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US attacks China!! a scenario

Tons of them

http://www.google.ca/search?q=Ken+A...ient=firefox-a&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official

Col Allen is the authority on the PLAAF. Since you spouted some knowledge concerning the PLA, I assume you know who he was. I don't have to mention what John Wayne did if you ever watch Westerns. For PLA watchers, Col Allen's works is a must read.

If you want to start another thread about Vietnam, I will be happy to oblige. However, the US lost Vietnam more because of South Vietnam than any other cause. The Chinese, however, lost just as much as the Americans did and had to fight 2 wars just to eliminate that threat.

Incidently, the Korean War was not a proxy war.

A complete strike package means CAP, SEAD, and sortie.

I'll check CDF's logs to see what's going on.
 
As for COPE INDIA, the lesson was re-enforced.

He who sees first, shoots first, dies last. For whatever reason (both deliberate and accidental), the InAF saw the USAF first and hence the result. This was tried in a myraid of ways both from advantage and disadvantage of position, the USAF saw last and died first.
 
Officer of Engineers said:
As for COPE INDIA, the lesson was re-enforced.

He who sees first, shoots first, dies last. For whatever reason (both deliberate and accidental), the InAF saw the USAF first and hence the result. This was tried in a myraid of ways both from advantage and disadvantage of position, the USAF saw last and died first.

Agree wholeheartedly.

egarding your previous entry,I was not "spouting". This is a discussion forum not a "spouting" session. I thought we could have a intelligent conversation without introducing offensive words. We are/ should be grown adults. Cheers. Thanks for the link on the colonel. I read up on it.
 
Reply to entry#61

What about the China Russia excersise in 2005? All elements CAP, SEAD, and sortie were very much there even if the whole show was termed "anti terrorism"
 
TexasJohn said:
JSF is not out yet, and Raptor production has slowed down, due to cost overruns an some structural issues. The latest was when the pilot was "locked down" into his cockpit and had to be chain-sawed out!!
Ermm, go to my earlier link. Yes, the pilot had to be rescued, but still its being inducted in to squadrons as early as Dec 2005.
http://www.aerospaceweb.org/aircraft/fighter/f22/

Cope India 2006 had F-16 block 50s, AWACS, the MKIs flew in mixed sorties. By that I mean MKIs and 16s against MKIs and 16s
No, you are wrong. Cope India 2006 was a DACT involving a mix of Indian AC like MKI's, Mirages, Floggers, Bisons and Fulcrums.

Beg to differ. Block 60 is the customized 50 version for UAE only. USAF does not fly a Block 60. They do fly a limited block 52 (AESA)

Huh? FC-1 (thunder) is China dude! I am talking Taiwan. MICA and MICA II are considered short range. The Mirage took out a target 67km away. Whoopee!! here is the link
My bad, read it as F-CK-1. MICA is a dual role missile, based on 2 different seekers. And hitting targets 67kms away is not exactly short range to start with.
http://www.eads.com/web/lang/en/1024/content/OF00000000400004/7/08/560087.html
 
TexasJohn said:
Agree wholeheartedly.

Then, you know the limits to apply COPE INDIA to the real world.

TexasJohn said:
egarding your previous entry,I was not "spouting". This is a discussion forum not a "spouting" session.

Poor choice of words but then I've never been known to skirt around an issue.

TexasJohn said:
I thought we could have a intelligent conversation without introducing offensive words. We are/ should be grown adults.

LMAO! I've been accused of being a gentlemen but never an adult. This old wardog talks blunt. It avoids misunderstandings.

TexasJohn said:
What about the China Russia excersise in 2005? All elements CAP, SEAD, and sortie were very much there even if the whole show was termed "anti terrorism"

Not in one single package and if you read up on Col Allen's works, you will find out that this would never be the case. The Chinese don't believe in strike packages or rather, they have not try to co-ordinate one nor do they need to.

Contrary to popular belief, the PLA is not an infantry army. It's an artillery army. They rather use guns and rockets rather than planes to do their sorties. The main role of the PLAAF is air denial, not air supremacy.
 
Officer of Engineers said:
Then, you know the limits to apply COPE INDIA to the real world.



Poor choice of words but then I've never been known to skirt around an issue.



LMAO! I've been accused of being a gentlemen but never an adult. This old wardog talks blunt. It avoids misunderstandings.



Not in one single package and if you read up on Col Allen's works, you will find out that this would never be the case. The Chinese don't believe in strike packages or rather, they have not try to co-ordinate one nor do they need to.

Contrary to popular belief, the PLA is not an infantry army. It's an artillery army. They rather use guns and rockets rather than planes to do their sorties. The main role of the PLAAF is air denial, not air supremacy.

Please go back to item #53 and read my response. I know you are stuck on this Col Allen thing. Has he written anything that answers that? He appears to have a lot of analysis on where the PLAAF was and is going now. Granted he knows his stuff. He should - he was a military attache.

How does this answer anything related to China attacking Taiwan or the US response to it? ( This topic)

And what EXACTlY do you mean by "single package"?? How was it not so?
 
TexasJohn said:
Reply to entry#61

What about the China Russia excersise in 2005? All elements CAP, SEAD, and sortie were very much there even if the whole show was termed "anti terrorism"
Hmm, really, you should see what exactly Chinese fielded for this exercise. Yes they did perform SEAD and CAP operations, but the Col can tell us from his sources, how much China learnt from this exercise.

he Russians were able to give their annual strategic exercise an extra twist by navigating their Tu-95MS and Tu-22M3 bombers over a different route. The Russians used four Tu-22M3 strategic bombers and two Tu-95MS on a conventional strike mission to soften up the defenses before the amphibious landing. Using the Tu-95MS is intriguing—it is a cruise missile carrier ill-suited to the conventional bombing role in comparison to the Tu-23M3.

The Russians provided the bulk of the high technology and larger items of military equipment. Russian aircraft, in addition to the Tu95MS and Tu22M3, included Il-76 military freighters, an Il-78 aerial refueling tanker, A-50 AEW&C, Su-24M2 strike aircraft, and Su-27SM fighters. Russian naval vessels included the Udaloy-class anti-submarine destroyer Marshal Shaposhnikov; the Sovremenney guided-missile destroyer Burny; a large landing ship; a rescue tugboat; and a logistics support vessel. Russian ground combat assets included a company from the 55th Marine Corps Division with their BTR-80 wheeled fighting vehicles, and a reinforced parachute company of the 76th Division of the Airborne Forces with their BMD airborne combat vehicles. The Chinese forces used many of the new items in their inventory including Su-27 fighters, Il-76 freighters, Z-9G armed helicopters, ZTZ-96 main battle tanks, ZLS92 series wheeled light armored fighting vehicles, ZTS63A amphibious tanks, and six of their new ZSL2000 airborne fighting vehicles. The PLAN provided three destroyers: the Type 052 class multi-role destroyer Harbin, the Type 052C air-defense destroyer Guangzhou, and three frigates including a Jianghu-class frigate converted into an inshore fire support vessel.

First and Second Phases

The first phase was a command-and-control exercise that enabled the two staffs to learn and coordinate their actions. The second phase of the exercise, a one-day joint naval fleet operation on August 23, consisted of destroyers, frigates, and anti-submarine vessels conducting anti- submarine and surface vessel operations—activities totally unrelated to anti-terrorism operations but useful against other naval forces. With the PLAAF and Russian Air Force providing air cover in conjunction with the Russian A-50, helicopters prosecuted anti-submarine missions using air dropped torpedoes, and a Chinese submarine and destroyer fired anti-ship missiles. The Burny also fired a Moskit 3M80E Mach 2 anti-ship missile, as used on China’s two Sovremenney class destroyers. Russian air support included TU-22M3, TU-95MS, SU-24M, and SU-27M aircraft.

Phase Three: Combined Airborne and Amphibious Assault

Prepared shore defenses rendered the exercise scenario an amphibious assault. No more than a carefully staged firepower demonstration, the time taken for the vehicles to land and clear the beach of obstacles and head inland was only four minutes. Large landing craft beached 14 minutes later with the second echelon. The assault was reported to have been performed in a force 4 wind with waves 2.3 – 3 meters high. The photos do not bear this out: under such conditions, paratroopers would have been blown all over the landing zone, and engineers in their assault craft and the PLA’s waterborne ZTS63A amphibious tanks supporting them would have been swamped.

The exercise started on August 25 at 11:00 AM. Two Russian Tu-95MS strategic bombers flew near the drill zone after two-and-a-half-hour flight from Russia to signal the combined amphibious and airborne assault. With an A-50 plane establishing an airborne early warning system, the amphibious forces headed toward the beachhead. At 11:07 AM, four Tu-22M3 Russian long-range bombers, after a four-hour flight from Russia, launched an attack on the enemy airport, and a lone Chinese B-6H bomber approached the zone and fired a new type of “long-range air-to-ground missile” from 6,000m altitude, hitting the target ten km away [1]. It may have been a guided bomb, as ballistics would have given the missile much of its range. Notional enemy fighters, presumably, were not in the air.

At 11:08 AM, 18 strike aircraft in nine waves, including Russian SU-24M and SU-27M fighters and PLAAF Su-27s, attacked missile launchers, shore defenses, and in-depth defensive positions. The firing of unguided rockets against shore defenses by Su-27s in a real conflict is unlikely. There are only a few Su-27 fighters among the PLAAF’s hundreds of attack aircraft, and the former would be required for air supremacy over a beachhead. At 11:17 AM, accompanying destroyers and frigates provided naval gunfire support, including multiple rocket launch fire support from at least one of China’s inshore fire support vessels. The amphibious assault force arrived at 11:25 AM with engineers in over ten assault boats, small aluminum boats with an outboard motor each, and they began to demolish the obstacles on the shoal. After the attacks, the notional enemy forces retreated to the airport and to deep defensive positions.

At 11:30 AM, two Chinese Z-9G helicopters flew at low altitude over the sea and fired rockets to open up a landing field. Five Russian and five Chinese Il-76 transports then dropped 12 Russian BMD and six Chinese ZSL 2000 airborne combat vehicles along with 86 paratroopers, mostly their crews, onto the drop zone. At 11:38 AM, covered by 12 armed helicopters and supported by Chinese ZTZ-63A amphibious tanks, a Russian marine company together with a Chinese amphibious battalion and more than 40 landing vehicles set foot on the beach. The first echelon of rangers captured the forward positions on the beach in two minutes. The beach was seized at 11:42 AM and the Russian and Chinese amphibious APCs began heading off the beach to assault the rugged and muddy mountain paths toward the mountaintop. Ten minutes later the second amphibious wave arrived in three landing craft with a second echelon of 32 armored carriers to secure the consolidated positions.

At 11:50 AM, these amphibious combat vehicles opened fire on their targets with six Hong Jian 8 anti-tank missiles, hitting all their targets. Soon afterward, rockets fired from six helicopters lit up the entire mountaintop. As the second echelon was landing, 18 helicopters transported a special force squadron under air cover to assault the target’s left, deploying troops that immediately launched an attack on the pre-set targets to cut off the enemy's link to sea. Immediately after the enemy’s air-link and sea-route were cut off, the Sino-Russian joint forces sent rangers to attack the defensive line of the enemy on the mountain under fire cover and quickly made breakthroughs in several spots. The amphibious landing exercise concluded at 12:15 PM, with armored vehicles from the southeast and southwest attacking deep within the enemy region.

This combined assault provided the opportunity for both countries’ forces to establish links with each other and to examine tactics and doctrine. More importantly, it sent the message to the Russian Far East, Japan, and North Korea that Russia was not abandoning the Far East and still had the capability to intervene in the area. China still may not have the means to intervene with heavy strategic forces, but the Russians demonstrated that they still could.

http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=408&issue_id=3474&article_id=2370274

All I see is PLAAF had Su-27's in support with Russian AWACS and Russian Air superiority fighters and Russian bombers.

you might also want to read this,
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2005/d20050719china.pdf
 
PLA Air Force Operation and Modernization

Conclusion

There is no simple description of the PLAAF's operational capabilities. The PLAAF is in the process of modernizing, but it still has a long way to go. Parts of the PLAAF are clearly obsolete, yet other parts have the most modern, sophisticated aircraft, SAMs, and software. The key to the PLAAF's modernization is integrating all of the different components, including its branches and new and old weapon systems, into a single operational unit within the PLAAF and with the rest of the PLA as a whole. As one China watcher recently stated, "It is not just a matter of the glass being half empty or half full, because the glass is getting bigger."

During discussions of the PLAAF, a former US Air Force Chief of Staff identified the following questions that he would want to know about China's airpower:

* What is their battle doctrine?
* Is their organizational direction defensive or offensive?
* Which classic air missions do they cover effectively? air defense, counter-air, conventional strike?
* What is their basic employment concept for these air missions? manned aircraft, ground or air launched missiles?
* What kind of support packages do they have? defense suppression, air escort, tanker support?
* What kind of power projection capability does their equipment represent? range, payload?
* How modern is the capability? precision guided weapons, battlespace surveillance?
* What is their equipment and personnel readiness status?
* What size, duration, and location of operations can they sustain with logistics support?



As discussed in this paper, the PLAAF clearly comes up lacking in most of these categories. However, during interviews in Japan, Taiwan, Southeast Asia, and India, defense officials repeatedly said that the United States cannot just look at the PLAAF through Western eyes. Everyone in these countries agreed that the PLAAF is not necessarily capable of sustained combat today, but it is moving in the direction of a more modern offensive force over the next fifteen to twenty years. Each of these countries is looking carefully at China's intentions and taking the long-term view of China's potential capabilities.

At the same time, however, it is my opinion based on interviews in the region that most of the countries surrounding China do not have a thorough understanding of the PLAAF. For example, other than Taiwan and Japan, there are very few assets or analysts dedicated to just the PLAAF. The majority of the countries in Asia have only one military attaché in Beijing, most of whom do not speak Chinese, and who concentrate primarily on the macro-level PLA strategic issues, rather than on operational capabilities. In addition, most of the countries in Asia focus only on the PLAAF forces in their immediate border region, rather than on the PLAAF as a whole. They also tend to focus on hardware issues only (i.e., how many Su-27s does China have), rather than on the software issues.

The PLAAF is still primarily a defensive force, but, through the acquisition of systems with longer ranges and more lethal bombs and missiles, is moving gradually toward having an offensive capability. Although the PLAAF is acquiring some systems to support the air defense mission, such as refueling, ECM, and airborne early warning platforms, it will be several years before these systems can be fully integrated into the force, and even then, only in limited numbers. The PLAAF still lacks precision guided munitions and a battlespace surveillance capability, but China is working on these capabilities. The PLAAF is beginning to train its forces in mobile operations, but is still hindered by institutional, organizational, and equipment limitations that hinder mobile operations. Furthermore, the PLAAF is not yet capable of round-the-clock or sustained operations.

There is little doubt that what the PLAAF has done over the past decade is impressive. The Air Force has acquired limited numbers of Russia's most sophisticated weapon systems, but still must rely on Russia for long-term logistics support. The PLAAF will continue to rely on imported weapons systems to modernize its force, but is moving toward developing and producing better domestic engines, avionics, and missiles. Air combat training has become more realistic, including more live air-to-air missile launch training, but the pilots still lack sufficient flying hours due to engine and airframe limitations. While the PLAAF's Blue Force aggressor program has obviously been successful, it has pointed out even more starkly the limitations of aircraft like the J-6, J-7, and J-8.

With the acquisition of several Russian Il-76 transports, the PLAAF's 15th Airborne Army has been able to train in more locations around China, but the focus is still on use for domestic situations rather than situations outside China's borders.

Although Commander Liu Shunyao states that the PLAAF has the capability to support ground and naval operations, the Air Force's ability to do this is questionable. The PLA as a whole is just beginning to address joint operations and logistics. Very little information is available in open source material about PLAAF support for the Navy, which would entail joint exercises and some type of joint command and control structure. As for supporting the ground forces, the PLAAF has consistently stated that it cannot provide direct support for the ground forces. Nothing has occurred over the past decade to change this philosophy. While the Su-30 will replace the B-5 in the interdiction and deep strike mission, there are not ready replacements for the A-5, whose mission is battle field interdiction and ground attack.

While the PLAAF can look proudly at its accomplishments in equipment acquisition and training over the past decade, the bulk of the aviation force still consists of aging J-6, J-7, and J-8 interceptors, only some of which have an all-weather capability. China's aviation industry is working toward designing and producing a modern aircraft to meet the PLAAF's needs in fifteen years, but will still need foreign assistance from Russia and Israel along the way. Therefore, the PLAAF will still be relying on Russian support for the near term. Once China's next generation of domestically produced aircraft, such as the J-10, improved FB-7, and XXJ, are operationally deployed, we will have a better understanding of how far China's aviation industry has come.

The PLAAF will continue to analyze its needs and implement changes as it can, but there will also continue to be resource and system limitations that will hinder the PLAAF's overall modernization drive and operational capabilities. China will eventually have to face the fact that there are limitations on how many foreign aircraft it can buy. If the PLAAF is going to replace its current fleet of aircraft, it will have to rely on China's aviation industry to provide much of the necessary components or they will not be able to afford it. The PLAAF simply cannot afford to continue purchasing Russian aircraft at $35-40 million apiece, plus rely on the Russian supply line. Finally, the PLAAF's leadership must also accept aircraft losses as part of a more vigorous, realistic training program.

In closing, a clear distinction must be made between the PLAAF's capabilities and intentions. Even if the PLAAF is not the most modern force, the PLAAF's leaders will salute smartly and use every means available to achieve victory if the CMC tasks them to go into battle.
 
Officer of Engineers said:

I couldn't agree more! And that's exactly the point I'm trying to make ( now that I'm @home kicked back). If China decides to take Taiwan, they will do it at the time and place of their own choosing probably at a time when we have our underwear tangled somewhere else. They have 2 important advantages 1)The luxury of waiting 2)Location.

Given the fact that they are modernizing, learning and doing it low profile. The "string of pearls" is going into place. No telling if Gwader will become another "pearl" or not. They can make the cost so unacceptably high we would back off. Taiwan is not overflowing with oil or anything like that. Consider the fact that poor Chen had to refuel in Anchorage - we did not want him around. What makes you think we would send a carrier group out there to save his or Taiwan's butt??
 
TexasJohn said:
They have 2 important advantages 1)The luxury of waiting 2)Location.

They have neither. The decision to declare Independence or not is Taiwan's choice; not the Mainland.

And that 100 miles of water is still an obstacle which you have yet to show that they can breach successfully.

TexasJohn said:
Given the fact that they are modernizing, learning and doing it low profile. The "string of pearls" is going into place. No telling if Gwader will become another "pearl" or not. They can make the cost so unacceptably high we would back off.

What costs. Both Jay and I have refuted every one of your assertion that the Chinese posed a threat. They are no threat to Taiwan and they are no threat to any CVBG.

TexasJohn said:
Taiwan is not overflowing with oil or anything like that.

Except electronics and money.

TexasJohn said:
Consider the fact that poor Chen had to refuel in Anchorage - we did not want him around. What makes you think we would send a carrier group out there to save his or Taiwan's butt??

What makes you think the US won't? Even Clinton sent two CVBGs and no one backed down on the EP-3 Incident.

The Chinese are in an INFERIOR position and they know it.
 
TexasJohn said:
The "string of pearls" is going into place. No telling if Gwader will become another "pearl" or not. They can make the cost so unacceptably high we would back off.
String or pearls...ha ha. PRC does not have a decent surface fleet to start with. What are they gonna do with extra bases?? At this point they cannot afford sending a part of their surface fleet to Gwadar or Coco Islands or any pearls for that matter. They dont have enough ASW assets, nor do they have any CVBG's that can act as a high seas command center. Anything that China can field in Arabian Sea/Gulf countries has to face US Fleet based in Diego Garcia. FYI, the entire PLAN/IN cannot withstand US 7th Fleet.

What makes you think we would send a carrier group out there to save his or Taiwan's butt??
US Senate/Congress.
 
Officer of Engineers said:
They have neither. The decision to declare Independence or not is Taiwan's choice; not the Mainland.

And that 100 miles of water is still an obstacle which you have yet to show that they can breach successfully.



What costs. Both Jay and I have refuted every one of your assertion that the Chinese posed a threat. They are no threat to Taiwan and they are no threat to any CVBG.



Except electronics and money.




What makes you think the US won't? Even Clinton sent two CVBGs and no one backed down on the EP-3 Incident.

The Chinese are in an INFERIOR position and they know it.

The EP3 incident? If that didn't prove our impotence/ lack of political will then what will?

Consider this - Our EP-3 is forced to land on a Chinese base, the crew is frantically trying to destroy data on drives etc. Chinese soldiers jank the crew out of their planes and move them 2 miles away from the plane on the other side of the base while they probed the plane pretty darn good
took drives rebuilt data etc. The Chinese btw excel in this sort of stuff.

We dispatched Aegis destroyers and the Carriers with bluster and Tomohawk missiles within rangeof the plane. If we really had b@11s we could have fired a barrage of cruise missles and blown up our own plane before the Chinese could glean too much information from it.

At this point it would have been a political issue." Yes,we blew up our own plane and sorry you did not get the chance to snoop around it".

OK, call it an act of war - we can discuss this at the UN.. ho hum!!

Instead, the way it panned out, we went through the humiliation of having to dismantle the plane ( after the Chinese were done screwing with it) crate it, and ship it out in a Russian Antonov, cuz we did not have anything big enough!

If we lost our nerve over a lousy airplane with maybe a dozen personnel, what makes you think we would risk Carriers with a few thousand on board?

We simply will not intervene in the defense of Taiwan!

It's not about might - it's about nerve!!
 
TexasJohn said:
The EP3 incident? If that didn't prove our impotence/ lack of political will then what will?

That's how you read it?

FYI, the crew completed their OPSEC procedures before they surrendered the plane. The Chinese learned nothing. As for cutting up the plane, what did you expect? The thing barely landed. It had to be taken apart to be repaired.

The Chinese demanded an apology. They've got none. They demanded that the US admit were spying. Zilch. They demanded that the US admit that they were violating Chinese territory, aks the Chinese EEZ. The US and Australia sent warships through that EEZ while ignoring Chinese demands. They demanded the surveillance flights stopped. They continue and is continuing.

We demanded a more professional intercept. We got it.
 

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