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US & NATO Behind Rabbani Assassination?

These guys are members of Lashkare Khurasan, an Al-Qaeda affiliated group which hunts down "spies" and target among others tribal elders who opposes the Taliban or don't strongly support them.Their dress also shows strong AQ influence. The message of guy singing is even more chilling if you understand Pashto. The message seems for the citizens to keep clear out of their way, coz these lunatics apparently seek the establishment of Khurasan bla bla :lol:

Not AQ but the Talibans had created Lashkar e Khorasan to eliminate the anti-Taliban elements in NW. Now I understand who these people are.
 
I think it was the Martians that did it. They obviously hate Afgh
ans and Pakistanis because they send no military aid to either country, nor engage in any charitable activities. Murdering Rabbani kept attention away from that fact. Thus the Martians benefit.

So it's perfectly obvious that the Martians MUST have done it. There is no need to consider any other facts; they would merely be insignificant details.

That was very cute. You want a flower and a pink dress with it?
 
Hamidullah Akhund (the interlocutor) arrested in connection with Rabbani's assassination.


KABUL, Afghanistan — Afghan officials said on Sunday that they had arrested a man connected to the Taliban militants who sent a suicide bomber to kill the leader of Afghanistan’s peace process.

Few details were released about the suspect, Hamidullah Akhund, or the circumstances of the arrest. Sifatullah Safi, a government spokesman, said only that Mr. Akhund was detained “somewhere in Kabul in the past days” and was being investigated by Afghan intelligence agents.

President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan and his government have come under intense pressure from political rivals and the Afghan public to arrest whoever was responsible for the plot to assassinate Burhanuddin Rabbani, a former president and the head of the High Peace Council.

Afghan officials have revealed fragments of a coordinated plot that led the killer, identified as Mullah Esmatullah, toward Mr. Rabbani. They said Mr. Akhund was a critical interlocutor between the peace council and Taliban leaders in Quetta, Pakistan, near the Afghan border.

Beginning four months ago, Mr. Akhund traveled to Kabul twice to meet with Mr. Rabbani and another member of the High Peace Council, Masoom Stanekzai, according to an account given at a news conference this week by Ramatullah Wahidyar, a former Taliban member who now serves on the council.

Mr. Akhund recorded an audio message from Mr. Rabbani to the Taliban, which he promised to deliver, and passed along reports of his progress and conversations with high-ranking Taliban leaders, Mr. Wahidyar said.

About a week ago, he said, Mr. Akhund called with news of what seemed like a breakthrough: the Quetta group was ready to talk to the Afghan government, and had an important message to send. Mr. Akhund said he could not go to Kabul personally, but would send a man he trusted, Mr. Wahidyar said. The substitute turned out to be the bomber.

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Hamidullah Akhund also headed Ariana Afghan Airlines under the Taliban regime, the same airlines that were maintained by the notorious arms dealer Viktor Bout, and were intensively used to ferry arms and terrorists of al Qaeda.
 
Deconstructing the death of Rabbani

By M K Bhadrakumar

Afghans invariably had a twinkle in their eye when the "Ustad" came up in conversation. It was mirthful and respectful, it spoke of familiarity bordering on affection for a patriarch who was capable of frailties. Burhanuddin Rabbani was incomparable in the pantheon of Afghanistan's jihadi heroes.

Rabbani, 71, former president and head of the Afghan Peace Council, was assassinated in his Kabul home by a suicide bomber on September 20.

Rabbani evoked respect as an Islamic scholar, while his jihadi pedigree was impeccable. He was admired for the ease with which he criss-crossed Afghanistan's political and ethnic divides although he remained the tallest Tajik leader. Rabbani could be ruthless, but then, he was also incapable of guile and animosities. He amused onlookers with his vanities and his weakness for pomp and flattery.

But he was feared for his political skills and could also be fickle-minded to the point of being unreliable. Above all, he was widely respected as an Afghan nationalist.

Rabbani was a man of many parts. Unlike his Jamiat e-Islami (Islamic Society of Afghanistan) commander, Ahmad Shah Massoud, who remained in Panjshir through the Afghan jihad in the 1980s, Rabbani was based in Pakistan and was one of the "Peshawar Seven" during the jihad of the 1980s against the Soviets. This necessitated, or enabled, him to forge a close working relationship with Pakistan's military and security establishment.

This was so much so that when bitter rivalries over the leadership of the mujahideen government in Kabul erupted in early-1992, then-Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif anointed him as "interim president".

However, Rabbani became so accustomed to the presidency that he wouldn't vacate it as he had earlier vowed to do, and Islamabad tried all the tricks in its bag but couldn't dethrone him. Unsurprisingly, some bitterness followed when the Taliban forcefully drove him out of Kabul and seized power in 1996.

But a cordial relationship resumed nonetheless when after a lap of absence he visited Islamabad in his new capacity with the High Peace Council (entrusted with the mission to reconcile the Taliban). Pakistan's army chief Parvez Kiani hosted him in General headquarters in Rawalpindi as a mark of honor to someone, who, despite the ebb and flow of time, remained a familiar figure, after all.

Karzai is the 'loser'
Any attempt to deconstruct Rabbani's assassination should begin with a detached look at the bonds between him and Pakistan's military leadership. No doubt, it was a complex relationship, enriched by Rabbani's networking with the "Islamic" parties in Pakistan and the various jihadi elements in the region and beyond as well as with Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

Conceivably, Kiani saw Rabbani (an ethnic Tajik) as a potential interlocutor who could help Pakistan reach out to the non-Pashtuns, especially the Panjshiris. Rabbani had complicated equations with Massoud and the Panjshiris, and there were acute moments when the two sides barely tolerated each other.

What helped was that without Rabbani as figure-head, the Shura-e-Nazar - the supervisory council created by Massoud in 1984 that comprised about 130 commanders from 12 northern, eastern and central regions of Afghanistan - would have remained provincial. Massoud needed Rabbani politically, and the Ustad lacked military skills while the commander made up for it.

Again, his excellent ties with Iran, his sagacity to keep lines open to the Taliban, his virulent "anti-Americanism" - these were also of interest to Pakistan, whose military leadership showed pragmatism by accepting him as the point person in intra-Afghan dialogue. Pakistan assessed that if any non-Pashtun leader had a chance of bringing the Northern Alliance groups on board the reconciliation process and a broad-based settlement, it was Rabbani.

Suffice to say, the repercussions of Rabbani's assassination for Pakistan could be serious. One, the hawkish Panjshiris and other intransigent Northern Alliance groups will use Rabbani's death to block any accommodation with the Taliban, which indeed would mean a disastrous slide toward civil war.

Two, against the backdrop of the US-Pakistan standoff, an axis might develop at some point between these intransigent Northern Alliance elements and the United States on the basis of a congruence of interests. (The Northern Alliance suggested such an alliance in the immediate aftermath of 9/11.)

Equally, a polarization would further isolate President Hamid Karzai. The US agenda to corner Karzai receives a fillip in these changed circumstances. The deck gets cleared now for the US to mop up residual issues relating to the strategic agreement that it is keen to conclude before a peace conference begins in Berlin in December.

With the non-Pashtun Northern Alliance groups in rebellious mood, Karzai will have a hard time carrying forward the dialogue with the Taliban. He cannot easily find a replacement for Rabbani. The credibility of the High Peace Council was never really high, and it is literally in tatters today.

Besides, Karzai needs to focus on his own political survival as his isolation after the murder of his half-brother Wali Karzai becomes acute. His opponents in parliament challenge his constitutional authority; the government's functioning has suffered and the president is unable to get his cabinet posts filled.

On the other hand, he is pilloried for being "ineffectual" and an impression has been created that while he remains in office, the drawdown of US troops is hard to implement on the ground. It is actually more than a blame game.

The 'unknown unknown'
The US prefers to directly handle the reconciliation process with the Taliban and set its terms, without involving Karzai (or Pakistan). Surely, the biggest gain for the US from Rabbani's departure is that the idea of the "Afghan-owned" peace process that Karzai spearheaded (which Washington never really favored) has floundered for all practical purposes.

In sum, deconstructing the death of Rabbani produces strange patterns. Those who "gained" include the intransigent Northern Alliance groups and the "alien mercenaries of organized terrorism", as Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad pithily described. What is certain is that Karzai "lost" heavily. He needs to figure out a way forward. Pakistan is pressing him to pick up the threads and resume the joint Afghan-Pakistani peace process.

Some fingers have pointed at Pakistan for being responsible for Rabbani's murder - principally, these are irate Northern Alliance elements ("warlords") who are jostling for political space and are openly courting foreign sponsorship. The US, which is piling the pressure on Pakistan, refrained from linking the ISI with Rabbani's murder - the Taliban have denied involvement.

In Rabbani's last interview - with a Russian television channel - he admitted that he was skating on thin ice. The following excerpts become significant:

I cannot say that [Taliban leader] Mullah Omar has agreed to participate in the peaceful negotiations, or that he has denied this possibility completely ... the Taliban leadership has trends towards peace, and these trends do have a certain power. They realize that the country's security is in their interests as well.

No doubt, presently there are divisions within the Taliban leadership operating in the country as well as beyond ... We understand that there are issues within the movement, and there are certain forces that can cause problems ... Some forces intend to undermine the peaceful process and the negotiations with the Pakistani government.

Certainly, the people of Afghanistan do not want foreign troops to remain ... and we don't want our nation's security to depend upon a foreign military presence. It is unacceptable ... However, considering the critical security situation in our country, the lack of stability and the continuing armed clashes, we have to tolerate the foreign military presence.

We have received assistance as well as certain commitments from the countries of the region, especially Pakistan, and we expect it to start making some practical steps ... The biggest challenge ... is the issue of representation of negotiators and, again, a lot depends upon Pakistan's attitude ... As soon as the government of Pakistan decides that it is time to seriously tackle the issue of peace in Afghanistan and undertake the task of providing their assistance and protection to our country, I'm sure the peace process will be out of the deadlock.


It was a candid interview. Rabbani wasn't sure Mullah Omar was in the peace process, nor was he sure the Taliban supremo was rejecting it - the "unknown unknown", as former US defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld would say.

Rabbani said the Afghan people opposed foreign occupation, but he justified the US military presence and sidestepped the reality that the military presence was part of the problem. He hinted there were forces that resented his dealings with Pakistan, but he complained that Pakistan wasn't yet cooperating with the peace process - although it had mastery over the insurgents. Rabbani knew that a shroud of strategic ambiguity was inexorably surrounding him and the peace process.

The intriguing part is where he stood vis-a-vis the US, finally. His "anti-Americanism" was apparently mellowing, but his last port of call was Tehran. He juggled far too many balls in the air, which in today's Afghanistan meant inviting trouble - even for an Ustad.

Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.
Asia Times Online :: Deconstructing the death of Rabbani
 
As the former Indian Ambassador Bhadrakumar has high lighted, the assassination of Mr. Rabbani appears to involve the US and suggests a dangerous development, in so far as the use of suicide bombers is concerned, even the Indian Premier does not but the US finger pointing -- but the larger questions should be explored, these question go to the heart of the motivation of the US to engage in ever riskier endeavors, below are two related articles I think can add to our understanding:


Afghanistan After Rabbani
By Lt-Gen (r) Asad Durrani
Published: September 26, 2011

I do not know who killed Professor Rabbani, the former president of Afghanistan. If someone had taken responsibility it would have helped — even though at times credit is claimed on ulterior grounds. A few reasonably known factors may, however, help make a tentative assessment about who might have done it; more importantly, what follows next.

Asking Ustad (the teacher) Rabbabni, a Tajik, to head the High Peace Council to start a peace process with the Afghan resistance was wise. It was a signal to the predominantly Pashtun militias that the non-Pashtun North was also on board. Indeed, not everyone in the north, or in the south, was. Some, like Dr Abdullah Abdullah, a former Foreign Minister, believed that talking to the Taliban was futile. Some others stood to benefit from the status quo. Though possible, it is unlikely that anyone of them was behind the assassination.

The Taliban appear to be the main suspect and may have had some motive as well. Besides being old adversaries — they removed the Rabbani led government in 1995 — some of them feared that Ustad’s efforts to reach out to them were aimed to split the movement. If it was, therefore, a Taliban sponsored act, it was extremely foolish. Since only a broad-based agreement ensures peace and stability in Afghanistan, eliminating Rabbani who once led the largest multi-ethnic party in the country, makes reconciliation amongst diverse Afghan groups even more difficult than it normally would be.

Long before the US conceded that the Taliban had to be engaged in a dialogue, the late president had publicly opposed the use of force against them. Yet another factor that made him an ideal interlocutor for the Taliban was his insistence that there could be no peace in Afghanistan till the occupation was vacated. His opposition to the ‘strategic agreement’, reportedly being negotiated between Washington and Kabul to grant the former, the right to maintain operational basis beyond 2014, was well known.

That places America on the ‘whodunit’ list too. Admittedly, there is no circumstantial evidence that there was a hidden Yankee hand. Their desire to pin the crime on the latest emerging superpower, the Haqqani network, however, was all too evident. Almost all Western analysts and commentators, after conceding that the evidence was lacking, could not help blurting out that “it looked like” a Haqqani handiwork. (Reminds me of a pre-Mumbai terrorist act in India, when many experts from the other side warned against jumping to conclusion, but then suggested that it was the “Lashkar” as in the LeT.)

For most of us, this nitpicking is superfluous. We already know the perpetrators: the ones we hate the most. What must, however, concern us deeply are the likely developments post Rabbani. That it would take quite a while before the intra-Afghan dialogue could resume, assuming of course, that it had started in the first place, is no big deal. Afghans take their time. It is the argument that Afghanistan was best served by another Durand Line — this time along the Hindukush — which we now must take more seriously.

Our main argument against a possible North-South divide in Afghanistan — besides none of its neighbours relish the prospect — has always been that all Afghan factions were passionately nationalist. One is not sure if such noble sentiments survive all odds. The late colonel Yahyah Effendi, an accomplished historian in his own right and whose views I value more than the current cartographic strategists, had started smelling a rat more than a decade ago.

The Soviets toyed with the idea when their withdrawal was imminent. Mujahideen dissuaded them. If the Americans, in view of their bases located north of a convenient divide, were also thinking about it, I wonder if we in the region are giving some thought on how to best scuttle this design
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A key leader of the Afghan militant group, the Haqqani network, has told the BBC it was not responsible for killing Burhanuddin Rabbani, the man overseeing Taliban peace talks.

Afghan officials have linked the Haqqanis to a suicide attacker who killed Rabbani with a bomb in a turban.

The leader, Siraj Haqqani, also told BBC Pashto his network was not linked to Pakistan's spy agency, the ISI.

Mr Haqqani was giving an audio response to written questions from the BBC.

Security considerations ruled out a face-to-face interview in which the answers could be challenged, but the BBC understands that the audio response is genuine.

The questions were delivered through an intermediary, who returned with the audio response.

Siraj Haqqani is the son of group founder Jalaluddin Haqqani and has a key role in its operations.

The Haqqanis have been blamed for a series of deadly recent attacks in Kabul.

'Military council'

Burhanuddin Rabbani was killed at his home in Kabul on 20 September when meeting a man who said he was carrying an important peace message from the Taliban. The man detonated a bomb hidden in his turban.

In his interview response, Siraj Haqqani simply says: "We haven't killed Burhanuddin Rabbani and this has been said many times by the spokespersons of the Islamic Emirate."

The Islamic Emirate is the name the Taliban gave to Afghanistan when they took control in 1996.

The Taliban have said they do not wish to comment on the Rabbani killing.

Afghan investigators say the killer was a Pakistani and that the murder was plotted in the Pakistani city of Quetta.

Afghan government officials have also accused the Pakistan intelligence agency, the ISI, of involvement, a charge Islamabad denies. Afghanistan and the US have both accused the ISI of links to the Haqqani network.


Mr Haqqani said the "Islamic Emirate" was behind "the attack on the US embassy, Nato headquarters and other attacks" in Kabul, which he said were ordered by a "military council" and were not the work of individuals.

In relation to links to the ISI, Mr Haqqani said that during the Soviet occupation of the 1980s, mujahideen fighters "had contacts with the intelligence agencies of Pakistan and other countries, but after the invasion by the Americans there have never been contacts by intelligence agencies of other countries which could be effective for us".

He said the Haqqanis "have been contacted and are being contacted by intelligence agencies of many Islamic and non-Islamic countries, including the US, asking us to leave the sacred jihad and take an important part in the current government".

Mr Haqqani said that was not his network's responsibility, but he added: "We know that their aim is not peace, they want to create tension among the Emirate's mujahideen."

He said accusations of links to the ISI were an attempt "to hide their failure and to confuse peoples' minds".

Command structure

Mr Haqqani vowed that "the game which is being played by the West... is close to an end".

He pledged loyalty to Mullah Omar, saying he "is our leader and we totally obey him".

"In every operation we get the order, planning and financial resources from the Emirate's leadership and we act accordingly," Mr Haqqani said.

He also delivered a message to the "government and people of Pakistan", telling them to be "careful of their Islamic values. They should understand that America will not let Pakistan live a peaceful life until it destroys all the wealth and values of it."

After Rabbani's death, Afghan President Hamid Karzai said his government would no longer hold peace talks with the Taliban, but would instead focus on dialogue with Pakistan.

Mr Karzai said: "[Taliban leader] Mullah Omar doesn't have an address... their peace emissary turns out to be a killer, whom should we talk to?

"The Afghan nation asks me who's the other party that you hold talks with? My answer is, Pakistan.

BBC News - Haqqani network denies killing Afghan envoy Rabbani
 
perhaps the killing of Rabbani was too big for the Taliban to claim it.

These terrorists only claim whats convenient, i mean murderers of unarmed innocents are hardly the angels of accountability and truth.

We have had that experience with LET too, they claim whats of propaganda value and reject anything that is difficult to brag about. The recent assassination of Moulana Shoukat Ahmad Shah, (who BTW ALSO favored talks and refused to take orders from GHQ) was denied by Lashkar, but when the killers were revealed by Indian police and local kashmiri leaders (for fear of their lives) started showing their displeasure, Lashkar had to own up saying it was a 'rogue' operation.
 
How much Money must have been filled in his pocket by ISI to deny the killing to look Pakistan innocent?
 
Here is detailed article by M.K.Bhadrakumar a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. Devoted much of his 3-decade long career to the Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran desks in the Ministry of External Affairs and in assignments on the territory of the former Soviet Union. M.K.Bhadrakumar in his article clearly identified it is US who is responsible for the assassination.

Who killed Burhanuddin Rabbani?

Continue digging deeper and deeper, and don’t allow oneself be distracted by the US’s drum-beating or sabre-rattling against Pakistan.

PM Manmohan Singh’s statement spoke volumes. He refused to rush to judgment as to whose hand it is that is red with Rabbani’s blood. Let me quote his message to Karzai:

............................

Maybe, PM will inquire from Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad when they meet in New York this week. Tehran is very well clued-in as to what is happening in the name of the war on terror in Afghanistan. Besides, Tehran was Rabbani’s very last port of call, from where he headed for Sharjah to spend a few days with his family members who live there.

That is, until he was asked to rush back to Kabul by an Afghan official who conveyed a message from the US and British embassies in Kabul that they had something of extreme importance to discuss with him urgently and he should get back. Which he, alas, did.

http://blogs.rediff.com/mkbhadrakumar/2011/09/23/who-killed-burhanuddin-rabbani/
 
Who killed Burhanuddin Rabbani?

By M K Bhadrakumar – September 23, 2011

[M.K.Bhadrakumar a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. Devoted much of his 3-decade long career to the Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran desks in the Ministry of External Affairs and in assignments on the territory of the former Soviet Union. M.K.Bhadrakumar in his article clearly identified it is NATO who is responsible for the assassination.]

The Taliban’s statement denying involvement in the killing of Burhanuddin Rabbani, head of the Afghan High Council for Peace, is coming on the third day of the incident. Evidently, Quetta Shura thoroughly checked out with the various Taliban factions before coming out with this statement. Indeed, Taliban, uncharacteristically enough, was not on message this time. They are normally the first with a claim, but this time they weren’t.

A Guardian editorial, too, makes this important point: “Rabbani’s scalp would have been high on the target of the Taliban, who have turned to killing senior Afghan leaders, but for the fact that he was also the head of the high peace council. Bombing him would be akin to bombing the talks themselves, and there was no suggestion from the Taliban leadership that this is their aim.”

Indeed, Taliban supremo Mullah Omar’s recent Eid message was widely interpreted as signifying a change of time, signalling that the future of the insurgency could lie in politics. A commentary by Ahmed Rashid is here. Another commentary by the US-funded Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty virtually echoing Rashid’s mind is here.

A number of theories have appeared on who killed Rabbani, adding to all-round confusion, and the only good thing is that the needle of suspicion is moving by the day further and further away from the Taliban. But then, someone did order Rabbani’s killing, isn’t it? Who was it?

Continue digging deeper and deeper, and don’t allow oneself be distracted by the US’s drum-beating or sabre-rattling against Pakistan.

PM Manmohan Singh’s statement spoke volumes. He refused to rush to judgment as to whose hand it is that is red with Rabbani’s blood. Let me quote his message to Karzai:

“It is with great shock and sadness that I have learnt of the tragic death of Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani. This is a senseless act of terrorism which the Government and people of India condemn. I fondly recall my two meetings with Professor Rabbani in Kabul in May 2011 and in New Delhi in July 2011 during which he had shared with me his vision of peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan. The best tribute the people of Afghanistan can pay to him is to carry on with the task that he had begun — securing a peaceful and safe future for the people of Afghanistan. Please accept my deepest condolences on the tragic loss. I wish to assure Your Excellency that India stands by you and the people of Afghanistan in this hour.”

Maybe, PM will inquire from Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad when they meet in New York this week. Tehran is very well clued-in as to what is happening in the name of the war on terror in Afghanistan. Besides, Tehran was Rabbani’s very last port of call, from where he headed for Sharjah to spend a few days with his family members who live there.

That is, until he was asked to rush back to Kabul by an Afghan official who conveyed a message from the US and British embassies in Kabul that they had something of extreme importance to discuss with him urgently and he should get back. Which he, alas, did.


The Iranians would know what was on Rabbani’s mind as he walked into the sunset. Most certainly, Ambassador Mohsen Pak-Ayeen would be one of them who spent time chatting up Rabbani in Tehran. That was one of the two reasons why what Ambassador Pak-Ayeen said caught my attention.

The second reason was that he was my Iranian colleague when I served as ambassador in Tashkent. Those were the tumultuous days of the Northern Alliance and the anti-Taliban resistance. Ambassador Pak-Ayeen and I became great friends — and, boy, don’t I know if there is one diplomat in our region who knows Afghanistan like the back of his hands, it is him, it is him. What he said is here.

Who killed Burhanuddin Rabbani? - Indian Punchline
 
M.K.Bhadrakumar a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service stated Iranian statement to be the fact and NATO is behind Rabbani's assassination.

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Iranian FM Official Blames NATO for Rabbani's Assassination


TEHRAN (FNA)- A senior Iranian Foreign Ministry official here on Wednesday condemned the US-led NATO forces in Afghanistan for the last night assassination of former Afghan President Burhanudin Rabbani.

Speaking to FNA here in Tehran on Wednesday, Head of the Iranian Foreign Ministry's Afghanistan Headquarters Mohsen Pak-Ayeen voiced deep regret over the cowardly assassination of the former Afghan president, and described Rabbani as a clergy Mujahed (combatant of God) who fought against the colonialist policies of such countries as England and the former Soviet Union.

He reminded that Rabbani also strongly opposed a security pact between Kabul and Washington on the establishment of permanent US military bases in Afghanistan.

"His assassination was aimed at an omission of a Mujahed who has fought for Afghanistan's independence for years and came as part of a chain of terror attacks which led to the killing of Davoud Zee and Ahmad Karzai," the diplomat stated.

He said those behind the terror attack on Rabbani's life aimed to pressure Karzai's government to consent to their demands.

"The NATO member states, and the US at the top of them, are responsible for this terror attack as they invaded Afghanistan under the excuse of establishing security and campaign against terrorism 10 years ago, but they have failed to restore security to Afghanistan.

"Foreign countries, headed by the US, are seeking to gain a permanent military deployment in Afghanistan and they martyr everyone who is opposed to their permanent presence, including Martyr Rabbani." Pak-Ayeen reiterated.


Rabbani was killed in a terror attack Tuesday night by a bomb hidden in a turban.

Rabbani was the head of a high-profile council called Afghanistan's High Peace Council formed of former and present senior officials. He also was Afghanistan's president from 1992 to 1996, when the country went through a brutal civil war. His government was ousted by the Taliban in 1996.

Fars News Agency :: Iranian FM Official Blames NATO for Rabbani's Assassination
 
The murder of Burhanuddin Rabbani
October 3, 2011
S Iftikhar Murshed

Former Afghan president Burhanuddin Rabbani has been inappropriately described by a Western analyst as “a titan among the Tajik warlords.” Nevertheless, it is believed that his recent assassination, probably by one of the Taliban factions, has the potential of transforming the ongoing insurgency into a full-blown ethnic conflict. Prior to his involvement with the Islamic Movement of Afghanistan, the 71-year old Rabbani was widely known for his anti-Pakhtun views and therefore his appointment as head of the High Peace Council was controversial.

Rabbani was a disarmingly soft-spoken man who, it almost seemed, was inspired by the Quranic injunction: “… be modest in thy bearing, and lower thy voice: for, behold, the ugliest of all voices is the voice of *****.” Yet, behind this self-effacing facade was a ruthlessly ambitious person who is blamed by his detractors for the anarchy that prevailed in post-Najib Afghanistan and triggered the emergence of the Taliban.

Three overwhelmingly strong impulses motivated Rabbani throughout his eventful life: a commitment to the cause of Afghanistan’s Tajik community, a passion for restructuring Afghan society in accordance with his own interpretation of Islam, and an insatiable urge for power. He believed that power would enable him to achieve the first two objectives.

In the early 1960s, he was one of the four founding members of an organisation which projected itself as a movement against national oppression. This group consisted only of Tajiks from northern Afghanistan and dedicated itself to redressing the persecution that the ethnic minorities had suffered under centuries of Pakhtun rule. Rabbani, however, left the outfit because of strategic and tactical differences between him and its leader Tahir Badakhshani.

Subsequently, he involved himself with Islamists at the faculty of theology at Kabul University, where he was teaching. A reasonably accurate portrayal of Rabbani was in an obituary: “In the best traditions of Afghan hierarchs he was both elder statesman and warlord, a vainglorious politician and an Islamic scholar.”

His religious predilections evolved during his studies for a master’s degree in Islamic philosophy at Cairo’s Al-Azhar University from 1966 to 1968. He established close links with the Muslim Brotherhood and was deeply influenced by the political teachings of Sayyid Qutb (1906-66),

Qutb is described by Karen Armstrong as “the real founder of Islamic fundamentalism…” He insisted that the tolerance enjoined by the Quran was applicable only after the political victory of Islam and the establishment of a truly Muslim state. Rabbani became the first Afghan to translate Qutb’s works into Dari and sought to enforce his obscurantist interpretation of Islamic doctrine in Afghanistan.

Rabbani’s studies in Al-Azhar paid off and his reputation as a theologian prompted the 15-member council of the Jamiat-i-Islami to select him as the leader of the party in 1972 in the presence of its founder, Ghulam M Niyazi. The widespread belief among Afghan Pakhtuns is that the underlying motive behind the creation of the Jamiat-i-Islami was to replace two-and-a-half centuries of Pakhtun rule by that of the Tajiks.

With the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan the expectation was that the Najibullah government would collapse. But the regime battled on and Pakistan extended support to the Mujahideen factions.

Contrary to the perception that Islamabad was partial to Hekmatyar, it was Rabbani’s Jamiat-i-Islami that was the largest recipient of Pakistani assistance between 1990 and 1992. He was paid Rs460 million while Ahmed Shah Masood received Rs142 million. Thus the total assistance given by Pakistan to the Jamiat was Rs602 million. The disbursements to the leadership of the other Mujhideen factions were: Younis Khalis, Rs 496 million; Gulbadin Hekmatyar, Rs366 million; Prof Sayyaf, Rs244 million; Pir Gilani, Rs241 million; Nabi Mohammadi, Rs240 million; Sibghatullah Mujaddadi, Rs160 million; and Mohseni, Rs60 million.

Six days after the Najib regime came to an end, Pakistan convened a meeting of Mujahideen leaders in Peshawar which was boycotted by Hekmatyar. Under the provisions of the Peshawar Accord of April 24, 1992, Rabbani succeeded Mujaddadi as president on June 28 for a four-month term. He immediately removed Pakhtuns from key positions in the administration and the army and replaced them with Tajiks.

Even worse, he refused to step down in accordance with the stipulations of the accord and had his tenure extended by a further two years through a hastily convened council on Dec 29. The claim that 1,335 delegates participated in the deliberations was dismissed as a farce. Hekmatyar, himself not a man of the most punctilious honour, described the outcome as “a declaration of war against the nation.”

Pakistan intervened again and invited Hekmatyar, Rabbani and other Mujahideen leaders to Islamabad. The talks resulted in a new power-sharing agreement on March 7, 1993, under which Rabbani continued as president and Hekamatyar was appointed prime minister. The Islamabad Accord was to last till July 1994 and in this period the regime was to draft a constitution, hold parliamentary and presidential elections and create a national army and police force.

The signatories went to Mecca and solemnly swore in front of the Kaaba that they would honour the agreement in letter and spirit. But oaths are never sacrosanct to those who crave power. Shortly afterwards, differences broke out between Rabbani and Hekmatyar on the formation of the cabinet and the distribution of ministries. Fierce fighting erupted and lasted until an uneasy compromise was negotiated in Jalalabad on May 20 through the good offices of the Nangarhar shura led by Haji Abdul Qadeer.

Rabbani was to remain president till July 1994 but he had no intention of honouring this agreement and, while the chief justice was out of the country, secured a decision from the Afghan Supreme Court whereby his term was extended till December. Even this decision was not respected by him and he continued in office till the Taliban takeover of Kabul in September 1996.

But Rabbani had mellowed over the years and towards the end of his life genuinely sought reconciliation among the Afghan groups. Several months prior to the initial contact between the Taliban and the US last November, he openly opposed the use of force against the Taliban.

He also believed that peace could not return to the country so long as foreign forces remained and he was against the grant of permanent military bases to the US. For this reason the point-man for Afghanistan at the Iranian foreign office, Mohsen Pak-Ayeen, made the preposterous statement that the Americans and Nato were responsible for the killing of Rabbani.

At his funeral there were deafening chants of “Death to Karzai, death to Pakistan, death to America.” The leader of the Coalition for Change and Hope, former foreign minister Dr Abdullah Abdullah yelled, “Karzai should go to the Taliban whom he has repeatedly called the sons of Afghan soil” and demanded that all contacts with the Taliban must end. Former Afghan deputy foreign minister Mahmood Saikal blamed Pakistan’s ISI for Rabbani’s death. It is unfortunate that the same sickening refrain was parroted by a segment of the Pakistani media.

If “happiness lies in the joy of achievement, in the thrill of creative effort,” as post-impressionist painter Vincent Van Gogh believed, then Rabbani must have been saddened by his failure to achieve his goals. He felt strongly for the cause of the Tajiks but was never accepted as their undisputed leader so long as Ahmed Shah Masood was alive. After Masood’s assassination two days before 9/11, he was eclipsed by Gen Muhammad Qasim Fahim who dominated the Afghan Transitional Administration from 2001 to 2004, from which Rabbani was excluded. His dreams have finally fallen from the tired hands of eternal sleep.

The writer is the publisher of Criterion Quarterly. Email: iftimurshed@ gmail.com
-The News
 
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