US Naval Institute: Chinese "Aircraft Carrier Killer" Confirmed
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M8R
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I would think that they would fire dozens of them to overwhelm ship defenses.They could target carrier from submarine, dozens of ballistic missile to overwhelm the defenses of carrier.After all even 30 ballistic missiles would be cheaper then a whole carrier plus it's fighter jets.Overall it would require huge efforts and many lives will be lost in this operation but worth it!
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applesauce
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absolutes? prove it
hellofriends
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don't worry it's impossible to destroy aircraft carrier by missile due to it's anti missile and anti-aircraft feature.
Molawchai
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What are you talking about? DF-21d=anti missile, anti-aircraft feature? Please don't do open poop poop on the thread.
Thomas
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☪☪☪☪;925771 said:
No doubt odds do go up with numbers. So at least some would get through defenses
if you fired enough. Do keep in mind though that just 1 Aegis destroyer alone has the capability to track and shoot over 100 targets at once. The only thing that can limit it is how many missiles it has loaded at the time. the Aegis system also can communicate between ships in the carrier battle group to allocate targets and takes into account what missiles that ship has available at the time. below is a sample of how many missile cells just 1 destroyer has
2 × 61 cell Mk 41 vertical launch systems
122 × RIM-156 SM-2ER Bock IV, RIM-162 ESSM, BGM-109
(The SM-3 has recently been added)
Add the other battle group ships and there are hundreds of missiles available for defense without reloading.
The biggest threat to a carrier is not the DF-21 but submarines. But then again the Chinese navy is just as vulnerable. As is every other navy in the world.
http://en.citizendium.org/wiki/Cooperative_Engagement_Capability
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This thing has a speculated speed of mach 10.
How much reaction time would that give the defender to destroy it after first detecting it.
I read somewhere before (can't remember where) that with regular supersonic AShM, you have less than 30 seconds to intercept before it hits.
I imagine with a high hypersonic missile, the reaction time would be much less.
How much reaction time would that give the defender to destroy it after first detecting it.
I read somewhere before (can't remember where) that with regular supersonic AShM, you have less than 30 seconds to intercept before it hits.
I imagine with a high hypersonic missile, the reaction time would be much less.
Thomas
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The DF-21 is a ballistic missile, it would be detected the moment it launched.
below_freezing
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In an ideal environment yes. It would not be the ships themselves detecting the launch, but sattelites with thermal imaging.
If the com link between sattelite and ship was broken in even 1 place, there would be no reaction time.
Even if they're shot down, if the altitude is insufficient then fragments would still rain down on the ships (at mach 10 and 2000 degrees) and would still cause major damage.
This is also not occuring in vaccuum. An integrated defense of missiles, submarines, aircraft and surface ships is what we have to offer, this missile is merely 1 more tool, if it indeed exists.
If the com link between sattelite and ship was broken in even 1 place, there would be no reaction time.
Even if they're shot down, if the altitude is insufficient then fragments would still rain down on the ships (at mach 10 and 2000 degrees) and would still cause major damage.
This is also not occuring in vaccuum. An integrated defense of missiles, submarines, aircraft and surface ships is what we have to offer, this missile is merely 1 more tool, if it indeed exists.
gambit
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That 'ideal environment' we have been maintaining for decades.
A very big 'if'. One that China cannot break.
A warhead is not that large.
If structural integrity is compromised during its double-digit Mach descent, there is no predicting where and how the small debris will pattern out. At best, there could be minor damages. Stop using 'Chinese physics'.
Ahchai Eliminator
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On the Verge of a Game-Changer
By Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang
A Chinese antiship ballistic missile could alter the rules in the Pacific a
Technical Sources
The Second Artillery dominates available technical ASBM assessments, suggesting that it may control the majority of any Chinese ASBM programs. As the PLA's strategic rocket force, with equal attention devoted to (and the vast majority of its recent acquisitions in) conventional forces, and 78.2 percent of its cadres now holding a bachelor's degree or above, it would seem the logical choice to handle such a challenging new mission. Most of the available technical articles devoted explicitly to ASBM issues are
written in full or in part by individuals associated with the Second Artillery Engineering College in Xi'an, suggesting that this institution may play a major role in ASBM development. The most prolific contributor is the PLA uniformed civilian Tan Shoulin, a leading professor at the college who advises master's students and specializes in "missile weapon firepower applications."
Second in institutional prominence is the Second Artillery Equipment Department in Beijingwith some involvement by the Second Artillery Equipment Research Institute as well, the latter of which may suggest that some degree of procurement, or at least active consideration thereof, is under way. Individuals associated with Second Artillery bases are occasionally involved as well.
Doctrinal Sources
How does the Second Artillery think about using ASBMs? Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, which likely serves as an educational handbook for the service, details five possible tactics:
* "Harassment strikes against the military bases of the enemy's allies around our periphery as well as the carrier battle groups."
* Frontal firepower deterrence by firing intimidation salvos in front of a CSG "to serve as a warning."
* Flank firepower expulsion: interception of a CSG by PLAN forces coupled with intimidation salvos "launched toward the enemy carrier battle group opposite our relatively threatened flank."
* Concentrated fire assault: "When many carrier-borne aircraft are used in continuous air strikes against our coast, in order to halt the powerful air raids, the enemy's core carrier should be struck like a 'heavy hammer.' The conventional missile forces should be a select group carrying sensitive penetrating submunitions and, using the 'concentrated firepower assault' method, a wide-coverage strike against the enemy's core carrier should be executed, striving to destroy the enemy's carrier-borne planes, the control tower [island] and other easily damaged and vital positions."
* Information assault: "Directed against the enemy's command and control system or weak links in the Aegis system, conventional missiles carrying anti-radiation submunitions or electromagnetic pulse submunitions can be used when enemy radar is being used and their command systems are working, with anti-radiation submunitions striking radar stations and EMP submunitions paralyzing the enemy's command and control system."4
The document states that theater ballistic missiles extend the Second Artillery's strike range and seems to assume that it would have ASBM inventory sufficient to permit a wide variety of warning shots. It ignores the possibility that these could easily be misinterpreted as failed attempts to strike the CSG and thus be dangerously escalatory.
Technical and doctrinal materials would seem to be more authoritative, but such literature has limitations. Specialized studies might reflect championing of programs that could be expected to benefit the Second Artillery, as well as jockeying for publicity among researchers. Doctrinal publications would seem to be far less prone to service-bias but may reflect aspirations or projected capabilities (as opposed to the existence of concrete hardware and supporting infrastructure). It is thus useful to examine the generalist literature, wherein there is widespread debate on all major aspects of ASBM development and employment, for indications of challenges and dilemmas China may face as it proceeds in these areas.
Utility and Feasibility
The generalist literature is broadly consistent concerning the operational effects of ASBMs and their potential value for Chinese maritime strategy. ASBMs are promoted as a means to overcome conventional inferiority by exploiting technological asymmetry, deter intervention to give China more maneuvering space, and offer both escalation control and a "trump card" for victory if deterrence fails. Skeptics writing in a China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation journal, however, charge that ASBMs offer limited power-projection capabilities, are highly escalatory if employed, and might trigger nuclear retaliation.5
Chinese debates about ASBMs' utility parallel widespread disagreements over their technical feasibility. Analysts generally agree that five major technical challenges must be surmounted to achieve a functioning ASBM:
* Detection. Pessimists claim that carriers are too small relative to the potential search area to be detected by satellite images. Optimists maintain that CSGswith their massive electromagnetic footprintscan be detected, e.g., with space-borne sensors.
* Tracking. Skeptics maintain that requisite satellite coverage is unattainable, as are sufficient naval and surveillance craft and overseas bases for signals intelligence. They believe that China's other tracking methods are inadequate, even in combination. Strangely, they seem to overlook the possibility of China possessing relevant land-based over-the-horizon radars.
* Target defense penetration. Skeptics, with their claims that slowing the warhead for terminal guidance makes it prohibitively vulnerable to interception, seem relatively unpersuasive. Optimists advocate multi-axis saturation attacks to overwhelm CSG defenses, without appearing to acknowledge the difficulty of coordinating them.
* Hitting a moving target. How to strike a CSG that moves during location, data transmission, and ASBM delivery? Skeptics contend that ballistic missiles are less accurate than cruise missiles because the former's trajectory is relatively fixed. But optimists maintain that as long as the initial ASBM trajectory is reasonably accurate, appropriate homing corrections can be made. They suggest improving precision with passive radiation homing and activating terminal guidance at higher altitude to allow the seeker to scan a larger area, and selecting opportune moments for attack, e.g., when tailwinds or at-sea replenishment preclude significant mobility.
* Causing sufficient damage. Several experts detail CSG damage-control equipment. But the conventional wisdom seems to be that multi-axis saturation attacks (to defeat defenses) and/or submunitions (to distribute damage), delivered accurately, can achieve a mission kill by targeting critical exposed areas (e.g., the carrier's aircraft, island, and C4ISR equipment).
On the Verge of a Game-Changer - U.S. Naval Institute
By Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang
A Chinese antiship ballistic missile could alter the rules in the Pacific a
Technical Sources
The Second Artillery dominates available technical ASBM assessments, suggesting that it may control the majority of any Chinese ASBM programs. As the PLA's strategic rocket force, with equal attention devoted to (and the vast majority of its recent acquisitions in) conventional forces, and 78.2 percent of its cadres now holding a bachelor's degree or above, it would seem the logical choice to handle such a challenging new mission. Most of the available technical articles devoted explicitly to ASBM issues are
written in full or in part by individuals associated with the Second Artillery Engineering College in Xi'an, suggesting that this institution may play a major role in ASBM development. The most prolific contributor is the PLA uniformed civilian Tan Shoulin, a leading professor at the college who advises master's students and specializes in "missile weapon firepower applications."
Second in institutional prominence is the Second Artillery Equipment Department in Beijingwith some involvement by the Second Artillery Equipment Research Institute as well, the latter of which may suggest that some degree of procurement, or at least active consideration thereof, is under way. Individuals associated with Second Artillery bases are occasionally involved as well.
Doctrinal Sources
How does the Second Artillery think about using ASBMs? Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, which likely serves as an educational handbook for the service, details five possible tactics:
* "Harassment strikes against the military bases of the enemy's allies around our periphery as well as the carrier battle groups."
* Frontal firepower deterrence by firing intimidation salvos in front of a CSG "to serve as a warning."
* Flank firepower expulsion: interception of a CSG by PLAN forces coupled with intimidation salvos "launched toward the enemy carrier battle group opposite our relatively threatened flank."
* Concentrated fire assault: "When many carrier-borne aircraft are used in continuous air strikes against our coast, in order to halt the powerful air raids, the enemy's core carrier should be struck like a 'heavy hammer.' The conventional missile forces should be a select group carrying sensitive penetrating submunitions and, using the 'concentrated firepower assault' method, a wide-coverage strike against the enemy's core carrier should be executed, striving to destroy the enemy's carrier-borne planes, the control tower [island] and other easily damaged and vital positions."
* Information assault: "Directed against the enemy's command and control system or weak links in the Aegis system, conventional missiles carrying anti-radiation submunitions or electromagnetic pulse submunitions can be used when enemy radar is being used and their command systems are working, with anti-radiation submunitions striking radar stations and EMP submunitions paralyzing the enemy's command and control system."4
The document states that theater ballistic missiles extend the Second Artillery's strike range and seems to assume that it would have ASBM inventory sufficient to permit a wide variety of warning shots. It ignores the possibility that these could easily be misinterpreted as failed attempts to strike the CSG and thus be dangerously escalatory.
Technical and doctrinal materials would seem to be more authoritative, but such literature has limitations. Specialized studies might reflect championing of programs that could be expected to benefit the Second Artillery, as well as jockeying for publicity among researchers. Doctrinal publications would seem to be far less prone to service-bias but may reflect aspirations or projected capabilities (as opposed to the existence of concrete hardware and supporting infrastructure). It is thus useful to examine the generalist literature, wherein there is widespread debate on all major aspects of ASBM development and employment, for indications of challenges and dilemmas China may face as it proceeds in these areas.
Utility and Feasibility
The generalist literature is broadly consistent concerning the operational effects of ASBMs and their potential value for Chinese maritime strategy. ASBMs are promoted as a means to overcome conventional inferiority by exploiting technological asymmetry, deter intervention to give China more maneuvering space, and offer both escalation control and a "trump card" for victory if deterrence fails. Skeptics writing in a China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation journal, however, charge that ASBMs offer limited power-projection capabilities, are highly escalatory if employed, and might trigger nuclear retaliation.5
Chinese debates about ASBMs' utility parallel widespread disagreements over their technical feasibility. Analysts generally agree that five major technical challenges must be surmounted to achieve a functioning ASBM:
* Detection. Pessimists claim that carriers are too small relative to the potential search area to be detected by satellite images. Optimists maintain that CSGswith their massive electromagnetic footprintscan be detected, e.g., with space-borne sensors.
* Tracking. Skeptics maintain that requisite satellite coverage is unattainable, as are sufficient naval and surveillance craft and overseas bases for signals intelligence. They believe that China's other tracking methods are inadequate, even in combination. Strangely, they seem to overlook the possibility of China possessing relevant land-based over-the-horizon radars.
* Target defense penetration. Skeptics, with their claims that slowing the warhead for terminal guidance makes it prohibitively vulnerable to interception, seem relatively unpersuasive. Optimists advocate multi-axis saturation attacks to overwhelm CSG defenses, without appearing to acknowledge the difficulty of coordinating them.
* Hitting a moving target. How to strike a CSG that moves during location, data transmission, and ASBM delivery? Skeptics contend that ballistic missiles are less accurate than cruise missiles because the former's trajectory is relatively fixed. But optimists maintain that as long as the initial ASBM trajectory is reasonably accurate, appropriate homing corrections can be made. They suggest improving precision with passive radiation homing and activating terminal guidance at higher altitude to allow the seeker to scan a larger area, and selecting opportune moments for attack, e.g., when tailwinds or at-sea replenishment preclude significant mobility.
* Causing sufficient damage. Several experts detail CSG damage-control equipment. But the conventional wisdom seems to be that multi-axis saturation attacks (to defeat defenses) and/or submunitions (to distribute damage), delivered accurately, can achieve a mission kill by targeting critical exposed areas (e.g., the carrier's aircraft, island, and C4ISR equipment).
On the Verge of a Game-Changer - U.S. Naval Institute
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