IND151
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While its is true that he led Pakistan during tough times, one can not forget the fact that his backing for Afghan jihad is one of main reasons of the current state of Pakistan.
He brought gun culture to Pak along with extremism.
This is what I have said many times.
War in Afghanistan was not only reasons for collapse of USSR.
Economic stagnation (which started in Brezhnev era), massive expenditure due to arms race, "brilliant" reforms like glasnost and perestroika along with financial drain due to Afghan war, together, led to collapse of USSR.
Thus the famous notions "Zia broke USSR" or "Pakistan broke USSR" are myth; Zia got all help required from US, KSA and UK for afghan jihad, alone he would not have been able to wage proxy war against USSR.
As far as second notion is concerned, we must realize that Pak pitched same mujahids against India in Kashmir, why the so called champion which "broke" USSR was unable to achieve its agenda against a regional power?
He brought gun culture to Pak along with extremism.
Lets make two things clear . I am not trying to tell you that U.S.S.R. wasn't an enemy of Pakistan or that nothing needed to be done in Afghanistan , of course the country on the other side of the Khyber Pass wasn't to be left alone , there was much at stake . What I disagree with of course , is what was done and what did it result into - manifest today in , the consequences . While many people would laud Zia-ul-Haq to be a brave man who faced the Reds in Afghanistan - though technically with American backing and the massive support - of all kinds imaginable - from the Arab world and a man who defeated and broke the U.S.S.R. which again wouldn't be entirely true , because the Union had a lot of other factors for its disintegration . The fact does remain that the short term thinking , policies and actions of the Commander of the Faithful , continued with much zeal and fervor by his successors until the attack on twin towers , have resulted in increased sectarianism , radicalization , extremism and subsequent terrorism - the damage to the country's otherwise tolerant and peaceful had been catastrophic . The damage to the country itself and all that we stand for has been catastrophic . How dare we discount and rationalize the reality on ground ? What wisdom ever lay in importing a radical and extremist ideology and fighters from the world over , training them on Pakistani soil , forcing Islamization one that aimed to change the identity of the country down people's throats , indoctrinating the population with a ideology both violent and intolerant of others and taking the burden of Afghan refugees - whose influx and arrival with guns and drugs wasn't checked and allowed to spread into every part of Pakistan with impunity ? Do you see what we have lost today to gain a few objectives back then , suffice to say which could have taken care of , with much lesser resources and impact on the country itself ?
Remember , that since our independence we always had dealt with problems arising from Afghanistan easily and effectively without involving ourselves directly and without that much concentrated effort and ruining our country during the process by using low-risk assets , what had changed so much in war torn , unstable and faced with public uprising with the arrival of the Soviets ? Maybe the idea of the warm waters was there before , the capability sure wasn't at the time of invasion . Contrary to the popular belief , the Reds having initially refused to help their comrades of Kabul were very reluctant to act in that country , the politburo's mood was one of non-intervention and the army only crossed the borders to provide some stability to the communist regime . Can this U.S.S.R. later be expected to try to invade Pakistan when it was in doubt and uncertainty about the involvement in Afghanistan ? Militarily , Pakistan was no pushover , it wasn't the submissive Govt of Kabul and had a fairly strong conventional military . The Soviet Union which didn't want to face the public in Afghanistan couldn't have dared to face the resistance in this country , there was simply no way at all to come to warm waters . Even though , the Kremlin issued threatening statements towards Pakistan from time to time but its economy , the geopolitical complexities and the ground realities in Afghanistan , clearly sent the message that the U.S.S.R. was in no position to " deal with Pakistan " . The USSR due to its economic policies and huge military spending vis a vis U.S was already on the verge of decline . The myth of the " warm waters " , unfortunately , has been propagated too long and to exaggerated levels and raised to ' divine truth ' without ay logic and reason and without taking the realities of that time into account . The short term economic gains bolstered by huge influx of aid during the Afghan Jihad was a bubble , which burst afterwards in the 90's and I need not tell you the economic situation of the country after it .
The opposition for " entering forces in Afghanistan " came from the top brass itself . " We believe it would be a fatal mistake to commit ground troops. If our troops went in, the situation in your country would not improve. On the contrary, it would get worse. Our troops would have to struggle not only with an external aggressor, but with a significant part of your own people. And the people would never forgive such things ; Alexei Kosygin, the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers . Similar concerns would be raised by other Soviet leaders that " full Soviet intervention "would only play into the hands of our enemies ; both yours and ours " - Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet head of state warned .
Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov sent a letter to the Soviet embassy in Kabul noting that "to fight in Afghanistan with the basmachi [armed Muslim guerrillas who fled from Soviet Central Asia] and the White Guard would mean provoking a war in Central Asia, which would be to the advantage of Germany and Japan. It would undercut our prestige in the East and destabilize the territories behind the Red Army's front lines. Therefore, neutralization of Afghanistan and cooperation with Iraq and Saudi Arabia, along with strengthening relations with Yemen are the main tasks of our policy in this region." A KGB delegation headed by chief of First Directorate (intelligence) Vladimir Kryuchkov ("V .A. Alexandrov") visited Afghanistan in the same time period . The impressions of one member of the delegation, KGB General Oleg Kalugin, are that Taraki "did not have the physical strength or the backing to continue to lead the country for long" and that Amin "was a far more impressive figure."
On March 17-19, 1979 - The Soviet Politburo met in three extended sessions during the height of the Herat crisis to discuss pleas from Taraki and Amin to send troops. The next day, however, even though the situation in Herat has worsened, Kosygin, Andropov and others still advocated staying away from a commitment of troops. Gromyko delivered a detailed rundown of the reasons why such a commitment would be a mistake . He also pointed out that the conflict is an internal Afghan affair. A verbatim transcript of the politburo discussion has become available in the public domain . Yuri Andropov : Comrades , I have thought this issue over very thoroughly since yesterday and have concluded that we should consider very, very seriously whether it would make sense to send troops into Afghanistan . The economy is backward , the Islamic religion predominates , and nearly all of the rural population is illiterate . I do not think we can uphold the revolution in Afghanistan with the help of our bayonets. The idea is intolerable and we can not risk it.
Andrei Gromyko in the Politburo told the committee " I fully support Comrade Andropov;s view that we should exclude the dispatch of troops to Afghanistan . The Afghan army is unreliable and our army would become an aggressor. With whom will it fight? With the Afghan people! Our Army would have to shoot them! To be blunt, the Afghan [communist] leaders have made many mistakes and haven't got the support of their own people . Andrei Kirilenko : Tanks and armored vehicles cannot rescue them [the PDPA]. I think that we must frankly tell them that. We must say that we will support them to the hilt, we shall give them all of the aid that we have promised to give , but we cannot send troops . In Late September 1979 - The Politburo commission on Afghanistan summoned the chief of the military advisory group, Gorelov, and KGB representative Ivanov to Moscow on short notice. Questioned separately, Gorelov again strongly contended that it would not be a good idea to increase the Soviet military presence in the country .
Contrary to the popular belief , even for the Soviets , the Afghanistan wasn't the much hyped strategic prize , it was always thought to be . This is reinforced by the Soviet General Secretary in his initial encounter with Afghan President Babrak Karmal, where Gorbachev made clear his determination to end the war: Karmal would have to defend his own country, Gorbachev told him in no uncertain terms, by the summer of 1986. According to recently disclosed Russian documents, Gorbachev said that Karmal was shocked by this news. "[He] was dumbfounded, in no way expected such a turn, was sure that we needed Afghanistan more than he did, and was clearly expecting that we will be there for a long time, if not forever,"
Several conclusions may be drawn from the above. First,it is clear that Soviet leaders had a very low opinion of their Afghan friends with whom they had signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation earlier , allowing them to call the Soviet troops if need arose , the PDPA's Govt lack of popularity and leadership skill was fully recognized in Moscow . Second, there is no evidence from this meeting that Soviet officials regarded Afghanistan as a strategic prize that would project communist influence into the Persian Gulf or Indian Ocean regions. Finally, there can be little doubt that the Politburo members were not enthusiastic about the prospect of invading Afghanistan.Soviet reluctance to intervene gradually changed, however, primarily due to internal events within Afghanistan, combined with a substantial measure of blunder and mis-perception .
Look at the current situation of the country , look at the blunders done and the catastrophic consequences that we have to endure today , all because of fighting a superpower's war and short term benefits . At least , the Zia-ul-Haq had a choice , Musharraf didn't enjoy the same luxury . Whilst the former had many option , the latter only had two and he chose the lesser of the two evils . Can I say the same about the Zia-ul-Haq who chose to embrace the insanity and take the country into oblivion ?
This is what I have said many times.
War in Afghanistan was not only reasons for collapse of USSR.
Economic stagnation (which started in Brezhnev era), massive expenditure due to arms race, "brilliant" reforms like glasnost and perestroika along with financial drain due to Afghan war, together, led to collapse of USSR.
Thus the famous notions "Zia broke USSR" or "Pakistan broke USSR" are myth; Zia got all help required from US, KSA and UK for afghan jihad, alone he would not have been able to wage proxy war against USSR.
As far as second notion is concerned, we must realize that Pak pitched same mujahids against India in Kashmir, why the so called champion which "broke" USSR was unable to achieve its agenda against a regional power?
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