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All right a question;

I dont get to see RPG types in US military so whats the weapon was for its role?

AT-4, M-72 LAW, Javelin, M-141 and the one with 4 tubes which Arnold used in Commando is still around I think. RPGis also used for familiarization and Special Forces.
 
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All right a question;

I dont get to see RPG types in US military so whats the weapon was for its role?

By and large the US military doesn't use RPG-type weapons. Apart from the AT-4 and Carl Gustav, which are recoil-less rifles and not an RPGs, the only comparable weapon is the USMC's SMAW

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Caliber: 83 mm rocket + 9mm spotting rifle
Type: rocket
Overall length: 825 mm (launcher), about 1370 mm (ready to fire w. HEDPround)
Weight: 7.52 kg unloaded launcher plus 4.3 to 6.9kg rocket in canister.
Effective range: up to 250 m (500m max)
Armor penetration: HEAA ~ 580-600mm (23-24") RHA; HEDP25mm (1") RHA or 30cm (12") brick wall or 20cm (8") concrete wall



The SMAW (Shoulder-launched Multi-purpose Assault Weapon) has been developed by early 1980s by McDonnel Douglas corporation especially for US Marine Corps(USMC), which required lightweight, one-man portable multipurpose weapon,capable to defeat light armor, enemy bunkers and other reinforced positions.Currently manufactured in USA by Talley Defence Systems, the SMAW is in service with USMC since 1984. Known in service as Mark 153 Model 0 (Mk.153 Mod. 0) SMAW rocket launcher, it can fire a variety of ammunition, intended against light armor such as armored personnel carriers, enemy bunkers etc.

SMAW is a shoulder-fired,reusable rocket launcher that consists of a launch tube made of epoxy and fiberglass, with attached firing unit, 9mm spotting rifle, and sight bracket.Firing unit has dual grips, manual safety, and fire selector that allows to fire either a spotting rifle or a loaded rocket. Spotting rifle is ballistically matched to all rockets. It is loaded with special ammunition and fires from special 6-round magazines. Spare magazines are clipped to each rocket container.Once operator roughly aimed the unit, using either telescope or night sight, or backup open sight, he starts to fire spotting rifle until rounds are hitting the intended target. 9mm bullets provide a visible trace up to 500m range, so operator can check his aim, and once on target, he then switches to rocket and launches it. SMAW launcher can be fired from the shoulder, using dual grips and shoulder rest, or from the ground, using foldingbipods located near the center of mass, next to the shoulder rest.

All types of rockets are supplied in disposable, sealed plastic containers,which are clipped to the rear part of the launcher. Once rocket is fired, empty container is detached from the launcher and discarded. Rockets have caliber of 83mm, and are stabilized in flight using spring-open switchblade-type stabilizations. Standard types of rockets are: Mk.3 HEDP (High Explosive Dual Purpose) weighting 4.35kg (5.9kg in container), Mk.6 HEAA (High Explosive Anti Armor) weighting 4.4kg (6.2kg in container), CPR (Common Practice - training),FTG (Follow-Through Grenade with dual warhead - first that penetrates barrier,and second that follows through the hole and explodes inside) weighting 5.2kg (7.1kg in container), and CS (Confined Space with HEDP warhead - createsno backblast and an be fired from confined spaces such as rooms in building)weighting 6.9kg (9.1kg in container). The most recent (2003) addition to therange of SMAW rounds is Mk.80 rocket, known as NE (Novel Explosive, basically a thermobaric HEDP warhead).

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The US Military prefers guided missiles over unguided rockets or rocket-propelled grenades.
 
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Is the 4-tubed still used named M202 I think?

The current model is the M202A1 thermobaric launcher

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Caliber: 66 mm
Type:rocket
Overalllength: 686 mm empty launcher, 883 mm loaded with clip
Weight: 5.22 kg unloaded, 12 kg loaded with clip of4 rockets
Effective range: up to 200 m (750 m maximum)



The M202 multishot rocket launcher evolved from XM191 multishot rocket launcher, that was extensively combat tested by US Army in Vietnam during late 1970s. The M202 is very similar to XM191 although it appears that its rockets were loaded with different incendiary agent -TPA rather than Napalm. It is also believed that XM191 was developed as a multipurpose weapon, capable of firing not only incendiary, but also 66mm HEAT rockets, compatible wit that of M72 LAW lightweight antitank weapon. The M202, however, was issued only with one type of ammunition - the M74 incendiary rockets.

In theory, the M202 was an impressive weapon with significant combat capabilities - it had long range (compared to earlier flamethrowers),it allowed for relatively rapid fire and high maneuverability, its physical and psychological effect on unprotected infantry and military vehicles was significant to say the least. However, it appears that M202 ammunition had some flaws (most probably due to poor quality control or design flaws), which resulted in self-ignition of warheads during loading of the weapon. Not surprisingly, such disastrous events made the M202 less than popular among the troops, and most M202 launchers were put into storage during late 1980s, although some launchers were observed during training of US and allied troops through early 1990s.

It must be noted that M202 made its biggest impact noton the battlefields but rather on cinema screens, when it was featured in the "Commando" movie (1985), starring Arnold Schwarzenegger. In this movie the M202 was used to blow up the police truck and free the Schwarzenegger's character, although in real life this would be thel ast scene of the action, with main character quickly burned to death inside scorched truck (the M74 rocket generated fire as hot as 1800-2200oC for several minutes).

The M202 multishot rocket launcher is a four-barreled re-usable smootbore weapon which is loaded with a clip with factory-loaded M74 rockets, pre-loaded into separate aluminum tubes that are assembled together to form a single 4-shot clip. The clip is attached to the rear of the launcher and each loaded tube forms an extension to the barrel. Once clip is loaded and fixed to the weapon, launcher can be fired up to 4 times,with practical rate of fire as high as 1 round per second. Once all rockets are fired, the empty clip is detached and discarded. During storage and transportation the M202 launcher is closed at front and back with two hinged covers, which shall be unlocked and opened before loading and firing. The front cover has a dual-purpose handle, which is used for carrying the launcher in vertical position, and is used as a forward grip in firing position. Firing controls include folding pistolgrip under the barrel cluster, and folding collimating sight on the left side of the weapon. 66mm rockets use solid fuel engines,switch-blade type folding stabilizator fins, and a warhead loaded with some 0.6kg of self-igniting triethylaluminum (TEA), a gel-like substance. Since the M202 is a rocket launcher, upon firing it produces a dangerous backblast zone about 15 meters long.

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It is being produced, and has seen action in Afghanistan, but is not a commonly used weapon.
 
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I need some opinions on this
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As many of you may know, the LCS is going throught some identity and armament issues. Then I found this alternative proposal diagram. Now it actually looks like a proper FFG.

I know it would cost more, but I would take 4 of these vs 10 LCSs.


Additions over LCS
- 48 VLS w/ VLA,SM series, BGM-109, ESSM, Harpoon Blk3 VL.
- SPY-1F, SPG-62 for illumination
-Mk32 torp tubes

Plus we would get the improved multifunction towed sonar designed for the SSC, and we still got the room for the UAVs and SH-60s. All of this is proven tech that we already employ. It's not like we have to take time to innovate for this.

Thoughts?
 
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Long-Range Ship Plan: Navy to Pursue Block Buys for DDGs in 2018, SSNs in 2019
Long-Range Ship Plan: Navy to Pursue Block Buys for DDGs in 2018, SSNs in 2019 - USNI News
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Virginia-class attack submarine Minnesota (SSN-783) under construction in 2012. US Navy Photo

The Navy told Congress it would pursue a 10-ship multiyear procurement contract for its Flight III Arleigh Burke-class destroyers in Fiscal Year 2018 as part of its newest long-range shipbuilding plan, which also announced a nine-ship attack submarine block buy and delays in several auxiliary ship programs.

The plan, which the Navy admits represents a “best case scenario” – one in which Congress pays for the Ohio replacement ballistic missile submarine program outside the shipbuilding account and in which the Navy is not held to Budget Control Act-level funding – notes a 308-ship requirement and shows how the Navy plans to meet that requirement from 2022 to 2031

The destroyer contract is one piece of reaching the goal, as the Navy plans to keep the production line open through FY 2029.

In 2013‪, NAVSEA made a similar $6.1 billion multiyear deal with Huntington Ingalls Industries and General Dynamics Bath Iron Works for nine – which grew to 10 – Arleigh Burke DDGs. The price-per-hull came to $660 for HII and $700 for BIW, not including government-furnished equipment like radars and vertical launch systems (VLS).

In late March, both yards received contract modifications as part of the deal. HII was awarded $604.3 million for DDG-121 while BIW won $610.4 million for DDG-122.

The first Flight III DDGs will be part of the FY 2016 ships. Its unclear which yard will be the first to build the modified destroyer with the upgraded Raytheon Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR), Naval Sea Systems Command told USNI News last week.

The shipbuilding plan indicated the Navy will pursue a nine-ship multiyear procurement contract for the Block V Virginia-class SSNs bought between FY 2019 and 2023. That contract supports continuing two-a-year SSN procurement except during years when an Ohio replacement SSBN is built, when only one SSN will be built. Officials have said that, in terms of shipyard workload, one SSBN is about equal to two SSNs.

To go along with the SSN block buy, the Navy notes in the plan that the Virginia Payload Module (VPM) would be built into at least one submarine per year beginning in the FY 2019 block buy, though Navy acquisition chief Sean Stackley told the House Armed Services Committee in February that he was looking into whether that timeline could be moved up a year. The VPM is a mid-body section that would be added to the submarine and include four additional launch tubes, or 28 additional Tomahawk missiles or other payloads, to help compensate for the loss of the SSGN guided missile submarines, which will have all retired by 2028.

The Navy has updated its LX(R) amphibious dock landing ship replacement program to “a more efficient procurement profile,” which procures the lead ship in FY 2020 and begins serial production in 2022, according to the document. Previously, the Navy planned to buy the ships every other year and not enter serial production of amphibious ships until 2028. The Navy chose a modified San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock to serve as the LX(R), and the new profile would allow a smoother transition from the LPDs to the LX(R)s.

The document states that, as a result of budget constraints, one of the two T-ATS auxiliary tugs, which will replace the T-ATFs and T-ARSs, will be delayed from FY 2017 to 2019. The lead T-AGOS surveillance ship replacement will be delayed from FY 2020 to 2021, and it the Navy is in the midst of an engineering review to determine if the current T-AGOS ships’ lives could be extended further beyond the planned 30 years.

The plan announced a cancelation of the LCC amphibious command ships in FY 2032 and 2034, and instead the Navy “will look at alternative means to meet the requirements fulfilled by these ships, such as modular systems that can be temporarily installed on an existing ship.”

Of course, the Navy notes, all these plans are subject to adequate funding. The document states that the Ohio Replacement Program (ORP) will move ahead as scheduled regardless of the fiscal situation, and the Ford-class aircraft carrier program will have to continue to maintain a legally mandated 11-carrier fleet. That said, the document notes that the ORP will “consume about half of the shipbuilding funding available in a given year – and would do so for a period of over a decade. “

Without additional funding for shipbuilding, or paying for the ORP with non-shipbuilding money, “Navy would be limited to, on average, as few as two other capital ships (SSN, DDG, CG, LPD, LHA, etc.) per year throughout this decade,” the document states.
“Such low shipbuilding rates for an extended period of time would result in a battle force inadequately sized to meet our naval requirements in support of the DSG. Further, there is significant risk to the industrial base in this case since low production rates outside of the SSBN and CVN production lines may not provide adequate work to keep shipyards operating at minimum sustaining levels and could result in shipyard closures.”

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From Sailors To Robots: A Revolution In Clearing Mines
From Sailors To Robots: A Revolution In Clearing Mines « Breaking Defense - Defense industry news, analysis and commentary
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An Avenger-class minesweeper

This is the third in our exclusive series on the crucial but neglected question of sea mines and how well — or not — the United States manages this global and very real threat. Here we’re looking at the most promising technologies, ships and aircraft that can give the United States the edge in this crucial and complex battle. What works? Read on. The Editor.

Clearing sea mines is so murderously hard that the best defense is to sink the ships or shoot down the planes carrying them before they can be put in the water. But politics, surprise, orfear of escalation might keep the US military from stopping the minelayers “left of splash.” That means somebody had better be ready to go after the deadly explosives in their natural habitat. The great leap forward today is that “somebody” is increasingly likely to be a robot.

For over a century, clearing mines was a brutal, crude and close-up business. Specialized ships, divers, and even trained dolphins had to go right into the minefield. The US Navy has led the world in counter-mine equipment that could be towed from helicopters, but that still means flying low, slow and in a predictable pattern in airspace where enemy aircraft or missile launchers might be watching. There are even reports that China has developed anti-helicopter mines designed to launch themselves out of the water. For more than a decade, the Navy has increasingly invested in technologies to “keep the sailor out of the minefield” by sending unmanned systems in, both under water and on the surface.

Since 2002, when the Navy officially launched its controversial Littoral Combat Ship program, this new remote-controlled approach has been intimately linked with LCS. When fitted with its Mine Counter-Measures module, whose first iteration goes into full-up operational testing this year, LCS will replace the Navy’sremaining 13 wooden-hulled Avenger-class minesweepers.

So it might seem like bad news for mine warfare that the LCS has faced relentless criticism since its inception, culminating in Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel’s decision in January to truncate the program and develop a better-armed successor. The upgunned LCS unveiled last Decemeber will focus on hunting submarines and fast attack boats, while dropping the minesweeping mission — which has always been a Navy stepchild.

The Navy ethos has been thoroughly aggressive since its birth: “I wish to have no Connection with any Ship that does not Sail fast for I intend to go in harm’s way,” wrote John Paul Jones in 1778. The fleet has always favored fast ships that can take the battle to the enemy: aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered submarines, guided-missile destroyers. By contrast, minesweeping is slow, inherently defensive and, well, just not sexy.

But there are two substantial silver linings for mine warfare. First, the LCS is not all dead. The Navy still plans to build 32 (down from 52) of the original design, the one that can perform mine-hunting missions. Second, new mine-clearing technologies are no longer tied to the LCS program.

Iran’s threats in 2011-2012 to close the Strait of Hormuz jolted the Navy into taking mines more seriously and speeding new equipment to the fleet. Instead of waiting for LCS, sailors have launched mine-seeking underwater drones and mine-killing mini-torpedoes from current vessels, even including inflatable boats. Helicopters have tested a new technology to find mines with a laser beam, the Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMNDS).

The Navy even repurposed a decommissioned amphibious ship, the USSPonce, as what’s called an Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB), primarily to support counter-mine operations. Two more purpose-built AFSBs will follow, and “the primary mission of the Afloat Forward Staging Base [is] aviation mine countermeasures,” said Capt. Henry Stevens of Naval Sea Systems Command at January’s Surface Navy Association conference. While the AFSB can potentially accommodate a multitude of missions, from special operations to V-22 Ospreys, its design is driven first and foremost by the needs of the massive MH-53E helicopter used for aerial mine-clearing.

Precisely because the Littoral Combat Ship’s design is modular, it’s relatively easy to break off specific systems and use them independently. “The various MCM mission systems are programs of record in their own right, which the LCS Mission Modules program then integrates,” Naval Sea Systems (NAVSEA) spokesman Matthew Leonard explained. A former top aide to the Navy’s top admiral, Bryan Clark, has proposed taking the entire MCM module and installing it on ships other than LCS, including both future Afloat Forward Staging Baseslike Ponce and the smaller Joint High-Speed Vessels (JHSVs).

So, in spite of the decision to curtail the LCS buy, new mine-clearing technologies may end up spreading widely through the fleet. With increasingly aggressive Russia and China amassing hundreds of thousands of increasingly sophisticated naval mines, a revolution in minesweeping might be just what we need.

How primitive can “modern” mine warfare get? At least as recently as the 1990s, US sailors hunting mines spent a lot of time shooting dead sheep.

Both Iraq and Iran used the classic black-spiky-ball mines that are the world’s most common type. Clones of the century-old Russian M-08, these are contact mines that detonate when a ship bumps against their “horns.” Until then, they float somewhere below the surface of the water, anchored in place. Sometimes, though, the anchor chain breaks. Then the M-08 bobs to the surface and drifts about at random until it bumps into something, like a lethal bath toy. It’s also possible, albeit against international law, to set mines adrift on purpose.

But stray mines are hardly the only thing drifting around. Humanity has a multi-millennium bad habit of dumping garbage in the sea. Some of it floats. From a distance — which is definitely how you what to deal with a suspected explosive device — it can be hard to tell that junk from a mine.

“It’s why we used to shoot all the sheep,” said Bob O’Donnell, a retired Navy captain with a long career in mine warfare. “Over in the Persian Gulf, they have all these sheep ships coming from Australia and New Zealand, and when the sheep would die, they’d thrown them into the water. They’d bloat; their little legs would stand up” — and suddenly you’d have a round, dark object with four spiky projections bobbing in the water, looking uncomfortably like an M-08. So, O’Donnell recounted, US sailors would do what mine-hunters have done since at least World War I: go up on deck, shoot the drifting object, and see if it explodes.

That’s how tricky it is to handle mines that you can see. Mines under the water are far harder. In theory, a tethered mine is a pretty obvious target: very few natural or manmade objects float at a specific depth and location with an anchor chain keeping them in place. In the real world, sonar has real difficulties finding them.

The problem is the ocean’s not a bathtub. It’s not the atmosphere, either, where radar can look hundreds of miles. Underwater currents; differences in pressure, temperature, and salt content (salinity); currents; even how sound waves reflect off the bottom — all these factors change how sonar performs, sometimes from hour to hour. “You can optimize your capabilities against a certain kind of threat in the morning and it won’t be that good in the afternoon,” mine warfare expert Scott Truver said.

Even more difficult than mines floating underwater are those on the bottom. “Something that has a ball, a chain, and an anchor, that’s pretty apparent that’s a mine,” said Navy Capt. Frank Linkous, a mine warfare official. “When you start looking at things on the bottom, it could be a mine, it could be a barrel, it could be a tire, it could be a lot of stuff, [like] rocks.” Each suspicious sonar return must be marked as a “mine-like contact” and investigated.

Worst of all are mines buried under the bottom of the sea. There is no sonar in current service that can find them, said Navy Captain Aaron Peters, an explosives ordnance disposal (EOD) specialist. “The only things that can detect buried mines right now are yourmarine mammals,” he said, primarily trained dolphins. But the Navy is working on a new system called Knifefish, with a special low-frequency sonar that can penetrate ordinary soil and detect small, dense objects such as explosives. It won’t be ready until 2017.

Until the new drones and sensors spread through the fleet, the mainstays of mine warfare will remain the MH-53E Sea Dragonhelicopter and the Avenger-class minesweeper, both of which entered service in the 1980s. The helicopter is literally the cutting edge of the current force. It tows a cable through the water that slices the mooring cables of mines like the M-08, forcing them to bob to the surface where someone can blow them up. Usually those are human beings, highly trained Explosive Ordnance Disposal divers who must swim up to each individual mine, attach an explosive, swim clear, and detonate.

More sophisticated mines, ironically, can be easier to detonate. Because advanced mines detect ships by the noise they make or their magnetic fields, they can be set off prematurely by an “influence sweep system,” a kind of decoy that emulates the acoustic and magnetic telltales of a ship. It’s the MH-53E helicopter, again, that tows the sweep “sled” through the water.

After the helicopters have done all they can from the air, the Avengers sail into the mine field to take a closer look. Hopefully only the stealthier, deeper mines remain by this point, with no contact mines left to bump into near the surface, while magnetically triggered mines cannot detect the minesweeper’s wooden hull. Any surviving mines with acoustic triggers might still pick up the Avenger‘s engines, however, and pressure-triggered mines might sense its hull displacing water.

“For a mine countermeasures guy, the worst problem is a country that’s got a goodly number of mines [of] different types,” said O’Donnell. “You start from the top of the ocean down and you try to take out the different mine types going from shallow to deep, because you’re trying to make it safe for our current mine countermeasures vessels to get in there and work.”

But savvy adversaries will set some mines to lurk on or near the bottom with their sensors turned off so they can’t be decoyed into detonating prematurely. Instead, they go live at some preset time, let out more slack in their anchor chains, and rise. So, said O’Donnell, “you think you got all the mines out, but you didn’t, because two days later one of these close-tethered mines decides to move up.”

That is the kind of danger US sailors face using current techniques and tactics. That is why the Navy is moving towards drones.

“If you look at the ships we’ve lost due to mines, a large number of them are mine warfare ships. It’s still a dangerous mission,” said Rear Adm. John Ailes, who for many years ran the mission modules program for the Littoral Combat Ship. “Right now what we do is we take this wooden ship and drive it into the minefield – with 80 to 90 people at risk. [With the equipment being developed for LCS,] we have a remote controlled system and we stand off.”


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An unmanned mine-hunting drone, the Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle (RMMV)

The workhorse of the new approach is the Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle. “It’s basically a diesel engine with some expensive electronics attached,” Ailes said. The RMMV is what’s called a “semi-submersible”: not quite a surface craft, not quite a sub, it swims along with its upper surface just above the water. Being mostly submerged helps stabilize the small craft in choppy seas, which gives its sonar a much better picture. Being partly exposed to air allows it to burn diesel fuel, which gives it much longer endurance than batteries. Manufacturer Lockheed Martin boasts it can do 24-hour-plus missions. That said, the program has had to work hard to make the RMMV reliable enough to do multiple day-long missions without a breakdown.

The semi-submersible RMMV will be supplemented from below and from above. The Knifefish, a deep-driving drone sub, will find buried mines, while a helicopter-carriedAirborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS) will scan for mines floating on or near the surface. (The laser can’t penetrate very far through water). Knifefish won’t enter service until 2017, though, while ALMDS mine-identification software is still struggling to improve its accuracy.

Once it’s working, the ALMDS will allow a fast, wide scan. That is, it will if the airspace over the minefield isn’t in range of enemy anti-aircraft missiles: ALMNDS is currently carried by a manned helicopter, the MH-60S Sea Hawk. (The Littoral Combat Ship will also operate the unmanned Fire Scout, but that’s slated to carry other sensors). The manned MH-60 will also destroy mines, lowering a four-pack of mini-torpedoes into the water — the Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS) — and using their cameras to check out suspected mines before blowing them up. Of course, if you can’t fly the helicopter over the minefield before you send in the RMMV, and the robot hits a mine you missed, at least you haven’t lost a manned minesweeper and its crew.

The helicopter-carried AMNS blows up mines on a retail basis: It has to return to a mothership to reload after it fires four shots. The wholesale minesweeper will be something called Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS), a smaller version of the mine-detonating decoy sled currently towed by the MH-53E helicopter. One of the many controversies about the Littoral Combat Ship program has been the lack of a helicopter-towed sweep system. The LCS deck can’t accommodate the MH-53, and the smaller MH-60 didn’t have enough power to tow a sled safely. So the UISS will be towed by a robot boat, aka an unmanned surface vessel (USV).

The USV-towed sled is slower than the helicopter-towed version, but it can stay out much longer, Navy officials told me. “With a helicopter you’re only going to get about three hours of mission time,” said Peters. “The [USV] is going to go out and tow 12-plus hours.”

Ultimately, the plan is for a single Littoral Combat Ship to simultaneously control two RMMVs looking for mines and one USV sweeping them. Meanwhile the LCS stands back at a safe distance from not only the minefield but from any nearby enemy forces, protected by its onboard anti-missile systems and potentially by a full-up Aegis destroyer.

“What we do today is we take the wooden Avenger class, which has no self-defense capability and we send it into the minefield, [and] no Aegis ship’s going to go into the minefield with it,” Ailes told me. While critics have savaged the Littoral Combat Ship for its lack of firepower and survivability, there’s no question it’s better armed than the Avengerswhose heaviest weapons are machineguns — and that its hull is made of metal, not wood — which was last considered cutting-edge protection circa 1812. New technology is long overdue.
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I need some opinions on this
View attachment 212216

As many of you may know, the LCS is going throught some identity and armament issues. Then I found this alternative proposal diagram. Now it actually looks like a proper FFG.

I know it would cost more, but I would take 4 of these vs 10 LCSs.


Additions over LCS
- 48 VLS w/ VLA,SM series, BGM-109, ESSM, Harpoon Blk3 VL.
- SPY-1F, SPG-62 for illumination
-Mk32 torp tubes

Plus we would get the improved multifunction towed sonar designed for the SSC, and we still got the room for the UAVs and SH-60s. All of this is proven tech that we already employ. It's not like we have to take time to innovate for this.

Thoughts?

Better armed, but less adaptable than the current LCS. The LCS program didn't design a frigate replacement, as is commonly thought, it designed and produced multi-mission, adaptable combatants that could do anything. And lets be honest, the whole survivability this is garbage anyways, no modern ship is survivable in the face of the weapons that would be launched towards them.

An up-armed LCS would be good, but not preeminent armament. The LCS is a plug-and-play ship. One day it's an anti-ship platform, the next day it's performing ASW. Putting permanent weapons on the LCS would cut into its adaptability.

We'll have to wait and see with the LCS program though, and the outcome of the joint US-Japan LCS variant.
 
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Forward Air Controller Uses Android Tablet To Rapidly Order Air Strike

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DARPA is working hard on making it easier for Forward Air Controllers to order fast precision air strikes under chaotic and stressful conditions. Under a new initiative, a revolutionary new way of calling in crucial air support includes migrating away from clumsy radios and hardbook laptops to Android tablets and data links.

This new initiative is called the Persistent Close Air Support program, or PCAS for short, and is described by DARPA as such:

PCAS focuses on technologies to enable sharing of real-time situational awareness and weapons systems data through approaches designed to work with almost any aircraft. PCAS envisions more precise, prompt and easy air-ground coordination for CAS and other missions under stressful operational conditions and seeks to minimize the risk of friendly fire and collateral damage by enabling the use of smaller munitions to hit smaller, multiple or moving targets. This capability is critically important in urban environments.


Just last month, PCAS was brought to fruition in the deserts near Yuma, Arizona, during an exercise called “Talon Reach.” Talon Reach was itself part of the larger Weapons Tactics Instructor course capstone exercise that happens a handful of times a year.

During Talon Reach, forward air controllers, also known as Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs), dispensed with the heavy computer gear and crackling radios, and replaced them with a tablet computer much like one you would buy for a few hundred dollars at Best Buy. This Android tablet was loaded with intuitive software that leverages satellite imagery, real time intelligence and surveillance data, and easy to fill in fields that represent all the information a JTAC would commonly communicate to an aerial CAS asset. This information is commonly known as a "Nine Line" brief.

The Android tablet itself was connected wirelessly to a data-link system that pushed its information directly to the aircraft overhead. The aircraft used in the exercise was also experimental in nature, as it was Bell’s V-22 Osprey testbed which has recently been equipped with rockets and guided missiles. You can read all about this up-armed Osprey here.

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Once the JTAC enters their brief, the overhead aircraft, in this case a V-22 loaded with AGM-176 Griffin low-yield air-to-ground missiles, receives it and the software onboard their side of the PCAS system automatically provides the location of the target on a map and an attack solution for the pilots to execute based on the JTAC’s request, location of friendlies, local terrain and other factors. This drastically cuts down the time it traditionally takes for a JTAC to ‘talk on’ an aircrew to the target, it also should drastically reduces the possibility of fratricide.

In the past, the closest thing to anything like PCAS JTACs and aircraft had at their fingertips was ROVER, which allowed for the aircraft's targeting pod video to be transmitted to the JTAC on the ground so that they could look at and even manipulate it. It was better than just the radio, but a far cry from what PCAS offers.

DARPA describes the two main components of the PCAS system:

There is PCAS-Air and PCAS-Ground. PCAS-Air consists of weapons management, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and communications systems located on a modular Smart Launcher Electronics (SLE) device designed to enable plug-and-play hosting of tactical software and mounting of equipment on almost any aircraft. PCAS-Air communicates with ground forces through PCAS-Ground, a suite of situational awareness and mapping software on commercial Android tablet computers. Two interoperable PCAS-Ground software applications have been developed with government partners: the Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division (NAWC-WD) and the Air Force Research Laboratory’s Rome Labs.


The android tablet interface that is central to PCAS has its own very elaborate name, the Kinetic Integrated Low-cost SoftWare Integrated Tactical Combat Handheld, otherwise known as KILSWITCH.

KILSWTICH has been in use for a couple years in multiple evolutionary forms, but it has never been seamlessly integrated with the aircraft overhead. And this is precisely what Talon Reach succeeded in doing. During the exercise's mock engagement, the JTAC sent a precise location near an abandoned truck for the Osprey to engagement along with other key details associated with a Nine Line CAS brief. The Weapon System Officer onboard the Osprey also had a tablet that was receiving the JTAC’s orders in real time, allowing him to quickly confirm the request. Then, the Osprey followed the PCAS-Air’s engagement solution and lased the coordinates of the target with its onboard laser designator. It then fired off a Griffin Missile at over four miles from the target, with the missile impacting exactly where requested. According to DARPA, the success of the exercise was measured in accuracy and especially time, and by both counts it was a stunning success:

The length of time from initiation by the JTAC to missile impact on target was just over four minutes—even better than PCAS’ goal of six minutes, and more than seven times faster than the half hour or more it can take using current methods that rely on voice directions and paper maps.

Although shortening the kill chain and helping to eliminate fratricide on the modern battlefield is a fantastic thing, KILSWITCH/PCAS has the ability to expand into much more than just a close air support enabling tool. Other data from information, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) sources could be available via the system at a tap of the software’s menu, allowing for greatly enhanced situational awareness by anyone with access to a KILSWITCH tablet. Additionally, if KILSWITCH and an active network, like the one used for PCAS demonstration, were expanded to different levels and permissions across a service, it could provide everyone from the individual soldier all the way up to commanders in the field with a common shared ‘picture’ of the battlespace around them. This could include everything from the latest topographical maps, known locations of friendly and enemy forces and even the locations of emitting sources of radio energy.

An evolved and highly networked KILSWITCH could drastically improve communications around the battlefield via the introduction of common encrypted messaging services and even facetime like capabilities. Another area where this technology could really become a game changer is in the leveraging of real-time Wide Area Aerial Surveillance (WAAS) imagery feeds.The WAAS concept is all about allowing a multitude of customers to use the system's imagery for a myriad of purposes at any given time, and KILSWITCH/PCAS could be a broad distribution architecture to make that happen.

During another phase of Talon Reach, the exciting situational awareness that KILSWITCH tablets provide when Marines are operating within a networked battlespace versus an unnetworked one was also proven with fantastic results:

Another part of the exercise showed the value of the PCAS-Ground system on its own. In a simulated night ground battle between Marines and adversaries, a group of Marines had KILSWITCH tablets but very limited situational awareness of the location of friendly forces and enemy locations. Another group of Marines, also equipped with KILSWITCH tablets, arrived simultaneously and launched a small unmanned air vehicle (UAV) into the air to provide ISR and network relay capabilities. Within seconds, all the KILSWITCH tablets synced up with the UAV through the Marines' tactical radios and automatically populated the location of all friendly forces, greatly improving both groups' ability to coordinate and accomplish their mission.

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So have we reached a point where precision guided munitions will be dropped from the sky seemingly on demand and all a soldier has to do to stay connected and briefed on virtually anything they may need to accomplish their mission is to carry around an Android tablet?

Not quite, but we are getting there.

The weapons on demand model has always been the endgame vision of truly persistent close air support. Under such a concept, heavy bombers, 737 derivatives, or even unmanned aircraft, could be parked up at 35,000 feet, their bellies full of various weapons, some of which have a 50 mile glide range. Then, when the order comes in via data link, the weapons bay doors open and a munition perfectly tailored to the target assigned to it heads off to its destination down below. Think of it as the automatic vending machine of close air support.

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There is no doubt that this form of close air support is attractive for its convenience, economy, and speed. One day it could even give a whole fleet of stealthy advanced unmanned combat air vehicles something to do after the enemy's metaphorical door has been kicked down and air dominance has been achieved. Still, its use in extreme danger and close proximity to friendly forces is measured by the weapon's unbending reliability statistics. In other words, unless we are going to drop dozens of very low-yield Griffin missiles in a long row along a treeline, each costing tens of thousands of dollars, nothing can replace a manned aircraft carrying a big gun down low.

That is not to say that for a large portion of CAS scenarios, CAS on demand via an Android tablet and a high-flying arsenal ship loaded with a cocktail of weaponry is not a very attractive solution. Yet such a concept relies heavily on a lot of technology always working perfectly, including data links and computer systems that could be jammed, infiltrated, hijacked or hacked by a capable foe. That is precisely why a low-down and fairly simple form of CAS have to remain in America's quiver.

In the end, highly networked concepts like PCAS are a fantastic layer of combat capability to have, but they are just that, another layer. As long as multiple capability layers of varying technological sophistication exist, each layer will be better for it. Conversely, if just one layer remains, and that layer is highly dependent on complex and disreputable technology, we are inviting disaster as we can't simply decide not to fight when our network isn't working perfectly. There has to be a plan B, and that plan B is a radio, a set of binoculars and the Buuuuurrrrrppppppp from an A-10's 30mm Avenger cannon.

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From Forward Air Controller Uses Android Tablet To Rapidly Order Air Strike
 
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