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US predator strikes inside Pakistan - without permission

Maqsad
- regarding "arresting people", how do you propose we do that - since the militants have essentially destroyed the traditional authority in the region, and have killed upwards of 300 Tribal Maliks?

When Pakistan wanted the "foreigners" out of South Waziristan, it took a major operation by thousands of Wazir Tribesmen backed by the PA, over a few weeks to accomplish that, even though the Wazir's supported the move. Not exactly a conducive environment to "arrest and try suspects".

Imposing the constitution and allowing the "rule of law" is what all of us want, but it is not Pakistan or the US who are preventing that - it is the militants, and they refuse to bow in front of any law.

How hard is it to surround a compound made of mud with some tanks, Al-Khalids since there are so many of them now, and then fire a few cannisters of teargass and ask them to surrender? I mean I would expect even a swat team to be able to handle that and an army crew should be able to do so as well.
 
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How hard is it to surround a compound made of mud with some tanks, Al-Khalids since there are so many of them now, and then fire a few cannisters of teargass and ask them to surrender? I mean I would expect even a swat team to be able to handle that and an army crew should be able to do so as well.

And do you really think that if we did that the only issue we would have to deal with is fire from within the compound? The PA tried asserting itself in SWaziristan and over in Darra Adamkhel we have the Kohat Tunnel taken over. You are viewing ops in FATA as localized, containable events. Given that NWa has established Taliban groups with thousands of fighters, going after high profile figures, who undoubtedly have protection from some Taliban/Tribal factions, would inevitable escalate into a massive operation across the agency. It would have also destroyed the peace talks that recently got ratified by the 200 something Jirga. As long as Intel is good, I see no reason to arrest people like Libbi, and plausible denial works in our favor while we attempt to convince the locals to participate in the political process.
 
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And do you really think that if we did that the only issue we would have to deal with is fire from within the compound? The PA tried asserting itself in SWaziristan and over in Darra Adamkhel we have the Kohat Tunnel taken over. You are viewing ops in FATA as localized, containable events. Given that NWa has established Taliban groups with thousands of fighters, going after high profile figures, who undoubtedly have protection from some Taliban/Tribal factions, would inevitable escalate into a massive operation across the agency. It would have also destroyed the peace talks that recently got ratified by the 200 something Jirga. As long as Intel is good, I see no reason to arrest people like Libbi, and plausible denial works in our favor while we attempt to convince the locals to participate in the political process.


I would say that if the risk factor is minimal then it should be treated more like a police arrest rather than a military engagement. What exactly do you have against arresting Libby and trying him and then executing him or letting him cut a deal to live imprisoned? The worst that can happen is someone kidnaps an official to swap for Libby's release during his interrogation or trial.

Now if you are also implying that in a military engagement with Libby sitting inside some mud huts where the PA has tanks, choppers, radar, infrared, acoustics, teargass and mortars available it stands a reasonable chance of suffering casualties than that assessment in itself is quite shocking and disgraceful. If a professional army is technically incapable of bullying a cornered terrorist into surrendering then there needs to be a serious overhaul within the army to upgrade combat readiness.

Are you basically saying that because the PA is not adept enough to capture or kill a militant without having any of its own killed...then it chooses to press a button and send a missile to do the job? Never mind the inhumanity of denying a person their right to raise a white flag, which is supposedly a basic human right under the Geneva convention, but when you say that the army is not tactically able to threaten a militant with a "surefire" offensive well, that's another disturbing issue altogether.
 
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Maqsad,

We cannot do "police arrests" when GoP authority has been demolished by the Taliban. If libbi had the support of certain factions of the Taliban, why do you think they would turn him over quietly to a police party, when Mullah Omar refused to do the same with OBL?

I am not looking at the risk factor as being limited to the potential losses during any siege/raid of the compound, rather the escalation that would result all across FATA and the stoppage of peace talks. The militants had declared and for the most part held to a unilateral ceasefire for a couple of months by that point. Despite all the fanfare over the creation of the "United taliban" (TTP), the NWa Taliban did not join in with BMehsud when the PA launched ops in Swa, nor did they overtly join in the Dara Adamkhel fighting. Risking this potential opportunity to come to an agreement such as the one with Mullah Nazir in Swa is the "risk factor" I would be concerned with. At the same time, people like Libbi do not continue staying at the same location for very long, and whether the US had intel on where he was and wanted to go after him or we told the US, not taking the opportunity to get a senior AQ figure (who has probably been responsible for some of the terrorism in Pakistan as well - given AQ's statements) would also be a risk. With this strike, AQ suffers a blow, NWa Taliban enter into agreements with us, and actually helped conduct the elections in a safe and fair (relatively) manner. We continue isolating Mehsud, and if peace prevails we can actually get some of the developemnt projects going in FATA.
 
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You didn't make a mistake. You intentionally distorted that story. I know that and so do you.

Easily done as the lotus-eaters here followed in your footsteps...until I showed up.

Get used to it.
 
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S-2
You ruined our hissy fit!:P

But seriously, thanks for pointing out the additional information, I thought the complete article was pasted, and it wasn't.
 
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The relevant part of the article, buried at the end.
With all signs pointing to a unique target, CIA officials ordered the launch of a pilotless MQ-1B Predator aircraft, one of three kept at a secret base that the Pakistani government has allowed to be stationed inside the country. Launches from that base do not require government permission, officials said.

Whether they require permission or not, it is unthinkable that the Pakistani military does not know about whats going on, or what kinds of missions the "secret" base is used for. If they didn't, I suppose they could close it down now...

My question is, what happens to the "secret base" now. Or is it only a "secret" with regards to its publicly available information on where it is located. I would have thought both Pakistanis and Americans would have wanted the existence of the base kept "secret" as well. :D
 
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Uh...sorry.

I'm actually worried that YOU may need some plausible deniability soon. I see how it works now.
 
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S-2
You ruined our hissy fit!:P

But seriously, thanks for pointing out the additional information, I thought the complete article was pasted, and it wasn't.

No the complete article(two pages pasted off the web lin) was pasted by me in this thread. Look at post #2 and you will find this paragraph:

With all signs pointing to a unique target, CIA officials ordered the launch of a pilotless MQ-1B Predator aircraft, one of three kept at a secret base that the Pakistani government has allowed to be stationed inside the country. Launches from that base do not require government permission, officials said.

If you read the headline, the first page and got the general "gist" of the article then this little paragraph just doesn't "fit in" so to speak which is why everyone including me missed it.

Anyone who clicks on the link which I also posted can see this is exactly what the news article says just as I copied into my thread except it is in bold red on the web page.


U.S. strikes within Pakistan — without notice


Also underneath that one can see in bold black:

Unilateral attack on al-Qaeda commander called a model for operations


If I wanted to mislead people on here deliberately why would I leave out that bolded subheadline which has the phrase UNILATERAL ATTACK in it?

That entire article is a reading error waiting to happen. The "fine print" is tucked away in a little corner on the second page when in all honesty it should be in the first couple of paragraphs.
 
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The relevant part of the article, buried at the end.


Whether they require permission or not, it is unthinkable that the Pakistani military does not know about whats going on, or what kinds of missions the "secret" base is used for. If they didn't, I suppose they could close it down now...

My question is, what happens to the "secret base" now. Or is it only a "secret" with regards to its publicly available information on where it is located. I would have thought both Pakistanis and Americans would have wanted the existence of the base kept "secret" as well. :D

You beat me to it.
 
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Maqsad,

I apologize - my mistake really. I somehow missed your second post because I was skimming through the posts in a bit of a hurry, and I think that as I scrolled down I thought the second post was the first, and I scrolled through it without reading.
 
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Maqsad,

I apologize - my mistake really. I somehow missed your second post because I was skimming through the posts in a bit of a hurry, and I think that as I scrolled down I thought the second post was the first, and I scrolled through it without reading.

No problem, it was I myself who missed the key paragraph in my own copy and paste job. Just goes to show, you should read everything very very carefully and not use speed reading techniques when it comes to news articles.
 
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U.S. strikes in Pakistan — without notice
Unilateral attack on al-Qaeda commander called a model for operations
Joby Warrick and Robin Wright, The Washington Post

Feb. 18, 2008

In the predawn hours of Jan. 29, a CIA Predator aircraft flew in a slow arc above the Pakistani town of Mir Ali. The drone's operator, relying on information secretly passed to the CIA by local informants, clicked a computer mouse and sent the first of two Hellfire missiles hurtling toward a cluster of mud-brick buildings a few miles from the town center.

The missiles killed Abu Laith al-Libi, a senior al-Qaeda commander and a man who had repeatedly eluded the CIA's dragnet. It was the first successful strike against al-Qaeda's core leadership in two years, and it involved, U.S. officials say, an unusual degree of autonomy by the CIA inside Pakistan.

Having requested the Pakistani government's official permission for such strikes on previous occasions, only to be put off or turned down, this time the U.S. spy agency did not seek approval. The government of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf was notified only as the operation was underway, according to the officials, who insisted on anonymity because of diplomatic sensitivities.

Model for the future

Officials say the incident was a model of how Washington often scores its rare victories these days in the fight against al-Qaeda inside Pakistan's national borders: It acts with assistance from well-paid sympathizers inside the country, but without getting the government's formal permission beforehand.

It is an approach that some U.S. officials say could be used more frequently this year, particularly if a power vacuum results from yesterday's election and associated political tumult. The administration also feels an increased sense of urgency about undermining al-Qaeda before President Bush leaves office, making it less hesitant, said one official familiar with the incident.

Independent actions by U.S. military forces on another country's sovereign territory are always controversial, and both U.S. and Pakistani officials have repeatedly sought to obscure operational details that would reveal that key decisions are sometimes made in the United States, not in Islamabad. Some Pentagon operations have been undertaken only after intense disputes with the State Department, which has worried that they might inflame Pakistani public resentment; the CIA itself has sometimes sought to put the brakes on because of anxieties about the consequences for its relationship with Pakistani intelligence officials.

Pakistan considered unreliable

U.S. military officials say, however, that the uneven performance of their Pakistani counterparts increasingly requires that Washington pursue the fight however it can, sometimes following an unorthodox path that leaves in the dark Pakistani military and intelligence officials who at best lack commitment and resolve and at worst lack sympathy for U.S. interests.

Top Bush administration policy officials -- who are increasingly worried about al-Qaeda's use of its sanctuary in remote, tribally ruled areas in northern Pakistan to dispatch trained terrorists to the West -- have quietly begun to accept the military's point of view, according to several sources familiar with the context of the Libi strike.

"In the past it required getting approval from the highest levels," said one former intelligence official involved in planning for previous strikes. "You may have information that is valid for only 30 minutes. If you wait, the information is no longer valid."

But when the autonomous U.S. military operations in Pakistan succeed, support for them grows in Washington in probably the same proportion as Pakistani resentments increase. Even as U.S. officials ramp up the pressure on Musharraf to do more, Pakistan's embattled president has taken a harder line in public against cooperation in recent months, the sources said. "The posture that was evident two years ago is not evident," said a senior U.S. official who frequently visits the region.

A U.S. military official familiar with operations in the tribal areas, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to talk about the operations, said: "We'll get these one-off flukes once every eight months or so, but that's still not a strategy -- it's not a plan. Every now and then something will come together. What that serves to do [is] it tamps down discussion about whether there is a better way to do it."

The target is identified

During seven years of searching for Osama bin Laden and his followers, the U.S. government has deployed billions of dollars' worth of surveillance hardware to South Asia, from top-secret spy satellites to sophisticated eavesdropping gear for intercepting text messages and cellphone conversations.

Yet some of the initial clues that led to the Libi strike were decidedly low-tech, according to an account supplied by four officials briefed on the operation. The CIA declined to comment about the strike and neither confirmed nor denied its involvement.

Hours before the attack, multiple sources said, the CIA was alerted to a convoy of vehicles that bore all the signatures of al-Qaeda officers on the move. Local residents -- who two sources said were not connected to the Pakistani army or intelligence service -- began monitoring the cluster of vehicles as it passed through North Waziristan, a rugged, largely lawless province that borders Afghanistan.

Eventually the local sources determined that the convoy carried up to seven al-Qaeda operatives and one individual who appeared to be of high rank. Asked how the local support had been arranged, a U.S. official familiar with the episode said, "All it takes is bags of cash."

Kamran Bokhari, director of Middle East analysis for Strategic Forecasting, a private intelligence group, said the informants could have been recruits from the Afghanistan side of the border, where the U.S. military operates freely.

"People in this region don't recognize the border, which is very porous," Bokhari said. "It is very likely that our people were in contact with intelligence sources who frequent both sides and could provide some kind of targeting information."

Precisely what U.S. officials knew about the "high-value target" in the al-Qaeda convoy is unclear. Libi, a 41-year-old al-Qaeda commander who had slowly climbed to the No. 5 spot on the CIA's most wanted list, was a hulking figure who stood 6 feet 4 inches tall. He spoke Libyan-accented Arabic and learned to be cautious after narrowly escaping a previous CIA strike. U.S. intelligence officials say he directed several deadly attacks, including a bombing at a U.S. military base in Afghanistan last year that killed 23 people.

Observing their prey

Alerted to the suspicious convoy, the CIA used a variety of surveillance techniques to follow its progression through Mir Ali, North Waziristan's second-largest town, and to a walled compound in a village on the town's outskirts.

The stopping place itself was an indication that these were important men: The compound was the home of Abdus Sattar, 45, a local Taliban commander and an associate of Baitullah Mehsud, the man accused by both the CIA and Pakistan of plotting the assassination of Benazir Bhutto on Dec. 27.

With all signs pointing to a unique target, CIA officials ordered the launch of a pilotless MQ-1B Predator aircraft, one of three kept at a secret base that the Pakistani government has allowed to be stationed inside the country. Launches from that base do not require government permission, officials said.

During the early hours of Jan. 29, the slow-moving, 27-foot-long plane circled the village before vectoring in to lock its camera sights on Sattar's compound. Watching intently were CIA and Air Force operators who controlled the aircraft's movements from an operations center at Creech Air Force Base in Nevada.

On orders from CIA officials in McLean, the operators in Nevada released the Predator's two AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, 100-pound, rocket-propelled munitions each tipped with a high-explosive warhead. The missiles tore into the compound's main building and an adjoining guesthouse where the al-Qaeda officers were believed to be staying.

Even when viewed from computer monitors thousands of miles away, the missiles' impact was stunning. The buildings were completely destroyed, and as many as 13 inhabitants were killed, U.S. officials said. The pictures captured after the attack were "not pretty," said one knowledgeable source.

Libi's death was confirmed by al-Qaeda, which announced his "martyrdom" on Feb. 1 in messages posted on the Web sites of sympathetic groups. One message hailed Libi as "the father of many lions who now own the land and mountains of jihadi Afghanistan" and said al-Qaeda's struggle "would not be defeated by the death of one person, no matter how important he may be."

A temporary impact

Publicly, reaction to the strike among U.S. and Pakistani leaders has been muted, with neither side appearing eager to call attention to an awkward, albeit successful, unilateral U.S. military operation. Some Pakistani government spokesmen have even questioned whether the terrorist leader was killed.

"It's not going to overwhelm their network or break anything up definitively," acknowledged a military official briefed on details of the Libi strike. He added: "We're now in a sit-and-wait mode until someone else pops up."

Richard A. Clarke, a former counterterrorism adviser to the Clinton and Bush administrations, said he has been told by those involved that the counterterror effort requires constant pressure on the Pakistani government.

"The United States has gotten into a pattern where it sends a high-level delegation over to beat Musharraf up, and then you find that within a week or two a high-value target has been identified. Then he ignores us for a while until we send over another high-level delegation," Clarke said.

Some officials also emphasized that such airstrikes have a marginal and temporary impact. And they do not yield the kind of intelligence dividends often associated with the live capture of terrorists -- documents, computers, equipment and diaries that could lead to further unraveling the network.

The officials stressed that despite the occasional tactical success against it, such as the Libi strike, the threat posed by al-Qaeda's presence in Pakistan has been growing. As a senior U.S. official briefed on the strike said: "Even a blind squirrel finds a nut now and then. But overall, we're in worse shape than we were 18 months ago."

© 2008 The Washington Post Company
 
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fatman17 wasn't that basically a copy of post #1 and post #2 from the beginning of the thread? :confused:
 
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