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Towards a new & Improved Fauj

According to some estimates, the size of the undocumented economy is equal to the official one, so your estimate of twice the $180b declared GDP may not be too far off. Add to that an estimated $15-20 billion of profits from the narcotics trade that are shared between Afghan and Pakistani players involved, and one can easily see where the additional revenues may be generated from.
Here we would be referring to a sort of 'secret official economy' - revenues are being generated through existing taxes, customs etc. and somehow 'taken off the books' to show a significantly smaller revenue base, and being directed to the defence/nuclear budget.

The drug trade could be a possibility, but it would require a massive syndicate controlled by the military to generate significant enough revenues to justify its use. Such a syndicate run by the military would be impossible to hide for this long, so I doubt drugs are a major source.
 
Here we would be referring to a sort of 'secret official economy' - revenues are being generated through existing taxes, customs etc. and somehow 'taken off the books' to show a significantly smaller revenue base, and being directed to the defence/nuclear budget.

The drug trade could be a possibility, but it would require a massive syndicate controlled by the military to generate significant enough revenues to justify its use. Such a syndicate run by the military would be impossible to hide for this long, so I doubt drugs are a major source.

I do not wish to upset you, or anyone else, but BOTH possibilities that you mention have been a reality for DECADES.
 
Mr Cheng is the former PM of Pakistan - so he knows all this as fact LoL - IMO india was the threat, is the threat, and will remain the threat, the indian state has as it's raison'datre the destruction and subjugation of our Muslim state.

The Armed Forces cannot disregard the Pakistan specific indian capability. It is a fact that anyone studying the ORBAT of their armed forces cannot ignore, now we will have indians come here -- that will say "its PRC that we see as the main threat" - but a analysis of where the indian formations, will quickly extinguish that lie.
 
Rafi, It seems that for you, like so many others, it's more important to use the India Hate/threat rather than the love Pakistan line -- and it is good, because it is necessary if we are to imagine Pakistan anew - All readers, are invited to review the piece below, along with the piece by the AVM and the Brigadier - consider:


Beyond the ‘crisis state’


Mosharraf Zaidi
Tuesday, March 29, 2011


The notion of a new Pakistani nationalism is not new in a chronological sense. It is as old as the country itself. Its newness is in how widely it is dispersed and how explicitly divorced it is from the state-defined and military-dominated version of Pakistan’s economy, its history and its politics. Old Pakistani nationalism is India-centric, it is scared of multiple identities, it rejects indigenous cultures. Worst of all, it is confused. It often plays jump rope between being Muslim and being Islamic, being Indian and being Arab. Its fear of the Bengali language broke up the country, but has failed to break reality to it. Luckily, the new Pakistani nationalism doesn’t need an invitation. It is a product of the very realities that the old nationalism helped produce. Old Pakistan may be incapable of learning lessons from its mistakes, but it seems very likely that the new Pakistani nationalism is a product of the lessons of history.

Where’s the evidence of this new Pakistani nationalism? Like the answers to so many questions in life, I’ve found an answer to this one, in an exciting new book. Being released this week, Pakistan: Beyond the Crisis State (Oxford University Press) is a collection of essays by an array of some of Pakistan’s best and brightest minds. Each essay helps define some of the country’s most dire problems, and each one attempts to propose a range of solutions that are likely to help forge a Pakistani future more prosperous and more stable than today. Edited by former Pakistani ambassador to the US and the UK, Dr Maleeha Lodhi, Beyond the Crisis State is a solid effort to illuminate where hope will come from.

Two features of the book merit extraordinary consideration. The first is its refreshing honesty. The book does anything but tread lightly, even on some very, very sensitive nerves. In the opening chapter, Ayesha Jalal provides an account of some of the creative explanations often used to cohere the idea of Pakistan. In the shorter form, we are denied Jalal’s signature narrative style. Yet, this is more than made up for by the calm and assertive confidence with which she takes a hatchet to the state’s clumsy, inadequate and failed attempts to forge national identity in Pakistan.

The second is the outstanding and powerful positivity of tone that the book takes. Many of the contributors, like Ahmed Rashid, are not exactly known to be optimistic and positive observers of the Pakistani condition. Yet the book offers a realistic and positive set of ideas about what has enabled Pakistan to survive, as a society and a state, and what are the likely realities of the near- and medium-term future that will enable the country to go from surviving to thriving.

Lodhi’s own essay, from which the title of the book is derived, is an exceptionally good summary of post-1999 Pakistan. Her analysis of what constituted the substance of the Musharraf era, and what factors brought it to an end, offers a very cogent look at recent political history. Most importantly, she articulates some of the conditions that reflect at least a partial, if not textbook, kind of emergence of a politically relevant Pakistani middle-class. In her assessment of the five possible futures for Pakistan from here on, the most optimistic and most fragile is the evolution of this enlarged Pakistani middle-class.

The book relies on this narrative of a Pakistani middle class, both through explicitly appropriating the idea of an urban Pakistani middle class, and by implicitly addressing it, and challenging it to do better. In his essay, “Why Pakistan will survive?” novelist Mohsin Hamid revisits taxation and Pakistan’s unsustainable fiscal realities – an issue that he has written and spoken about frequently since relocating to Pakistan. Other contributors to the book include veteran reporter Zahid Hussain, former ambassadors Akbar Ahmed and Munir Akram, former IMF official Meekal Ahmed and the resident South Asia expert at the United States Institute of Peace, Moeed Yusuf.

Yusuf’s contribution to the book is an excellent essay he has co-authored with Shanza Khan, titled, “Education as a strategic imperative.” Derived from a research that Yusuf did for the Brookings Institution in 2008, the essay articulates the current state of education, the risks involved in allowing this situation to continue unchecked and the kinds of changes required to change direction, from the disaster that the state of education in Pakistan entails today to a situation in which Pakistan’s youth bulge becomes a competitive advantage for Pakistan.

On the whole, the book acknowledges the problems that plague Pakistan, and offers a reasonable set of ideas about how to tackle them. Best of all, there is decidedly none of the self-consciousness in this book that has in the past been a hallmark of efforts to articulate solutions to Pakistan’s problems.

Too often, corrective measures are suggested for problems, either with far too much anger and bitterness or with far too little introspection. In the past, we’ve often had to choose scathing, acerbic and insensitive diatribes, by folks with non-existent constituencies. Or we’ve had to choose delusional, self-righteous and inaccurate portrayals of history that slavishly seek to patronise those in power, with or without uniform.

In this new book, and, indeed, right across the emerging Pakistani discourse, the era of having to vacillate between two extremes might be coming to a close. We don’t have to choose between ill-informed, angry, insensitive diatribes and dangerous and concocted propaganda. Lodhi has edited a set of brilliant Pakistani minds, all of whom seem to be saying that Pakistan and Pakistanis have made a lot of mistakes. But that we need not repeat them. They also suggest that key institutional trends in Pakistan over the last decade indicate that the time for this learning may finally be here. These include a visible and empowered urban middle class, a loud and aggressive national media, unprecedented international pressure and support and a growing sense of self – a sense of Pakistaniat that is good enough, just because it is.

This sense of Pakistani identity is at the heart of what I call the new Pakistani nationalism. It is captured quite nicely in this new book. It is the beating heart of Pakistan, on Main Street and in the virtual reality of blogs, and social media. Perhaps it is best summed up by Adil Najam, the Boston University professor, environmentalist and international-relations expert. On his blog, “All Things Pakistan,” he defines Pakistaniat (a term that he may not have coined but has certainly helped popularise): “To embrace Pakistan in all its dimensions – its politics, its culture, its minutiae, its beauty, its warts, its potential, its pitfalls, its facial hair, its turbaned heads, its shuttlecock burqas, its jet-setting supermodels, its high-flying bankers, its rock bands, its qawwals, its poets, its street vendors, its swindling politicians, its scheming bureaucrats, its resolute people – in essence, all things Pakistani.”


The writer advises governments, donors and NGOs on public policy. Mosharraf Zaidi
 
This is beautiful:

“To embrace Pakistan in all its dimensions – its politics, its culture, its minutiae, its beauty, its warts, its potential, its pitfalls, its facial hair, its turbaned heads, its shuttlecock burqas, its jet-setting supermodels, its high-flying bankers, its rock bands, its qawwals, its poets, its street vendors, its swindling politicians, its scheming bureaucrats, its resolute people – in essence, all things Pakistani.”
 
Ah.. but there are sides that is not prepared to embrace the other..and cannot do so either..
Its the "religiously" motivated facial hair types.. vs the "If I dont come off as secular I wont come off modern either" ... types..
One will eventually.. end up dominating.. and wiping the other out.
 
Perhaps it serves you not to do so but the key word is, instead of "cannot", substitute "willnot".

Ok, works for us. No problem.

Happy, yo?

India poses no realistic threat of offensive conventional high-intensity war against Pakistan. Please key in upon "realistic". It simply won't happen unless provoked. Too much to lose and too little to gain for them.

^^ Really?

BTW, no one really finger anyone unless provoked to do so. So the question is should one be ready when the 'finger' gets done (unwillingly ofcourse) and results into an assault or one should just reject the idea of staying prepared and gets screwed when this happens? i think i'll place my bet on the former, though you can disagree.

Now, i know, you must be thinking how about we make arrangements in absolute terms by putting in every effort that we could muster which include 'downsizing' our forces to make sure that such a 'finger' doesnt get happened, which in turn can result into a mad (suicidal) india syndrome. Ok, i agree, but what should one do if this 'finger' happens itself before we are able to follow his majesty's diktat (i.e kill every 'terrorist')? Wouldnt it be better that we maintain and/or sustain both (unconventional and conventional) capabilities, well may be till the time the New World Order read One (world) Govt establishes itself and puts an end to war :joke:

i think, though i know Red Bull gives you wiiiings, but then 'i'll like to keep both of my the options open' (ad?) and make sure that while i fight out insurgency still i remain viable in terms of a conventional response so that when the 'finger' fingers itself, i am ready for IT.

Islamic militancy will pose the greater (and more enduring) threat.
No it wont. Not until you keep drone-ing us and keep pronouncing the CIA footprint here.

The way we are taking on these people, i dont think they can stand it any more. But i cannot guarantee this if you people dont quit behaving like a jejune.
Transforming your forces (and other elements of your government) to meet those challenges is paramount.
Lolz...

We see COIN stuck so up your arse around the world (starting from Nam, Iraq and now Afg), but we dont see you guys 'transforming' every branch of your armed forces to fight it? Now should i call it hypocrisy when you ask us to do the same? i know indians dont admit that they have insurgency and separatism as a problem (though it has been almost 3 decades since they entered Kashmir), but then i also agree that their problem is not as pronounced as it is in our case, but i think it would be safe to say that with a history of such issues india too should have transformed its 'entire' forces, but then we dont see them tranphorming their forces, do we?

This argument of 'transformation of forces' is lame, it's lame because it could have been valid and only valid if this was suggested before we went in Swat. As i have mentioned in my post # 106 that we have already transformed our forces (to include FC and Police) to fight out this 'new' dimension of warfare and this transformation doesnt only affect a small portion of our forces but the entire length and breath of Pakistan Defence Forces to include military (the tri-services), the para military and the civil armed forces viz Pakistan Rangers, Frontier Corps and Pakistan Coast Guards. Why the fcuk do you think we raised the SSG HQs from a brigade to a division?



P.S. i think you people should (better) start concentrating across Kunar River instead of telling us what to do. :rolleyes:
 
Here's an old article and video suggesting that the US is supporting rebels in Balochistan to fight against Iran; however, this is not BLA, it's Jundullah, and the same article and video indicate that Pakistan is helping the Americans to support these groups against Iran, but then again this is 4 years old so maybe it had something to do with Musharraf, though I can't comment on that since I don't know much about the topic.

ABC News Exclusive: The Secret War Against Iran - The Blotter


2:10 "This absolutely could not happen without the approval at the most senior level of the Pakistani government"

so is it true, and if it is, then are the US and Pakistani blaming each other for supporting the same thing?
Pakistan is still struggling with controlling its own Baluch insurgency, so I fail to see how one can make the claim that 'Jundullah could not operate without the knowledge of the Pakistani State'. As has been pointed out by Pakistani officials recently, covert US operations in Pakistan have gone 'out of control' and too much leeway was extended in terms of allowing US personnel into Pakistan and allowing them free movement.

But at least in terms of US/Afghan support for Baluch terrorists attacking Pakistan, that has been proven with wikileaks and official US knowledge of the presence of those terrorists in Afghanistan, and the recent relocation of Brahamdegh Bugti to Switzerland for asylum.

I suppose one could argue that there are no 'good baluch terrorists and bad Baluch terrorists', and the US support for Junduallah also ends up seeping to the Pakistan focused groups.
 
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All of that would need substantiation. I don't see how efficiencies can account for such a large difference, don't know any really big ticket hardware that is indigenous in Pakistan that can account for it or even anything explicit that China supplies you anything on other than commercial terms.
You are the one who made a speculative argument to begin with - you have to at least offer some factual starting point for further discussion of your argument, outside of speculation. For example, look up Pakistan military pay scales and come up with a figure - can that amount be catered to within the existing defence budget? How much is left over for administrative costs and maintenance? How much for new equipment acquisitions? Without some factual basis for your argument, all we can do is speculate, and we will have to go with the official numbers.
Perhaps what Vcheng said makes better sense, can't be sure that the undocumented economy is not estimated while calculating the size of the economy though.
The reports I have read indicate that the informal economy is not included in the official estimate - some estimate it to be over $100 billion on top of the $180 billion estimate currently.
But raising the kinds of revenues we are talking about here would require use of a fully functioning taxation and customs structure - which means that if revenues are being raised from an undocumented part of the economy, then that is at revenue collection points, FBR, Customs etc. which means the complicity of multiple institutions and individuals across the civilian-military bureaucracy. Again, arguing that a scam of this size exists would require a significant amount of credible evidence.
Perhaps it is the military inc. (as mentioned by that lady) cornering a large chunk of the country's economy, proceeds from that narcotics and some funding by foreigners (25% of the budget is what I read some time back) with a quid pro quo, like the current Saudi demands.
Ayesha Siddiqa did not rally substantiate the argument of the military 'cornering the economy'. The military has significant business interests, but they pay their taxes and compete in the marketplace, and typically enjoy a good reputation in terms of delivering on the goods and services they are supposed to provide.

Now what really is a drain on the Pakistani State and stifles competition and investment, are the civilian run Public Sector Enterprizes like Pakistan Steel, PIA, Pakistan Railways, and in the past, the State controlled banks and telecoms. Currently, as pointed out earlier, these enterprises cost taxpayers billions of dollars annually (almost equal to the entire defence budget) in subsidies to cover their losses.

It is possible that some funding is coming from the Gulf States, but then that is not a 'drain' on the national economy, since that funding is specifically for the military/nuclear program, and would not be available to Pakistan otherwise.
The same as military inc.
I am not sure what you were trying to say there.
 
Rafi, It seems that for you, like so many others, it's more important to use the India Hate/threat rather than the love Pakistan line -- and it is good, because it is necessary if we are to imagine Pakistan anew

Don't distort peoples opinions through strawmen please. If we all take the same route you are taking in dismissing the other's arguments, then we will get nowhere. I can easily call every one of your arguments a 'hate Pakistan argument' since 'you want India to invade Pakistan and take it over under the pretext of development' - but that would get us nowhere.

So try and desist from being so dismissive of peoples opinions and attributing false values to them. Those who oppose your POV do so because of the perception that there are certain threats that need to be catered to, threats that you do not see as major.

The answer here would not be to offer inane rhetoric of 'love Pakistan' vs 'hate India', but to try and understand the concerns of the other side, ask what steps would alleviate those concerns and offer solutions. I use my own example here - while disagreeing with your and the author's position, I offered alternatives that would satisfy the concerns on COIN, development and lack of resources that were outlined. I did not resort to calling you names or denigrating your views by attaching petty labels to them. Try and do the same for those disagreeing with you. I am yet to see a rebuttal of the counter-arguments and counter-proposals I made.
 
You are the one who made a speculative argument to begin with - you have to at least offer some factual starting point for further discussion of your argument, outside of speculation. For example, look up Pakistan military pay scales and come up with a figure - can that amount be catered to within the existing defence budget? How much is left over for administrative costs and maintenance? How much for new equipment acquisitions? Without some factual basis for your argument, all we can do is speculate, and we will have to go with the official numbers.

My starting point is the fact that there has to be a vast qualitative or quantitative difference between the militaries of India and Pakistan, given the ostensible resources available to them.

That difference doesn't seem to exist in reality. So what gives?

None of the reasons you mentioned are plausible enough to explain this. I understand you know (or are willing to disclose if you are an insider ;) ) as much of the facts as I do.

The reports I have read indicate it is not - some estimate it to be over $100 billion on top of the $180 billion estimate currently.
But raising the kinds of revenues we are talking about here would require use of a fully functioning taxation and customs structure - which means that if revenues are being raised from an undocumented part of the economy, then that is at revenue collection points, FBR, Customs etc. which means the complicity of multiple institutions and individuals across the civilian-military bureaucracy. Again, arguing that a scam of this size exists would require a significant amount of credible evidence.

At least one Pakistan seems to think this may be happening. Not beyond the realm of the possible.

Ayesha Siddiqa did not rally substantiate the argument of the military 'cornering the economy'. The military has significant business interests, but they pay their taxes and compete in the marketplace, and typically enjoy a good reputation in terms of delivering on the goods and services they are supposed to provide.

OK. I have not read that book so can't comment much.

Now what really is a drain on the Pakistani State and stifles competition and investment, are the civilian run Public Sector Enterprizes like Pakistan Steel, PIA, Pakistan Railways, and in the past, the State controlled banks and telecoms. Currently, as pointed out earlier, these enterprises cost taxpayers billions of dollars annually (almost equal to the entire defence budget) in subsidies to cover their losses.

Yes, they are a drain. Your contention is that they are far bigger than the defense budget. That may not be true if the real scale of military expanses were to be made public.

My best guess is that you are basing your whole premise on faulty data.

It is possible that some funding is coming from the Gulf States, but then that is not a 'drain' on the national economy, since that funding is specifically for the military/nuclear program, and would not be available to Pakistan otherwise.

That is correct. It just means that PA can't really say "no" when the requests come from the like of SA. It is up to you to see if that is what Pakistan wants.

I am not sure what you were trying to say there.

I meant that the business you are referring to would be the same ones that Ayesha calls military inc.

If their scale is what she mentioned, it would point to a much greater share of the resources available to Pakistan going to the military.
 
Pakistan is still struggling with controlling its own Baluch insurgency, so I fail to see how one can make the claim that 'Jundullah could not operate without the knowledge of the Pakistani State'. As has been pointed out by Pakistani officials recently, covert US operations in Pakistan have gone 'out of control' and too much leeway was extended in terms of allowing US personnel into Pakistan and allowing them free movement.

But at least in terms of US/Afghan support for Baluch terrorists attacking Pakistan, that has been proven with wikileaks and official US knowledge of the presence of those terrorists in Afghanistan, and the recent relocation of Brahamdegh Bugti to Switzerland for asylum.

I suppose one could argue that there are no 'good baluch terrorists and bad Baluch terrorists', and the US support for Junduallah also ends up seeping to the Pakistan focused groups.

I think it should be mentioned that since this was 4 years ago, that the US added Jundallah to the terrorist list late last year:
US designates Iran's Jundallah as terrorist organization - CNN

This means they were not a terrorist group officially all those years, which might mean that the US was trying to keep them alive to fight the Iranian Government; however, on the other hand, since they are now a terrorist group, does that mean they no longer have the alledged American support?
 
I've reviewed your proposed 2010-2011 budget. It accords 10 rupees to your defense expenditure for every rupee spent on education, health, housing and the environment. This is unsustainable.

Pakistan cannot wait for your Fauj to "rout" the taliban. Development, therefore cannot proceed sequentially but must happen in concurrence to achieve effective control over areas retaken by your proud army.
You are ignoring the PSDP (Public Sector Development Programme) and 'other development' numbers which add up to 620 billion rupees, compared to the 380 billion defence budget.

And I do not think that enough resources are going into development, hence my call for reforms in civilian institutions. Privatizing the largest loss making PSE's would give Pakistan around 300 billion rupees additionally (no more subsidies to cover their annual losses). Expansion of the tax base would yield hundreds of billions more. These reforms generate far more revenue than cuts in the defence budget ever could, and they allow for enhancing our development without compromising our national security.
 
I think it should be mentioned that since this was 4 years ago, that the US added Jundallah to the terrorist list late last year:
US designates Iran's Jundallah as terrorist organization - CNN

This means they were not a terrorist group officially all those years, which might mean that the US was trying to keep them alive to fight the Iranian Government; however, on the other hand, since they are now a terrorist group, does that mean they no longer have the alledged American support?
Since Obama has attempted rapprochement with Iran, it is possible that US support for Jundullah has been frozen for the time being.

Are the BLA and the other Baluch terrorist organizations on the US list of terrorist organizations and individuals?
 
"We see COIN stuck so up your arse around the world (starting from Nam, Iraq and now Afg), but we dont see you guys 'transforming' every branch of your armed forces to fight it?"

Try this-type TRANSFORMATION OF THE U.S. ARMY into google. You might actually enlighten that self-satisfied lame azz of yours.

OTOH, we're not engaged in a COIN battle on our own lands. You are. Our transformation entails different resource pools, objectives and priorities suited to our requirements. Thus the ways, means, and ends differ dramatically from your situation.

"Now should i call it hypocrisy when you ask us to do the same?"

Would it help your patent anti-American bent to acknowledge the original thread was written by a Pakistani asking you to consider such?

"i know indians dont admit that they have insurgency and separatism as a problem (though it has been almost 3 decades since they entered Kashmir), but then i also agree that their problem is not as pronounced as it is in our case, but i think it would be safe to say that with a history of such issues india too should have transformed its 'entire' forces, but then we dont see them tranphorming their forces, do we?"

Is India spending ten rupees on defense for every rupee allocated to education, health, housing and the environment? You are. Are they financially destitute? You are. Are their socio-cultural trendlines in decided decline? Your's are.

Do they possess the same strategic objectives and face the same threats?

Your pre-occupation with India is a comfortable professional past-time that serves your nation poorly IMV. Remove the blinders and smell the coffee.

"This argument of 'transformation of forces' is lame..."

Then leave the discussion. Your value appears marginal.

"...it's lame because it could have been valid and only valid if this was suggested before we went in Swat..."

Why would that have made a difference? Did you not recognize the nature of taliban combat operations long before that or were you so unobservant to ignore Bosnia, Somalia, the afghan civil war and NATO/ISAF between 2001 and 2009? What eye-openers did your army receive at Loe Sam in the early fall of 2008-

Pakistanis Mired In Brutal Battle To Oust Taliban-NYT Jane Perlez Nov. 10, 2008

Maybe you recall these captured soldiers-

Pakistan Seeks Talks With Rebels On Missing Soldiers-Reuters Aug. 31, 2007

Why did it take until Swat and Buner were nearly captured in April 2009 for you to recognize the existential threat to your society? For eight years between 2001-2009 your army sat in self-satisfied splendor on the eastern punjab plains facing a non-existent threat while your west rotted away by devices of your own choice and construction.

Those afghan taliban warriors invited into your lands in late 2001 INFECTED your pashtun populace and created the enemy you fight today.

"As i have mentioned in my post # 106 that we have already transformed our forces (to include FC and Police) to fight out this 'new' dimension of warfare and this transformation doesnt only affect a small portion of our forces but the entire length and breath of Pakistan Defence Forces to include military (the tri-services), the para military and the civil armed forces viz Pakistan Rangers, Frontier Corps and Pakistan Coast Guards."

Nice. How's that working for your nation? That "transformation" is hardly complete. Meanwhile you continue spending 10/1 on your military in lieu of education, housing, health and environment...and the results lie before you.

"P.S. i think you people should (better) start concentrating across Kunar River instead of telling us what to do."

I'm late to this party. There's ten pages of your own citizens telling you the same. Best you read and consider.
 

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