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U.S-Pakistan Military Cooperation

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Council on Foreign Relations

U.S-Pakistan Military Cooperation

Authors: Greg Bruno, Staff Writer
Jayshree Bajoria, Staff Writer

June 26, 2008

Introduction
A Complicated History
Terrorist Safe Havens
Overt Support
Pakistan's Failed Promise
Covert Operations
Betting on Musharraf
An Ailing Alliance

Introduction
Military cooperation between the United States and Pakistan has undergone a tactical renaissance since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Moribund at the end of the Cold War, when concerns about nuclear proliferation and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan diminished Pakistan's importance in the eyes of U.S. policymakers, bilateral military cooperation accelerated during the Bush and Musharraf administrations. In 2006, U.S. arms sales to Islamabad topped $3.5 billion (PDF), nearly matching total purchases by Pakistan during the fifty years prior to 2001. Now, with Pakistan's tribal areas serving as the base of operations for Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan, the United States has tried to strengthen these bonds. But U.S. covert military operations along the Afghan-Pakistani border, Washington's unflinching support for President Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's political instability, and Islamabad's questionable record on terrorism have thrown one of America's most important military alliances into disarray.

A Complicated History
Soon after Pakistan was founded in 1947, U.S. concerns about Soviet expansionism in the region and Pakistan’s desire for security assistance against a perceived threat from India prompted a military alliance between the two countries. Washington and Islamabad signed a mutual defense assistance agreement in 1954 and soon military aid started flowing into Pakistan. But as this timeline shows, this relationship has been a turbulent one over the years. While military coups and wars with India led to U.S. sanctions and a strain in ties, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 brought the military and the intelligence agencies of the United States and Pakistan into a partnership. Along with Saudi Arabia, they worked covertly to support the Afghan resistance, the mujahedeen, against the Soviets throughout the 1980s. Following the Soviet Union's withdrawal, the alliance cooled. In October 1990, the United States blocked the delivery of dozens of new F-16 fighter jets to protest Pakistan's then-undeclared nuclear weapons program; Pakistan's nuclear test of 1998 brought a fresh wave of sanctions from Washington. Meanwhile, geopolitical changes brought about by the end of the Cold War led Washington to grow increasingly intimate with Pakistan's sworn enemy, India.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, shifted relations once again. Today Pakistan is among the United States' top recipients of foreign military assistance. But due to the historical inconsistency in Washington's support, experts say many within Pakistan’s security forces and government view the United States as an unreliable ally.

Terrorist Safe Havens
In the 1990s, as factional fighting kept Afghanistan in a state of almost constant warfare, Pakistan’s government supported the rise of a group known as the Taliban, or "students," who swept to power in Kabul in 1996. Through its Inter-Services Intelligence agency, Pakistan provided the Taliban with advisers and materials in their battles with rival warlords, ensuring a friendly government that controlled most of Afghanistan. But the Taliban hosted unsavory guests, including al-Qaeda, which by the late 1990s had been identified as a serious new threat by the United States. Following the 9/11 attacks and the U.S.-led invasion that followed, leaders of al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, along with other terrorist groups, fled across the border into Pakistan and made its Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) their new home.

Since then, as this Backgrounder explains, many new terrorist groups have emerged in Pakistan, several existing groups have reconstituted themselves, and a new crop of militants—more violent and less conducive to political solutions than their predecessors—has taken control. According to a 2007 report by the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center, Pakistan had 137 percent more terrorist attacks in 2007 than in 2006. The North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the tribal areas accounted for 54 percent of the total attacks, up from 23 percent the previous year. One such attack killed Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan's former prime minister, during an election rally in December 2007.

Overt Support
Foreign military assistance from Washington has increased exponentially since the 9/11 terror attacks, with Pakistan today among the largest recipients of U.S. military aid. In June 2008, the U.S. government reported that nearly $11 billion (PDF) in military and economic assistance grants have been delivered since 2002, the vast majority channeled through Pakistan's military for security-related programs. A report by the Center for Public Integrity finds that in the three years after 9/11, military aid to Pakistan from the Coalition Support Fund—created after the attacks to assist U.S. allies in the global fight against terrorism—was nearly $3 billion, ten times the amount received by Poland, the second-highest recipient of cash from the fund. Pakistan has used the money to purchase helicopters, F-16s, aircraft-mounted armaments, and anti-ship and antimissile defense systems—weapons that Indian officials and others have deemed of questionable relevance to the counterterrorism mission. A June 2008 report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office found widespread accounting irregularities (PDF) with Pentagon spending.

Craig Cohen and Derek Chollet of the Center for Strategic and International Studies suggest that more funding should be aimed at development and humanitarian programs. "Although foreign military financing is often justified to Congress as playing a critical role in the war on terrorism, in reality the weapons systems are often prestige items to help Pakistan in the event of war with India," the authors write. "Few of these weapons are likely to provide much help in rooting out al Qaeda or the Taliban." Lisa Curtis, a senior research fellow at the conservative Heritage Foundation, says the United States should focus more on economic and political initiatives in the region.

Pakistan's Failed Promise
As president and army chief, Musharraf promised "unstinted cooperation" to the United States in the fight against global terrorism. But while Musharraf has cracked down on terrorist groups, he has done so selectively, experts say. Ashley J. Tellis, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes (PDF) that Musharraf tightened pressure on groups whose objectives were out of sync with the military's perception of Pakistan's national interest. Today, more than eighty-five thousand Pakistani troops remain deployed along the Afghan border. While the military has captured over seven hundred al-Qaeda operatives within its borders, experts say it has made no significant victories against the Taliban and other groups that have been traditionally supported by the military and the intelligence services. But Pakistan points to the death of nearly a thousand soldiers in its fight against militancy to deny these charges.

Pakistan's armed forces have proven ineffective in the tribal areas, in part because the regular military has not been deployed in these semi-autonomous areas in decades. Thus, Islamabad has turned to its Frontier Corps—a Pakistani paramilitary organization that operates in the the autonomous tribal areas—to target insurgents. Local language skills and familiarity with the local terrain have given the corps an advantage. But this strategy, too, has been plagued with problems; there have been numerous defections, and refusals to fight and follow orders. RAND Corporation expert C. Christine Fair, in January 2008 testimony to a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee, said the Frontier Corps is “inadequately trained and equipped and has been ill-prepared for counter-insurgency operations in FATA.” Fair, along with other experts, also questions the soldiers' willingness to fight. She says the corps “was used to train the Taliban in the 1990s and many are suspected of having ties to that organization.”

As the Jamestown Foundation notes, Washington has funded a program to transform Pakistan's Frontier Corps into an effective counterbalance against terrorist elements; training of the corps—part of a broader $400-million effort to improve security in the region—was expected to start in late 2008. But an errant U.S. air strike in June 2008 that Pakistan says killed eleven Frontier Corps soldiers has infuriated the Pakistani military and jeopardized the training effort (NYT). Brian Cloughley, a South Asian military affairs analyst, says the program faces an uphill climb (PDF) even if it does get off the ground. "The Frontier Corps … is under strain because its members are all Pushtun and there are extreme pressures placed upon them in regard to combating fellow Muslim tribesmen," Cloughley writes in a January 2008 research brief.

Military analysts and U.S. intelligence officials say success in Afghanistan is only achievable with the cooperation of Pakistan.
Another approach taken by past and present Pakistani governments in the tribal areas is to sign peace agreements with tribal leaders. So far, most of them have failed. Critics, including many in Washington and the U.S. military, say such agreements only end up strengthening the militants.

Covert Operations
In January 2008, the United States' top intelligence officials traveled to Islamabad to request permission to hunt down militants inside Pakistan. The request was rebuffed by President Musharraf (NYT), but some analysts believe a quiet understanding was hashed out during that meeting. K. Alan Kronstadt, a specialist for South Asian affairs at the Congressional Research Service, writes in an April 2008 report that "three Predators are said to be deployed at a secret Pakistani airbase and can be launched without specific permission from the Islamabad government." Pakistan officially denies the planes exist, but reports of operational successes inside the country suggest a beefed-up U.S. presence in the tribal areas. In February 2008, the Washington Post reported that a CIA Predator had fired two Hellfire missiles inside Pakistani airspace three weeks earlier, killing a senior al-Qaeda commander. A month later, Jane's Defense Weekly reported that a strike by an unmanned aerial drone on March 16, 2008, killed fourteen people in southern Waziristan.

U.S. counterterrorism officials say such attacks are necessary. "In the past, it required getting approval from the highest levels," one former intelligence official familiar with targeting inside Pakistan told the Washington Post. "If you wait, the information is no longer valid." Some military analysts even advocate for increasing U.S. activity in the region. "Congress should encourage the CIA and other agencies in the ntelligence [c]ommunity to take more active and aggressive measures to gather intelligence and act against al-Qaeda and Taliban militias [in Pakistan's tribal regions]," Steven Emerson, executive director of the Investigative Project on Terrorism, told lawmakers in April 2008 (PDF). But U.S. diplomats see things differently. According to Kronstadt, opponents of the policy, including some State Department officials, fear mounting Pakistani anger will eventually outweigh the military gains, a concern that is borne out in public opinion surveys. A national poll conducted in mid-2008 found that 74 percent of Pakistanis oppose direct U.S. military (PDF) action against Taliban and al-Qaeda militants.

Betting on Musharraf
Washington's support for Musharraf—despite his declining popularity in 2007—has left the United States without much support within Pakistan, when Musharraf's supporters lost the February 2008 parliamentary elections. Even as the U.S. State Department and national intelligence reports attributed the growing strength of al-Qaeda and the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan to Pakistan's safe havens, the Bush administration continued to praise Musharraf on his success against terrorism.

The Frontier Corps is “inadequately trained and equipped and has been ill-prepared for counter-insurgency operations in FATA.” — C. Christine Fair, RAND Corporation
Having relied on Musharraf, Washington had to rush to make friends with the new army chief once Musharraf stepped down in November 2007. So far, General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani, unlike his predecessor, has shown a preference for keeping the army out of politics. Pakistan's new ambassador to the United States, Husain Haqqani, told CFR.org in December 2007 that General Kiyani's training in the West works in his favor among the U.S. military hierarchy. But even while many in the Pakistan army would like to have positive relations with the West, Haqqani says they would like "a different set of terms to be the determining factor for that association."

An Ailing Alliance
Despite ongoing criticism, U.S. military and intelligence officials have gone out of their way to praise the United States' military-to-military relationship with Pakistan. In November 2007, Lt. Gen. Carter Ham called Pakistan "a great partner so far in the war on terror" and said collaboration and cooperation in border missions was improving. During a visit to Islamabad in June 2008, Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, reiterated Washington's commitment to Pakistan. “Pakistan and the United States remain steadfast allies, and Pakistan’s military is fighting bravely against terrorism,” Mullen said.

Yet longtime observers of the delicate partnership say events in 2008—like the June air strike and Pakistan's February elections—have increased tensions and strained the alliance. "One could say it's on a downward trajectory," says Shuja Nawaz, a Pakistani journalist and author of Crossed Swords, a history of the Pakistani military. "However, it's not irreconcilable differences in my view. This is something that can be resolved … bearing in mind the talks should come directly from the U.S. to Pakistan—not publicly, and not by Afghanistan." Peter Bergen, a senior fellow at the New America Foundation, says Washington can do more to heal the relationship and increase Pakistan's counterterrorism capabilities. During an April 2008 hearing on al-Qaeda, Bergen suggested the U.S. military should train Pakistani army officers at Fort Bragg or Fort Leavenworth in counterterrorism tactics; increase military aid but link conditions to the funding; and publicly declare its intention to stay in the region for the long term.

But Kronstadt says Washington also needs to consider the historical perspective of Pakistanis when seeking to mend fences. "There are short and long, general and specific problems here," the CRS analyst says. "In the general sense, there's recognition we need a good relationship with Pakistan. I don't think there is any push within the major powers in either capital for a divorce. But in the short term, there are obvious problems. There's a historic mistrust. I don't think many people in Washington get that in Pakistan, they feel that the U.S. treats them as a disposable ally."
 
pakistan and us have very old militery relations in the early years pakistan had buyed a lot of tanks from them.and now a days thay are selling there aircrafts to pak.
 
the situation from 9 11 is really changed and the order of the f 16s had been delayed and thay want pakistan to use pakistan against talibans.
 
thay had given so much aid to pak but not for promoting pakistan politics but only for fighting against militants.
 
i think pakistan should have to take an action against those prediatior drones really.and i request to all the members of this fourm that discuss this topic as well.
thankyou:angel:
 
the us have no such big coporation with our navy.thay will have to build this relation with tham.
 
i think pakistan should have to take an action against those prediatior drones really.and i request to all the members of this fourm that discuss this topic as well.
thankyou:angel:

brother this topic is discussed everytime a drone attack happens. and almost every pakistnai on this forum is against it. look through the forum and u will find many threads
 
us is not pakistans allei he just looks after to destablize pakistan and to get the nuclear weapons from the only islamic country and our stupid dectators and politisions support the us policy of fighting terrorism.the only way to get out of the us war against terror is that to seal the border with afghnistan no smugling no talibans.and i gaurentee that every thing is gonna be all right.
 
the only way to get out of the us war against terror is that to seal the border with afghnistan no smugling no talibans.and i gaurentee that every thing is gonna be all right.
You live in Quetta? You are familiar with the lay of the land, yes? Are you telling us that you actually believe sealing the border with Afghanistan is possible?
 
You live in Quetta? You are familiar with the lay of the land, yes? Are you telling us that you actually believe sealing the border with Afghanistan is possible?

Be a bit real.
You know as well as I that there is 'sealing a border' and 'sealing a border'.

You can seal a border in other ways than building a huge fence like the one the Israelis did with the West Bank.

When it comes to border sealing you should know well enough with respect to your sieve fence along the Mexican border. To be effective it has to be patrolled and that is aggressively patrolled.

Seriously to seal the Pakistan-Afghanistan border it requires a border. This is a thing, a border, which is fundamentally missing. You have to have agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan on that line in the sand, there is no agreement so far.
Also so far neither the US nor Afghanistan have happily accepted a border sealing process, be it fence or other wise.
Several US based think tanks have in part of their recommendations proposed such a barrier, but that has fallen on deaf ears. Also sorry but a barrier be it aggressive patrolling and part fence would handicap the US in its cross border work, (which naturally does not occur).
Afghanistan will not accept it as they disagree with the current and long standing border demarcation line.

Terrain is one issue but in reality there are bigger issues involving the US and Afghanistan Govts in this.
It is a bit like your border with Mexico there does not seem to be much agreement between US govts, state and national, with the Mexican Govt. Again perceived possibly but it leaks like anything does it not?
 
Be a bit real.
You know as well as I that there is 'sealing a border' and 'sealing a border'.

You can seal a border in other ways than building a huge fence like the one the Israelis did with the West Bank.

When it comes to border sealing you should know well enough with respect to your sieve fence along the Mexican border. To be effective it has to be patrolled and that is aggressively patrolled.

Seriously to seal the Pakistan-Afghanistan border it requires a border. This is a thing, a border, which is fundamentally missing. You have to have agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan on that line in the sand, there is no agreement so far.
Also so far neither the US nor Afghanistan have happily accepted a border sealing process, be it fence or other wise.
Several US based think tanks have in part of their recommendations proposed such a barrier, but that has fallen on deaf ears. Also sorry but a barrier be it aggressive patrolling and part fence would handicap the US in its cross border work, (which naturally does not occur).
Afghanistan will not accept it as they disagree with the current and long standing border demarcation line.

Terrain is one issue but in reality there are bigger issues involving the US and Afghanistan Govts in this.
It is a bit like your border with Mexico there does not seem to be much agreement between US govts, state and national, with the Mexican Govt. Again perceived possibly but it leaks like anything does it not?
Excellent Post.If Afghanistan really wants peace then they should accept Durad Line and let Pakistan fence the board (Pakistan tried to fence before but Afghanistan did not agree)
 
The border between Pakistan and Afghanistan has never been sealed, even during the British rule the border wasn't sealed and Pakistan had no problem with that until recently since India has made its prescence in Afghanistan.

Now that India is in Afghanistan, the border must be sealed as it is sealed in the Indian-Pakistani border.
 
The border between Pakistan and Afghanistan has never been sealed, even during the British rule the border wasn't sealed and Pakistan had no problem with that until recently since India has made its prescence in Afghanistan.

Now that India is in Afghanistan, the border must be sealed as it is sealed in the Indian-Pakistani border.

pakistan never had a problem primarily because it conveniently looked the other way and let the tribals get on with what ever they wanted to do. In many ways it is this inactivity and neglect of the problem that has resulted in the situation that we face today. pakistan now has no other option but to exert control over the border and in order to do that you need to mine and fence it. However, it is a question of who will bear the cost. To be honest PA is not too concerned about Afghan reservations with regards to the Durrand line. We are in a position to tell them to take a hike. the real problem at the end of the day is our will to do so and also the cost of establishing and monitoring and maintaining the fence.
WaSalam
Araz
 
US Missile Attacks On Pakistan To ?Dramatically Increase?: Report Pak Alert Press


March 10, 2009...4:43 pm
US Missile Attacks On Pakistan To “Dramatically Increase”: Report


Steve Watson
Infowars.net



A British newspaper says that officials in contact with the US State Department have been briefed on plans to intensify military attacks on Pakistan, despite strong objections to the policy from the Pakistani government.

A new offensive would see a dramatic increase in Predator drone attacks on Taliban targets, reports the London Telegraph, which says it learned of the plans from State Department contacts and senior diplomats.

The report states:

President Barack Obama on Sunday admitted that the US military was pushing for talks with the Taliban, but officials consulted on the plans said the military conflict would be raised to new levels of intensity before talks could begin. “There will be talks but the Taliban are going to experience a lot of pain first, on both sides of the border,” said one senior Western diplomat.

Pakistani authorities have consistently voiced opposition to cross border missile strikes, which have killed hundreds of innocent civilians.

Obama is seemingly oblivious to this given his statement last week that “it’s very important for us to reach out to the Pakistani government and work with them more effectively.”

It seems that the new president is forging ahead with his campaign promise to shift the focus of the war on terror into Pakistan, stepping up the policy of unmanned airstrikes which have been ongoing for years.

Obama has also recently beefed the U.S. military role in Pakistan beyond that pursued by the Bush administration and “expanded the covert war run by the Central Intelligence Agency inside Pakistan,” according to the New York Times, with an increase in missile attacks by drone aircraft.

Pakistani officials also believe that the drones are taking off from Pakistani airfields, a claim that has been backed by chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Diane Feinstein.


Obama recently demanded a total of around $800 billion in war funds and subsidiary costs just to cover the rest of 2009.

He has also promised to to send at least 17,000, and eventually perhaps as many as 30,000, extra troops to Afghanistan - over seven years after the U.S. invaded in 2001.

Meanwhile, despite public pronouncements by Obama that a plan to withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq is in progress, the details of the agreement actually establish a permanent presence of a sizable occupying force of 50,000 troops in perpetuity.

All this within just two months of Obama’s inauguration on the back of an election campaign won on the basis of changing the warmongering policies of the Bush administration!

As alluded to in the London Telegraph report, the intensification policy comes via the new special U.S. representative to Pakistan and Afghanistan, Richard Holbrooke. A prominent member of the board of directors of the Council on Foreign Relations and a consummate insider, Holbrooke has been dubbed “Obama’s Neocon”.
 
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