US must convince India to move troops from LoC

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

and do you know the impact of 30 highly motivated, armed militants who have been conditioned to fight using local populance as protection in an urbanised insurgency area?

Far lower than the thousands, more than half a million military and paramilitary troops are designed to handle.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

True concern for national security could be more successfully expressed by ensuring that Pakistani territory isn't used as a staging ground for terrorism against other states. If/when this basic requirement is met everything else will sort itself out.

This is a rather circular argument - so long as there is instability in Pakistan and areas where government writ does not exist, the potential for terrorist attacks goes up, even assuming a 100% committed Pakistan.

The instability and the insurgency however may not be contained without a large scale reorientation of troops, and even with an increased military focus on the lawless areas, the chances of greater instability and increased terrorist attacks cannot be ruled out in the near to medium term.

Your argument for what is 'a basic requirement' to prevent Indian aggression is therefore unfeasible, without large scale PA reorientation (assuming that is required for restoring government writ) and assurances from India that it will not play aggressor in the event of an attack on India during the time the PA is fighting to establish its writ.

 

[Hellfire]

Far lower than the thousands, more than half a million military and paramilitary troops are designed to handle.

not exactly. you are trying to draw parallel to FATA like situation.

Its easier to track and hunt 100s or even 1000s, but difficult to track small cells operating independently.

and as for high ratio of troops, innumerable times i have said that you need to hold ground, both rural/urban and forested/desolate areas in order to dominate over the area.

PA shall face same situation soon. Insurgency is more to do with high mobility and less to do with static defenses and classical warfare. Right now you are seeing the classical scenario in FATA. The mere fact India has maintained such a high ratio has enabled incidents to be brought down to minimal (something that US in only realising now)

As such these troops are no threat to Pakistan for offensive operations in J&K. IA doctrine calls for limited offensive/proactive defensive posturing in J&K and offensive in plains. The terrain also makes it impossible for India to make rapid inroads into Pakistani Kashmir even if the PA was to withdraw some troops from these areas.

 

[Hellfire]

This is a rather circular argument - so long as there is instability in Pakistan and areas where government writ does not exist, the potential for terrorist attacks goes up, even assuming a 100% committed Pakistan.

The instability and the insurgency however may not be contained without a large scale reorientation of troops, and even with an increased military focus on the lawless areas, the chances of greater instability and increased terrorist attacks cannot be ruled out in the near to medium term.

Your argument for what is 'a basic requirement' to prevent Indian aggression is therefore unfeasible, without large scale PA reorientation (assuming that is required for restoring government writ) and assurances from India that it will not play aggressor in the event of an attack on India during the time the PA is fighting to establish its writ.

So you mean to say that GoP's writ is non-existent even in Kashmir under Pakistani control? And as an extension there are not enough assets on ground to ensure your writ?

Now dont parry with your 'reorientation' pitch, for its unthinkable that any PA cdr will leave his lines of communication unprotected, and you do have a large military presence along LoC needing substantial amounts of supplies which cannot be left unprotected by 'lawlessness'

In essence, the fact remains as Energon put it - contain the terror/'freedom fighters' based in Kashmir on Pakistani side (you dont need special reorientation of troops for that), dismantle their infrastructure in as transparent a manner as you have so far done (or atleast seem to be doing) in FATA and you can be assured that you shall have all the assurances of non-aggression even in face of terror attack in India.

 

[Xeric]

Hmm the Doc is talking Strategy now

 

[Hellfire]

Hmm the Doc is talking Strategy now

and what pray are your intentions sir ........... ban me?

 

[All-Green]

So you mean to say that GoP's writ is non-existent even in Kashmir under Pakistani control? And as an extension there are not enough assets on ground to ensure your writ?

Now dont parry with your 'reorientation' pitch, for its unthinkable that any PA cdr will leave his lines of communication unprotected, and you do have a large military presence along LoC needing substantial amounts of supplies which cannot be left unprotected by 'lawlessness'

In essence, the fact remains as Energon put it - contain the terror/'freedom fighters' based in Kashmir on Pakistani side (you dont need special reorientation of troops for that), dismantle their infrastructure in as transparent a manner as you have so far done (or atleast seem to be doing) in FATA and you can be assured that you shall have all the assurances of non-aggression even in face of terror attack in India.

hellfire, i would differ regarding the assurance of non aggression.
Sadly it wont mean much as words go, words are wind.

Strictly from strategic/military perspective one cannot and should never ever assume that a country with which one has fought multiple wars over issues that are still unresolved will not take a shot; especially when it sees an opportunity and a vulnerability like never before...

The world is not run on goodwill alone...that is the harsh reality which commanders, leaders, governments have to be aware of and keep in mind when formulating a strategy.
The world is cruel and selfish, one can do only so much in the way of goodwill alone.
The history is full of treachery, deception and broken oaths.

Pakistan will have to take on TTP knowing fully well that India may use the situation and try to inflict irreparable damage to Pakistan.
I know i will not forgive a commander who turns a blind eye towards India...just not acceptable.
It makes the job for us more difficult but certainly not impossible...however this needs to be appreciated by all stakeholders and steps taken to ensure that Pakistan is not being forced to reinforce the troops on its borders in face of external threats and warnings...

I do not deny that i would like to see proper diplomatic approach and a government level agreement...not just assurance but an agreement...that is something both countries have to work towards and will help us more than anything to solve not only terrorism but the internal weaknesses in both Pakistan and India.

I know that it is possible and I think that it is of utmost importance!

 

[Hellfire]

All-Green

Sir.

hellfire, i would differ regarding the assurance of non aggression.
Sadly it wont mean much as words go, words are wind.

assurance, as you rightly implied, should not be trusted.but one needs to analyse the situation thoroughly, and see the adversarys perspective too, does it help him to weaken you or is it in his interest to not touch you for the time being.

Strictly from strategic/military perspective one cannot and should never ever assume that a country with which one has fought multiple wars over issues that are still unresolved will not take a shot; especially when it sees an opportunity and a vulnerability like never before...

am sure you would appreciate that even if you were to withdraw significant amount of troops (from eastern border) you can leave sufficient numbers as holding force and yet not face a shortage in west for adequate assets.

Primarily what I could make out, the apprehensions in this revolve around Kashmir theater. Being a mountainous terrain, you can still continue with holding pattern and stall any indian advances in case of hostilities till as suach time your reinforcements reach the theater. Your reinforcement capability for troops along Saltoro ridge is a typical example where you have roads leading right till your troops and as such your mobility is higher vis-a-vis Indian troops in the said sectors.


Pakistan will have to take on TTP knowing fully well that India may use the situation and try to inflict irreparable damage to Pakistan.
I know i will not forgive a commander who turns a blind eye towards India...just not acceptable.

The threat will always be there. We are stretched thin too thanks to 2 decades of insurgency in J&K . Yet we have infused the necessary amounts of troops. And remember we have a pretty strong adversary in our North too. And the number of personnels between India and Pakistan do not vary by much. Its just the question of prioritization.

We faced similar situation in 1962, yet there was no Pakistani adventure at the time, ditto for 1971. There are lot of factors to guide such decision apart from clear hostile intent.

It makes the job for us more difficult but certainly not impossible...however this needs to be appreciated by all stakeholders and steps taken to ensure that Pakistan is not being forced to reinforce the troops on its borders in face of external threats and warnings...

I have repeatedly suggested limited transfer from J&K region (leaving behind enough for holding operations just in case) and majority to be taken off from Punjab-Sindh sectors. In any case offensive plain operations, if India was to launch them even with your full complement of troops in place, is only likely to make any headway in Rajasthan-Sindh sector and not at all in Punjab (due to topographical considerations there). So actually the bogey is being raised unnecessarily. The will to act is missing IMO.

 

[Contrarian]

The Indian armed forces since 2002 have adopted standardized mixed formations, I´m not really sure there´s much they can do at this point to diminish their offensive capabilities, nor do I think (fairly certain actually) they have the necessary monetary resources to reorient their force structure all over again..."

KASRKIN.

What do you mean by this statement.

1. India does not have enough heavey equipment for cold start.

2. Not equipped for insurgency warfare.

3. That there $30 biillion a year defense budget is too small

4. That there planned $100 billion defense spend between 2007 & 2017 IS INSUFFICUENT to prepare for Cold Start.

Its a sweeping statement but rather contradicts the massive spending by the military that we are all witnessing by india which incidently has only just started in the last few years but will continue to grow year in year out for decade to come..

It relates to problems in the procurement process. There are critical deficiencies. IA is woefully short of Arty, both towed and SP. As it is of WLR's. There is not a single plant in this country that makes 155mm gun ammo.

All this however has been relatively offset by IA taking lead in inducting rocket arty and UAV's. Smerch/Pinaka, et all. A distinct edge over PA in this area.

Then there is a shortage in planes needed . That is being worked on, though slowly. Then there is the issue of transportation, as Energon mentioned.

That being said. There is a LOT of reorientation in the Defence-Industrial setup in India. A lot of reforms. In 5 more years, these will start to yield result. Then things will move a LOT faster.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

The mere fact India has maintained such a high ratio has enabled incidents to be brought down to minimal

The high ratio of troops to militants has definitely helped, but without Pakistani cooperation after 2002, you would likely still be in the same situation that existed in the late 90's.

 

[AgNoStiC MuSliM]

So you mean to say that GoP's writ is non-existent even in Kashmir under Pakistani control? And as an extension there are not enough assets on ground to ensure your writ?

Pakistan will likely largely control the groups in Kashmir, as it has been since 2002. However, if elements such as Lakhvi are determined to carry out attacks on India, they will obtain the necessary resources elsewhere, and FATA would be open to them.

Now dont parry with your 'reorientation' pitch, for its unthinkable that any PA cdr will leave his lines of communication unprotected, and you do have a large military presence along LoC needing substantial amounts of supplies which cannot be left unprotected by 'lawlessness'

Wait, in your earlier post you argued about the success of maintaining a 'high ratio' of troops to militants, which in Pakistan's case could require an even larger number of troops than India deployed, for an undetermined amount of time given the linkage between the Taliban and the insurgency in Afghanistan.

With massive troop requirements on both fronts - one side or the other will have to be short changed. Its either that or the Civilian government steps into FATA and some of the other agencies with reconstruction and developing effective local LEA's that can take over in areas the military clears and be responsible for COIN.

With a continuation of the status quo along the LoC and IB, the importance of the FC (its expansion and capacity building) in Pakistan's COIN strategy cannot be minimized, and will be the likely solution going forward.

In essence, the fact remains as Energon put it - contain the terror/'freedom fighters' based in Kashmir on Pakistani side

The Kashmiri's are not the issue, since they have largely been controlled since 2002. Nor is it a smart idea to open another front in Pakistan against the Kashmiri groups that command wide support in their freedom struggle. If they decide to go the route of the Taliban and resist, then it really will be a mess.

The best policy related to the Kashmiri groups is the current one - use Pakistani influence to keep them under control and quiet.

Beyond that, it is not possible to prevent all possible terrorist attacks that might occur on Indian soil until GoP writ is restored in all parts of Pakistan.

I concur with All green's comment here:

'Pakistan will have to take on TTP knowing fully well that India may use the situation and try to inflict irreparable damage to Pakistan.
I know i will not forgive a commander who turns a blind eye towards India...just not acceptable.

It makes the job for us more difficult but certainly not impossible...however this needs to be appreciated by all stakeholders and steps taken to ensure that Pakistan is not being forced to reinforce the troops on its borders in face of external threats and warnings..."

 

[Kasrkin]

"What he might have alluded to may have been the RAPIDs (Reorganised Augmented Plain Infantry Divisions) which has a higher mechanised component in terms of armour and mechanised infantry being integrated..."

I don't think he was talking about RAPIDs, because they're largely inconsequential in terms of what he was implying. Pakistan has RAPIDs too but they're stationed in their peace time locals, not right next to the border as envisioned by Cold Start.

"Also you are slightly confused about the cold start program.The said program envisions movement of troops for offensive operations within a stipulated time period. Assets for the same were created along IB along the western border at the time of Op. Parakaram as in over the 1 year that IA spent there, deficiencies were noted and changes made. These assets are at static locations now and can be utilised at a short notice..."

I'm not confused about anything, but you are. I'm not wrong when I said the required infrastructure is not yet in place. The report I have says:

"The forward deployment of integrated battle groups and other offensive elements capable of undertaking Cold Start operations requires the construction
of new support infrastructure to house not only the units themselves, but also
the logistical “tail” that supports them. Stationing division-sized forces in the border region will require the expansion of existing facilities and the construction
of new ones. Forward locations close enough to the international border
would be located along a line stretching from Barmer-Jaisalmer-Bikaner-
Suratgarh. It is likely that the IBGs would be colocated with existing units
from the pivot corps in their area of operations. Key strategic locations in this
regard include the cantonment at Bathinda, Punjab (the largest cantonment in
India) and the 24th RAPID base at Bikaner.

At this point, there is no indication in open source materials that these required
facilities are being developed. Although hiding some new construction
within existing facilities might be possible, given how closely the Pakistanis
and Indians are watching each other, it is reasonably safe to assume that the
construction of facilities to house nine divisions’ worth of armor, vehicles, and
soldiers along the border would attract attention. By contrast, Pakistan’s
signiªcantly more modest construction of new bunkers and observation towers
on its side of the border adjacent to Barmer, Jaisalmer, and Bikaner in
December 2005 attracted Indian attention and press coverage."

Thus my claims are well founded.

"However, the only limiting factor as of yet for this doctrine to be 100% operationalised is - lack of adequate rail routes for transportation..."

Dead wrong.

"An examination of the Indian Army’s progress toward implementing Cold
Start shows that the limited war doctrine remains in the experimental phase. Simulated exercises demonstrate signiªcant progress in networking various units, but much more work is required to achieve proªciency in the execution of Cold Start and the joint operations required by the doctrine. Organizationally, the creation of the South Western Command represents a step forward, but there is no evidence of offensive units being forward deployed as the doctrine requires. Interservice and civil-military tensions remain signiªcant barriers to the doctrine’s acceptance. Finally, the execution of Cold Start will require further improvements in the quality of the army’s matériel
and the caliber of its officers. All of this paints a picture of a military organization
struggling with the implications of a new warfighting strategy."

"The Indian Army has developed a new limited war doctrine for responding to
the speciªc challenges posed by Pakistan’s proxy war strategy. While this Cold
Start doctrine represents a signiªcant advance in India’s conventional capabilities, it also risks provoking or escalating a crisis on the subcontinent that could breach the nuclear threshold. The persistent disengagement of India’s political leadership from security issues is a cause for concern, for they may turn to a limited war strategy during the next crisis without having evaluated the potential consequences."

"At present, Cold Start remains more of a concept than a reality. Recent military exercises and associated organizational changes indicate that even though the Indian Army has made progress toward developing an operational Cold Start capability, much work remains."

I would've love to explain things address the issues and my PoV in greater detail here instead of just quoting a study, but unfortunately I don't have time.

 

[1712]

Bottomline is that India cannot be "convinced" by any super power, unlike some other countries.

borrowing a phrase from Musharraf, We Indians only work under our 'Supreme national interests'.

 

[Rabbit.Rabbit]

Bottomline is that Pakistan is negotiating with a noose around its neck. Not cool.

Taliban is a threat to its existence, and if it takes concessions from India for Pakistan to save itself then something is drastically wrong with the Pakistani leadership.

 

[Hellfire]

malaymishra


There is not a single plant in this country that makes 155mm gun ammo.

Correction here MM, OFB makes the same.

Indian Ordnance Factories: Ammunition, Explosives, Propellants & Chemicals