Raphael
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Push for missile defense
Seoul must make clear extent of alliance cost
The U.S. push to make South Korea join its missile defense system is becoming increasingly conspicuous, driving Seoul into a corner. Such pressure comes from all directions ― the Congress, government, military and media ― telling Seoul even how to purchase the system and where to locate it.
If one believes defense ministry officials' explanation that the two sides have had little discussion about the issue, Washington's one-sided, high-handed moves are regrettable.
South Korea is rejecting the U.S. demand, at least on the surface, vowing to develop its own system, called the long-range surface-to-air missile (L-SAM), instead of buying the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to intercept hostile missiles at altitudes above 40 km. Still a ministry spokesman left some rooms for change, saying it would examine the U.S. proposal if and when Washington "officially" makes it.
We hope the comment will end up as just diplomatic decency, not a precursor of commitment. Already, however, there are unconfirmed reports about bilateral talks going on behind the scenes. South Korea had refused to join the MD system or maintained strategic ambiguity about it until the former Lee Myung-bak administration began to open the way for becoming part of America's global missile shield network.
The Park Geun-hye administration has neither denied nor confirmed it, but it is time for Seoul to make clear its position on the matter because any further ambivalence can be interpreted as tacit approval.
As with most military issues, the debate can be boiled down to two main points ― practical value and strategic propriety. U.S. officials talk about North Korea's evolving missile capability and threats, but one can't help but wonder whether the North will need high-altitude missiles to attack the South when its long-range artillery can reach and destroy Seoul and points farther south. If the communist regime actually launches mid-range missiles, South Korea cannot intercept them during the six to seven minutes they would be in the air, even if it introduces up-to-second U.S. system.
That means the MD in South Korea will be necessary more for defending the U.S. bases in the rest of Asia, including those in Guam and Okinawa ― and/or encircling China ― which poses a serious question about Seoul's strategic wisdom: Will South Korea have to spend big money to become initial targets for China and Russia in a regional conflict?
Yes, the nation needs to prepare for situations when China and Russia emerge as its direct security threats. Because these threats will be less urgent than those from North Korea, however, Seoul should have time to build missile defense with its own technology rather than hurriedly buying it from America.
The ongoing MD controversy is all the more disturbing because of widespread talks that the U.S. is demanding this in return for the delay in Seoul's takeover of wartime military command from Washington. Add to this the similar increases in financial burden from buying F35 stealth jets and heavier sharing of costs for the U.S. troops stationed here, and Seoul is left with compromised military sovereignty and far heavier bills for it.
It is past time for Koreans to question what should be the appropriate cost of alliance ― and their government's defense and foreign policy.
I hope the Koreans can fend off this odious US racketeering swindle.
Seoul must make clear extent of alliance cost
The U.S. push to make South Korea join its missile defense system is becoming increasingly conspicuous, driving Seoul into a corner. Such pressure comes from all directions ― the Congress, government, military and media ― telling Seoul even how to purchase the system and where to locate it.
If one believes defense ministry officials' explanation that the two sides have had little discussion about the issue, Washington's one-sided, high-handed moves are regrettable.
South Korea is rejecting the U.S. demand, at least on the surface, vowing to develop its own system, called the long-range surface-to-air missile (L-SAM), instead of buying the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to intercept hostile missiles at altitudes above 40 km. Still a ministry spokesman left some rooms for change, saying it would examine the U.S. proposal if and when Washington "officially" makes it.
We hope the comment will end up as just diplomatic decency, not a precursor of commitment. Already, however, there are unconfirmed reports about bilateral talks going on behind the scenes. South Korea had refused to join the MD system or maintained strategic ambiguity about it until the former Lee Myung-bak administration began to open the way for becoming part of America's global missile shield network.
The Park Geun-hye administration has neither denied nor confirmed it, but it is time for Seoul to make clear its position on the matter because any further ambivalence can be interpreted as tacit approval.
As with most military issues, the debate can be boiled down to two main points ― practical value and strategic propriety. U.S. officials talk about North Korea's evolving missile capability and threats, but one can't help but wonder whether the North will need high-altitude missiles to attack the South when its long-range artillery can reach and destroy Seoul and points farther south. If the communist regime actually launches mid-range missiles, South Korea cannot intercept them during the six to seven minutes they would be in the air, even if it introduces up-to-second U.S. system.
That means the MD in South Korea will be necessary more for defending the U.S. bases in the rest of Asia, including those in Guam and Okinawa ― and/or encircling China ― which poses a serious question about Seoul's strategic wisdom: Will South Korea have to spend big money to become initial targets for China and Russia in a regional conflict?
Yes, the nation needs to prepare for situations when China and Russia emerge as its direct security threats. Because these threats will be less urgent than those from North Korea, however, Seoul should have time to build missile defense with its own technology rather than hurriedly buying it from America.
The ongoing MD controversy is all the more disturbing because of widespread talks that the U.S. is demanding this in return for the delay in Seoul's takeover of wartime military command from Washington. Add to this the similar increases in financial burden from buying F35 stealth jets and heavier sharing of costs for the U.S. troops stationed here, and Seoul is left with compromised military sovereignty and far heavier bills for it.
It is past time for Koreans to question what should be the appropriate cost of alliance ― and their government's defense and foreign policy.
I hope the Koreans can fend off this odious US racketeering swindle.
