US objects to China-Pakistan nuclear deal

[SpArK]

China plays down Indian fears, says deal within IAEA norms​

NEW DELHI: India has not made a formal diplomatic demarche to China for its announced nuclear deal with Pakistan to build two new nuclear reactors. But official sources said China was "aware" of India's "interests and concerns. There are other opportunities and occasions to raise such issues and we have done that." Essentially, India has asked for "clarifications" from the Chinese side. China has responded by saying the deal was "peaceful" and would be under IAEA safeguards. This has been the official response of the Chinese government as well.

India, said official sources, would wait to see what happened at the NSG meeting in New Zealand in the coming week. In the meantime, India has also been in touch with its other "partners" in the NSG to seek clarification of the deal.

The China-Pakistan nuclear issue was "on our radar", they said, and India would be following closely to see how the NSG receives the Chinese announcement.

The China-Pakistan relationship has been very close and there is a strong Chinese footprint on the Pakistani nuclear programme. Since Pakistan is itself a proliferation hazard -- up there along with North Korea and, earlier, China -- the prospect of giving them more nuclear reactors that would be operated under the Pakistan military is disquieting in most parts of the world.

China has maintained that the new reactors had been "grandfathered" during its entry to the NSG in 2004.




China plays down Indian fears, says deal within IAEA norms - India - The Times of India

 

[GUNNER]

Chinese reactors: NSG and US duplicity

Monday, June 21, 2010

By Momin Iftikhar

Facing a staggering crunch of energy shortage, the reported Pakistan-China deal for the provision of two reactors (Chashma 3 & 4) for the Chashma Nuclear Power Plant is reassuring. But the question will the deal go through has become a knotty issue; thanks to the duplicitous double standards of the US and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

The matter will come under deliberation during the plenary session of the NSG being held in New Zealand under the chairmanship of Hungary during the third week of the current month.

This is a moment of truth for the 46-member nuclear trade regulatory body, whose guidelines are voluntary and not legally binding. Following bending of rules and violation of its own charter by allowing nuclear trade with India, a non-NPT signatory, how will the NPT prevent fully safe guarded nuclear reactor’s sale to Pakistan remains a moot point.

Pakistan contracted China for construction of the Chashma Nuclear Reactor (Chashma 1) in 1991, which was finished and began operating in 2000. In 2004, China joined the NSG and formalised its ongoing nuclear cooperation.

A longstanding framework agreement with Pakistan committed China to provide a second reactor (Chashma 2), more research reactors plus supply of all fuel in perpetuity for these units, it notified the NSG.

The construction for the second reactor commenced in 2005 and is likely to finish in 2011. So far so good but it is the planned expansion of the Chashma project by Pakistan by adding two more reactors with power generation capacity of 650 MW (Chashma 3 & 4) that has raised the heckles in the US. Pakistan had enlisted China in 2004 for the extension of the Chashma project by addition of two reactors and a commitment prior to China’s joining of the NSG cartel enjoys exemption from its guidelines. The Chinese position on the issue was articulated by a spokesman of its foreign ministry.

“The cooperation is subject to safeguards and the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It is in compliance with respective international obligations of the two countries,” said the spokesman.

US double standards in allowing the nuclear trade with India while the country stays outside the ambit of the NPT and preventing a transparent IAEA covered Pakistani deal of a restricted nature with China has knocked the authenticity from under the US attempts to block the sale of the two Chinese reactors to Pakistan.

Daryl G Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control association, said the China-Pakistan deal “is some of the fallout of the India-US civil nuclear agreement” — which included the special exemption for nuclear trade.

It is worth recollecting that even as the Indo-US deal was a Bush administration initiative, it was strongly supported by then senators Barack Obama, Joseph R Biden Jr and Hillary Rodham Clinton; all of whom are now pivots of the power structure in the US.

The US opposition to the sale of reactors to Pakistan and its pressure bearing tactics on China appear highly discriminatory. When the US made its own “NSG rule suspending deal with India” in 2008, it wouldn’t have been possible without a tacit acquiescence of the Chinese government.

As highlighted by Mark Hibbs of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; “Beijing could have blocked the NSG exemption for India but accommodated the pressure of the United States and its allies on this issue. Now, the bill is coming due as Islamabad demands equal treatment. It would be reasonable for China to expect reciprocity from the US in the NSG, given that it was Washington that started changing the rules”.

There is a growing perception in Pakistan that it is fully entitled to a nuclear deal that would allow it to trade in nuclear technology on the lines of the Indo-US nuclear deal made possible through back bending US endeavours.

US diplomats beginning in 2005 held out to Pakistan a distant promise that it would be exempted from the NSG safeguards. Among heightened expectations, the issue was raised at the first round of strategic dialogue held in Washington on Mar 24-25 and would certainly continue to re-emerge in any Pak-US interaction even as the US response has remained non-committal and evasive.

The US arguments that it held protracted dialogue with India following the May detonation of nuclear device by India before reaching a nuclear understanding don’t hold to reason. India refused to commit to any of the benchmarks demanded by the US interlocutors like signing the NPT and reaching an understanding on the FMCT, and even then was rewarded with the Indo-US deal that lifted all restrictions on nuclear trade and technology for India.

In fact, the deal has helped India in speeding up its production of fissile material and capability to produce nuclear weapons. In this backdrop, why the US should object to the sale of IAEA covered nuclear reactors, for energy generation by Pakistan, remains an enigma.

 

[RescueRanger]

Momin Iftikhar hit the nail on the head. Give that man a cigar!

 

[GUNNER]

US defies China on Pakistan reactors


• Jeremy Page, Islamabad
• From: The Australian
• June 22, 2010 12:00AM

CHINA and the US are on a collision course over Chinese plans to build two nuclear reactors in Pakistan.

This is despite the country's chronic political instability and history of selling nuclear secrets to North Korea, Iran and Libya.

China is expected to formally announce the plans to build the 650-megawatt reactors in Punjab province at a meeting in New Zealand of the Nuclear Suppliers Group - the 46 countries that dominate and try to control the world's atomic trade.

The US has already voiced its disapproval before the meeting, which starts today, and will try to forge a consensus on updating the rules designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

US officials say that the plan requires special exemption from the NSG, which China joined in 2004, as Pakistan has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and could, therefore, divert some technology to its nuclear weapons program or to another country.
China and Pakistan disagree, pointing out that the US set a precedent by sealing a deal to sell civilian nuclear fuel and technology to India in 2006, even though Delhi had yet to sign the treaty.

That deal, which lifted a US ban imposed after India tested its first nuclear device in 1974, was seen as the cornerstone of a new partnership with Delhi designed to counterbalance China's influence in Asia. However, critics say that it undermined the international non-proliferation regime.


Having muscled the Indian deal through the NSG in 2008, the US is likely to struggle to forge a consensus against China's deal with Pakistan. "Because Washington pressed the NSG and China to exempt India from NSG trade sanctions, it is now more difficult to complain about China's desire to export reactors to Pakistan," said Mark Hibbs, a nuclear expert at the Washington-based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The dispute could also complicate US-led efforts to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear bomb, since any multilateral action requires China's support in the UN Security Council.

China has had close relations with Pakistan since the 1960s and had already built one reactor and started a second at Chashma, in Punjab, before joining the NSG. It signed the deal to build another two reactors at Chashma in February but is expected to argue that it does not need NSG exemption as it was agreed before 2004.

The US did not protest when the deal first came to light but, after intense lobbying from India, it said last week that it had asked China to "clarify the details".

The US has grave concerns about proliferation - especially since Abdul Qadeer Khan, Pakistan's top nuclear scientist, confessed in 2004 to selling nuclear secrets to North Korea, Iran and Libya.

Washington also worries about the potential for Islamic militants to attack or capture Pakistani nuclear sites. Last year, Pakistani police said they found a map of Chashma in the possession of five
American Muslims arrested for plotting a terrorist attack.

China responded to the US statement last week by insisting that its nuclear co-operation with Pakistan was for peaceful purposes and under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Pakistan said that the deal was needed to help ease chronic power shortages that have caused long blackouts across the country for much of this year.

The Times

 

[Nahraf]

US got waiver for India so does not have any moral ground to oppose Pakistan at NSG. US need cooperation of both China and Pakistan on different geo-political issues so it will not push them too far. US cannot oppose both Pakistan-China nuclear deal and Pakistan-Iran gas pipeline knowing fully well energy shortage in Pakistan of over 5,000 MW. Pakistani people are sick and tired of daily blackouts and electricity shortages. US opposition to these energy deals will only add to already bad image it has with Pakistani people.

 

[Spring Onion]

US should offer ‘criteria-based’ N-deal to Pakistan
By Anwar Iqbal
Tuesday, 22 Jun, 2010


WASHINGTON: The United States should consider offering a criteria-based nuclear deal to Pakistan instead of sending it to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a key US think-tank suggested on Monday.

On the day when the 46-nation NSG begins a four-day meeting in New Zealand, which is likely to take up a Chinese plan to provide two nuclear reactors to Pakistan, the Rand Corporation urged the United States to reconsider its policies towards Pakistan.

The group, which employs a significant number of former US intelligence officials, suggested that “a criteria-based approach with Pakistan could be possible”.

The explicit criteria could be tied to access to A. Q. Khan, greater visibility into Pakistan’s programme, submission to safeguards, a strategic decision to abandon militancy as a tool of foreign and domestic policy, and empirically verifiable metrics in eliminating militant groups operating in and from Pakistan.

The proposed deal could have elements that are much more restrictive than the one the US made with India five years ago.

“For example, it could be based on an exclusive relationship with the United States, rather than seeking broad accommodation with the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group and other regimes that limit the proliferation of nuclear technology and access to materials for nuclear programmes,” the study suggested.

Authors Christine Fair of Georgetown University and Seth Jones of Rand Corporation suggested that “such a deal would confer acceptance of Islamabad’s nuclear weapon programme and reward it for the improvements in nuclear security it has made since 2002”.

They noted that in the long shadow of A. Q. Khan and continued uncertainty about the status of his networks, “it is easy to forget that Pakistan has established a Strategic Plans Division that has done much to improve the safety of the country’s nuclear assets”.

In exchange for fundamental recognition of its nuclear status and civilian assistance, Pakistan would have to meet two criteria: It would have to provide the kind of access and cooperation on nuclear suppliers’ networks identified in the Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation. Pakistan would also have to demonstrate sustained and verifiable commitment in combating all terrorist groups on its soil.

“Such a civilian nuclear deal could achieve the goals that Kerry-Lugar-Berman could not because it would offer Pakistan benefits that it actually values and that only the United States can meaningfully confer,” the authors noted.

The study, however, observed that a nuclear deal will not be an easy sale either in Washington or in Islamabad, much less in New Delhi.

Details of the Indo-US deal are still being negotiated more than five years after the idea was initially floated.

The authors concede that a deal with Islamabad will be even more protracted than the deal with New Delhi because of A. Q. Khan’s activities and the clout of domestic lobbies in Washington.

The authors also acknowledge that even this deal may not provide Pakistan adequate incentives to eliminate terror groups or provide access to such individuals as A. Q. Khan.

The authors also urged the US administration to offer “a serious economic carrot” to Pakistan, which has long sought access to economic and trade concessions, especially for textiles.

The authors warned that some US economic initiatives were unlikely to be useful. For example, setting up Reconstruction Economic Zones in Fata, Kashmir, and the earthquake-affected areas is unlikely to have an appreciable effect on local economic activity even if it would have some public-relations value.

Instead, the study titled “Counter-insurgency in Pakistan” urged a free trade agreement between the two allies.

“If the United States seeks to achieve a greater economic effect, Washington and Islamabad should consider signing a free trade agreement, which would affect more people.”

This initiative too would be subject to requirements like a phased and verifiable end to any support for militant groups and greater visibility into Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

AP adds: Pakistan hasn’t quit its habit of courting insurgents, and extremist networks with current or former ties to the government pose a significant risk to the United States and Pakistan’s elected government itself, the study concludes.

A rising number of terrorist plots in the United States with roots in Pakistan stems in part from an unsuccessful strategy by the US-backed government in Pakistan to blunt the influence of militant groups in the country, the report by the Rand Corporation said.

The report says the May 1 failed car bombing in New York’s Times Square is an example of how militant groups, some with shadowy government backing, can increasingly export terrorism far beyond the country’s borders.

The United States isn’t getting its money’s worth for all the billions in aid pledged to the strategically located, nuclear-armed nation, the report concludes. The US should withhold some aid until Pakistan makes “discernible progress”, the report said.


DAWN.COM | Front Page | US should offer ?criteria-based? N-deal to Pakistan: report


Dangerous scenario

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Pakistan, India and the anti-nuclear rules

Clouds of hypocrisy
An offer to supply Pakistan with nuclear reactors shows China at its worst

Jun 24th 2010

WHEN it comes to nuclear danger, North Korea and Iran grab everyone’s attention. One flounced out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and tested two bombs; the other, though it denies it, seems headed for just such a breakout. Syria and Myanmar make the worry-list for getting secret nuclear help from North Korea. Even Israel, which keeps mum about its bombs, is now being named and (Egypt hopes) shamed. Pressing Israel to join nuclear talks was Egypt’s price for not ruining a big NPT review last month.

Picking on Israel makes the silence—and hypocrisy—that surrounds nuclear-armed India and Pakistan all the stranger. Like Israel, neither joined the NPT so their bomb-building did not break its rules. Yet their rivalry is fuelling the fastest, most dangerous build-up of bomb-usable plutonium and uranium anywhere. And a proposed sale by China of two civilian nuclear reactors to proliferation-prone, unstable Pakistan points to a further distinction. Although much of the world has co-operated over North Korea and Iran, everyone is competing over India and Pakistan to make things worse (see article).

China’s reactor deal with Pakistan has incensed India and alarmed others. It would also break the rules of a little-known cartel, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), of which both China, Pakistan’s pal, and America, India’s friend, are members. The NSG has guidelines, intended to rule out nuclear trade with countries like India, Pakistan and Israel that do not allow international safeguards on all their nuclear industry. Until now there has been little pressure on China to play by the group’s rules and halt the Pakistan deal, though it obviously should. But if China refuses, India has itself to blame too.
Related items

India was jubilant in 2008 when America strong-armed an exemption from this no-trade rule past the NSG. India was fast running out of domestic uranium to keep building bombs as well as lighting homes. Now uniquely exempted from the NSG trade ban, India has various deals pending with Russia, France, Britain, South Korea and other NSG members that involve supplying reactor fuel too. So India is now freer to use more of its own uranium for bombs.

Barack Obama did not like the India deal struck by his predecessor, George Bush. Helping India’s nuclear ambitions clashes particularly badly with Mr Obama’s promise to seek “the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons”. In weighing those fine promises against America’s relations with India, however, Mr Obama has chosen not to offend India by helping Pakistan too. So Pakistan turned to China.

Find courage and conviction

This newspaper argued against the America-India nuclear deal, not least because it would intensify nuclear rivalry in an already fissile region. A second wrong—shrugging the China-Pakistan one through, on the basis of some sort of big-power tit-for-tat—will only double the damage.

Before China joined the NPT and the NSG its proliferation record was execrable. It helped Pakistan make uranium and plutonium. It handed over the design of one of its own nuclear warheads, which Pakistan later passed on to Libya and possibly Iran. China hates talk of its irresponsible past. It will resent being told it is breaking NSG rules. But the other 45 countries in the group should find the courage of their anti-proliferation convictions and call China to account. Like others in this sorry saga, China richly deserves embarrassment.

Pakistan, India and the anti-nuclear rules: Clouds of hypocrisy | The Economist

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

Nuclear proliferation in South Asia

The power of nightmares​

China’s proposed sale of nuclear reactors to Pakistan will intensify nuclear rivalry with India. But the damage will go far wider

Jun 24th 2010

AT FIRST sight, China’s proposed sale of two civilian nuclear-power reactors to Pakistan hardly seems a danger sign. Pakistan already has the bomb, so it has all the nuclear secrets it needs. Next-door India has the bomb too, and has been seeking similar deals with other countries.

Yet the sale (really a gift, as Pakistan is broke) has caused shudders at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), an informal cartel of countries who want to stop their advanced nuclear technology getting into the wrong hands. They are meeting in New Zealand, for what was supposed to be a quiet and nerdish rule-tightening session. But their efforts may now fall victim to China’s rivalry with America.

By any measure, Pakistan is a shocker. Its proliferation record would make the serial nuclear mischief-makers of North Korea blush. If the Chinese reactor deal goes ahead, the damage will be huge: beyond just stoking the already alarming nuclear rivalry between Pakistan and India.

That does not deter China, which still seethes about the way in which the Bush administration in 2008 browbeat other NSG members into exempting America’s friend India from the group’s rules. These banned nuclear trade, even civilian deals, with countries like India and Pakistan, but also Israel and now North Korea, that resist full international safeguards on all their nuclear industry.

America argued that India had a spotless non-proliferation record (it doesn’t) and that bringing it into the non-proliferation “mainstream” could only bolster global anti-proliferation efforts (it didn’t). The deal incensed not just China and Pakistan but many others, inside and outside the NSG. An immediate casualty was the effort to get all members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), who have already promised not to seek the bomb, to sign up to an additional protocol on toughened safeguards. Many have, but on hearing of the America-India deal Brazil’s president is reputed to have flatly ruled that out. And where Brazil has put its foot down, others have also hesitated.

What particularly riles outsiders is that America did not get anything much out of India in return. It did not win backing for new anti-proliferation obligations, such as a legally binding test ban or for an end to the further production of fissile uranium or plutonium for bombs. India has since designated some of its reactors as civilian, and open to inspection, but others still churn out spent fuel richly laden with weapons-usable plutonium. India can potentially make even more of the stuff. Now that it can import uranium fuel for its civilian reactors, it can devote more of its scarce domestic supplies to bomb-making.

Pakistan suffers no such uranium shortage and is determined to match India. According to analysis of satellite imagery by the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security, it is greatly expanding its capacity to produce weapons-usable plutonium, as well as uranium.

China has given Pakistan lots of nuclear and missile help in the past. It even passed it a tested design of one of its own missile-mountable warheads. This was one of the most damaging proliferation acts of the nuclear age, since the same design was later passed by Pakistan to Libya and possibly Iran and others.

But after China joined the NPT in 1992 and the NSG in 2004, it reined in such help, at least officially (some Chinese firms are still involved in illicit nuclear trade with several states). But on joining the NSG, it argued that it had already promised to build the second of two nuclear reactors for Pakistan at Chasma in Punjab and would therefore go ahead. Some grumbled. But it seemed a price worth paying to have China inside, playing by the NSG’s rules rather than outside, undermining them. The latest sale blows a hole in that hope.


A big leaky tent

China is trying a legalistic defence of the sale of the third and fourth reactors at Chasma. But its real point is this: if America can bend the rules for India, then China can break them for Pakistan.

Pakistan hopes that it will eventually get a deal like India’s. Some in Barack Obama’s administration have supported this, on the ground that America needs Pakistan’s support in the fight against al-Qaeda and the Taleban. Israel wouldn’t mind such an exemption either.

The NSG’s damage-control efforts now centre on a new rule to bar the sale of kit for uranium-enrichment or plutonium-reprocessing to any country outside the NPT. That, predictably, annoys India.

The deal also affects efforts to contain Iran. Western diplomats seeking support for UN sanctions on the Islamic republic find themselves receiving a wigging over the double standards used with India. Iranian officials used to argue that they just wanted to be treated like Japan. It has free access to advanced nuclear technology. But unlike Iran, Japan does not repeatedly violate nuclear safeguards. Some Iranian officials now muse boldly that the big powers will eventually come to do deals with them, just as they did with India. Iran’s latest raspberry in response to a fourth round of UN sanctions was to ban two nuclear inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN’s nuclear guardian. Iran dislikes its reports on the regime’s dubious nuclear activities.

If Pakistan really is worried about India’s growing nuclear arsenal, diplomacy might work better than an arms race. George Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment, a think tank, says Pakistan should lift its veto on a ban on the production of fissile materials for bombs. That would put India (which claims to support a ban) on the spot. Like enriched uranium, hypocrisy can be costlier than it seems.

Nuclear proliferation in South Asia: The power of nightmares | The Economist

 

[desiman]

US got waiver for India so does not have any moral ground to oppose Pakistan at NSG. US need cooperation of both China and Pakistan on different geo-political issues so it will not push them too far. US cannot oppose both Pakistan-China nuclear deal and Pakistan-Iran gas pipeline knowing fully well energy shortage in Pakistan of over 5,000 MW. Pakistani people are sick and tired of daily blackouts and electricity shortages. US opposition to these energy deals will only add to already bad image it has with Pakistani people.

i dont know why each person on this thread is comparing the Indo-US nuclear deal with Pakistan's nuclear deal. India and Pakistan cannot be compared on this front, The NSG has credible reasons to deny Pakistan anything as Pakistan has been involved in the sale and trade of nuclear material illegally and it is a fact that no one can deny. So please stop comparing India and Pakistan on this front as we are miles apart.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

The NSG has credible reasons to deny Pakistan anything as Pakistan has been involved in the sale and trade of nuclear material illegally and it is a fact that no one can deny.

Actually, since Pakistan is not an NPT signatory, Pakistan has done nothing 'illegal'.

And so far the claims of 'proliferation to other countries' center around the activities of AQ Khan and associates, with little evidence indicating a State policy of proliferating to Iran and Libya (indeed there is little motive for that, given the Pakistani State's alleged reliance on the Saudi's for financing the nuclear program, and the Saudi-Iranian rivalry).

If then we are to stick to the known facts of proliferation being conducted by an entity within Pakistan, AQ Khan, then how is that different from the entities in Western Europe and China proliferating to AQ Khan and Pakistan in the initial days of Pakistan's nuclear program? What about European nations proliferating to Israel and helping them develop nuclear weapons? How do those nations make it onto the NSG, and is their proliferation not far worse than anything Pakistan did?

The argument of 'proliferation' against Pakistan does not hold given the role of current NSG members in being even bigger proliferators.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

The NSG’s damage-control efforts now centre on a new rule to bar the sale of kit for uranium-enrichment or plutonium-reprocessing to any country outside the NPT. That, predictably, annoys India.

This certainly should be a rule that is passed, given the West's desire to deny Iran enrichment technology. India is in a conflict zone, giving her additional capabilities to reprocess Plutonium (of which she reportedly has thousands of kilograms worth) would be foolhardy. It is in no way essential to the purpose of generating electricity, and reprocessing can occur outside of India in Russia or any other State if need be, or with current Indian technology.

 

[desiman]

Actually, since Pakistan is not an NPT signatory, Pakistan has done nothing 'illegal'.

And so far the claims of 'proliferation to other countries' center around the activities of AQ Khan and associates, with little evidence indicating a State policy of proliferating to Iran and Libya (indeed there is little motive for that, given the Pakistani State's alleged reliance on the Saudi's for financing the nuclear program, and the Saudi-Iranian rivalry).

If then we are to stick to the known facts of proliferation being conducted by an entity within Pakistan, AQ Khan, then how is that different from the entities in Western Europe and China proliferating to AQ Khan and Pakistan in the initial days of Pakistan's nuclear program? What about European nations proliferating to Israel and helping them develop nuclear weapons? How do those nations make it onto the NSG, and is their proliferation not far worse than anything Pakistan did?

The argument of 'proliferation' against Pakistan does not hold given the role of current NSG members in being even bigger proliferators.

try to sell that point to the NSG, your the only person denying this again just as you deny many other facts, sadly to say the world does not share your opinion. Concerns regarding the sale of nuclear material to Pakistan are genuine and must be taken into consideration. Supplying material to rogue nations like North Korea is a crime against humanity and putting the life of every south Korean in grave danger. State policy or not such acts took place from Pakistan and were initiated by Pakistani nationals. I see nothing wrong in the NSG rejecting Pakistan altogether.

 

[desiman]

This certainly should be a rule that is passed, given the West's desire to deny Iran enrichment technology. India is in a conflict zone, giving her additional capabilities to reprocess Plutonium (of which she reportedly has thousands of kilograms worth) would be foolhardy. It is in no way essential to the purpose of generating electricity, and reprocessing can occur outside of India in Russia or any other State if need be, or with current Indian technology.

sorry but again no comparison between India and Pakistan. You are going down the wrong path of including India in this discussion. India is an economic giant and a rising power and has showed from its actions

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

try to sell that point to the NSG, your the only person denying this again just as you deny many other facts, sadly to say the world does not share your opinion.

What does this have to do with 'denying the facts'? Are you contesting what I wrote and if so why? You can't just rant about 'denying the facts' when you yourself have not refuted a single line I wrote.

Concerns regarding the sale of nuclear material to Pakistan are genuine and must be taken into consideration. Supplying material to rogue nations like North Korea is a crime against humanity and putting the life of every south Korean in grave danger. State policy or not such acts took place from Pakistan and were initiated by Pakistani nationals. I see nothing wrong in the NSG rejecting Pakistan altogether.

Who made it a crime? Even if Pakistan had supplied technology to NK (which it did not, AQ Khan allegedly did) it committed no crime since it is not a member of the NPT. You cannot make up your own facts and laws to vilify Pakistan just because you feel like it.

And why is that worse than the West supplying nuclear capabilities to Israel (that also has occupied and enslaved millions of Palestinians) as well as Pakistan? Why do those nations get to be on the NSG despite their own history of proliferation?

And why is supplying nuclear technology to a nation like India, that has occupied and subjugated millions of Kashmiris in violation of the UNSC resolutions and conditions of accession (plebiscite) not an even bigger 'crime against humanity'?

---------- Post added at 02:19 PM ---------- Previous post was at 02:18 PM ----------

sorry but again no comparison between India and Pakistan. You are going down the wrong path of including India in this discussion. India is an economic giant and a rising power and has showed from its actions

A comment that addresses none of the points I raised - where exactly in this post of mine that you responded to did you see Pakistan mentioned?

 

[Nahraf]

i dont know why each person on this thread is comparing the Indo-US nuclear deal with Pakistan's nuclear deal. India and Pakistan cannot be compared on this front.

Really ! Pakistan's nuclear weapons program is response to Indian nuclear weapons program. Whether you like it or not Pakistan will respond to any Indian developments on nuclear front. India cannot separate its from Pakistan program nor can the the international community.