salman77
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February 11, 2008
Star-Ledger of Newark
Sometimes doing less is better than doing more. Such is the case in Pakistan today. Pakistans president, Pervez Musharraf, is so discredited that it is in American interests for him to cede powerbut only if Pakistanis themselves hasten his demise. American intervention against him or on his behalf would be counterproductive to our long-term interests in Pakistan.
The Bush administration continues to support Musharraf in order to ensure Pakistans counterterrorism collaboration. Most Pakistan experts outside of government, on the other hand, assert that Washington should curtail its support for Musharraf and throw its full weight behind free and fair democratic elections. Yet neither prescription can fulfill Washingtons security interests today and in the future.
To mitigate near- and long-term security challenges in Pakistan, the United States must instead develop a third way. This alternative must persuade Pakistans military and its general population that counterterrorism is important to Pakistan, regardless of any American agenda. Washingtons Pakistan policy should reflect the need to appeal to both constituencies within Pakistan.
For Pakistan to undertake a successful counterterrorism campaign against the troika of dangerous Islamists within its bordersal Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban and domestic militantsits people must believe that such an effort is in their self-interest. We know from Iraq that winning over the populace is vital to a successful counterinsurgency or counterterrorism campaign. Pakistanis need to be convinced that Islamist extremism threatens their way of life.
Presently, though, many Pakistanis attribute the rise of Islamist extremism in Pakistan to Musharrafs ill-fated alliance with the United States. Given his role in sacking the chief justice last March and declaring a state of emergency in November to ensure his re-election as president, Musharrafs unpopularity seems irreversible.
Accordingly, the appeal of a Musharraf-centric explanation for domestic terrorism will fade only if Pakistan continues to experience militant attacks after the presidents downfall. This is why Musharraf ultimately must go. Until he does, Pakistanis will not accept that the fundamentalists have a more expansive goal: to impose strict Islamic law on all of Pakistan.
Yet the support of the Pakistani peoplewhile necessaryis not sufficient to carry out a prolonged, effective counterterrorism campaign. The concurrence of a motivated Pakistani army is also essential. To maintain the armys support, Washington cannot instigate Musharrafs demise.
Many in Pakistans army believe the United States will desert Pakistan when Americas immediate interests in the region are satisfied. Historical events have informed this belief. Washington withdrew from the region, for example, after the Soviet Union pulled out of Afghanistan in 1989, leaving Pakistan to deal with a failed state on its western flank. Throwing Musharraf overboard would only fortify this view, even among Musharrafs enemies.
Washington, then, faces an unenviable paradox: Pakistanis will not accept that Islamist extremism poses an existential threat to Pakistani society while Musharraf remains in power. But abandoning Musharraf would undo any trust fostered among the army brass since 9/11 and would likely deter wholehearted Pakistani military collaboration on a protracted and costly counterterrorism mission.
Instead of digging a deeper ditch with one constituency or the other, Washington should err on the side of inaction. We should not hasten Musharrafs demise, but neither should we prop him up. We should continue to collaborate operationally with the Pakistani security services but avoid any provocative U.S. incursions or strikes. Even praise for Musharrafs handpicked successor as army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, should be kept to a minimum; Washingtons enthusiastic endorsement diminishes his credibility in Pakistan.
Washington should press for transparent elections on Feb. 18 but not appear to favor any candidate, as it did with Benazir Bhutto. American support is more of an obstacle than an asset. Moreover, Washington will need to work with whoever emerges as Pakistans next leader.
For Pakistan to align itself unreservedly with a counterterrorism mission that fulfills American security interests, both its general populace and army must believe that fighting Islamist militancy is not merely a quid pro quo with the United States but a necessary battle for the survival of their society. This joint outlook can only emerge after Pakistanis oust Musharrafwithout American interference.
U.S. Must Keep Its Distance in Pakistan - Council on Foreign Relations
Star-Ledger of Newark
Sometimes doing less is better than doing more. Such is the case in Pakistan today. Pakistans president, Pervez Musharraf, is so discredited that it is in American interests for him to cede powerbut only if Pakistanis themselves hasten his demise. American intervention against him or on his behalf would be counterproductive to our long-term interests in Pakistan.
The Bush administration continues to support Musharraf in order to ensure Pakistans counterterrorism collaboration. Most Pakistan experts outside of government, on the other hand, assert that Washington should curtail its support for Musharraf and throw its full weight behind free and fair democratic elections. Yet neither prescription can fulfill Washingtons security interests today and in the future.
To mitigate near- and long-term security challenges in Pakistan, the United States must instead develop a third way. This alternative must persuade Pakistans military and its general population that counterterrorism is important to Pakistan, regardless of any American agenda. Washingtons Pakistan policy should reflect the need to appeal to both constituencies within Pakistan.
For Pakistan to undertake a successful counterterrorism campaign against the troika of dangerous Islamists within its bordersal Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban and domestic militantsits people must believe that such an effort is in their self-interest. We know from Iraq that winning over the populace is vital to a successful counterinsurgency or counterterrorism campaign. Pakistanis need to be convinced that Islamist extremism threatens their way of life.
Presently, though, many Pakistanis attribute the rise of Islamist extremism in Pakistan to Musharrafs ill-fated alliance with the United States. Given his role in sacking the chief justice last March and declaring a state of emergency in November to ensure his re-election as president, Musharrafs unpopularity seems irreversible.
Accordingly, the appeal of a Musharraf-centric explanation for domestic terrorism will fade only if Pakistan continues to experience militant attacks after the presidents downfall. This is why Musharraf ultimately must go. Until he does, Pakistanis will not accept that the fundamentalists have a more expansive goal: to impose strict Islamic law on all of Pakistan.
Yet the support of the Pakistani peoplewhile necessaryis not sufficient to carry out a prolonged, effective counterterrorism campaign. The concurrence of a motivated Pakistani army is also essential. To maintain the armys support, Washington cannot instigate Musharrafs demise.
Many in Pakistans army believe the United States will desert Pakistan when Americas immediate interests in the region are satisfied. Historical events have informed this belief. Washington withdrew from the region, for example, after the Soviet Union pulled out of Afghanistan in 1989, leaving Pakistan to deal with a failed state on its western flank. Throwing Musharraf overboard would only fortify this view, even among Musharrafs enemies.
Washington, then, faces an unenviable paradox: Pakistanis will not accept that Islamist extremism poses an existential threat to Pakistani society while Musharraf remains in power. But abandoning Musharraf would undo any trust fostered among the army brass since 9/11 and would likely deter wholehearted Pakistani military collaboration on a protracted and costly counterterrorism mission.
Instead of digging a deeper ditch with one constituency or the other, Washington should err on the side of inaction. We should not hasten Musharrafs demise, but neither should we prop him up. We should continue to collaborate operationally with the Pakistani security services but avoid any provocative U.S. incursions or strikes. Even praise for Musharrafs handpicked successor as army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, should be kept to a minimum; Washingtons enthusiastic endorsement diminishes his credibility in Pakistan.
Washington should press for transparent elections on Feb. 18 but not appear to favor any candidate, as it did with Benazir Bhutto. American support is more of an obstacle than an asset. Moreover, Washington will need to work with whoever emerges as Pakistans next leader.
For Pakistan to align itself unreservedly with a counterterrorism mission that fulfills American security interests, both its general populace and army must believe that fighting Islamist militancy is not merely a quid pro quo with the United States but a necessary battle for the survival of their society. This joint outlook can only emerge after Pakistanis oust Musharrafwithout American interference.
U.S. Must Keep Its Distance in Pakistan - Council on Foreign Relations
