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U.S. Plan Widens Role in Training Pakistani Forces

Blain:

Is there any move towards or consideration of moving to a separate dedicated officer corps for the FC?

The indications are that the FC is going to be the primary COIN force, given its demographic makeup, and Musharraf mentioned almost completely pulling the Army out as the FC capacity building gathers steam. From what I have read, officers from within the Army do not exactly view being seconded to the FC as a great career move. If that is true, wouldn't the FC be better served by having officers that know they will be serving their days out with it, and be better acquainted with the FC, its role, mission, training and goals - rather than vacillating between COIN duties when seconded to the FC, and whatever capacity they function in when with the Army?

Valid point. Retraining FC may mean that their own officers are recruited from among the population and then put through a training program and eventually they lead their own troops. The above point supports my earlier assertion even more that the PA (which invariably will take the lead in training) would try to setup a dedicated training program after undergoing training with the US/UK forces in Pakistan. There may be a couple of things going on, re-equipping the FC and then also COIN training for those involved in the region. Its too early to say what the exact format of the training and formations would be so lets see how this pans out.
 
Blain,

I totally understand what you are saying---but please take this from a middle aged dog like me, an outside trainer can do wonders in building up the psyche of the troops, non comm' and commisioned officers---remember inside training becomes routine, stagnant and stale---for that reason here in the u s, in my business we pay thousands and thousands of dollars to outside trainers just to come for one day and give a training session---these people are national trainers of high repute----some of them hold a one day seminars with 200---500 people each paying somewhere 300--500 dollars per head. I still to this day relate to the guy whose seminar I attended in 1989---I still have his face in front of me, even though he passed away many a years ago---he was a super star salesman named---Jackie Cooper.

Now I know that car business and millitary business are two different things----but trainers have similiar jobs---they sell you on the idea that what they are sayng and what they are asking you to do is better and proven than what you and I had been doing in the past---then it is left upto the managers to pratcise and constant training and doing things over and over again and again that makes us perfect.

Not all hard work is rewarding---hard work with proper guidelines anb 21st century training is rewarding, keeping in mind and adjusting to the ever changing environment within seconds---it is like, thinking like a two fighter pilots engaging each other in combat---. So far, the approach, combat tactics and support of troops in combat has been way below par. There are some people in command and control who are not on the same page as the commander in chief and that is not a good sign of a progressive millitary.

Today's bombing at the navy college, the bombing inside the dining room of the SSG barracks, this all show a very non-chalant and casual attitude of the pak millitary towards this threat---over here there is a lack of pro-active approach to combat terrorism---truthfully the pakistani millitary is asleep---I have started to think that there is a problem with the high command of the millitary---I believe that some in pak millitary are playing a very very dangerous game---I believe that the commanders of pak millitary are not as proffessional and sincere as they want the people to believe---I truly doubt their sincerety to the cause of pakistan and the welfare of the pakistanis---When pakistan needed a Maj Gen Kuldeep Singh Brar to spearhead the operation, they got someone who was a weak knee and who came up with one one sob story after another for his incompetence.

Blain---the last five years of pak army history against the al qaeda is full of failures---one after the other---we do have a big big sob story of having close to a thousand troops killed---but other than that, it has been a totally shameful failure. The problem with pakistani officers has been that they have started thinking of what to do and what not to do---they have doubts about the directive from the top to the bottom alike---and that is a recipe for total disaster---if there are doubts on the northern front today, there maybe doubts about the southern front tomorrow---this army has suddenly become a doubting force---they have a sob story ready for every action and failure---bottomline is that they were given a job to do 5 years ago and they have intentionally failed to deliver. If you start with their handling of al qaeda people after tora bora, it was very evident that our defence forces weer in it half hearted---the way theyhandled the al qaeda prisoners---our muslim brothers kind of thing etc etc etc---.

It is not the job of an officer to think why the order is what it is---his job is to make sure that it is done and done right the first time in an expeditious manner.

The problem with the pakistani brass was that they were not capable of changing their attitudes right in the middle of the stride---they were not able to stop on a dime and change directions---they were unable to understand and comprehend what had transpired on 9/11---you know why---because they were not trained to do so---and to this day, they are still behind the eight ball---they are still having a terrible time in understanding in what to do next---there is an absolute vaccuum of leadership in the pak millitary for the last five plus years. You know why pak millitary had this problem---because they were listening to their own story told by their own story tellers after the sanctions were placed on pakistan by ht e u s. If they would have listened to what the outsiders had been saying before the sanctions were enforced by Pressler, pak millitary would not have had this problem---but the pak generals would not admit to it---because in the ignorance---they didnot believe the outsiders who were saying that sanctions are acoming---sanctions are acoming---Pressler is hot---be careful. But no---they just let the warning roll over their shoulders---when the sanctions hit ---they didnot want to admit that they knew in advance---why---because they would be branded as failures and not watching out for the national interest.

Pakistani trainers are good people----but I have reservations about their high training capabilities. It is a misunderstanding---pakistanis won't be trained at the iraqi and afghan forces levels. This training has different pleateus---for a novice it is different than mid level experties to high end highly trained troops. I don't think there would be any afghan trainers in here---but truly I think that FC needs better uniforms, boots and equipment more suited for the 21st century combat---I believe that they are inadequately equipped for this war---.

You are right, it is not beyond pak millitary to do this on their own---they jus need the right setup, equipment and training to get going---training at troop level would mean getting as low as non comm's---as low as Naik---pak millitary would come out as a winner---this is from personal experience in a different field.

Asaad ul Islam---there is no issue with 80000 FC of pushtuns---it has never been an issue before---there is no issue of a seperatist movement over here---the loyalties of the pathans have been tested many atimes.
 
Valid point. Retraining FC may mean that their own officers are recruited from among the population and then put through a training program and eventually they lead their own troops. The above point supports my earlier assertion even more that the PA (which invariably will take the lead in training) would try to setup a dedicated training program after undergoing training with the US/UK forces in Pakistan. There may be a couple of things going on, re-equipping the FC and then also COIN training for those involved in the region. Its too early to say what the exact format of the training and formations would be so lets see how this pans out.

lets say we do recruit cadet officers for the FC. where will they get their officer training? PMA-Kakul or we build a new academy for them!. one needs to look for synergies (read money). generally the PA seconds officers who have a pushtun background into the FC.
 
lets say we do recruit cadet officers for the FC. where will they get their officer training? PMA-Kakul or we build a new academy for them!. one needs to look for synergies (read money). generally the PA seconds officers who have a pushtun background into the FC.

I would say a short course in the PMA may work instead of having a dedicated academy for the FC or maybe the continued secondment of officers from the Army and their charges will undergo this new training. In the past the Army has taken on training Sind Police at the Sind Regimental Training Center. I think if the idea was to give these FC troops grounding with basic training, it could be accommodated in the existing Army schools.

My point about setting up something was in the context of COIN warfare. The Army in all likelihood would like to institutionalize this learning experience. We already have a Special Operations School in Cherat which could actually take on this aspect with input from the US advisers.
 
I would say a short course in the PMA may work instead of having a dedicated academy for the FC or maybe the continued secondment of officers from the Army and their charges will undergo this new training. In the past the Army has taken on training Sind Police at the Sind Regimental Training Center. I think if the idea was to give these FC troops grounding with basic training, it could be accommodated in the existing Army schools.

My point about setting up something was in the context of COIN warfare. The Army in all likelihood would like to institutionalize this learning experience. We already have a Special Operations School in Cherat which could actually take on this aspect with input from the US advisers.

then while agreeing with you, one can expand the sp ops at cherat to include COIN ops to enhace the capability of the PA as well as the para militaries.
 
Insurgents target Pakistan's naval war college
Farhan Bokhari JDW Correspondent - Islamabad

Key Points
Six people have been killed in an attack on Pakistan's naval war college, as insurgents continue to target the country's military

US plans to provide counterinsurgency training to Pakistani troops could backfire, analysts have warned

A suicide bomber killed at least six people at Pakistan's naval war college in the central city of Lahore on 4 March, as suicide attacks directly targeting the military continued to intensify.

The attack coincided with a visit to Pakistan by Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff - his second in less than a month - and came a week after Lieutenant General Mushtaq Ahmed Baig, Surgeon General of the Pakistan Army, was killed in Rawalpindi.

Western analysts warned that the United States was becoming increasingly alarmed over the growing insurgency backed by Al-Qaeda and the Taliban inside Pakistan.

Hasan Askari Rizvi, a Pakistani expert on defence and security affairs and a visiting scholar at Washington's Johns Hopkins University, told Jane's that "for the Americans, Pakistan's security is important in view of Pakistan's role in the 'war on terror'. As [the Americans] see the army being increasingly targeted, their concerns must be growing."

A US-Pakistani agreement for at least 22 US trainers to travel to Pakistan and train up to 8,500 members of the frontier corps - one of the main units fighting insurgents in the North West Frontier Province - forms one component of Washington's efforts to halt the rising tide of violence.

A senior Pakistani military officer speaking to Jane's on condition of anonymity said the agreement involved "small teams of US military trainers coming to Pakistan for no more than six to eight weeks at any one time to train units in fighting insurgencies".

While unconfirmed reports said US trainers were already in Pakistan, some sources suggested that they would arrive in May or June.

Analysts have warned that deployments of US trainers in larger numbers and for longer durations would only give nationalists a reason to attack President Pervez Musharraf's government for betraying national interests, further stoking the insurgency.

However, according to one Western defence analyst, Pakistani troops are in need of fundamental reorientation to deal effectively with the insurgency. The country's armed forces have spent most of their 61 years, training and equipping to fight large-scale conflicts with India.

"The growing number of attacks on the military now more than ever [demonstrates] the need for a fundamental reorientation, which includes acceptance of insurgency-related equipment rather than big items like fighter planes, tanks and ships," he said. "The military needs to be retrained from just remaining a territorial force to one which deals with internal security."
 
Not long before we have death squads....... latin american style all trained up and financed by the US to counter the terrorist.
 

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