"IMO, Pakistan will not expand the war unless it sees the following:
1. A long term US commitment to Afghanistan and some sort of measurable road plan for stabilizing Afghanistan.
2. Military assistance in terms of expanding and replenishing its military assets expended in the fighting in Swat and SW, specifically its air assets (Especially rotary).
Fred Kagan talks about the limitations in Pak Mil resources in his analysis: Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban: Military Considerations | Critical Threats
3. Some sort of stabilization of South Waziristan before even considering an expansion into North Waziristan."
Pakistan WILL expand the war regardless of what it sees in Afghanistan, IMHO. How and at what speed it does so seems the larger question?
The
war, afterall, to which Pakistan is engaged is Pakistan's war. No more nor less. Not a single soldier nor citizen of Pakistan has died anywhere but upon Pakistani soil. So whether you agree or disagree with why this war is being fought, from where it came, or even when it started, if Pakistan wishes to be truly sovereign and in control of its destiny it will attempt to control that which it can without respect to adjoining issues. Doing so means asserting the state's sovereignty over those lands ostensibly Pakistani.
At present, great swaths of Pakistan are not under the control of your government. Whether peace comes tomorrow to Afghanistan or not, that fact is the case today and why this war of yours shall continue. It will do so, however, at your pace and your whims-correct in your assessment of matters or otherwise.
A.M.'s assessment of the two contingent requirements to carry forth Pakistan's reclaiming of lands adjacent to S. Waziristan are likely correct. You will no doubt require additional assistance in the way of supplies and possibly technical intelligence support. I don't know the state of your equipment deployed in the west. Virtually all of you do not either. However, we can reasonably assume that much of it is or shall in due course be in some state of disrepair or in need of replacement.
Secondly, you may use it as a strategic rationale to not proceed further but I'd concur that it's irrelevant under any strategem until you can be assured that you've effectively displaced those elements that had previously held a grip on S. Waziristan. I didn't say
kill nor shall I say
destroy. Neither matter or are likely necessary if your citizens know that you are the dominant species in the neighborhood. At present that isn't the case although it's beginning to change. Note the use of
beginning. Like the effort of ISAF across the border, gains anywhere in this war are tenuous and easily reversed until affirmed through a very long period.
Consider Bajaur- fourteen months and running of combat operations. Is it secure? I'd say no although it certainly is contested by your army and with each day that commitment appears more genuine it offers real hope to those of that area. Still, consider all that must yet be done to make Bajaur truly as physically habitable as it once was and emotionally more connected to the rest of your country. You've got a very long road to hoe there.
The same applies to SWAT. It is NOT a victory. That will come for SWATIs when they can no longer remember the last time they heard gunfire, a bomb explode, or a neighbor who hasn't been kidnapped. Have you reason to be proud? Of course. Is your work there finished or is the use of the term "
victory" yet justified? No. Just the other day, more militants were captured. Capturing militants is a double-edged blade, is it not? It certainly beats not capturing them yet indicates their continued presence. As your public returns, they know that and will wonder if the presence of your security forces will be as permanent as that of the militants. That's a challenge of trust and, frankly, remains to be seen.
So too then with S. Waziristan. IMHO, it will be some considerable time before your Waziri citizens can be assured that they are, indeed, safe and living under a nat'l flag of Pakistan. To believe that simply because your army is now actively patrolling up and down roads that had as of three months ago not been a part of their presence in years is no basis to believe that S. Waziristan has been retaken and fully sanitized.
Then there are the IDPs. Are all of them returned to Bajaur? I'm unsure but would guess not. SWAT and Buner? Many, yes, but all? And how about S. Waziristan? It will appear that those IDPs must now plan for a winter in refugee camps, does it not? Even if things go marvelously though the winter and next spring, will they return to S. Waziristan
en masse and overnight? I doubt it.
Can Pakistan wait for all these issues to be fully answered before proceeding on to N. Waziristan? Likely not in my estimation. At some point you will do so despite complete and thorough resolution of Bajaur, SWAT, and S. Waziristan. Will it be at a pace belonging to anybody but Pakistan, though? No. You don't have the means to resolve all your issues immediately and to your thorough satisfaction.
Will you go after the Haqqani network and the Quetta shura? Maybe. That answer, though, we only be addressed after you've determined WHY it's in your interest to do so. My answer to that is, regardless of Jana's thoughts about external forces, your issues today are rooted in the maintenence of these proxy options for Pakistan.
Your tribals have been infected more by the observable leniency provided to these groups. They see these men as ascendant in the natural order of things. Clearly it is better by virtue of both prestige and pay to be a militant than a member of your F.C. Even now that will be recognized in the manner and deference shown to Maulvi Nazir and Hafez Gul Bahadur's men. A commitment to attacking Afghanistan pays in Pakistan.
Should you trust these men? Maybe but the moment they feel threatened by the state, I guarantee you that they shall turn against Pakistan rather than acquiesce. Failure to give them what they want will mean more, not less, enemies on your plate. Again, that deference won't be missed by your young tribals as it wasn't before.
Can you provide those young tribals with any other options? I guess we're back to resources, are we not? Without eventually transforming the nature of these areas, whether Bajaur, SWAT, or S. Waziristan, the conditions of disaffectation remain and, thus, the potential to for attraction by
charismatics.
Finally, it was interesting to note that what the NYT characterized as "
ask", DAWN postured as "
demand". As usual, it's all about the narrative in some quarters.
Maybe I'll chat about America the next time but that's really quite boring speculation and we're all on the cusp of receiving the definitive word from Obama here soon.
Thanks.