan, commentators seldom take the time to point out how the country got here (fighting against the Taliban, under pressure by the U.S., and now Pakistan and the U.S. exchanging fire at the Afghan-Pakistan border) in the first place.
According to Filkins it all started a decade ago or so. Pakistan’s leaders, Filkins writes, ‘began nurturing the Taliban and their brethren to help advance the country’s regional interests.’ The Taliban and Al Qaeda ‘owe their survival — and much of their present strength — to a succession of Pakistani governments that continues to the present day.’
‘The origins of the present predicament date to 1994, when Pakistan, unnerved by the bloody civil war that had engulfed Afghanistan following the Soviet Union’s departure five years earlier, turned to a group of fierce but moralistic Afghan tribesman who had won a string of victories. They called themselves “the students” — in Arabic and Pashto, the Taliban. Sensing an opportunity, the Pakistani government, led then by Benazir Bhutto, threw its support behind them. Aided by Pakistani money, supplies and military advisers, the Taliban swept across Afghanistan, entering the capital in 1996,’ Filkins explains.
Then in 2001 it was this same group that the U.S. overthrew because it aided Al Qaeda which launched a terrorist attack against the United States resulting in thousands of innocent American victims.
Next Pakistan, then led by Pervez Musharraf, promised the U.S. to work against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and to try to destroy them. ‘For that, Pakistan was rewarded with nearly $10 billion in American aid. But over the years, something else happened: whatever President Musharraf said in public, the military and intelligence services over which he presided demonstrated every intention of strengthening the Taliban, who fled en masse to the borderlands after their expulsion from Kabul in November 2001.’
Evidence of this ’strengthening’: Islamic schools were not closed, even though Musharraf promised to do so. He did arrest 2,000 militants and extremists, but released them weeks later without explanation. ‘The most glaring example came last July, when operatives of Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence, or I.S.I., were said to have helped fighters under Serajuddin Haqqani, a Taliban commander, bomb the Indian Embassy in Kabul. An Indian defense attaché was among 54 people killed, and American officials said there was overwhelming evidence pointing to I.S.I. involvement,’ the American journalist writes.
The main reason for Pakistan’s support for the Taliban, Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations was and continues to be the ongoing rivalry with India. The two countries despise each other, and have waged war with each other - via proxies or not - for decades. ‘India has allied itself closely with the Afghan government of Hamid Karzai. In 2006, for instance, a senior I.S.I. official told a New York Times reporter that he regarded Mr. Haqqani as an I.S.I. intelligence asset. Mr. Haqqani, an Afghan Pashtun, is one of the Taliban’s most senior commanders battling the Americans. His father, Jalalhuddin, is a longtime associate of Osama bin Laden. The Haqqanis are thought to be overseeing operations from the border territories.’
But then the Taliban turned against its Pakistani masters. The Taliban has goals that go beyond Afghanistan. Afghanistan is merely one of its goals, one of its tools. Its looking beyond Afghan borders to other Islamic countries and then especially Pakistan. ‘A turning point came in the summer of 2007, when Pakistani troops stormed the Red Mosque, where Islamic militants had gathered in the capital. The gun battle killed nearly 100 people. Taliban militants launched a wave of suicide bombings around the country, and Baitullah Mehsud formed Tariq-i-Taliban Pakistan, an umbrella organization of several Taliban groups, and declared war on the Pakistani government. Since then, Taliban militias have expanded their reach beyond the FATA areas to include much of the neighboring Northwest Frontier Province.’
Meanwhile, the U.S. grew increasingly concerned about the Pakistan-Taliban relationship. It tried to put pressure on Islamabad to break with the Taliban and to take military action against it. The Pakistani leadership did indeed order an offensive against militants hiding in the country’s tribal region, but ‘there is abundant evidence suggesting that at least some elements of the army do not want to do that.’
“I would not rule out the possibility that explicit deals were made by the military,” an American military official told Filkins.
After Musharraf resigned and was replaced by others, by civilians, the situation continued to deteriorate. Pakistan stepped up its military offensive, but that only strengthened the position of the Taliban; many fighters were killed, for sure, but public opinion is increasingly turning against Islamabad and the U.S. and in favor of the Muslim extremists. The terrorist attacks taking place in Pakistan so often nowadays are considered to be retaliation for the military offensive against the Taliban. Most Pakistanis do not blame the extremists for the violence but, rather, their own government and the U.S. (which they feel is bullying their government into submission).
Meanwhile, the troubling situation in Pakistan’s tribal region enables the Taliban to launch attacks against Western and Afghan targets in Afghanistan. They use the border with Pakistan to bring money, weapons and men into Afghanistan for battle. The U.S. understands this and has decided to take military action against the Taliban in Pakistan resulting in even more anger among average Pakistanis.
And so the new Pakistani government finds itself between a rock and a hard place. Whatever it does, it’s wrong. The Taliban has become so strong that it cannot be easily destroyed. Additionally, many Pakistanis are sympathetic towards the Taliban and oppose the U.S. The Taliban will not be destroyed by Islamabad, not without American help. But such help would greatly increase the Taliban’s appeal in Pakistan; the more the U.S. gets involved, the more Pakistanis will join the Taliban and fight against both the U.S. and their own government.
It’s a terrible situation… created by the Taliban itself